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Obituary

Professor Deoram (Danny) Sing

On 21 January 2019, we learnt with great sadness of the untimely passing away of our academic colleague and long standing friend, Professor Deoram (Danny) Sing following a short illness. Prof Sing was one of the academic stalwarts commencing his junior lecturer career at the former University of Durban-Westville in his formative year of 1976. He was an excellent scholar and researcher, with a track record of extensive publications in the field of public administration. His scholarly work served as invaluable resources for both students and academics in the discipline. His dedication and commitment to academia went further as he mentored several early and mid-career academics and students in the spirit of *uBuntu*. Following a very successful career at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, he retired as a Senior Professor in the Discipline of Public Governance in The College of Law and Management Studies in 2011. Given his illustrious academic career, Prof Sing was appointed as a senior research associate in 2012 followed by the conferment of emeritus professorship, positions he held until his death. Prof Sing was a dedicated member of ASSADPAM, where he served on the Editorial Council for many years. His support of the Association and that of mentoring junior academics to publish their research will serve his legacy well.

Editorial

V Jarbandhan
Chief Editor

In **'Policy Nudging: Old Wine in a New Bottle?'**, Fanie Cloete questions whether 'policy nudging' can be regarded as a conceptual breakthrough in the field of Economic and Governance Sciences or whether this is merely a reformulation of existing policy design and implementation practices. While the Thaler model of policy nudging was awarded the 2017 Nobel Prize in Economics, the current article argues that the concept is not new. However, Cloete points out that, "The emerging focus on policy nudging... acknowledges the fact that citizens sometimes have to be encouraged to change their behaviour towards the preferred direction that the state wants them to move to, in order to protect and promote their perceived own interests".

Internal audit functions should be executed according to given statutory and regulatory frameworks. In **'Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Effective Implementation of the Internal Audit Function: The Case of the South African Social Security Agency'**, Vaola Sambo applied the 6C protocol framework for policy implementation to investigate internal auditing activities at the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). While SASSA's internal auditing functions adhered to certain elements like communication and commitment, several challenges were identified in human resource (HR) and financial capacity. In this article, the author provides solutions to these challenges by creating a conceptual framework for the effective implementation of internal audit functions.

Organisations understand the importance of conversations in addressing contemporary strategic challenges. In **'Framing Strategic Conversations in Government: Towards a Conceptual Framework for Analysis'**, Gerrit van der Waldt explores how mainstreaming conversations or stories could contribute to the effective functioning of public sector institutions. According to the author, "the analysis of strategic conversations' applicability to government settings is still a largely untapped field of empirical investigation". However, inferences drawn from the literature suggest that strategic conversations are of significant value when a government's unique socio-political context forms part of the equation. Based on these insights, the author proposes a conceptual framework to analyse strategic conversations within government settings.

In **'Public Participation in Integrated Development Planning: A Case of the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality'** Modeni Sibanda and Liezel Lues explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the integrated

development planning (IDP) process and explain how these dynamics influence IDP outcomes in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM). Findings suggest that public participation in BCMM's IDP processes mostly focused on complying with statutory and regulatory precepts. Results suggest that communities often lack the knowledge and capacity to understand the strategic nature of IDPs. Results further revealed that some residents were excluded from participating in IDP processes based on their political beliefs and affiliation. Based on these power dynamics, public participation often failed to influence IDP outcomes.

Public housing is often associated with urban decay and high crime levels, including drug-related crime. In **'Collaborative Governance in Reducing Drug-related Crime in the Public Housing Environment in Cape Town'**, Anton Visser and Frederick Uys set out to determine whether drug-related crime can be reduced by applying collaborative governance principles as a management approach. To this end, a qualitative experiment involving a multi-disciplinary task team was undertaken in Ravensmead, a gang- and drug-infested public housing in the City of Cape Town. Despite certain challenges, it was found that the task team made great strides in managing the Ravensmead's public housing safety project by following collaborative governance principles.

Employee rewards, specifically remuneration, is a strategic enabler to ensure a high-performing institution. In **'Remuneration Variables that Play a Role in Attracting and Retaining Academic Staff at Public Higher Education Institutions'**, Krishnee Kissoonduth, Werner Webb and Sinval Kahn discuss key elements how fair, equitable, consistent and transparent remuneration structures can help attract and retain quality employees within the higher education system. In this regard, the authors state that, "A fair, consistent and defensible remuneration strategy is likely to earn the employees' trust. While employees tend to look for a total rewards package that addresses personal and professional needs, employers are willing to pay the required remuneration for employees who are skilled and experienced".

After independence, all Commonwealth countries undertook public service reform to promote economic and social growth. In **'Public Service Reform: The Case for Police Reform in the Bangladesh Police Service'**, Andries Redman and Goonasagree Naidoo investigates reform initiatives within this department as part of a larger public service reform programme. The article aims to determine why the Bangladeshi Police Service failed to undergo complete public sector reform, as well as to earmark specific obstacles to effective administrative reform. Research findings suggest that police reform was hampered by politicisation, a lack of political will, poor working conditions and corruption that limited progress. In this regard, a number of recommendations are made to promote "real and committed" reform.

Citizen participation is seen as a key element within a democratic developmental state. In **'Citizen Participation in the Developmental State'**, Tiisetjo

Maloba and Christelle Auriacombe argue that a developmental state focuses on building independent communities and not on government intervention. To this end, the authors discuss participative democracy in South Africa and networking between the government and its citizens. More specifically, the role of local government in a developmental state comes under the spotlight. As South Africa has not met its developmental goals, the article concludes with sustainable solutions to transform South Africa into a truly developmental state.

Despite being viewed as a developmental state, South Africa has remained stagnant from an economic growth perspective and has recently even experienced negative growth. In **'Towards a Developmental or Welfare State: The Case of South Africa'**, Tasmyn Cooper and Daniel Meyer followed a quantitative research approach to analyse the relationship between economic growth and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, government effectiveness, social welfare spending and corruption-related perceptions. Based on their research findings, the authors state that, "when the definitions and characteristics of developmental state versus a welfare state are taken into account, South Africa leans more towards being a welfare state.

In **'The Politics of Road Tolling in Zimbabwe'**, Alouis Chilunjika, Dominique Uwizeyimana and Christelle Auriacombe explore the politics surrounding Zimbabwe's road-tolling processes and practices by using the 'Lasswellian lens', namely "who gets what when and how" (Lasswell 1936). The research revealed that the allocation of goods and services among role-players such as the Zimbabwe National Roads Administration (ZINARA), road authorities, toll collectors and the motoring public could be contradictory and conflicting. In this regard, the authors highlight the importance of equitably allocating public goods and services between and among key actors in the Zimbabwean tolling discourse, while focussing on building and maintaining quality road infrastructure.

In South Africa, driver's licence testing centres in local and metropolitan municipalities generally lack standard operating procedures according to which driver's licences are issued. In **'Developing Driving License Standard Operating Procedures: The Case of Madibeng Local Municipality'**, Corlia Alers and Gera Ferreira aim to design a framework for developing standard operating procedures to issue driver's licences. The Madibeng Local Municipality's driver's license testing centre was used as a case study. In this regard, specific recommendations are presented to this municipality on how to effectively design and review standardised procedures.

While we live in a globalised society, most nations that were granted 'nominal political independence' by their former colonisers still struggle to institutionalise democracy and good governance. In **'Globalisation and the Political Economy of Institutional Choices: Assessing their Impact on the Democratisation Process in Africa'**, Sam Ezeanyika examines the current institutional choices adopted by

the political elite in Africa. In addition, the author outlines the most suitable institutional choices to facilitate democratic consolidation in post-colonial African nations. The article illustrates that the political elite can help foster democratic ideals and democratisation processes by facilitating citizen participation, among others.

Chief Editor: Prof Vain Jarbandhan

Policy Nudging

Old Wine in a New Bottle?

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ABSTRACT

The concept ‘policy nudging’ has become the new global buzzword in policy design and implementation. Its creator received the 2017 Nobel Prize for Economics. The purpose of the article is to attempt to obtain more clarity on questions like what ‘nudging’ is and whether it is a new conceptual breakthrough in the policy sciences or just a reformulation of known policy design and implementation practices? The article first identifies and summarises the current knowledge base on optimal policy tools and instruments to improve policy outcomes and the current knowledge base on policy nudging. These findings are then critically assessed to determine to what extent policy nudging can and should be regarded as a new conceptual innovation in the policy sciences, or whether it is just a reformulation and recombination of existing policy approaches and strategies. The main findings are that nudging is not a conceptually new breakthrough in the policy sciences. Recent advances in behavioural economic insights and in policy design thinking have, however, just highlighted the need for and the utility of well-planned and synchronised policy content and implementation strategies in the economic and governance sciences in order to maximise the potential of successful policy impact for societal transformation.

INTRODUCTION

The research problem that is addressed in this article revolves around a number of controversies about the theory and practice of ‘policy nudging’. Nudging has become the new global buzzword in policy design and implementation, especially after one of its creators, Prof Richard Thaler, received the 2017 Nobel Prize for

Economics (Renda 2017). Even before Thaler received the Nobel Prize, his work attracted the interest of governments and international agencies across the world. This led to a deluge of policy research and design projects based on Thaler's nudging principles. Today, nudging is a fully-fledged international industry in public and private sectors globally. It is without doubt the current global governance fashion.

At least 196 national governments, international agencies and non-governmental organisations already apply behavioural insights (BI) principles in their work (OECD 2018; August 2018:23; Whitehead *et al.* 2014; Ly and Soman 2013; Lunn 2013). These agencies include inter alia the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (OECD 2017, Lunn 2013), the European Union (EU) (EU 2016), Troussard and Van Bavel (2018), the World Bank (WB) (WB 2015) and the United Nations (UN) (UN) (Shankar and Foster 2016; Aibana, Kimmel and Welch 2017) as well as the governments of the United Kingdom (UK) (UK Cabinet Office 2018), Canada (Soman 2014; Ly, Mažar, Zhao and Soman 2013), the United States of America (USA) (2015, 2016, Marron 2015; O'Leary and Murphy 2017), France (<http://frenchnudgeproject.fr/>) Germany (Purnhagen and Reisch 2015), the Netherlands (Stroeker 2016; BIN NL 2018), Belgium (Van Damme, Caluwaerts and Brans 2016) and Australia (AU PSC 2015; NSW 2018). Singapore was probably the quintessential 'nudging' state long before the concept of nudging was born (Keating 2018). Jones and Whitehead (2018) refer to the nudging state as 'psychological governance' and 'the experimental state', while Jones, Pykett and Whitehead (2013) refer to the 'psychological state'.

At the end of 2017 the new peer reviewed journal *Behavioural Public Policy* (BPP) was launched with Cass Sunstein as one of the editors, while the first edition of the *Journal of Behavioral Public Administration* (JBPA 2018) saw the light in February 2018. The BI approach is therefore now regarded as a fully-fledged public policy tool for good Public Administration and Governance (e.g. OECD 2017:13; Moynihan 2018; Nørgaard 2018). At the end of September 2018, the first conference on BI was held in Cape Town, jointly hosted by the OECD and the Western Cape Provincial Government (WCG) (WCG-OECD 2018).

Nudging has, however, become a controversial practice. While many people regard it as an innovative new governance tool, questions are increasingly asked about its originality, ethics and impact (e.g. Campbell 2017). It has become a divisive policy management approach and strategy that seem to result in gaining either enthusiastic support or fierce criticism. The article first identifies and summarises from existing international and domestic research publications and practical experiences, the latest knowledge on policy tools/instruments to improve policy outcomes. It then summarises the current knowledge base on nudging. This also includes recent empirical advances in behavioural economics that led to the conceptualisation of nudging approaches and strategies. These findings are then critically assessed to determine to what extent policy nudging can and

should be regarded as a new conceptual innovation in the policy sciences, or whether it is just a reformulation and recombination of existing policy approaches and strategies that should rather be avoided for various reasons.

NATURE OF GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTAL POLICY TOOLS

The role of any government in society, whether democratic or non-democratic, is in principle to protect and empower its citizens as well as to regulate their interactions in different ways to maintain law and order and to provide an enabling environment for this purpose. This is done through stimulating individual, community and societal development and growth, care for vulnerable segments of society (e.g. the young, the elderly, the sick and disabled and nature) and to provide and maintain services and facilities for these purposes where members of society cannot do this by themselves.

The nature and extent of government intervention in the destiny of human beings in their various contexts can consist of minimal enforceable prescriptions from different liberal, capitalist, democratic perspectives to allow maximum freedom of choice and action by members of society in their respective quests for personal and other fulfilment in their lives. On the other hand, it can consist of comprehensive enforcement of prescriptions covering and controlling virtually every sphere of life and society from the perspective of various conservative, socialist and authoritarian ideologies.

In order to achieve the 'ideal' society, governments adopt different policies and strategies to achieve their ultimate transformation goals, whatever they are. If government is happy with a current situation it normally refrains from trying to change it. However, if it is unhappy with any status quo issue, the question is what to do, how, when, where, why and by whom in order to improve the current unacceptable situation into a more acceptable condition (Kuipers *et al.* 2013). This is the process of governing through providing effective leadership, guidance and management (AU PSC 2015:2).

Bemelmans-Videc *et al.* see public policy instruments as *"...the set of techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect or prevent social change...(These instruments include)... instruments of external policies which aim at the behaviour of citizens"* (2010:3). Linder and Peters (1989:49–50) explain that political, economic and cultural preferences determine governmental choices of specific instruments, for example, more regulatory instruments in statist governments and more voluntary compliance instruments in less statist and more liberal societies (see also WB 2007).

Different classifications of overlapping types of policy tools or instruments are available to governments to try to achieve policy change on specific issues that

it wants to change or improve. One of the most useful classifications of policy instruments or tools, is the distinction between policy sermons, carrots and sticks (Bemelmans-Videc *et al.* 2010). This strategic approach to policy management will be used as a general conceptual framework for purposes of the rest of this article.

Policy sermons, carrots and sticks

Bemelmans-Videc *et al.* (2010) and Vedung (2010) distinguish policy sermons from carrots and sticks (similar to Etzioni 1975:5 – coercive, remunerative and normative power). The most important of these different policy change approaches are first, **sermons** (aimed at influencing individuals' or organisations' mental or cultural attitudes by providing information and arguments in order to persuade them to do the best, right thing and not a bad, wrong thing). Bemelmans-Videc *et al.* conceive of sermons as “...attempts at influencing people through the transfer of knowledge, the communication of reasoned argument and persuasion” (2010:11).

A second (alternative or reinforcing) policy change approach is to focus not on persuading people to accept normative attitudinal change (eg about the legalisation of marijuana), but to rather focus on a persuasive approach based on the maximisation of the alleged benefits of such behaviour change which constitutes the **carrot** approach (eg legalising marijuana will make available more resources for rehabilitation than is the case under prohibition regimes).

The third alternative or reinforcing policy change approach is the so-called **stick approach**, which focuses on scare tactics based on maximisation and enforcement of the costs of and penalties for non-compliance with policy change prescriptions. From this perspective the policy change argument centres on a deterrence factor. It is the opposite of the sermon and carrot approaches and maximises the negative results of refusal to change.

All three approaches summarised above are strategies to change attitudes and behaviour of citizens to the preferred directions that the government wants them to take. Policy sermons, carrots and sticks operate at all policy change levels, and the most appropriate or suitable change instrument or combination of instruments need to be identified and applied in order to achieve the most favourable outcome. Developmental policy goals are normally better achieved through sermon and carrot approaches while peacekeeping and conflict-regulation goals are normally better achieved through stick approaches. A balanced or reinforcing approach using all three is frequently the best.

Policy sermons, carrots and sticks are not modern policy change strategies. The Bible as well as the Qu'ran are probably examples of the most authoritative historical and policy documents emanating from ancient times. One of the oldest recorded policy prescriptions for good behaviour is the Biblical Ten Commandments that were allegedly in force in the Jewish emigration from Egypt

to Canaan in the Old Testament. The prescriptions in Exodus 20 (apparently written down about 1440–1400 BCE), contain implicit and explicit sermons, carrots and sticks to attempt to keep the Israelites on what God via Moses apparently regard as their desired straight and narrow path of life. The Commandments inter alia prohibit theft, adultery and murder but have no penalties attached to such transgressions. Another commandment states explicitly that those who misuse the name of God will be regarded as guilty of transgression against His will. However, one commandment states explicitly that those who hate God, will be punished, including their third to fourth generation descendants, while those who love God and keep His commandments will be loved by God, including a thousand generations of their descendants. If you further honour your father and mother you will have a long life. Moses also explicitly informed his followers that God wants them to fear Him in order to keep them from sinning, implying disobeying His commandments. All Holy Scriptures contain codes of conduct for people, combining sermons, carrots and sticks to persuade them to comply with the wishes of whatever creator, or ruler on behalf of that creator, wants them to do.

Since ancient times governments in different societies used different approaches to get their subjects/citizens to change their behaviour along the lines that the government in power wanted them to move. Halpern (2015) relates how Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia allegedly threatened in 1744 to cut off the noses and ears of peasants who did not plant potatoes to alleviate a famine at the time. When that did not work to establish potato crops (they apparently resisted because it was an unknown crop in Europe at the time and also because it was not mentioned in the Bible), he allegedly placed armed guards around his royal potato gardens but ordered them to turn a blind eye to intruders. The peasants then stole the ‘valuable’ potatoes and planted them.

CONCEPTUALISING AND APPLYING NUDGING

The concept of ‘nudge theory’ and the use of nudging by government policymakers to achieve policy goals must be assessed against the above background. ‘Nudging’ originated from Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s (2008) book *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. Thaler is a Professor of Behavioural Science and Economics at the University of Chicago. Sunstein is a formal legal scholar at the same university where he also met his then colleague Barack Obama. He is currently a law professor at Harvard and was also a formal policy advisor to President Barack Obama during the latter’s term of office as President of the USA.

The authors regard policymakers as ‘choice architects’ to ensure ‘libertarian paternalism’ in society. Libertarian paternalism means that the government has to provide its citizens, clients or consumers with different choices to structure and

live their lives as they wish to do. However, according to them, the ‘libertarian’ element in human choice (to do what you want to do and to not be constrained in that choice as long as you do not constrain the choices of others), may sometimes constitute bad choices by individuals “...in many cases, individuals make pretty bad decisions—decisions they would not have made if they had paid full attention and possessed complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and complete self-control” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008:5).

Thaler and Sunstein therefore regard it as the duty of a government to assist citizens to make better choices where necessary. This constitutes the ‘paternalistic’ element where government is in an authoritative relationship towards its citizens, much like parents must look after and promote the interests of their children: “The paternalistic aspect lies in the claim that it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better. In other words, we argue for self-conscious efforts, by institutions in the private sector and also by government, to steer people’s choices in directions that will improve their lives. In our understanding, a policy is ‘paternalistic’ if it tries to influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008:5).

Nudging is therefore, “...any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008:5. See also Sunstein, Reisch and Rauber 2018:3).

Sunstein elaborates in a later publication (2015:417) that: “...(n)udges are interventions that steer people in particular directions but that also allow them to go their own way. A reminder is a nudge; so is a warning. A GPS nudges; a default rule nudges. To qualify as a nudge, an intervention must not impose significant material incentives (including disincentives). A subsidy is not a nudge; a tax is not a nudge; a fine or a jail sentence is not a nudge. To count as such, a nudge must fully preserve freedom of choice. ...Some nudges work because they inform people; other nudges work because they make certain choices easier; still other nudges work because of the power of inertia and procrastination.

Halpern, the Director of the Nudge Unit in the British Prime Minister’s Office, conceives of nudges on the basis of Thaler and Sunstein’s views, as “...a means of encouraging or guiding behaviour, but without mandating or instructing, and ideally without the need for heavy financial incentives or sanctions”. In addition to the above types of nudges, Hausman (2018:2) classifies *inter alia* the following different types of ‘steering’ mechanisms or nudges:

- *Informing: Enabling more informed decisions*
- *Boosting: Training or educating that empowers*

- *Activating or inciting: Stimulating emotions to motivate individuals*
- *Deceiving: Providing false information*
- *Brainwashing: Influencing someone's choice through means such as subliminal images, drugs or hypnotism*
- *Nudging (in a narrow sense): Changing the choice circumstances to neutralize or to exploit specific preferences or prejudices”.*

These conceptions of a nudge confirm that it includes most non-financial/material sermons and carrots but not sticks (Darling 2013). Michalek *et al.* (2018) therefore regard nudges as ‘soft policy tools’. However, the distinction between a material incentive or disincentive that is not a nudge according to Thaler and Sunstein, and a non-material incentive or disincentive that is a nudge, can be very vague, fuzzy and overlapping (see also Michalek *et al.* 2018:6, Mongin and Cozic 2018). For example, a tax on alcohol and tobacco still leaves freedom of choice to potential users but is not regarded as a nudge according to Thaler and Sunstein. On the other hand, the free provision of condoms to curb sexually transmitted diseases or pregnancies would be a nudge to them.

Thaler has also acknowledged that *“...nudging (is) as old as time ...‘religion at its best is all about nudging’... (Forsyth 2008)*. This view has been taken up by the UK Nudge Unit that explains that nudging is not a paradigm shift in government: *“Influencing people’s behaviour is nothing new to Government, which has often used tools such as legislation, regulation or taxation to achieve desired policy outcomes. But many of the biggest policy challenges we are now facing – such as the increase in people with chronic health conditions – will only be resolved if we are successful in persuading people to change their behaviour, their lifestyles or their existing habits” (UK Cabinet Office 2010:4, 77)*.

On the other hand, the EU (2016:7, 12) regards nudges as a relatively modern phenomenon because it is based on the contemporary rigorous evidence-informed approach to decision-making which is a modern 21st century phenomenon. Nudges are therefore policy applications of lessons learnt from the results of empirical BI research (EU 2016:7). According to Thaler and Sunstein (2008:100) the concept of ‘nudges’ is an acronym for:

- *“iNcentives*
- *Understand mappings: pros and cons of options*
- *Defaults: Path of least resistance*
- *Give feedback*
- *Expect error*
- *Structure complex choices: simplify”.*

The UK Nudge Unit is a Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) that was set up in the Cabinet Office in 2010 with direct access to the Prime Minister. It was the second

such unit that was created in a national government. The first was the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) that was established in 2009 in the USA government of Obama, headed by Cass Sunstein (Afif 2017:1). The founding and current Director of the UK BIT Unit is Dr David Halpern, a psychologist by training. It was initially a small unit of only about a dozen members, which now stands at 75 (Campbell 2017:13). It was supposed to achieve within two years the following goals or be shut down:

- Spread understanding of behavioural approaches across Whitehall.
- Transform at least two major areas of policy.
- Achieve at least a tenfold return on the cost of the unit (Halpern 2015).

It has proven to be very effective and profitable from the UK government’s perspective and is still in operation, eight years after its creation. The Nudge Unit initially used the MINDSPACE framework (Messenger, Incentives, Norms, Defaults, Salience, Priming, Affect, Commitments and Ego) as foundation for its attempts to change individual behaviour towards desired governmental outcomes (UK Cabinet Office 2010, Halpern 2015:49–50). The above elements constituting this framework are explained as follows (UK Cabinet Office 2010:8):

Table 1: The MINDSPACE framework for nudging

Messenger	we are heavily influenced by who communicates information
Incentives	our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses
Norms	we are strongly influenced by what others do
Defaults	we ‘go with the flow’ at pre-set options
Salience	our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant to us
Priming	our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues
Affect	our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions
Commitments	we seek to be consistent with our public promises, and reciprocate acts
Ego	we act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves

Source: (UK Cabinet Office 2010:8)


The MINDSPACE nudging model was later simplified into the EAST framework (Easy, Attract, Social Norms and Timely – Halpern 2015:60, 149). The UK Nudge Unit decided to start by focusing on the following three strategic priority policy areas to reduce challenges to policy change in those areas (UK Cabinet Office 2010:29–48):

1. **“Safer Communities”**. Challenges include preventing crime, reducing anti-social behaviour, preventing degradation of surroundings.
2. **“The Good Society”**. Challenges include: promoting pro-environmental behaviours, increasing voting, encouraging responsible parenting.
3. **“Healthy and Prosperous Lives”**. Challenges include: stopping smoking, reducing obesity, promoting responsible personal finances, encouraging take-up of education and training.

The MINDSPACE behaviour Insights framework is further applied by the UK Nudge Unit on the basis of a 6-E flow model (Explore, Enable, Encourage, Engage, Exemplify and Evaluate):

The UK Nudge Unit started on an experimental basis with small symbolic changes to government operations and interactions with its different constituencies. This is a deliberate evidence-informed approach to avoid or minimise citizen resistance against unpopular ‘nudges’ by government. Halpern (2015) refers to the following early examples of relatively small, tactical, technical policy ‘nudges’

Figure 1: 6-E Flow model for the implementation of the MINDSPACE behaviour change framework



Source: (UK Cabinet Office 2010:9, 49–60)

that have been employed in the UK and in other governments, and which had positive outcomes on the various EAST model indicators (see also Gntner and Sperling 2017):

- Shorter, simpler official communications and tick boxes on official forms rather than open-ended narrative formats for required data, to make citizen interaction with government easier and more effective. This made the provision of data simpler, easier and therefore reduced the resistance from citizens to interact with government.
- The default for new appointments is now also not any longer to choose to join the existing pension fund but compulsory joining is the default unless you want to opt out. This led to an increase from 60 – 80% of new workers joining a pension fund.
- Eliminating a single click of a mouse allegedly increased digital tax returns by 22%.
- Loft insulation to reduce energy loss was increased fivefold when linked to a loft cleaning service at cost.
- The introduction of compulsory helmets for motorcycle drivers resulted in a dramatic reduction in deaths but also in motorcycle thefts.
- Carbon monoxide suicides were dramatically reduced because of the shift to North Sea natural gas which has lower levels of carbon monoxide, while restricting the number of sleeping pills that can be bought at a time and packaging them in separate pop-out tinfoil packets also reduced suicides by those means because it became more difficult to do.
- An advance warning that a debt collector will visit soon, led to increased payments of traffic fines.
- Painting a staircase with attractive pictures and symbols, apparently worked well in Australia to increase its use.
- Information notices (sermons) at lifts in the US stating that ‘using stairs is better physical exercise’, were ineffective. However, notices stating that ‘most people use the stairs’ was much more effective, and increased the use of stairs by nearly half. This increased use remained higher even after the notices were removed.
- Switching to a debit order to pay local taxes in London, which reduced the management and costs of tax collection considerably, also automatically entered such tax payers for a £25,000 prize lottery. Savings already achieved in this way are estimated to be much more than the cost of the prize money.
- Messages that ‘90 per cent of companies have women on their boards’, are more effective than messages indicating that female board membership is very low.
- Warning foreigners with visas in advance that their visas are expiring soon, resulted in 20% more leaving before the expiry of their visas.

- Adding the question why a new applicant for the British police force wants to join and what difference it would make to their community, increased the number of ethnic minority applicants from 40% to 60%.
- Dutch schools experienced that children's consumption of wholegrain brown bread, which was initially much less than that of white bread, doubled by cutting it into fun shapes (attract).
- In Colombia, child education grants were increased if the child achieved at least an 80% school attendance rate. In order to reduce drop-outs the grants were paid after enrolment only and in successive tranches. These changes in the grant system resulted in significant improvements in school enrolment, attendance and success rates.
- Learner performances in school maths tests improved dramatically after parents were regularly warned in advance by SMS that a maths test is due soon. It improved the involvement of parents in ensuring that their kids prepare for the test. Text messages were also sent to students to support them in high stress situations like exams by emphasising that many students find it difficult to cope but that the risk of failing is reduced by good preparation and that it would soon be back to normal routines again. Drop-out rates were reduced by more than a third, while the costs of the text messages were insignificant.

Halpern (2015) comments that: *"...(e)ffective interventions often bring together all three elements of timeliness. The intervention is targeted before the behaviour has become entrenched; the intervention is aligned to a moment when it is likely to be most salient or when the existing behaviour is disrupted; and its design will help the person overcome their own time inconsistency – helping them to do what their future self would have wished"*.

As developed by Thaler and Sunstein, policy nudges, in the form of new or different policy designs or new or different ways of implementing existing policy designs, are supposed to be evidence-informed, complying with the criterion of what works best for whom under what conditions. The stronger the evidence, the stronger the imperative to adopt the strategy concerned. Different nudging classification and implementation systems, competing with the original nudging conceptions of Thaler and Sunstein (2008) and Halpern (2015), have so far been developed. The EU (2016:6, 15) has for example started to classify BI interventions in three categories, ranging from stronger to weaker evidence bases:

- ***"behaviourally-tested*** (i.e. initiatives based on an ad-hoc test, or scaled out after an initial experiment),
- ***behaviourally-informed*** (i.e. initiatives designed explicitly on previously existing behavioural evidence), or
- ***behaviourally-aligned*** (initiatives that, at least a posteriori, can be found to be in line with behavioural evidence)".

An alternative nudging model has also been developed by Hansen (2018), the chairperson of the Danish Nudging Network and co-founder of The European Nudge Network (TEN). Hansen’s BASIC model is different from the UK MINDSPACE/EAST models in that it has a more diagnostic nature and encompasses a more comprehensive process of nudging:

- *“Identifying and conceptualising relevant policy issues in terms of BEHAVIOR,*
- *ANALYSING the behavioural challenges targeted,*
- *identifying the relevant Behavioural Insights to apply as potential SOLUTIONS*
- *field-testing solutions through INTERVENTION based on proper experimental designs, and finally,*
- *implementing effective solutions as Behavioural Public Policies through a structured phase called CONTINUATION”.*

Hansen’s BASIC nudging model, however, seems to be just a different functional perspective on the MINDSPACE/EAST model. On the other hand, Ly *et al.* (2013:8) distinguish among the following types of nudges from a Canadian perspective:

Table 2: Examples of nudges

		Mindful		Mindless	
		Encourage	Discourage	Encourage	Discourage
Activating a desired behaviour	Externally-imposed	Simplifying tax rules to make tax filing easier.	Placing signs to remind people not to litter.	Advertising that most people are recycling to increase recycling efforts.	Using fake speed bumps to discourage speeding ⁹ .
	Externally-imposed	Simplifying application processes for college grants to encourage higher-level education ¹⁰ .	Installing car dashboards that track mileage to reduce gas usage ¹¹ .	Automatically enrolling for prescription refills to encourage taking medication.	Placing unhealthy foods in harder to reach places ¹² .
Boosting self-control	Self-imposed	Maintaining an exercise routine by agreeing to pay a small penalty if a gym session is missed ¹² .	Avoiding drunk driving by hiring a limo service beforehand ¹⁴ .	Joining a peer savings group to encourage saving money ¹⁵ .	Channelling money into a separate account to reduce the likelihood of it being spent ¹⁶ .

Source: (Ly *et al.* 2013:8)

Ly *et al.*'s (2013) above distinction among different types of nudges also overlaps with Hausman's (2018) classification referred to above. The OECD (2017:14) further suggests the following six principles for successful application of BI in government policy management:

- 1. Strategy:** Follow a deliberate strategy to implement behavioural insights, using a range of tactics.
- 2. Data and evidence:** Use as rigorous as possible research methodologies and resulting findings before developing specific nudging strategies.
- 3. Validity of results:** Test nudging strategies first in a rigorous experimental pilot project before rolling them out in a general way to ensure internal and external validity.
- 4. Segmentation:** Different strategies might be used for different demographic, cultural and social segments of society.
- 5. Evaluation:** Regular monitoring and evaluation of results should be undertaken.
- 6. Transparency and accountability:** Publishing all results improves good governance transparency and accountability

The OECD (2017:13–14) also advises policy designers and implementers to:

- Amend formal rules and practices to institutionalise these new approaches to policy design and implementation.
- Also apply nudging practices to the business and voluntary sectors of society.
- Coordinate the application of BI in policy design and implementation across programmes to ensure consistency, but provide for different experiments to identify the best approaches.
- Mainstream BI in training and other forms of capacity-building to develop new knowledge, mind sets and practices.
- Explicitly monitor and evaluate the results of BI initiatives.
- Plan BI interventions well and focus on the most appropriate areas with the best success potential.
- Also apply BI optimally in stakeholder interactions.

Assessing nudging practices

Current institutionalised nudging systems are sometimes centralised (e.g. in the UK Cabinet Office), or decentralised (e.g. with different nudging units in departments, regions and municipalities as is the case in *inter alia* Australia and the Netherlands). As is normally the case with centralised systems, their influence is potentially stronger because their scope and reach are wider and farther. However, errors in judgement have a much more serious cascading impact across centralised systems, than occurs in decentralised systems where errors of judgement are contained in small areas. Decentralised systems also enable competing

programmes in different subsystems, which allows for experimentation with different approaches simultaneously. Decentralised experiments can also in that way deal better with different conditions in different sectors, regions or communities, and therefore customise policy interventions better to suit those specific conditions and contexts. This is not so easy in centralised systems.

Nudging practices seem to be largely restricted to small, tactical, technical behaviour changes in the populace through new policy content design or new application or implementation strategies: ‘harvesting low hanging fruit’ (Afifa 2017:2). However, nudging is as appropriate in more strategic policy and behaviour changes focusing on not only individual changes in habit but on the collective impact of individual habits in society in the form of ‘culture’ (e.g. UK Cabinet Office 2010:74, 76) and the need to address inequality (Loewenstein and Chater 2017 on smoking, obesity and retirement savings; WB 2015:80, 92, 160 on poverty, early childhood development and climate change).

CRITIQUES OF NUDGING

The main types of opposition to the use of BI in government to try to improve public policy outputs and outcomes include factors ranging from ideological and emotional criticism in principle, to utilitarian opposition based on more rational considerations (see also Hansen and Jespersen 2013:8–9; Bovens 2012; OECD 2016). The most substantive **ideological critique** of nudging comes first from free market orientated neoliberals who reject it in principle because they do not like government intervention in society (e.g. Campbell 2017). Nudging is seen by such advocates as too interventionist and control-minded or too technocratic (Feitsma 2018:389). Other ideological differences also elicit opposition to nudges that attempt to persuade citizens to adopt attitudes or take actions promoting competing ideologies (e.g. non-believers in climate change reject nudges towards environmentalist positions). Bernard’s (1939) social control theory is frequently used as an explanatory instrument to assess the dangers of nudging (see also Van Dijk 2006). The argument is that citizens are sensible and rational and will take the decisions and actions that serve their interests. Paternalistic ‘nanny-state’ governments should not intervene to influence citizens in any way as to what they should do with their lives. These critics therefore accept Thaler and Sunstein’s libertarian freedom of choice element but not their conception of a paternalistic duty on the part of government, that should be implemented through non-enforceable nudging choices presented to citizens.

This critique, however, ignores the ‘nudging’ elements inherent in governmental operations where different combinations of structural, functional and cultural instruments are from the earliest times already routinely used through sermon,

carrot and stick approaches in various governmental practices, procedures, policies and legislation, as summarised at the start of this article. Generally accepted 'sin' taxes on alcohol, tobacco and sugar are excellent examples of nudging to promote healthier lifestyles that would result in less dependency on public health services. So are family planning and abortion services, tax and user charge discounts for new businesses in specific areas, speed restrictions and other sermon, carrot and stick type policy instruments summarised earlier. The election campaigns of political parties are all attempts at 'nudging' voters through propagandistic slogans and messages that provide selective fragments of information or disinformation ('fake news'), frequently out of context, to vote for them in upcoming elections. However, this is the nature of democratic politics which need to be firmly regulated to reduce this type of abuse of office and of citizens/voters. Another contemporary example of this type of strategy that has so far not been regulated effectively, is President Donald Trump's personal and official tweets aimed at either discrediting opponents or promoting causes that support him in America and world-wide.

A second substantive philosophical criticism of current nudging practices by different governments, is that they should be rejected because of their potentially **unethical nature and therefore their potential for abuse** (e.g. EU 2016:11; Wilkinson 2013; Bovens 2009; Sunstein 2016). An example might be the increasing use and sometimes abuse of experimental Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) by many governments, for example, providing on the one hand Anti-Retroviral medication to an experimental group suffering from HIV/AIDS, accompanied by a control or comparison group of similar patients who are only provided with garlic, lemons and beetroot in addition to a well-balanced nutritious diet. This experiment has life and death implications for the participants in the different groups.

Nudges are inherently based on normative goals and are never neutral. Political party campaigns and Trump's tweets are excellent examples of this. It is one of the reasons why opponents of the ideological direction that a nudge is taking, so vehemently oppose such nudging. Jones and Whitehead (2018:314) state further that: " ...*psychological governance has been understood to possess two key characteristics. First, it has been described as a style of government that is particularly sensitive to the emotional (or more-than-rational) aspects of the human condition. Authors ... have emphasised the therapeutic nature of the psychological state, as it seeks to grapple with the 'fragile' emotional conditions of its subjects. Second, work on psychological governance has examined how the state is increasingly and deliberately operating in a covert fashion*".

Jones *et al.* (2013) refer in this regard to a 'psychocracy' or to the 'psychological' state (Feitsma 2018:389).

The OECD, however, found that only 12% of respondents to their citizen survey on the application of BI in government expressed some concern about the

ethical nature of nudging, while 62% had no concern about it and 27% of respondents did not reply to the question (OECD 2017:39). This concern therefore does not seem to be a major one among the potential target audiences of nudges. Hansen and Jespersen (2013) also developed an effective practical framework for the responsible use of nudging while Sunstein, the co-inventor of this tool, has acknowledged (2018) the potential for abuse of nudging, as is the case with any other governmental agenda and strategy. In order to minimise this problem, he suggested early in 2018 the following five-point Nudging Bill of Rights:

1. *“Nudges must be consistent with people’s values and interests*
2. *Nudges must be for legitimate ends*
3. *Nudges must not violate anyone’s individual rights*
4. *Nudges must be transparent*
5. *Nudges ought not to take things from people without their consent”*

(<https://www.themandarin.com.au/96009-cass-sunsteins-bill-of-rights-for-nudging/>).

Sunstein’s Nudging Bill of Rights is a good starting point to minimise unethical, illegitimate and exploitative nudging behaviour by governments or government elites. Feitsma (2018) argues that the alleged general unethical nature of nudging and its psychological ‘manipulation’ only manifests in extreme cases where nudging is not implemented in an acceptable good governance manner.

A third major pragmatic criticism against current nudging practices across the world is a more rational one that argues that they can be useful if focused and implemented correctly, but so far, they have been **too narrowly defined** and focused only on the improvement of technical process efficiency and effectiveness while the achievement of big strategic goals is ignored (e.g. Alkine 2018; Selinger and Whyte 2012). John *et al.* (2011:30) also question the efficiency and effectiveness of nudging practices as a result of potential methodological validity weaknesses like the Hawthorne effect: false positive findings because subjects change their behaviour to please rather than as a result of attitudinal changes. On the other hand, the Pavlovian conditioning effect illustrates that external stimuli can change behaviour which can change attitudes and values (Skinner 1972; Cialdini 2007).

A number of these criticisms can be regarded as valid during the initial experimentation period, when governments and other agencies tried to determine the best nudging approaches and to assess the efficiency and effectiveness results of the new approach. The OECD (2017:53) found that nudging is not yet applied optimally and that it can potentially be applied in much more constructive and productive ways. Now that confidence has significantly increased in the experimentation results and successes that have been achieved so far in focusing on the most efficient and effective tactical nudges, the focus has started to shift to the more strategic application of the tool to achieve improvement in more

medium- to long-term impacts than in short-term policy outputs and outcomes. The OECD has concluded that: *"...The evidence ... confirms that behavioural insight has largely been applied to areas of policy implementation, but there are signs that it is now beginning to be used more for policy design"* (OECD 2017:48). Also *"...(l)essons on what works and what does not work in the implementation of policy and regulation could feed into the early design of policies where the traditional assumptions on perfect knowledge and rationality could be relaxed* (OECD 2017:53).

However, the normal principles of design thinking should also be applicable here (Brautigam 2018). (See also Aibana, Kimmel and Welch 2017:29; Howlett 2011; Cloete 2018a). They include problem discovery, idea validation, concept design and validation, product development and validation, experimental pilot application and validation through continuous stakeholder responsiveness and participation (Brautigam 2018; Kuehnhanss 2017).

This strategic shift in focus and scope over longer time frames is confirmed by the latest business plans of the UK government *"...to halve childhood obesity over the next decade, shift the behaviour of markets and technology giants; and get a grip on macroeconomic issues so far untouched by behavioural approaches"* (<https://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/australia/bx2018-onwards-to-the-next-frontier/>; <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/childhood-obesity-a-plan-for-action/childhood-obesity-a-plan-for-action>). This could be attempted by inducing food and drink manufacturers to use healthier recipes for their products by providing different inducements to them to change those recipes.

NUDGING IN SOUTH AFRICA

The joint OECD/WCG conference on nudging in September 2018 that was referred to in the introduction, is so far the first and only deliberate attempt by any government department or agency in South Africa to investigate some elements of BI or nudging for South Africa (WCG-OECD 2018). A number of strategic generic lessons about the application of BI in governments across the world that emanated from the conference are contained in the conference summary (WCG-OECD 2018:3). They confirm many of the issues addressed earlier in this article.

In 2012 the WCG added a BI element to its Policy and Strategy Unit in the Department of the Premier. The unit's current priority focus areas include: (1) improving education and youth policies; (2) creating safer communities; (3) making better choices in water, energy and transport; and (4) delivering better health services and results (WCG-OECD 2018:2). The unit has most recently piloted selected projects that include the installation of smart water meters at schools to reduce water consumption, and promoting a growth mindset in schools in the

province (Martinus 2018). Another initiative of the Department of Community Safety in the WCG, for possible future BI focus, is the development of a Provincial Gang Prevention Strategy (Dereymaeker 2018; OECD 2017:259).

No other similar units could be traced in the South African government, although a number of business initiatives exist. These business initiatives include KPMG (2017) on how to improve personal savings and also PWC-ZA (2018) on how to empower women in technology. The only dedicated academic BI research unit in South Africa seems to be based at the University of Cape Town (UCT). The Research Unit in Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics, RUBEN (<http://www.ruben.uct.ac.za/Pages/Welcome>) ... is *“an interdisciplinary group of researchers using economic research methods to look at how social, cognitive and emotional factors influence...economic decision-making. One of the first projects piloted was on energy efficiency—encouraging the Western Cape Government to cut down on energy consumption. We wanted to understand why employees were leaving lights on all weekend, and nudge them to switch lights off”*.

This led to a 14% reduction in energy use (Twig 2018; Klege *et al.* 2018; OECD 2017:112). The UCT RUBEN unit has also focused so far on water savings, especially in the Western Cape in cooperation with the Policy and Strategy Unit. In this process the UCT unit is experimenting with both carrot and stick approaches to try to maximise water consumption reduction (De Martino, Visser and Brick 2017; Visser, Brick, Garcia Lopez and De Martino 2017).

Other local South African examples that might be regarded as inadvertent lessons of nudging could include the current National Evaluation Policy Framework (NEPF 2011) developed by the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) and approved by Cabinet in 2011. This policy framework directs all government agencies to evaluate their strategic policy programmes every three to five years without specifying penalties for non-compliance. The current NEPF is therefore not enforceable in law, although the DPME is working on draft legislation for this purpose. Regular increases in ‘sin’ taxes on alcohol and tobacco and the free distribution of condoms linked to information campaigns on healthier sexual lives can also be regarded as ‘nudges’ to persuade citizens to reduce tobacco and alcohol use on the one hand and to increase their use of condoms in less promiscuous sexual interactions; to reduce the financial burden on curative health services to curb the negative fallouts of heart disease, cancer and HIV/AIDS infection rates (OECD 2017:252). The WCG’s After School project is also regarded by the OECD (2017:96) as an interesting case study on the application of BI principles, as well as its Healthy Lifestyles project (OECD 2017:256).

In conclusion it is clear that nudging in South Africa is in a very early stage, and that the South African government’s interest in it as a tool to improve policy processes and outcomes is minimal, with the exception of the WCG.

ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION OF NUDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE TO POLICY SCIENCES AND IMPACTS

The originality of nudging theory in the policy sciences can be assessed at two levels:

Contribution to public policy theory

Decision choice, goal achievement strategies and nudging principles have been inherent in policy instruments from the earliest times of government. Voluntary persuasion through information, moralisation, different kinds of incentives as well as involuntary enforcement of compliance with governmental prescriptions are both generally accepted democratic policy strategies, although enforcement (stick) approaches are supposed to be last fall-back options only when rational, financial, emotional and/or ideological persuasions do not work (Cloete 2018b; Michalek *et al.* 2018:20). This implies that a nudge that does not work can become a 'shove' if that is needed to make progress. Nudging is in essence just a new label, reformulation, revamping or rebranding of existing knowledge, experience and practices with policy tools to effect change in society (Einfeld 2017). Nudging theory relies on and prioritises instruments of 'soft' governance rather than 'hard' governance (Esmark 2017).

Knowledge of social, economic and political psychology is crucial in order to maximise the potential of voluntary persuasion towards policy change. This is the single area where the new focus on psychological and behavioural nudging has already made an original contribution since 2008 to highlight this important issue and to refine such policy strategies through experimentation with different approaches, to determine what works best for whom under what conditions, when and why (John *et al.* 2011). Policy nudging can in practice further refine and expand existing policy strategies for optimal change results. The explicit focus on policy nudging has therefore highlighted the complex nature of current knowledge of psychological, sociological, political and economic theories and research findings about the determinants of individual decisions that were until recently only implicitly and peripherally acknowledged by public administration and policy scientists (AU PSC 2015; Darnton 2008a and 2008b). The sudden interest in nudging therefore also concretely illustrates the inherent multi- and inter-disciplinary nature and practice of Public Policy and Administration. This change in focus was facilitated and supported by the emergence of both complexity thinking as a new paradigm to explain social events and the knowledge society that made it feasible to collect, validate, process and interpret big data sets in order to compile rigorous and valid evidence to support conclusions about the degree of effectiveness and efficiency of alternative policy strategies.

From this perspective, nudging can be seen as the inevitable culmination of knowledge accumulation and integration to refine and expand existing policy knowledge and insights. The most significant theoretical impact of the new focus on nudging is probably in the field of economics where the traditional controversial view of man as rational 'homo economicus' that takes consistent decisions over time to promote their own interests based on the collection of all available information, has now definitively been proven incorrect (Moynihan 2018:2). The presumed simple 'rational choice' basis of human decision-making has eventually been cut down to size. It has been proven that individuals instead frequently suffer from a complex overload of numerous competing biases, seldom take decisions purely on facts, are loss averse, can be altruistic and frequently take decisions based on non-rational emotional and ideological considerations (EU 2016:9; WB 2015:29). The potentially most effective policy change strategy is probably a combination of multiple synchronised nudges reinforced with stick approaches (see also Michalek *et al.* 2018:22).

These conclusions have already in principle been drawn a long time ago in the policy and governmental sciences, but have until recently been paid lip service by many traditional, conservative public administration and economics scholars. Herbert Simon was a lone exception to this rule among Public Administration and Economics scholars when he identified the non-rational drivers of decision-making (bounded rationality) in individuals in the middle of the 20th century already (Simon 1947, 1955, 1972, 1985). In addition to Thaler (1980) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008), scholars like Ayers (2007), Levitt and Dubner (2005, 2010) were some of the first economists to realise the influence of behavioural factors in decision-making. In the field of Psychology, Kahneman (1994), Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1982, 2000), Kahneman and Thaler (1991) were some of the first scholars to work on behavioural drivers of decisions (August 2015; Arieli 2008). Kahneman also received the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economics for his psychological debunking of the rational choice basis of decision-making. This preceded Thaler's similar prize by 15 years.

Contribution to public policy practice

Policy nudging as an application of more comprehensive and accurate behavioural insights into individual decision-making has been institutionalised in many advanced democratic policy systems after its debut in the UK, as was summarised earlier. All these systems are largely based on the application of Thaler and Sunstein's nudging model and strategies, tweaked for optimal results in different contexts and conditions (see also Shafir 2013).

In most of these countries, formal policy nudging units and practices are still emerging, and are applied in the form of narrowly conceived, tactical technical

nudges on an experimental basis that are in many cases increasingly contested, mainly on the basis of the criticisms summarised above (Huiteima *et al.* 2018; McGann *et al.* 2018). Nevertheless, early indications are that nudging tactics and strategies can be, have been and are effective in fast-tracking attitudinal, behavioural and in the end also value changes in society if they are implemented correctly (e.g. UK Cabinet Office 2010; Lunn 2013; WB 2015; EU 2016; OECD 2017).

Luthans, Youssef *et al.* (2007:3) developed the concept of ‘psychological capital’ as an additional type of attribute that organisations should strive to develop in order to achieve the best results. They conceive of psychological capital as “... *an individual’s positive psychological state of development that is characterized by: (1) having confidence (self-efficacy) to take on and put in the necessary effort to succeed at challenging tasks; (2) making a positive attribution (optimism) about succeeding now and in the future; (3) persevering toward goals and, when necessary, redirecting paths to goals (hope) in order to succeed; and (4) when beset by problems and adversity, sustaining and bouncing back and even beyond (resiliency) to attain success*”.

Psychological capital and social capital constitute the basic attributes of human capital (Luthans *et al.* 2004, 2006). Nudges are also seen as crucial policy tools to improve psychological capital by empowering individuals to take better control of their own lives (Whitehead *et al.* 2014:37).

Nudging has so far in practice also facilitated policy change in different sectors by reducing resistance against change. It has further reduced the necessity of using enforcement and penalties as sticks to achieve compliance with new policy directions that might be unpopular (e.g. reducing alcohol use and abuse). The most instructive and systematic examples of effective nudging systems and practices are probably the UK and Australian systems.

CONCLUSIONS

The main findings of this research project are that nudging is not a conceptually new breakthrough in the policy sciences. Recent advances in behavioural economic insights and in policy design thinking have, however, once again highlighted the need for and the utility of well-planned and synchronised policy content and implementation strategies in the economic sciences in order to maximise the potential of successful policy impact for societal transformation. This is a well-known fact in the policy sciences. Some insights from the new behavioural economics have already had an important emerging impact on contemporary global policy theory and practice after the awarding of the 2017 Nobel Prize to the Thaler model of policy nudging. These new insights from behavioural

economics therefore just confirm the lessons about the good practices and results of integrated policy design and implementation thinking that have already been learnt in the policy sciences. Nudging has also clearly been conceptualised too narrowly as only policy sermons and carrot strategies. The very important policy stick design approach has so far been ignored by nudging advocates, to the detriment of the full development of this integrated policy approach.

The emerging focus on policy nudging in behavioural economics acknowledges the fact that citizens sometimes have to be encouraged to change their behaviour towards the preferred direction that the state wants them to move to, in order to protect and promote their perceived own interests. In the policy sciences this realisation has dawned long ago and found expression in the distinction among different categories and types of policy tools and instruments like policy sermons, carrots, sticks and other strategies to enable a state to achieve its desired policy transformation vision and goals. These new behavioural economics insights will hopefully reinforce these good practices in the policy process, especially in resource-constrained contexts.

Whether one likes nudging or does not like it for whatever reasons, it seems as if it is globally the current good governance fashion. Despite the criticisms against its alleged statist intervention nature, its narrowly defined tactical foci and the potential for unethical application of nudging practices, virtually all governments that have established such practices and systems seem already persuaded of its early benefits, and many are considering expanding the scope and foci of these newly revamped policy change strategies to achieve more medium- to long-term strategic policy change goals instead of these programmes' current short-term tactical efficiency and effectiveness improvements.

The adoption of formal nudging programmes by not only the major powerful national governments but also by international organisations like the WB, OECD, UN, development aid and other international agencies, have already started to entrench this new approach in government structures across the world. It seems to have the potential of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of governance processes and outcomes if the potential weaknesses that have been identified and summarised above can be strengthened.

An interesting question is whether South Africa should not also devote some resources to experimenting with decentralised Strategic Innovation Labs or Nudging Units in national government departments as well as in the various provincial and local governments in the country as are found increasingly in cutting-edge policy design systems across the world. It seems as if the WCPG will again, as happened in the past, be the first to do this in cooperation with the OECD. One can only trust that such experiments will utilise the lessons learnt so far about both the experiences, experiments, strengths and weaknesses of existing nudging programmes, and try to improve on these results.

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Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Effective Implementation of the Internal Audit Function

The Case of the South African Social Security Agency

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ABSTRACT

In the last two years, the auditing profession (internal and external auditing) has come under the spotlight in South Africa mainly owing to the allegations of unprofessional conduct on the part of auditors. This problem calls on academics to look closely at the auditing profession with a view of identifying possible research problems and providing scholarly and practical solutions to the problems facing the profession. Within South Africa's public sector in particular, internal audit functions are implemented within the statutory and regulatory framework provided for in the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA), which is the statute that governs the management of public finances and National Treasury regulations. This article looks at the execution of the internal audit function at the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), by using the so-called '6C Protocol' framework of policy implementation, among others. The study adopted the qualitative research design and methodology. Data was collected using the case study approach, wherein first, one-on-one interviews with senior managers were conducted, second, junior managers completed a questionnaire that comprised open-ended questions and third, a focus group discussion was held with key personnel in the supply chain management department. The research findings indicate that when the actual implementation of the internal audit function at SASSA is juxtaposed to the key elements of the 6C Protocol as emphasised in the literature, there are aspects wherein actual implementation at SASSA is in line with the literature, such

as communication and commitment. However, several challenges were identified in human resource capacity and content among other areas. The article provides solutions to the challenges identified through a conceptual framework for the effective implementation of an internal audit function.

INTRODUCTION

Internal audit functions within South Africa's public sector are executed within the ambit of a comprehensive statutory and regulatory framework such as the PFMA and National Treasury regulations. Section 51(1) of the PFMA lists the general responsibilities of accounting authorities of public entities such as SASSA – the case study for the research. One of these responsibilities is that accounting authorities must establish a system of internal audit that is managed by an audit committee. Accordingly, the system of internal audit should comply with and operate according to regulations and instructions stipulated in sections 76 and 77 of the PFMA. Section 76 of the PFMA lists all the matters on which the National Treasury may make regulations or issue instructions. Section 77 stipulates the composition of audit committees.

The Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) (2016:139) postulates that during the period under review, SASSA achieved an unqualified audit outcome with findings on compliance with legislation. The findings related to a form of financial misconduct, that is, irregular expenditure. The latter was recorded at just over R1 billion up from R93 million during the 2014/15 financial year. Irregular expenditure occurs when statutes such as the PFMA, the State Tender Board Act 86 of 1968 (RSA 1968) and any other legislation that informs procurement procedures, are not complied with (RSA 1999:8). This recorded irregular expenditure could be an indication of lapses in internal controls, which could be a contributory factor to increased financial misconduct. Moreover, the lapse in internal controls could also point to weaknesses in the agency's internal audit function.

Internal audit functions play a critical role in public institutions in ensuring that internal controls for the prevention or reduction of cases of financial misconduct, among other forms of misconduct, are instituted. However, it must be emphasised that the role of internal audit functions in this regard is indirect and of an advisory nature (Sambo 2018:234). In addition, it must be pointed out that the study aims to address a gap in literature relating to a lack of research that assesses the value of the internal audit function as described above, especially in developing countries (Sambo 2017:5). Therefore, this article reports on, *inter alia*, the variables of policy implementation that explain causes of non-compliance with policy stipulations,

which may lead to misconduct, including financial misconduct, such as the importance of understanding the content of a policy that is being implemented (Sambo 2017:67).

Against this background, the purpose of this article is to report on findings of an empirical study conducted at SASSA. The study was directed by using the 6C Protocol framework of policy implementation, among others, to identify potential gaps in SASSA's internal audit function. The variables of the 6C Protocol of policy implementation are as follows: content, context, commitment, capacity, clients and coalitions, and communication (Brynard 2005:17–21). These variables are necessary for successful policy implementation, and will be explained in detail below.

Having noted the findings of the AGSA above, the following problem statement is articulated: *The implementation of the internal audit function at SASSA is not in line with the variables of the 6C Protocol of policy implementation.* Consequently, the research question for the article is: *Is the implementation of the internal audit function at SASSA in line with what is espoused within the variables of the 6C Protocol of policy implementation?*

Henceforth, the article will provide an exposition of an internal audit function and policy implementation variables. This will be followed by a description of the case study, SASSA. Thereafter, the empirical findings and framework will be provided.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The following section provides theoretical perspectives in the domain of internal auditing and policy implementation variables.

Theoretical framework for internal audit effectiveness

Khaled and Mustafa (2013:92) posit that various theories can be used to develop a theoretical framework for internal audit effectiveness, namely, agency theory, institutional theory and communication theory. This article will only consider agency and communication theories. These theories were used to explain the role of internal auditing, and are discussed below. However, the phrase 'internal audit effectiveness' has to be described first because the above theories seek to provide a theoretical framework for internal audit effectiveness. Internal audit effectiveness refers to the ability of internal auditors to achieve set objectives of the internal audit function (Badara & Saidin 2014a:76; 2014b:180). Similarly, Cohen and Sayag (2010:297) argue that the effectiveness of internal auditing is determined by the subjective evaluations given to the function by management. Furthermore, Enofe,

Mgbame, Osa-Erhabor and Ehiorobo (2013:163) posit that the internal auditor's work is not done until shortcomings have been corrected and remain corrected. Thus, the effectiveness of internal audit functions in the public sector ought to be assessed by the degree to which they play a role in the achievement of effective and efficient service delivery, since this drives demand for better internal audit services. Against this background, effective internal auditing is necessary in undertaking independent evaluations of financial and operating information and of systems and procedures, as well as in providing useful recommendations for improvements when deemed necessary.

Badara and Saidin (2014b:176) emphasise the importance of having an effective and efficient internal audit function, by contending that if an internal audit function carries out its work well, it serves as an effective means of monitoring and promoting a system of good governance within any institution. Some of the factors that have an influence on internal audit effectiveness are: experience, training, education (including continuous professional education), and professional qualifications. Regarding continuous professional education, Alzeban and Sawan (2013:445) underscore that internal auditors are required to complete 80 notional hours of acceptable continuous professional education every two years, which provides them with training on new developments in the profession.

Agency theory

Some authors posit that agency theory emanates from the subject of economics, and has been used by scholars in the subjects of accounting, finance, marketing, political science, organisational behaviour, and sociology (Eisenhardt 1989b:57; Mitnick 2013:2). Therefore, an agency relationship is defined as a contract that is entered into between leaders of an institution and its management (Al Mamun, Yasser & Rahman 2013:38; Khaled & Mustafa 2013:92). The managers are regarded as agents of the leaders, and as such perform work on behalf of the leaders. However, there is a possibility that managers may deviate from carrying out their duties according to how the leaders expect them to, and instead pursue their own personal interests. This situation can be managed by the presence of corporate governance mechanisms, such as audit committees and external and internal auditors, who can ensure that managers carry out their duties as expected by the leaders (Al Mamun *et al.* 2013:38; Vafaei & Christopher 2014:7).

There are costs to the leaders associated with appointing resources such as auditors, which Al Mamun *et al.* (2013:38) refer to as 'monitoring costs'. Furthermore, if an audit committee is found to be inefficient or ineffective, this creates problems because the internal audit function is not able to perform its role of monitoring the actions of management, resulting in management being more powerful, and having influence over the internal audit function (Khaled & Mustafa

2013:92). Enofe *et al.* (2013:164) use agency theory to explain how critical it is to maintain a strong internal audit function in order for senior management not to deviate from carrying out their duties in the expected manner. When the internal audit function reports to senior managers instead of the audit committee, this creates a dilemma because internal auditors are also agents of a board and audit committees, and have to evaluate the work of senior management.

In addition, the loyalty of internal auditors may lie with senior management instead of with a board and audit committee because senior management may have influence over the auditors' future positions and salaries. Eventually, this may result in internal auditors becoming agents who are biased and not objective. As agents, internal auditors should perform their audit work professionally, and they should have the required level of education, experience and competencies required for them to carry out their work in a satisfactory manner. The existence of the previously mentioned traits could result in a board/audit committee having more confidence in the competence of internal auditors. Furthermore, when the audit committee and internal audit function are effective, they are able to carry out their role of ensuring that managers do their work as expected by the leaders of the institution (Khaled & Mustafa 2013:93) who, in a public sector context, are political office-bearers.

Communication theory

Communication theory postulates that good communication between internal auditors and auditees and the members of a public institution is important in strengthening internal audit effectiveness. To this end, the manner in which internal auditors communicate their findings is critical. For example, if internal auditors communicate their findings in a way that auditees perceive as accusatory or as only identifying weaknesses, this may break trust between internal auditors and auditees, which in turn may create communication barriers. Therefore, effective communication is critical, and the communication process should focus on relaying only necessary information in a clear, simple and meaningful way, as well as on creating mechanisms for feedback (Sambo & Webb 2017:148).

Principles of policy implementation

Brynard (2005:4) accentuates that while there are many definitions of policy implementation, one worth mentioning is that policy implementation includes what both public or private individuals do, which is aimed at realising objectives, set in policy pronouncements (cf. Cloete & Wissink 2000:166). Similarly, Grindle (2017:6) asserts that the role of policy implementation is to establish a link that makes it possible for the goals of public policies to be accomplished as outcomes of government activity.

Parsons (1995:461) highlights that policy implementation studies are concerned with how change occurs, and how it may be encouraged. This is because the objective of implementing a policy is to achieve certain changes. It also seeks to understand how organisations outside and inside a political system conduct their affairs and interact with one another, what motivates them to act in the way they do, and what may motivate them to act differently. McLaughlin (1987:171) further emphasises that the success or lack thereof in policy implementation depends on how individuals interpret the policy in the policy system. Issues such as commitment, size, capacity, intra-organisational relations and institutional complexity influence the outcome of implementation. In addition, factors such as limited resources, inadequate organisational structures, ineffective communication or poor coordination because of the failure to implement policies as intended, has resulted in the unsuccessful execution of some policy outcomes (Denhardt & Catlaw 2015:146).

6C Protocol of Policy Implementation

Brynard (2005:16) identified the following six variables that are crucial in shaping the direction of policy implementation:

- **Content:** There are various types of policies such as regulatory, distributive and redistributive. The PFMA can be classified as a regulatory policy because it specifies the rules that officials in public institutions need to adhere to in the management of public finances, including the implementation of an internal audit function.
- **Context:** Institutional context in the form of social, economic, political and legal realities of the system need to be taken into account in the process of policy implementation. These components are more dependent on human interactions that occur during the process of implementation as opposed to hierarchical regulation in the system.
- **Commitment:** For successful policy implementation to take place, commitment by implementing officials is an important aspect throughout the implementation process.
- **Capacity:** Capacity refers to the structural, functional and cultural ability to implement the policy objectives of a government; that is, the ability to deliver public services intended to raise the quality of life of citizens in an effective way. This also relates to the availability of, and access to, concrete resources such as human, financial, material, technological, and logistical. Capacity also includes the incorporeal requirements of leadership, motivation, commitment, willingness, endurance, as well as other intangible features needed to convert policies into action.
- **Clients and coalitions:** It is an important factor to take into account the opinions of interest groups during the policy implementation process, whose opinions

can result in a power shift that can affect the implementation process.

- Communication: Communication has been referred to as the 6th C in the implementation protocol. It is one of the important variables of implementation. In addition, Hill and Hupe (2002:169) emphasise that all parties involved in the implementation process need to be aware of what is happening at each point in time in order for them to deliver on their respective deliverables. Therefore, the probability of successful policy implementation rises when thought was given to the potential problems that may be experienced during implementation, at the stage of policy design. Against this background, public officials who design policies should pre-empt what may go wrong during the implementation stage, and already at this stage proactively provide solutions to counter possible problems.

Gaining compliance from policy implementers

Some authors have described three types of mechanisms for gaining compliance from policy implementers, as follows (Matland 1995:161; Hill & Hupe 2002:177):

- Normative: This form of compliance encourages compliance by referring to a mutual goal between central government and the implementing institution, or by relying on the authority of the person giving the instruction.
- Coercive: This makes use of threats relating to sanctions for failure to comply with a request for action.
- Remunerative: This includes the use of incentives in the form of additional resources, which makes the desired course of action attractive to the implementing institution.

Hill and Hupe (2002:177) define involvement by an actor in policy implementation as an evaluation that the actor makes to an object. A difference is made among alienative, calculative, and moral involvement. Alienative involvement could mean that individuals participate in a programme they do not necessarily want to be a part of. In contrast, calculative involvement has both negative and positive elements, depending on what the actor stands to gain. For example, positive orientation is achieved when one has been offered a tangible reward such as cash. On the contrary, moral involvement has a positive orientation with high intensity, such as the one displayed by loyal members of a political party. The types of power and involvement are combined to form dimensions of a typology of compliance relations. Ultimately, this gives rise to the following combinations: calculative involvement and remunerative power, alienative involvement and coercive power, and moral involvement and normative power. As a result, it can be argued that institutions should strive for the combination of moral involvement and normative power because this is the more positive power and involvement combination.

EXPOSITION OF THE CASE STUDY

SASSA Act 9 of 2004 (RSA 2004b), (SASSA Act), which came into effect in May 2004, provides for the establishment of SASSA as a schedule 3A public entity in terms of the PFMA (RSA 1999:74). The main aim of the SASSA Act is to make provision for the effective management, administration and payment of social assistance and services through the establishment of SASSA (RSA 2004b:2). Accordingly, SASSA was established in April 2005 in accordance with the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 (RSA 2004a), (Social Assistance Act). The Act establishes a national legislative framework for the delivery of various types of social grants, social relief of distress, the delivery of social assistance grants by a national agency, and the establishment of an inspectorate for social security (RSA 2004a:5). SASSA was selected as the case study for the research because it represents a significant quantum of the budget of the Department of Social Development (DSD), and the importance of the work that the agency does. The Agency administers the application, approval and payment of social grants on behalf of the DSD.

The work done by SASSA is important to the South African population. The South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) (2012:1) observed that overall, social grant beneficiaries had increased by 333% since 2001. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (2011:3) reports that South Africa had the largest and best-developed social security system in Africa, with social grants alone reaching 28% of the population. This percentage has since increased as noted by SASSA (2017:24), and is reported at 31% of the population or 17.2 million beneficiaries. Furthermore, the budgeted amount for social grants for the 2017/18 financial year is reported at R178 billion, which represents 3.2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (National Treasury 2018:62). Therefore, social grants comprise one element of a comprehensive approach to poverty and inequality alleviation by the South African government (ODI 2011:3). Given the background explained above, the importance of the work done by SASSA cannot be discounted, thus the current study sought to make a contribution that would improve the implementation of an internal audit function at SASSA.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study adopted the qualitative research design and methodology because this was found to be the most suitable methodology to address the research question, which fell within the realism philosophical paradigm. Data was collected in the context of the case study approach, and the three data collection techniques employed were personal one-on-one interviews, a survey questionnaire that comprised open-ended questions and a focus group discussion. The study respondents/participants (senior and junior managers) were selected based on a

criterion-based/purposive sampling method wherein a sample is chosen based on the researcher's comprehension of the population. Therefore, the researcher chooses the respondents/participants with prior knowledge that they will be able to provide answers to questions on the central themes that are being studied. Purposive sampling also allows some diversity to be included in a sample in order for the influence of differences in respondents' views owing to the positions that they occupy, to be captured (cf. Sambo 2017:131).

Based on the above, five senior internal audit managers were identified. Three of the five senior managers were interviewed at SASSA's head office in Pretoria, where the agency's internal audit function is situated. In consultation with the General Manager: Finance, 10 more senior managers in certain of the areas in the agency that have been identified as strategic high risk areas, were also identified and interviewed at SASSA's head office in Pretoria, as well as at the agency's regional office in Johannesburg, therefore incorporating the agency's operations in Gauteng. On average, the duration of each interview was one and a half hours (total 19.5 hours). The managers in the so-called strategic high risk areas, such as the supply chain management department, were chosen because operational risks of such departments featured highly on SASSA's internal audit plan (cf. Sambo 2017:162), implying that those are the risks that ought to be prioritised by the internal audit function. Therefore, these managers would be better suited to answer questions pertaining to the agency's internal audit function because they have closely interacted with the internal auditors.

A survey questionnaire, which comprised open-ended questions, was completed by eight of the 14 junior managers in the agency's internal audit department. A qualitative data expert approved the data collecting instruments. Furthermore, a pilot study was conducted, and this gave the researcher an opportunity to refine the survey questionnaire.

The literature review and relevant empirical documents formed the basis on which the questions for both interview schedule and the survey questionnaire were conceptualised. The interview schedule used for the interviews with senior internal audit managers as well as the survey questionnaire that was completed by junior internal audit managers had similar content. This was necessary in order to observe any differences in the views of the two groups of respondents in an effort to achieve the objectives of purposive sampling, as noted above. However, certain items that were believed to be privy only to senior managers were excluded from the survey questionnaire completed by the junior managers. The interview schedule used for the interviews with the other senior managers also contained similar questions to the one for senior internal audit managers. The other senior managers were a necessary inclusion in the population for the study as they were the recipients of internal audit services in the agency.

The data from the interviews and completed survey questionnaire was analysed

using the Qualitative Data Analysis software called ATLAS.ti. All research respondents had been assigned names to highlight differing opinions or minority views (SA=senior internal audit managers, SO=other senior managers, JA=junior internal audit managers). Ritchie and Lewis (2003:203) cite that when analysing qualitative data, conclusions can be drawn from themes that emerge from the data once the coding process has been completed. The data for the present study is organised in accordance with non-cross-sectional data organisation and analysis, as such, answers to questions were looked at individually and conclusions were drawn on the themes that emerged from answers to individual questions.

In addition, there is information/data the researcher had to request from SASSA in writing, which was relevant for the study. This information (inter alia on financial misconduct cases and training schedules) had to be requested in writing because not all SASSA employees are privy to it. This information could therefore not be included in the survey questionnaire or interview schedule.

Concerning ethical considerations, Brynard and Hanekom (2006:6) highlight two primary requirements for researchers pertaining to ethics, namely, honesty and confidentiality. Accordingly, researchers should report on information truthfully, as well as avoid publishing confidential information in their research. Therefore, researchers ought to observe ethical requirements whenever research is conducted. In this regard, ethical clearance for this study was obtained.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSES

The findings presented below pertain to the key variables of the theoretical framework for internal audit effectiveness, as presented above, under 'theoretical perspectives'. As highlighted above, internal auditors have set objectives that they aim to achieve, and this determines the extent of their effectiveness. In assessing the likelihood of internal auditor effectiveness, certain variables can be evaluated, as done below. It must also be noted that there are questions that could not be answered by some of the group(s) of respondents/participants. This is captured in Table 1.

The PFMA and Treasury Regulations

Table 2 presents findings on relevant sections of the PFMA. It was noted above that internal audit functions are implemented within the ambit of statutory and regulatory framework such as the PFMA and National Treasury regulations. Therefore, it was necessary to ascertain the compliance of SASSA's internal audit function with stipulations of the PFMA and National Treasury regulations, as presented below. It must also be noted that the senior managers: internal audit, were the only group that could answer the questions. This is captured in Table 2.

Table 1: Findings on key variables of the theoretical framework for internal audit effectiveness

Concept	Opinions of senior managers – internal audit (SA 1–3)	Opinions of other senior managers (SO 1–10)	Opinions of junior managers – internal audit (JA 1–8)	Opinions of focus group participants (Participant 1–4)	Key themes
Experience of internal auditors	The overall view of these managers is that internal auditors are competent. Where there are gaps, these are addressed through training.	The common view of these managers is that internal auditors are competent and they have the required qualifications. However, it was also said – [] they are lacking in terms of linking theory to practice (SO 8).	These managers cited that internal auditors have the necessary qualifications and experience to conduct audits.	N/A	The common theme that emerged points to the fact that the internal auditors are competent. However, the minority view that points to inadequate ability to link theory to practice cannot be ignored.
Professional qualifications of internal auditors	Written feedback from SA 1 confirmed that all internal auditors in SASSA have the necessary qualifications in internal auditing.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Role of audit committee	In general, the theme that emerged was that the audit committee was adding value in the agency by providing advice. For example, the audit committee has played an advisory role in the agency helping the agency to avoid mistakes, such as during the process of appointing a grants administration service provider. SASSA (2016: 57) confirms this opinion, and cites that the audit committee has advised the agency during the process of transition towards incorporating the agency's grants payment role in-house. The audit committee found that the process of transition presented complexities, which would create new risks, for which both the risk management department and internal audit function would need to be prepared.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Concept	Opinions of senior managers – internal audit (SA 1–3)	Opinions of other senior managers (SO 1–10)	Opinions of junior managers – internal audit (JA 1–8)	Opinions of focus group participants (Participant 1–4)	Key themes
Reporting line of chief audit executive (CAE)	<p>The overall response was that the General Manager: Internal Audit reports directly to the CEO. The General Manager: Internal Audit's reporting line was also confirmed through a written reply to a list of questions, which the author sent to the incumbent prior to the interviews.</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>
Effectiveness of the internal audit function	<p>The majority of these managers cited that objectives are always met. In addition, audit objectives are aligned with the audit procedures in order to mitigate risks that face the agency.</p>	<p>The common theme that emerged is that improvements have been noted after internal auditors had concluded audit assignments, in the form of reductions in Auditor-General findings. On the other hand, the following was pointed out:</p> <p>[I]internal auditors are not effective, as they do not do what they are supposed to (SO 3).</p>	<p>The overall impression of junior internal audit managers was that the function is effective. However, there is a shortage of staff. Where the internal audit function does not have skills in-house to carry out audits such as performance and information communication technology audits, co-sourcing arrangements have been entered into, with contractors who have the required skills. In addition, the following was cited:</p> <p>[T]he internal audit function will be effective if senior managers implement its recommendations (JA 7).</p>	<p>All participants emphasised that most of the time internal audits clash with audits by external auditors. This has thus rendered the internal audit function ineffective. In addition, the participants cited that internal audit reports are submitted late, at which point they do not find them valuable. [T]he audits are done for compliance purposes, it is malicious compliance (Participant 2). Furthermore, the participants indicated that the internal audit function was reactive and focused on ad hoc requests, as opposed to planned audits.</p>	<p>Two themes emerged:</p> <p>Positive: There are improvements that have been realised at SASSA because of internal audits undertaken.</p> <p>Negative: Some of the clients of the internal audit function are of the view that the function is ineffective and does its work for compliance purposes.</p>

Source: (Author's own interpretation)

Table 2: Findings on relevant sections of the PFMA and Treasury Regulations

Concept	Opinions of senior managers – internal audit (SA 1–3)
Three-year rolling strategic internal audit plan (In terms of Treasury Regulation 27.2.7)	The managers cited that SASSA has a three-year rolling strategic internal audit plan in place, as required by Treasury Regulation 27.2.7, which is drafted in consultation with management and the office of the Auditor-General.
Reporting line of CAE (In terms of Treasury Regulation 27.2.8)	The opinions of the managers indicated that the General Manager: Internal Audit reports directly to the CEO, as stipulated in Treasury Regulation 27.2.8. The General Manager: Internal Audit’s reporting line was also confirmed through a written reply to a list of questions, which the author sent to the incumbent prior to the interviews. In addition, it was confirmed that the internal audit function reports at all audit committee meetings. The main items that are reported on at these meetings include progress against the audit plan, audit findings on completed audit assignments, staffing issues and training requirements.
Composition of SASSA audit committee (In terms of Treasury Regulation 27.1.4)	All the managers confirmed that all the SASSA audit committee members are external to the public sector. A list of SASSA’s audit committee members, which shows that they are all external, was sent to the author. Additionally, SASSA (2016:56) lists the audit committee members, which also indicates that they are all external members.
Frequency of audit committee meetings (In terms of section 77(b) of the PFMA)	All the managers corroborated the frequency of audit committee meetings at SASSA, which is four times a year. An additional special meeting is also held to consider financial statements prior to submitting these to the Auditor-General. SASSA (2016:56) confirms the above feedback by interview respondents, and shows that the audit committee members met four times during the year under review.
Financial misconduct cases (In terms of section 83 of the PFMA)	When it comes to how SASSA deals with financial misconduct cases, the managers cited that the Financial Misconduct Board (FMB) in the agency, which also recommends sanctions, handles these. Where money has to be recovered from transgressors, steps are taken to recover the money. The existence of the FMB in the agency is confirmed in SASSA (2016:54). It is further explained that the board is a governance structure established to deal with matters of financial misconduct as required by section 83 of the PFMA, which mandates that cases of financial misconduct should be dealt with adequately.
Role of risk management strategy in determining the skills that managers and staff should have to improve controls and manage risks (In terms of Treasury Regulation 27.2.1)	The managers alluded to the existence of a risk management strategy at SASSA. A copy of this document was subsequently provided to the author. Furthermore, SASSA (2016:55) highlights that, at the time of the report, the agency had an approved fraud prevention plan that was aligned with the agency’s risk management strategy. However, it was reiterated that there is no evidence that the risk management strategy determines the skills required of managers and staff to improve controls and manage risks, as stipulated in Treasury regulation 27.2.

Concept	Opinions of senior managers – internal audit (SA 1–3)
Maintenance of effective controls (In terms of Treasury Regulation 27.2.10)	The overall impression was that internal audit reports provide recommendations that assist management and the CEO with decision-making concerning controls. Additionally, the auditors audit high-risk areas, thereby giving assurance to the CEO on compliance with controls or lack thereof.
Development of recommendations for enhancement or improvement of internal controls (In terms of Treasury Regulation 27.2.10)	In general, the theme that emerged points to the fact that audit findings include recommendations for the improvement of the internal control environment.
The role of the internal audit function in assisting the accounting authority (CEO) in achieving the objectives of the institution (In terms of Treasury Regulation 27.2.11)	The common view was that the fact that the audit committee and CEO approve the audit plan of the agency ensures that risk areas that are identified by the CEO are addressed. The internal audit function thus assists the CEO in achieving the objectives of the institution in this way.

Source: (Author’s own interpretation)

The 6 C Protocol framework

The findings presented in Table 3 pertain to the variables of the 6C Protocol of policy implementation, which were presented above. As shown above, it is necessary for these variables to be in place for successful policy implementation. It must also be noted that there are questions that could not be answered by some of the group(s) of respondents. Table 3 captures the findings.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION

The conceptual framework for the implementation of the internal audit function presented below will serve the purpose of improving the implementation of the internal audit provisions of the PFMA at SASSA or any other public institution to which the PFMA applies. Most importantly, the conceptual framework also serves the purpose of providing recommendations pertaining to the necessary conditions under which the effectiveness of the internal audit function at SASSA could be improved. The framework describes the conditions, their interpretation as well as how they can be assessed. See Table 4.

Table 3: Findings on the 6 C Protocol framework

6C Protocol variable	Opinions of senior managers – internal audit (SA 1–3)	Opinions of other senior managers (SO 1–10)	Opinions of junior managers – internal audit (JA 1–8)	Key theme(s)
Content	<p>The common themes that emerged from the data pointed out that internal auditors do understand what is expected of them in terms of the PFMA. Specific reference was made to the internal auditors' role of assisting management in achieving the strategic objectives of the agency. It was cited that the role of the internal auditors is to evaluate the adequacy of internal controls, for example they support and advise management when appointing critical service providers, such as grant administration service providers, in order to ensure a smooth transition and less impact on beneficiaries.</p>	<p>The views of these managers were that internal auditors understand their role of promoting good governance. However, the way audits are done makes it difficult for the agency to implement the findings and suggested improvements. This is because internal auditors conduct audits at the same time as external auditors (Auditor-General), which leaves no time for implementation. It was also cited that the internal auditors do not communicate on time when audits are to be done. Furthermore – [S]enior management forces them to do ad hoc audits which has a negative impact on the internal audit plan (SO 3; SO 7).</p>	<p>The junior managers cited that they promote good governance through ensuring that the governance structures within the agency are in place. Additionally – [I]nternal audits are risk-based, informed by the risk assessments performed by the agency's risk management department. As such from the risk assessment performed, a one-year plan and a three-year plan are developed by the internal audit department based on the agency's high risk areas (JA 8).</p>	<p>Two themes emerged: Positive: The three groups were of the view that internal auditors in SASSA have a good understanding of their role, which includes inter alia evaluating the adequacy of internal controls and promoting good governance. Negative: The other senior managers who are the recipients of internal audit services in the agency were of the view that there was no synergy between the internal and external auditors.</p>
Context	<p>The general view was that internal auditors are always mindful of the prescripts that govern the function. In addition, it was cited that the function endeavours to avoid any political influences by striving to do its work without being influenced by politics.</p>	N/A	N/A	N/A
Capacity (Human resources)	<p>The opinions of these managers are that the internal audit function is understaffed. Only 23 staff members were responsible for auditing nine SASSA regional offices across the country.</p>	N/A	<p>These managers confirmed the views of their senior counterparts by stating that there was a shortage of staff in the internal audit function of the agency.</p>	<p>The key theme by both groups who could answer the question is that the internal audit function is short-staffed.</p>

6C Protocol variable	Opinions of senior managers – internal audit (SA 1–3)	Opinions of other senior managers (SO 1–10)	Opinions of junior managers – internal audit (JA 1–8)	Key theme(s)
Capacity (Financial)	The respondents were of the view that the budget that is allocated to the internal audit function is limited, which affects the work that has to be done in the various regions negatively.	N/A	The overall impression was that the financial resources allocated to the internal audit function are not adequate. This is because most of SASSA's work is done by the regions and/or provinces wherein they submit quarterly performance reports to head office, where all reports are consolidated. Internal audit thus has to provide assurance to management on the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls at the nine regional offices. This work requires vast financial resources.	The main theme that emerged points to the fact that the financial resources that are allocated to the internal audit function are not adequate.
Clients and coalitions	The internal audit function is situated at SASSA head office in Pretoria, and is responsible for providing value-adding auditing services to the agency's nine regional offices (one office in each province). This view was confirmed by SASSA (2016:53).	N/A	N/A	N/A
Communication	These managers were of the opinion that they communicate with others positively and always provide an opportunity for a right of reply to auditees.	The majority of these managers were of the view that communication by internal auditors was professional and highlighted that most communication was in writing.	These managers reiterated that they communicate positively with stakeholders. They also highlighted that they administer a survey at the end of each audit, in order to solicit feedback from managers on their experiences from interactions with internal auditors.	The key theme points to the fact that internal auditors at SASSA communicate positively.
Commitment	The overall impression was that internal auditors are committed to their work. They always try to go beyond their scope, giving advice and assisting with processes at local offices.	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: (Author's own interpretation)

Table 4: Framework for the effective implementation of the internal audit function

Number	Condition	Interpretation of condition	Assessing the condition	Link to theory
1	An understanding of the prescripts that the internal audit function should adhere to	Internal audit staff are required to demonstrate an understanding of the sections of the PFMA and Treasury regulations on the internal audit function, when carrying out their work.	Internal audit staff's compliance with the requirements of the PFMA and Treasury regulations.	This condition can be linked to the importance of understanding the content of a policy (cf. 6C Protocol on policy implementation).
2	Commitment of internal audit staff	Internal auditors' commitment to carrying out their duties in the manner expected.	The efforts of internal audit staff when carrying out their work demonstrates their commitment.	The commitment of staff responsible for implementing a policy is one of the key requirements for successful implementation (cf. 6C Protocol on policy implementation).
3	HR capacity	Sufficient human resources in the internal audit function in order to ensure that the internal audit plan is adequately implemented.	Sufficient staff in the internal audit function at any given time to implement the 3-year rolling strategic internal audit plan. The number of staff required to implement the audit plan has to be stipulated in the internal audit plan.	Human resource capacity remains one of the key requirements for successful policy implementation (cf. 6C Protocol on policy implementation).
4	Communication by internal audit staff	Internal auditors' ability to communicate positively with clients and stakeholders, as well as to promote open communication.	Positive feedback from clients and stakeholders on their interactions with internal auditors.	Communication by internal auditors is a key determining factor in ensuring that auditees understand the recommendations of the internal audit function (cf. description of communication theory & 6C Protocol on policy implementation).

Number	Condition	Interpretation of condition	Assessing the condition	Link to theory
5	Appointing and reporting line of the head of the internal audit function or CAE	The role of the audit committee in the appointment of a CAE and the reporting line of the incumbent.	An audit committee's involvement in appointing the CAE. The incumbent must report to the audit committee, in order to ensure independence from management. This will require that the PFMA be amended -Regulation 27.1.10 of Treasury Regulations stipulates that audit committees must report and make recommendations to the accounting authority.	The literature emphasises that in order to promote independence of the internal audit function, the audit committee must be involved in the appointment of a CAE (cf. discussion on agency theory & section on findings on sections of the PFMA and Treasury regulations).
6	Composition of audit committee	An audit committee that has members with the right mix of qualifications and a balance between external and internal members.	First, members of an audit committee having the right combination of qualification ranging from inter alia finance to accounting, legal and information systems. Second, the inclusion of both internal and external members in the committee. Internal members have the necessary insights of what is happening in the public sector and would add value to the committee.	It is suggested in the literature that audit committee members should have the right mix of qualifications necessary for them to carry out their work (cf. discussion on agency theory; section on findings in sections of the PFMA and Treasury regulations & Sambo, 2017:35).
7	Audit committee meetings	Frequency of audit committee meetings.	Audit committee meetings taking place at least once every month, in order for the committee to discharge its oversight role. This will require that the PFMA be amended -Section 77(b) of the PFMA states that audit committees must meet at least twice a year.	(cf. discussion on agency theory and section on findings on sections of the PFMA and Treasury regulations).

Source: (Author's own interpretation)

CONCLUSION

The PFMA and its regulations serve the purpose of streamlining the management of financial resources in South Africa's public sector. The PFMA emphasises that the role of internal audit functions is to assist public institutions in maintaining effective controls, and most importantly, developing recommendations for improvement of the said controls. This is necessary in order to among other things, ensure the reliability and integrity of financial and operational information as well as compliance with laws and regulations. Therefore, the role of internal audit functions is key, and the function ought to execute its duties in accordance with the statutory and regulatory framework that governs its existence, that is, the PFMA and its regulations. From a theoretical perspective, the following aspects were considered: the theoretical framework for internal audit effectiveness, as well as policy implementation variables, key to successful implementation, the 6C Protocol.

Furthermore, the case study of the research, SASSA was briefly described. Following this was a description of the methodology that the study followed, that is, the qualitative methodology. Lastly, the findings of the study were presented in the following manner: Findings on key variables of the theoretical framework for internal audit effectiveness. The findings here pointed to among other things, that the internal audit function at SASSA was in some instances found to be effective and in some not. The ineffectiveness of the function was attributed to its inability to schedule its own audits and those of external auditors (Auditor-General) in a way that would allow auditees to first implement internal audit recommendations in time before audits by external auditors. According to the research respondents/participants, the previously mentioned clashes rendered the internal audit function ineffective.

The findings on sections of the PFMA revealed that the function was mainly discharging its duties in accordance with the PFMA. This was found to be the case in areas such as the reporting line of the CAE, the frequency of audit committee meetings as well as the existence of a three-year rolling strategic internal audit plan. However, it was also revealed that the audit committee members were external to the institution and the public sector. This status quo may mean that the audit committee lacks the insight of what actually occurs within the SASSA, and may therefore not be able to make recommendations on aspects of which they are not aware.

In answering the research question: *Is the implementation of the internal audit function at SASSA in line with what is espoused within the variables of the 6C Protocol of policy implementation?* the findings on the 6C Protocol framework pointed to positive gains on aspects such as communication and to an extent, the internal auditors' understanding of what is expected of them in terms of the

PFMA. Shortcomings were highlighted in areas such as human and financial resources allocated to the internal audit function. The gaps that have been identified are possible explanations for the weaknesses that have been found in the internal audit function at SASSA. Furthermore, the weaknesses could also explain lapses in internal controls, which may have contributed to the recorded irregular expenditure as highlighted above. In addressing these gaps, a conceptual framework for the effective implementation of an internal audit function was presented. The conceptual framework provides some of the important variables that have to be in place for the successful implementation of an internal audit function.

The limitations of the study were that SASSA as the chosen case study for the research is a large organisation and as such, the research could not be conducted in all of its offices. Similar studies in the future could be conducted in other regional offices of the Agency, or in national and/or provincial service delivery departments, since this study was undertaken in a public entity. Other similar studies should be conducted at the National Treasury as the custodian of the implementation of the PFMA in order to understand what the Treasury can do to change or amend the PFMA and Treasury Regulations.

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Framing Strategic Conversations in Government

Towards a Conceptual Framework for Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Strategic conversations in private sector enterprises have gained significant prominence as legitimate additions to the post-modern analyses of organisations and management. Anti-positivistic traditions propagate narrative-based redefinitions of key managerial notions and ask for systematic efforts to incorporate narrative methods in the methodological toolkit of scholars who study organisations and management. As a result, academics, managers and consultants were eager to introduce the notion of conversations into management, and especially strategic management.

Organisations increasingly grasp that conversations are central to addressing many of their contemporary strategic challenges. This raises the question on how conversations or stories could be mainstreamed in public sector institutions. The purpose of this article is to explore the usage of strategic conversations in government settings with the aim to design a conceptual framework that may aid further investigations into this dynamic field.

INTRODUCTION

Conversations, narratives, dialogue, or storytelling in private sector settings have become fully legitimate supplements to the study of organisations and management. During the 1980s, strong cases were made for narratives by MacIntyre (1981) and McCloskey (1986) in economics, and by Bruner (1986) and Geertz (1988) in cognitive psychology and industrial anthropology respectively. Amstrong (1992), Corvellec (1997), and Czarniawska (1997) in turn, proposed narrative-based redefinitions of key managerial notions. Systematic efforts were also made to unfold the

tenets of narrative analysis (Riesman 1993) and to develop narrative methods as instruments that can analyse organisations and management (Boje 2001). Increasingly, business enterprises grasp the fact that organisational conversations are central to addressing contemporary strategic challenges. This entails successfully articulating the vision, goals, risks and opportunities identified by strategic management tools such as environmental scanning, scenario analysis and dilemma resolution.

The application of strategic conversations in public sector institutions is, however, largely an untapped area (Denning 2006:42; Di Virgilio and Ludema 2009:67). Conversations are prevalent in public management where the scope of applied communication is broader and its frequency higher in strategic management in general, and government settings in particular. However, currently these conversations are muted and largely an unexploited and underutilised field of investigation. A Google search with “strategic conversations in government” as search phrase, for example, yielded no direct results. Regarding such conversations, the contribution of this article is threefold:

- contextualise the potential contributions of conversations as strategic instrument;
- frame strategic conversations in government settings; and
- propose a conceptual framework to analyse strategic conversations in public sector institutions.

A conceptual exploratory approach is followed and inferences and suppositions are based on a comprehensive literature survey.

ORGANISATIONS AS NETWORKS OF CONVERSATION

Narrative paradigm theory is derived by and large from social exchange theory and general organisation communication theory. It concerns the ability to communicate and assess values as well as exchange and interpret values that influence human behaviour (Barker and Gower 2010:300). Additionally, narrative paradigm theory recognises that humans are innate storytellers, therefore, all forms of human communication are best relayed as stories (Cragan and Shields 1998, in Barker and Gower 2010:300). As explained by Soin and Scheytt (2006:55) “[S]tories help us to make sense of what we are, where we come from, and what we want to be”. There is a distinct difference between general organisational communication theory and narrative theory. According to the former theory, communication has an organisation-enabling function (for example, coordination, delegation, reporting), while narratives or storytelling have an organisation-maintenance function (Barker and Camarata 1998:444).

Adopting an interpretivist stance, Gabriel (2000:2) argues that strategic conversations open “valuable windows into the emotional, political and symbolic lives

of organisations". In his view, narratives within an organisation provide "access to deeper organisational realities, closely linked to their members' experiences". Riesman (1993:34) and Gabriel (2000:3) emphasise that stories are very specific sense-making and communicative devices in organisations. Stories include narratives, myths, rituals, rumours, interactions, transcripts, and pictures (Langer and Thorup 2006:372). Ford and Ford (2008:446) define organisational conversations as a "complex, information-rich mix of auditory, visual, olfactory and tactile events". This does not only designate the content of what is spoken, but the sum of communicative relations in action. These include symbols, actions, artefacts, written texts, facial expressions, and body movements, all of which are used in conjunction with or as substitutes for the spoken word (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Individual conversations create and support what employees perceive to be organisational reality, by forming a unique network. These "background" conversations are referred to in everyday interactions as a "taken-for-granted" reality that defines an organisation's identity and is presupposed in every conversation (Harre 1980:71).

Various scholars identify mechanisms through which narratives constitute the dynamics of organisations (Amstrong 1992; Gergen, 1999; Allan, Fairtlough and Heinzen 2002; Boje, Oswick and Ford 2004; Barker and Gower 2010). Ford (1999:482) makes a significant contribution in this regard by arguing that organisations can be understood as "networks of conversations". He views organisations as "multiple layers of conversations" that are embedded in a particular culture and practices. A network represents communication flow in an organisation and can be formal or informal.

- *Formal network*: messages travel through official pathways (for example, reports, newsletters, memos, policy statements) that reflect the organisation's hierarchy.
- *Informal communications*: messages follow unofficial paths (for example, the grapevine, which could be interpersonal or electronic) and include rumours, opinions, perceptions, aspirations and expressing of emotions.

Informal communications are often interpersonal and horizontal, and research suggests that employees believe this form of interaction to be more authentic than formal communications (Soin and Scheytt 2006:62; Williams 2008:112). Employees generally utilise these informal networks to understand and interpret their organisation. This perspective is shared by Berger and Luckmann (1966) who propose that order in an organisation is produced by interpersonal negotiations and implicit understandings established through a shared history and experience. Organisations are considered to be sustained when their members share in at least partial consensus about perceptions of things and the meanings they represent.

Gill (2011:24) furthermore confirms that corporate stories reach out to employees on a more personal level. Through stories, employees generally develop a

stronger association with and deeper understanding of the corporate message from their employers. This knowledge may stimulate a more meaningful understanding of the organisation's strategies. Such understanding may help maintain or strengthen the employees' loyalty and commitment to the organisation's goals (Boyce 1996:7). Cross and Parker (2004) further illustrate how so-called "social networks" in organisations function as a "hidden power" to frame the way work gets done. In the same vein, Cross and Thomas (2008) explore such interpersonal social networks in organisations and illustrate how these networks are the main impetus behind performance. These scholars argue that the state of an organisation at any point can be defined by its network of conversations and its associated actions, behaviours, traditions and practices. Organisations thus exist in the words, phrases and sentences, which have been combined to create descriptions, reports, explanations, understandings, and so forth. These expressions in turn create the content which is described, reported, explained, and understood (Ford 1999).

The idea that organisations can be viewed as networks of conversations open up new avenues. This notion is especially useful when designing a conceptual framework to analyse the flow of conversations within and between public institutions. In this regard Barker and Gower (2010:302) posit a Storytelling Model of Organisational Communication. This model recognises all employees as "storytellers" with the ability to send and receive messages that establish a common ground between participants. Such storytelling provides for accelerated social interpersonal relationships as well as motivates and inspires employees about their organisation, thus strengthening internal loyalties. Loyalty can be regarded as a strategic success factor for the growth and survival of an organisation (McFarlane 2013:63).

Barker and Gower's (2010:302) model is process-based and illustrates how storytelling improves the following facets in an organisation: (a) organisational diversity (that is, cross-cultural exchanges), which improves (b) social exchange (that is, swift communication and swifter action), which finally leads to (c) results (that is, stronger relationships, increased productivity, and attaining the organisation's goals).

Conversations may flow vertically, horizontally and/or diagonally in organisations (Jones *et al.* 2004:732):

- *Vertical*: flow either down the hierarchy of an organisation, or upward from lower to higher levels in the chain of command.
- *Horizontal*: refer to stories among employees on the same managerial levels, who in other words, have no hierarchical relationship.
- *Diagonal*: also termed omni-directional conversations – occur among employees at different levels and in their diverse functions or directorates such as finance, human resources, or information technology.

It should be noted that evolving design and arrangements, managerial structures, and technologies in organisations continuously create new networks or conversation flows (Williams 2008:72).

FRAMING STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC CONVERSATIONS

A literature survey reveals that conversations within organisations could be a powerful instrument to frame strategic conversations in diverse contexts. These contexts vary depending on the application. The following examples can be highlighted: Boje (1991) and Corvellec (1997) explain how stories can inculcate a performance orientation in companies; Brown *et al.* (2004) utilise stories as a change and transformational tool; Czarniawska (1997) indicates how it can be applied to create institutional identity and branding; Denning (2000) explains how conversations ignite action in knowledge-era organisations; Eisenberg (1984) points to narratives as an organisation's learning instrument; Barker and Gower (2010) explain that the narrative paradigm, or storytelling theory, has been proffered as an effective cross-cultural communication tool; Clandinin and Connelly (2000) investigate narrative inquiry in qualitative research; and Kelley (2005) utilises this type of inquiry for innovation in organisations.

Dynamic governance settings made it crucial to have effective management at strategic level. However, it is evident that the approaches to strategic management, as applied in the private sector, cannot be transferred *sito sito* to the public sector (Alford and Greve 2017:3). For strategic management to be applied successfully in the public sector, it must be adapted to the latter's particular needs. Strategic management can be applied if the differences are accepted regarding the socio-political context, the nature of service and product delivery, as well as legal contexts (cf. Starling 1993). For a public institution, a "strategy" can be regarded as a suitable plan or method to help achieve the aims of the institution (Koteen 1989:23). Four aspects can be identified of a strategy: (a) the vision, mission or overall aim of an institution; (b) the transformation technology used; (c) the strategic and operational planning to achieve the aims; and (d) strategic control (Thompson 1997).

Public institutions should regularly, but at least annually, analyse the external and internal environment. They should then review existing strategies to determine whether adjustments are necessary. After clarifying the matter of the strategic environment, the following step is to design appropriate strategies and operational action plans to transform the institution from its current state to a desired future state. A strategic orientation ensures that public institutions adapt continuously. They must be attuned to changing conditions, address major societal issues, establish goals and objectives for new programmes and services, and

make improvements to existing government operations (Freeman 1984). This is typically referred to as strategic “fit” (Koteen 1989:34).

The above-mentioned “fit” is only successful if managers have a thorough understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats facing an institution and take appropriate strategic steps to make successful adjustments (Bryson 2011:67). Applying strategic management in public institutions generally provides public managers with the opportunity to improve planning for the future and to manage government institutions in the public’s interest (Boyne and Walker 2004:233). This could bolster the image of the government in the eyes of those whom it serves. In this respect, Wilson (in Forman 2013:56) identifies four “triggers” that indicate situations in which strategic conversations can be particularly beneficial:

- new or unexpected situations;
- situations that require feelings as well as thoughts;
- complex situations; and
- situations in which managers must help employees understand why certain events are taking place or should take place.

Strategic conversations can be regarded as any form of engagement between members of an organisation with the potential to reach strategic fit between the organisation and changing conditions and help shape its future direction (Küpers, Mantere and Statler 2013:84). This is not a new notion: that conversations within organisations could improve strategic management processes. Linn (2008), for example, explores the significance of such conversations during strategic planning sessions. McCarthy (2008:163) illustrates how stories at work function as an instrument to gauge employees’ commitment to the organisation’s strategies. In this regard Spender and Strong (2014:2) regard strategic conversations as “carefully designed dialogue between management and employees that engage the workforce to explore opportunities for, and constraints to, company growth by unleashing employee energy”. Furthermore, Fineman and Gabriel (1996), Czarniawska (1997), and Forman (2013) explain how organisations use strategic conversations to “map” senior managers’ experiences. The aim is to identify and design process maps and strategic value chains in an organisation’s processes. This use of conversations typically has positive consequences with a sustained and significant impact on an organisation’s strategic orientation and its modes of survival in general (Ratcliffe 2002; Mason and Herman 2003; Ramírez and Selin 2014).

Generally, strategic conversations infuse formal and informal interactions with a strategic vision or organisational “master plan” to reach a desired future state (Adamson *et al.* 2006:37). A strategic vision generally has two fundamental elements. One is to provide a conceptual framework or “road map” of action. The

second is the emotional appeal that inspires people to pursue the vision. Both the cognitive, intellectual understanding, and emotional pull give the vision meaning (Tichy and Devannah 1986:146). As strategic instrument, conversations according to Dougherty and Kunda (1990:45) and Langer and Thorup (2006:373), could be utilised to define and articulate the vision and values of the organisation. Such an instrument can help improve the *esprit de corps* (that is, a sense of belonging and “community”), and strengthen internal communication. Conversations through dialogue create a sense of understanding and ownership of the mission, vision and set of values. In this regard, Sull and Spinosa (2007:79) refer to “promise-based” management.

By juxtaposing conversations on the strategic management process, Langer and Thorup (2006:374) refer to strategy formulation as the “super-story”, the pivot on which all other stories are built. For such a “super-story” a holistic framework is established for overall communicative expressions that present an organisation’s cultures and values. The aim of conversations is to communicate a uniform impression of an institution’s identity in a grand story. To be effective, an organisation’s strategies should not merely inform employees, but also inspire them. People are generally not inspired by reason (i.e. strategy) alone. Strategic conversations could invite people to bring the “whole person” to work (i.e. both heart and head), thereby encouraging more thorough perspectives and meaningful commitments to the organisation’s vision (Kelly and Zak 1999:232).

Senior public managers should act as leaders of transformation who understand bureaucratic inertia and forces that are resistant to change in organisations. This insight will help them create the energy to overcome these mentioned challenges and move the organisation forward. A typical organisational culture leads to stability, safety and conformity. Therefore, attempts to modify or alter this culture may cause anxiety and discomfort (Tichy and Devannah 1986:148). Strategic conversations are particularly relevant for dealing with such complexities. The reason is that these conversations may not only sensitise employees about the need for adjustment and change, but also maintain stability and control during times of change (Gabriel 2000:231).

Daly, Teague and Kitchen (2003:71) refer to strategic conversations as “complexity-reducing mechanisms”. Conversations about change can be seen as a “polyphonic orchestration of an organisation’s many voices” (Christensen and Morsing 2005:56). Rather than viewing an organisation as a single body with a sole (management) voice that relates one “grand story”, it should be regarded as an orchestra of multiple diverse instruments and voices, each capable of performing in its own register and delivering its own distinctive sound (Denning 2006:42).

Spender and Strong (2014:1) argue that organisations have access to a significant, untapped source of sustainable competitive advantage and are generally unaware of it. Building on Shirky’s (2010) notion of the “cognitive surplus”,

the mentioned scholars regard an organisation's staff complement as "a massive amount of energy and imagination, informed by deep knowledge and experience ... it is already paid for, but rarely deployed". Anderson (in Spender and Strong 2014:iii) states that the matter of strategic conversations "redirects focus to the pent-up, under-utilised asset – employees and the powerful ideas they are capable of generating". In support, Hardy (in Spender and Strong 2014:iii) asserts that the intelligence of employees should be regarded as the most important asset of an organisation. Employees, as active contributors to strategy, should be engaged meaningfully to shape the future of an organisation.

As pointed out by Lent (in Spender and Strong 2014:iii), sustained success needs a large number of entrepreneurs – the employees. In the same vein, Maddock (in Spender and Strong 2014:iii) terms strategic conversations the "secret sauce" of an innovative organisation since it gives the organisation the ability to sustain a culture that is agile and in sync with the environment. Fried (in Spender and Strong 2014:iii) views strategic conversations as means to engage a range of stakeholders, creating strategic benefits.

A literature review revealed that the success of strategic conversations generally entails organisational leaders' ability to articulate a clear and compelling vision and strategy for the future of the organisation (cf. Deetz, Tracy and Simpson 2000; Gay, Mahoney and Graves 2005). A powerful strategic narrative typically paints a picture of how an organisation's past, present, and future fit together in a broader strategic context. Such a narrative integrates functional activities, namely messages, and behavioural examples set by the organisation's leaders (Harris and Nelson 2008:98). Von Krogh and Roos (1995:390) regard storytelling as the key leadership competency for the 21st century. Storytelling can connect employees to strategy by providing understanding, belief and, ultimately, motivation for employees' personal contribution (Ertel and Solomon 2012:38).

Senior public managers' fundamental role as organisational leaders is to foster active dialogue and multilateral exchange of ideas in an organisation. They should also facilitate common purpose, understanding of the organisation's strategic goals, integration and coordination between functional units, and continually analyse the morale and levels of the staff's commitment (Gillis 2006:67). Di Virgilio and Ludema (2009:69) suggest that organisations' leaders should generate energy for action by engaging people in conversations that provide the latter with a sense of autonomy, competence and relatedness. In the process, energy is expressed in the form of support, time, compensation and resources, which contribute to the success of the work. Continual attention to conversations that invite the co-creation of desired futures helps create "upward spirals of energy", thereby increasing the probability of successful change over time. Leaders can thus be considered the driving force of strategic conversations and should place active communication central in all their actions.

According to Boal and Schultz (2007:411), the role of strategic leaders is creating and communicating a vision of the future and sustaining an effective culture within the organisation. In addition, they must develop key competencies and capabilities as well as organisational structures, processes, and controls. Boal and Schultz (2007:415) further suggest that strategic leadership moves organisations to the “edge of chaos” and out of stasis. Strategic leaders promote a “strange attraction” in organisations. In this regard, they provide balance between the inertia of Weberian-style bureaucracy, and anarchy. The result is ordered and fluid responsiveness of an innovative and creative organisation. Such leaders should develop, focus, and enable an organisation’s structural, human, and social capital and capabilities to meet real-time opportunities and threats.

Finally, strategic leadership makes sense of and gives meaning to environmental turbulence and ambiguity. These leaders provide a vision and road map that allow an organisation to evolve and innovate. In this respect, Berry (2001:59) notes that stories within the organisation provide leaders with a fundamental understanding of employees’ experiences and behaviour. The exchange of such narratives allows the members to develop a new “collective story” through which they function as a social learning system. Thus, stories or conversations form an important part of learning within an organisation and help balance the past, present, and future. Storytelling is an essential skill for strategic leaders who wish to promote it. Burt (1992) typifies strategic leaders as “cognitive network brokers” who interact with a wide range of networks, inside and outside the boundaries of the organisation.

It is evident that, at a fundamental level, strategic conversations potentially can shape an organisation’s future direction. These conversations help build networks of collaboration that become embodied in an organisation’s systems, structures, strategies, processes, procedures, and culture (cf. Weick 1979; Ford 1999). Such networks may utilise “open sky brainstorming” sessions to stimulate ideas and attain strategic results (Hermansson and Na 2008:24). Di Virgilio and Ludema (2009) point out that strategic conversations “create energy for action” to reap strategic benefits. Networks of collaboration are generally embodied in organisations’ systems, structures, strategies, processes, procedures and culture (cf. Weick 1979; Ford 1999). Stories help reduce uncertainty within an organisation by the following actions: (a) rapidly disseminating information; (b) framing the organisation’s events in terms of its value-laden features; and (c) promoting members’ identification with the organisation’s culture by establishing a social context for them (Smith and Keyton 2001).

On the other hand, more informal conversations in organisations often lead to increased insecurity, crises of confidence and rumour mongering, which in the long-term may incur major costs (DiFonzo and Bordia 1998; Proctor and Doukakis 2003). Therefore, a degree of coordination and discipline is required in any conversation flow within an organisation. The challenge is to channel

conversations appropriately so that it helps strengthen members' resilience within the organisation. This requires conversations to unlock the operational or "how-to" dimensions. These dimensions further imply answers to questions such as: In what context should conversations be utilised? And: What are the intentions, purpose, and expected outcomes of such conversations? Pinnegar and Daynes (2006) further confirm that multiple issues arise during the collecting, analysing, and relating of individual stories in organisations. These issues raise further questions such as: Who owns the story? Who can tell it? Who can change it? Whose version is convincing? What happens when narratives within an organisation compete or clash? Answers to these and similar questions are necessary to frame strategic conversations in public institutions.

It could be argued that certain aspects and benefits of strategic conversations in private sector settings, as outlined above, may not resonate in the public sector. Scholars such as Waldo (1990), Stillman (1992) and Henry (1995), convincingly argue that the socio-political, administrative, moral-ethical, and legal contexts of the public sector in many respects must be distinguished from those of the private sector. The question, therefore, is clear: Which dimensions and elements of strategic conversations can indeed be transferred to government settings?

STRATEGIC CONVERSATIONS IN GOVERNMENT

The advent of the New Public Administration and New Public Management paradigms, led to the adoption and adaptation of typical application techniques, and practices from private sector management to the context of the public sector (cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie 2002:9). Utilising strategic management in the government sphere is, therefore, not a new undertaking. The government of South Africa, similar to governments around the world, has set up comprehensive strategic architecture to facilitate strategic thinking – and conversations – on global, national, and departmental levels.

On a global scale, the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals, for example, set out broad parameters for countries' strategic frameworks. Furthermore, international treaties (such as BRICS), protocols and conventions guide the strategic conversations between political leaders and senior public officials of countries. On a national level, mechanisms are implemented such as the National Planning Commission, the Presidential State of the Nation Address (SONA), the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), Provincial Growth and Development Strategies, as well as municipal Integrated Development Plans. These legal instruments give effect to government's strategic or "apex" priorities. Within government departments, senior public managers have to design strategic plans based on the National Treasury Instructions,

and manage the execution of these plans within the respective branches and sections of departments. Conversations in government reveal a further dimension, which Spender and Strong (2014:175) typify as “collaborative partnerships” between public institutions and civil society. The engagement of civil society has the potential to improve citizens’ participation in government decisions significantly. This interaction also helps provide feedback for public service deliveries, holds public managers accountable for their actions, and legitimises government institutions’ actions in general.

For a government setting, Howick and Eden (2011:868–878) summarise the following key strategic tasks of public sector leaders:

- Identify and prioritise strategic issues by engaging employees on all managerial levels of the organisation. This gives the relevant stakeholders the opportunity to provide input to a hierarchical causal map, starting with operational statements at the bottom and leading to broader, more strategic issues (clusters, portfolios) at the top.
- Develop a system of organisational goals as these emerge from employees’ stories. Mintzberg and Waters (1985:257) refer to “emergent strategising” to help drive the organisation into the future.
- Analyse competitive advantages by obtaining input from all members within the organisation. Thereafter, align the strategic goals and the organisation’s distinctive competencies.


The strategic context highlighted above, entails directional official and unofficial conversations in government. It is evident that at least three directional dimensions of strategic conversations are evident:

- *extra-governmental*: between government officials and civil society;
- *inter-governmental*: between officials from different spheres of government; and
- *intra-governmental*: between managers and employees within government institutions.

These three levels of conversations imply a cyclical as well as a top-down and bottom-up process. Figure 1 illustrates this cyclical and directional nature of strategic conversations flowing in public institutions.

As viewed from Figure 1, strategic conversations as a top-down process generally take place when (a) organisational leaders convey strategy-relevant stories to ensure employees’ commitment to the organisation’s vision and strategic goals. The purpose of these conversations should be to inform employees about the strategic direction of the organisation. This would give them a sense of direction and focus and involve them in operationalising these goals in the best interests of the organisation (Hermansson and Na 2008:24). These conversations

Figure 1: Strategic conversations in government



Source: (Author's own construction)

should facilitate the design and commitment to (b) unit goals. The goals of units, sections or branches, in turn, culminate in individual goals and ultimately (c) the organisation's culture. The organisation's culture includes aspects such as the sharing of traditions, rituals, and symbols, a sense of openness to communicate, transparency about the organisation's issues, and unity in diversity. This culture sets the tone for (d) conversations and the sharing of stories between employees at the various levels in the organisation. These conversations, in general, provide employees with important information about their jobs, the organisation, the environment and each other. The conversations typically motivate, build trust, create shared identity and encourage involvement (Sull and Spinoza 2007:79). It furthermore provides a way for employees to express their emotions, share hopes and ambitions, and celebrate others' accomplishments. These conversations function as catalysts to pinpoint (e) emergent trends and events within the organisation. In other words, it refers to those priority issues that should appear on the action agenda of managers. Emergent issues, in turn, are funnelled to senior managers as (f) strategic clusters. In managerial terms, this refers to strategic portfolios. These may include issues such as the organisation's performance, staff morale, utilisation of resources, and alternative service-delivery matters. These strategic clusters will be channelled back to (a) portfolio leaders for them to act upon, and the cycle continues.

Figure 1 lays the visual foundation for the design of a conceptual framework to analyse strategic conversations in government. The following section builds on this illustration by highlighting key concepts, constructs, and variables that can be considered for future scientific investigations into this phenomenon.

TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSING STRATEGIC CONVERSATIONS IN GOVERNMENT

Scholars involved in the analysis of narratives in organisations generally adopt an interpretivist and post-modern (anti-positivistic) stance. They point out that stories open valuable windows into the emotional, political and symbolic lives of organisations and thus offer a powerful instrument for research (that is, analytic interpretations). In general, contemporary scholars view these narratives as instruments that give them access to deeper realities within an organisation, closely linked to its members' experiences. Narrative research is often viewed as a qualitative method from the social sciences that is used to frame adaptation communication in various disciplines in social studies and the humanities.

Polkinghorne (1998) and Pinnegar and Daynes (2006) suggest that narratives can be both a method of data collection, and the focus of study. As a method, it begins with the experiences expressed in lived and related stories of individuals (Czarniawska 2004:17). Thus, scholars devote much effort in constructing a "Theory of Organisational Storytelling". Typical research approaches and theories for scientific inquiry into organisational narratives include:

- social constructivism;
- organisational symbolism;
- social exchange theory;
- critical theory;
- positive psychology;
- organisations as complex adaptive systems (including chaos and complexity theory, Quantum Mechanics);
- agency theory;
- general communication theory;
- organisational theory; and
- narrative paradigm theory.

Davies and Lewis (1971:29) and Shoemaker, Tankard and Lasorsa (2004) explain that scientific sense-making is often embodied in frameworks and models that are representations of phenomena under investigation. Abdulghafar (2011:108) refers to the concept "framework" as a structure to analyse the relationships among variables, but emphasises that they are generally "tentative" and "incomplete". In this regard, Van der Waldt (2013:42) argues that conceptual frameworks provide an ideal means to analyse theoretical and practical problems. Lave and March (1993:vii) view conceptual frameworks as useful instruments to help predict and understand phenomena. However, Abdulghafar (2011:111) confirms that conceptual frameworks do not usually include all the features of the phenomenon under investigation; only those necessary for research purposes.


Regarding the features of a conceptual framework, it could be a written or visual presentation. Its function is to explain either graphically, or in narrative form, the key factors, concepts or variables and its potential interrelationships (Gemino and Wand 2005:307). Conceptual frameworks further guide the instrumentation's research design and data collection. In a quantitative research design, conceptual frameworks are typically developed after an extensive literature review to provide the structure and content for the study as a whole based on literature and personal experience (Avis 2003:996). The framework is revisited when presenting the conclusions of the study. In a qualitative research design, conceptual frameworks typically serve as initial frameworks after an extensive literature review. These initial frameworks are refined further after participants' views and other issues are captured and analysed (Sokolowski and Banks 2010:332).

In developing such a conceptual framework, researchers should firstly identify the key concepts and constructs relevant to the subject area of the study. They require adequate operational definitions for the constructs and concepts included in the framework (Avis 2003:997). Based on a literature review, researchers should secondly, identify variables that may potentially intervene or influence these concepts and constructs and, thirdly determine the potential (causal) relationship between these variables in order to map them (Green 2014:35).

By following the above-mentioned steps, conceptual frameworks help researchers move beyond mere descriptions of "what", to explanations of "why" and "how". As such these explanations provide a reference structure or draw boundaries for the discussion of the literature, methodology and research results. Conceptual frameworks, however, also hold challenges, for example, as being typically influenced by the experience and a *priori* knowledge of the researcher. Furthermore, once the framework is designed it could influence the researcher's thinking. Prominence may be given to certain elements, whereas others are excluded or simply ignored (that is, reductionism).

Literature generally reveals two types of conceptual frameworks. On a more abstract level, the first type is what Mouton and Marais (1988:137) refer to as a content framework that gives structure to theory and models. This type of framework sets out the variables and its possible interrelationship. On a more practical level, the second type of conceptual framework entails a framework on which studies will be based. Smit (1985:9) emphasises the importance of such a conceptual framework functioning as a "work scheme" for the research's design and as framework for data collection. Maree (2012:42) concurs and views a conceptual framework as the researcher's "map of the territory being investigated; a think tool". These "maps" can be regarded as process frameworks that depict the stages which activities traverse from initiation to completion. This latter application of conceptual frameworks, namely as a work scheme for analysis, will be explored for purposes of this article.

Figure 2: Conceptual framework for strategic conversations in government



Source: (Author's own construction)

Figure 2 depicts the key concepts and constructs as part of a conceptual map or work scheme. This framework is proposed for scientific investigations into strategic conversations in government.

It is suggested that this conceptual framework provides a solid foundation for a further scientific analysis of strategic conversations in public institutions. The author does not claim completeness; the framework should rather be regarded as a work in progress.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC CONVERSATIONS IN GOVERNMENT

Informal and formal usage of conversations as strategic instrument in government both are still fairly new concepts. Therefore, there are several queries, which also offer opportunities for future research. A few relevant questions are listed below:

- Which characteristics of an effective organisational narrative can be applied consistently within the context of government?
- At what level of the organisation can strategic conversations be most effective?
- In what way should the most compelling conversations be designed?

- How should the impact of strategic conversations be measured? In other words, which metrics could be used to gauge the intrinsic value of strategic conversations?
- How should conversations be used to identify strategic issues?
- How could strategic direction be influenced by organisational aspects such as the ethos of public service, social and personal values, the culture, and managerial styles?

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article was to explore the potential contributions that conversations can make as strategic instruments in government settings. Based on this insight, a conceptual framework was proposed to analyse strategic conversations in public sector institutions. The researcher established first, that conversations in the private sector add significant value by addressing contemporary strategic challenges. However, the analyses of strategic conversations' applicability to government settings is still a largely untapped field of empirical investigation. Inferences drawn from a literature survey suggest that strategic conversations can be similar to the general application of strategic management in the public sector. In this respect, such conversations have a significant value, provided that the unique socio-political context of the government is taken into consideration.

The second contribution of the article was designing a conceptual framework to aid the analysis of strategic conversations in government. It was found that such conversations have a highly multidisciplinary nature. Therefore, analysts should borrow theories, approaches, and principles from a wide range of disciplines and fields of study. These should include organisation and management studies, communication, social exchange, culture, and group dynamics. On a more abstract level, such a multidisciplinary approach could help refine the proposed conceptual framework, and on a practical level, improve the general strategic performance of government institutions.

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Public Participation in Integrated Development Planning

A Case of the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the integrated development planning process and explain how these dynamics influence the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) outcomes in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM). Public participation power dynamics pervasively influence the outcomes of IDP processes, in that forms of power shape the dynamics and outcomes of that process. The dialectical relationship between manifestations of power and community agency shape in complex ways why and how public participation might or might not be a space for giving voice to community priorities and needs. The article found that there is a lack of adequate requisite knowledge and understanding of the strategic nature of the IDP, as well as a lack of competences for the public to meaningfully participate. Results further show that some residents are excluded from public participation spaces in the IDP, based on their political beliefs and affiliation. Other critically important voices are thus excluded. Findings thus suggest that public participation in the IDP in the BCMM is tokenistic, mostly done to comply with statutory and regulatory precepts. This implies that public participation spaces in the BCMM often fail to influence IDP outcomes responsive to community priorities and needs. Power dynamics during public participation in the IDP in process marginalise and exclude less powerful interests.

INTRODUCTION

Public participation in integrated development planning processes is today seen as a critical cornerstone towards a sustainable democracy. It is also seen by many theorists as having a positive effect on the quality of democracy and as significantly contributing towards the enhancement of grass-roots democracy. However, in reality not all groups and their well-being are always represented. Public participation spaces often neglect and fail to pay attention to the ability of such spaces to manage complex power dynamics among stakeholders in the IDP review processes. The dialectical relationship between manifestations of power and community agency shape in complex ways why and how public participation might or might not be a space for giving voice to community priorities and needs.

This study explored the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP process in the BCMM and sought to explain how such dynamics influenced IDP outcomes. The study raises critical consciousness in municipal residents, communities and public officials, affording them the power to address and challenge visible, hidden and invisible forms of power through behavioural changes, collective agency, and local institutional, systemic and social reforms, and thereby promotes distributive justice and social equity.

Using an exploratory and explanatory case study research design and a mixed-method research approach, a survey questionnaire located within the positivist paradigm and quantitative methodology, as well as focus group discussions situated within the interpretive paradigm and qualitative methodology were used as data collection methods. A final purposeful sample (n=229) consisting of ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders was used for the survey questionnaire.

The BCMM was initially established as a local municipality in 2000. This was after South Africa's reorganisation of municipal areas. The municipality is named after the Buffalo River, at whose mouth lies the only river port in South Africa (BCMM 2014/2015:13; Main 2015:46). On 18 May 2011 it was converted into a metropolitan municipality after it was separated from the Amathole District Municipality (Main 2015:46). There is an estimated 247 759 households with an average household size of 3.3 persons per household. The BCMM, according to Statistics South Africa (2016:3–4), has an estimated population of 810 528.

The transition to a metro necessitated the development of a revised IDP. This revision had to guide development in the BCMM over the period 2011 to 2016. The BCMM advocates values that are committed to serving its communities. This is in addition to providing services that are consistent with good governance, transparency and accountability. In its municipal situation analysis undertaken towards the development of a revised IDP, the BCMM identified a number of challenges, constraints and inefficiencies that hampered the manner in which

communities participate in the affairs of the municipality (BCMM 2011–2016:99–109). In response to the identified challenges and work towards the realisation of the municipal vision, it has identified six strategic focal areas and set long-term strategic objectives to achieve them. Strategic objective two of the IDP specifically envisions the desire for the municipality to be an institutionally efficient and effective city that inclusively works with communities (BCMM 2012/13).

This article is structured in two parts. The first focuses on conceptual and theoretical approaches to public participation as point of departure. A brief discussion on the Network Governance Theory, reflexive and strategic meta-governance as well as fundamentals of IDP will follow. The second part of the article seeks to unmask the underlying dynamics that are undocumented and often not well recognised in municipal planning and therefore reports on the results of the study.

CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL UNDERPINNING OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

The IDP of a municipality establishes structures and sets goals to meet societal needs, and it develops approaches to achieve the goals and respective objectives. This plan is prepared within realistic time frames. The plan also recognises the complex interrelationships between various aspects of development, such as environmental, economic, political, social, ethical, spatial and infrastructural relations. At its core the IDP places emphasis on the public participation of all stakeholders in developing local governance strategies that support citizens' understandings of how an area within a community needs to develop in a democratic dispensation. To promote and support public participation in the integrated development planning process, local government structures are expected to promote meaningful public participation by a number of stakeholders.

Stakeholders, for the purpose of this article, refers to any group or individuals who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the municipality's goals and respective objectives and can make a significant contribution in the IDP process. Public participation is, however, inevitably pervaded by the presence of power dynamics that impinge upon successful IDP outcomes (Cullen, Tucker, Snyder, Lema and Duncan 2014:262). Gaventa (2006) sought to understand the different ways in which power operates. Gaventa (2006:25) developed a three-dimensional model of power based on the 'Rubik's Cube': the power cube. The power cube's three dimensions represent the forms, spaces and levels of power (Cornwall 2002:52; Brosnan 2012:46).

Rolfe's (2016:99) community empowerment thesis encapsulates community voice and localist discourses. There are three key empowerment elements,

loosely defined as resources, organisational capacity and 'community wiring' (Conservative Party 2009:2; Somerville 2011:10–11). Stiglitz (2002:163–182) accentuates the primacy of participatory processes ('voice', 'openness' and 'transparency') as citizen-empowering conditions for promoting successful long-term development. Dreze and Sen (2002:3) feel that 'opportunity' was instrumental to a people-centred development approach. For Dreze and Sen (2002:6–7), these opportunities increase the realm of community activity and freedom.

Conceptual and theoretical approaches to public participation

Public participation is often conceptualised as grass-roots community engagement (Forester 2006:447–456; Gbaffou 2008:1–7). It is seen as a deliberate attempt in which members of the public (as individuals, members of groups or group representatives) take part in a goal-oriented activity – in this case the IDP review process. The values of public participation include access, consultation, inclusiveness, openness, shared decisions and transparency (Manjoo and Czapskiy 2008:1–10). According to Murambo (2008:124–127), citizens' voices and participation are at the centre of a democratic dispensation. It is therefore reasoned that public participation needs to be an open and accountable process through which communities can exchange opinions and influence agenda-setting and, ultimately, decision-making (DPLG 2005:1).

In their theorisation, Webler and Tuler (2002:181) view public participation within the context of three theoretical approaches, namely management theory, procedural justice and communicative approaches. Ramarajan (2014:593) views it in the context of social identity theory. This approach views citizen identity in a public participation context as an acquired social identity (Hafer and Ran 2016:213). The procedural justice approach is constructed on the perceptions of formal procedures used for decision-making (Theodorakopoulos, Ram and Kakabadse 2015:238). Shafritz and Russell (2005:434) add a social equity dimension, which advances fairness in the delivery of public services. Procedural justice is premised on distributive justice, support for outcomes, citizen trust and service satisfaction. A power-dependence theory approach to public participation thinking is, in contrast, predicated on the relative dependency of actors on one another for resources of value and the outcome of the social exchange (Wilson and Game 2002:174). Rational-choice versions of exchange theory are further based on the assumption that dispersal of power among stakeholders is established by the availability of resources from alternative exchange relations in networks (Yamaguchi, Gillmore and Cook 1988:851). Exchange theorists therefore assume that during public participation in the IDP process, stakeholders 'exercise both reward and punishment or coercive power' (Molm 1989:1417–1418).

Network governance theory

Public participation in the IDP can further be understood within the analytical lens and framework of network governance theory. Network governance refers to the concept of pluricentric forms of governance as contrasted to multicentric forms (that is, the market) and hierarchical forms (for example, the state) (Lo 2018:650). It emphasises partnership, cooperation and collaboration (Leach and Percy-Smith 2001:30). Network governance is often an outcome of governing processes that are no longer entirely organised by the government. In this case, network governance is subject to negotiations among public, semi-public and private stakeholders (Lo 2018:650). Ultimately, stylised theories (for example, governability theory, interdependence theory, integration theory and governmentality theory) define governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing 2005:208).

Reflexive and strategic meta-governance

Interactive governance is understood as a response by public decision-makers to steer a society that is considered ungovernable by hierarchical methods (Torfing, Peters, Pierre and Sørensen 2012:31). Torfing *et al.* (2012:122) refer to meta-governance as the 'governance of governance'. According to the authors, meta-governance involves the deliberate aim to expedite and manage more or less self-regulating processes of network governance. The tools of meta-governance include both 'hands-off methods' (that is, institutional strategy, and goal and framework steering) associated with New Public Management reforms as well as 'hands-on' methods (that is, process management and direct participation) associated with the traditional categorised steering (Torfing *et al.* 2012:135). However, Torfing *et al.* (2012:51) recognise a disregard of power relations within formal research of network governance. Such neglect results in a depoliticised view of networked policy processes.

Fundamentals of integrated development planning

Planning is critically important in that it aims to determine future circumstances and identifies the measures needed to realise them (Van der Walldt and Du Toit 2007:183). A carefully planned system of municipal administration ultimately becomes cost-effective, efficient and easier to operate than a haphazardly planned one. Integrated development planning is a form of planning that comprises association and co-ordination between all sectors that have an impact on the service delivery of a municipality. The IDP assists municipalities directly in achieving their developmental mandates as it thoroughly guides all the activities of municipalities within their areas of jurisdiction (Nzimakwe 2012:143). For Cameron (2005:336), IDPs are the flagship development tools of municipalities. Thornhill and Cloete

(2014:90) explain that an IDP consists of a process through which different municipalities obtain a Strategic Development Plan (SDP) for a five-year period while also promoting integration by balancing social and economic pillars of sustainability. It is cautioned that if the IDP is not aligned with the budget, it is highly unlikely that the objectives, targets and outcomes of such plans will be realised. Public participation in integrated development planning must therefore be a participatory planning process aimed at integrating central strategies, in order to support the optimal allocation of scarce resources (Naude and Van Rensburg 2007:399).

As indicated in sections 28(2) and (3) and 29(1)(b) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, a bottom-up structured decision-making process, which allows broad public participation, is a requirement of the IDP process. Section 25(1) of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 obliges municipalities to adopt a single, strategic and inclusive plan for the development of the municipality. In section 26(a)–(i) the core components of IDPs are pronounced. The process to be followed for the planning, drafting, adopting and reviewing of IDPs is defined in sections 27–34 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.

In terms of Section 8(c)(d)(g) and (b) and Section 9(b)(d) and (f) of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, metropolitan municipalities may have ward committees (Van der Waldt 2014:63–64; Thornhill and Cloete 2014:75). Munzhedzi and Phago (2013:43–45), however, identify several reasons why some ward committees may be dysfunctional. The identified factors include, among others: political party influences, limited resources, communication asymmetries, unhealthy and dysfunctional stakeholder relations, racial as well as ethnic alignments, and political patronage. Mbuyisa (2013:126) further points to the presence of disempowering power asymmetries, which make it impossible to have meaningful public participation in communities.

Analytical framework for public participation power dynamics

Public participation power dynamics pose challenges for participatory democracy in local governance. Massey (2005:152) advises that public participation and integrated development planning spaces are products of social relations, which are often conflicting and unequal, and are a product of conflicting social identities, power asymmetries and value-laden power struggles. Public participation spaces are therefore never neutral (Cornwall 2002:8). Formally created, ‘invited’ spaces such as ward committees, *imbizos*, mayoral roadshows and public hearings often crowd out other spaces (Smith and De Visser 2009:16–22). Stakeholders’ power, capital, capacity as well as values and preferences pervasively influence which and whose interests or values are included or excluded during public participation. Power asymmetries are pervasive in various forms and at various levels, and power dynamics are constantly at play (often invisibly) when stakeholders participate in the

IDP review process (Gaventa 2006:25). Public participation in integrated development planning consequently often becomes superficial, falling short of tapping into the actual power base, where decisions affecting communities are made (Todes, Sithole and Williamson 2007:122). Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper (2008:306) concluded that only a 'privileged few' often access 'invited spaces' and that usually professional experts and powerful interests dominate and influence IDP priorities and outcomes. Gaventa's (2006:25) power cube as such theorises power dynamics in the context of three practices of power: visible, hidden and invisible.

According to Dahl (1957:203), power exists when A shapes decisions in order that B does what they would not otherwise have done. Power is thus defined as having the capability to make things happen ('power to' or 'network power'), make others do things ('power over') or prevent things from happening ('pre-emptive power') (Irazábel 2009:124). Within this conceptualisation, power dynamics must then be viewed as signifying the strategic deployment of practices of cooperation and non-cooperation through different forms of power manifested through public participation in IDP review processes. The theory of social practice views power as a force that pervades all human relations (Hearlson 2014:12). In Bourdieu's (1984:99–168) theorisation, social relations are spaces structured by capital volume and capital composition, particularly social, cultural, economic and symbolic. Bourdieu (1986:241–242) describes capital as accumulated (material, embodied or institutionalised) and presents a broad and generalised conception of social power as accumulated resources.

In contrast, Foucault (1991:79) theorises power within the power/knowledge continuum, positing that practices do not exist without a certain establishment of rationality and that such establishment of rationality is often historically rooted. The power/knowledge continuum operates as a structure of knowledge, allowing, at any particular time, certain events and patterns of thought and action, at the same time rendering others unthinkable, unsayable and undoable (Rossi 2004:1). Theoretically, Giddens's (1984:100) actor-oriented approaches propose viewing agency as dependent on the capability of the individual to 'make a difference' to a pre-existing state of affairs. For Wenger (1998:189), power has to be understood in the context of the negotiation of meaning and identity formation. Contu's (2013:291) thesis views power as situational and intertwined with the identities of the stakeholders who participate in the IDP process. Following Contu (2013:291), public participation spaces in the IDP process become arenas and sites of creation and transformation of knowledge, where tension and conflict are likely because of a clash of different identities and practices, and where different understandings of knowledge and meaning are at stake.

During public participation in the IDP process, stakeholders caught up in the process of symbolic violence remain unconscious of submitting to or exerting it. To this extent, the process of symbolic violence is then 'hidden' (Bourdieu 1984:566).

Symbolic violence manifests when society or the community miscomprehend as natural those systems of classification that are actually culturally uninformed and historical (Schubert 2008:184). As such, symbolic violence is an effective and efficient form of authority given that the powerful and authoritative need exert little energy to maintain their dominance (Schubert 2008:184). Symbolic violence is therefore everywhere and nowhere simultaneously; it manifests as power to construct reality and the ability to affect classifications, meanings and worldviews (Schubert 2008:193).

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

The study results relate to the aim and objective of the study: to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process, and to explain how the dynamics influence IDP outcomes in the BCMM. The reliability coefficient of the survey questionnaire was 0.89, suggesting that the instrument had high internal consistency. Quantitative data was analysed using Statistical Analysis Systems (SAS) Version 9.3. Varimax rotation was used to obtain factor loadings (v-f regression weights) from the survey questionnaire data set. Pearson's chi-squared test for independence was used to test for significance of associations. Given that the final sample size in the study was acceptably large ($n=229$), the normal approximation to the Mann-Whitney U test was used throughout this study, instead of the Mann-Whitney U. The Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared test was used for comparing factor variables across categories of variables with more than two categories. The results of the second part of the study survey questionnaire are reported and discussed in the subsequent sections.

Nature of public participation power dynamics in the IDP

Findings indicate that the majority of the respondents were of the view that the municipal council consults sufficiently with key stakeholders and interest groups during public participation in the IDP. These findings resonate with Bénit-Gbaffou's (2012:187) concept of the 'political society'. Within the concept of political society, the multiple relationships the marginalised (which constitute the majority of the people) have with the government are mediated. These relationships are mediated through local arrangements with local leaders, politicians and municipal officials (Bénit-Gbaffou 2012:187). This, however, inadvertently reproduces existing power structures. In this study, when the Kruskal-Wallis was used to test and compare the nature of public participation spaces in the IDP scores across age groups, educational levels and positions, results revealed that the nature of public participation in the IDP spaces scores were not significantly different across age groups ($KW=2.3$; $p=5098$). However, scores were significantly different across educational levels ($KW=12.2$;

$p=0.0023$) and positions ($KW=30.2$; $p<0.0001$). Results showing that the nature of public participation in the IDP spaces were significantly different across designations ($KW=30.2$; $p<0.0001$) could be interpreted as signifying the presence of local clientelism. Collective clientelism revolves around local party branch affiliation and loyalty (Bénit-Gbaffou 2012:187). Party structures and networks are used to access resources through the brokerage of ward committees and councillors and the use of political party networks, rent-seeking behaviour and patronage. The finding on educational levels was expected, given that inequalities are often steeped in unequal power relations, defined through forms of capital, of which education, knowledge and the resulting capacity is one such form (Bourdieu 1986:47, 241).

Empowering skills, knowledge and expertise

Results showed that 62.6% of the respondents were of the view that the public have insufficient empowering skills, knowledge and expertise capacitating them to make valuable inputs into the IDP process. Furthermore, 67% of the respondents felt that low literacy levels disempowered communities, thereby limiting their capability to participate in the IDP process. This limitation has negative ramifications on the IDP outcomes, whose end-product is expected to be sustainability, innovation, self-reliance, accountability and responsive politicians. The finding is, however, consistent with available literature regarding community strength which identifies key empowerment elements, loosely defined as resource availability, organisational capacity and 'community wiring' (Somerville 2011:10–11). Brodie, Cowling, Nissen, Paine, Jochum and Warburton (2009), for example, note that sturdy communities often have financial and other resources, physical belongings and human resources in the form of skilled, knowledgeable and assertive members.

Availability of resources

Availability of resources is often associated with community empowerment. For example, Sen and Mukherjee (2013:5) identify three dimensions of empowerment, namely: resources, agency and achievements. Resources and agency shape communities and individuals' ability to lead the lives they want to live, while achievements are a measure of whether such potential has been realised or not. Of the 218 respondents to the item on the extent to which cultural beliefs and practices influence participation, 61% were of the view that they influenced one's public participation in the IDP. Of those who responded to the item on access 74% felt that a lack of access to IDP formulation information restricts participants' ability to shape IDP outcomes, in terms of the extent to which IDP projects and programmes are responsive to community needs. Results from the survey questionnaire also revealed that there was above-average public interest

in participating in the IDP process, as 59.4% of the respondents believed that the municipal council adequately budgeted for public participation in the IDP process.

Trust, commitment and community satisfaction

Trust is a critical factor in community service satisfaction perceptions in municipalities (Walker and Hills 2014:124). Trust is defined as the willingness of a confidant to sometimes be weak based on the belief that the trustee will meet the expectation of the confidant (Kim 2005:621). Results of tests for significance of association between satisfaction with own participation in the IDP process and the items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics detected statistically significant associations for items on the municipal council's consideration of ward committee recommendations (satisfaction) ($\chi^2 = 20.9$; $p < 0.0001$), consideration of the IDP representative forum recommendations (satisfaction) ($\chi^2 = 17.0$; $p < 0.0002$), and adequacy of municipal budget for public participation in the IDP (satisfaction) ($\chi^2 = 14.2$; $p < 0.0008$). The feeling of trust again resonates with Bénit-Gbaffou's (2012:187) political society. Results from the survey questionnaire indicated high levels of trust and moderate levels of distrust in public participation spaces in the IDP.

However, the results of the chi-squared test statistic value and the corresponding p-values indicated that satisfaction with public participation in the IDP process in the BCMM had no significant associations with gender ($\chi^2 = 1.1$; $p < 0.2909$), age ($\chi^2 = 6.9$; $p < 0.0746$), educational level ($\chi^2 = 4.3$; $p < 0.3702$) and position ($\chi^2 = 5.0$; $p < 0.2907$). This finding suggests that satisfaction with public participation does not depend on demographic characteristics of respondents. Mangai's (2016:101) study on the dynamic forces of failing service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana similarly has found that satisfaction and dissatisfaction with service delivery is unrelated to gender. Moore (2013:58) argues that the public or collective is the initial point for creating public value, implying that 'public satisfaction' is a public value. Municipalities therefore create public value when they meet the needs of communities. The higher the level of needs satisfied, the higher the quantity of public value generated (Spano 2009:330).

Domination, inclusion and exclusion during public participation in the IDP process

Results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with public participation in the IDP process and the survey questionnaire items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics detected statistically significant associations for items testing the extent to which the municipal council takes into

account ward committee recommendations ($\chi^2 = 22.0$; $p < 0.0001$), the extent to which the municipal council considers IDP representative forum recommendations ($\chi^2 = 23.9$; $p < 0.0001$), insufficient skills and knowledge empowering residents to make inputs into the IDP, lack of community interest in participating in the IDP process ($\chi^2 = 18.0$; $p < 0.0001$) and the belief/perception that public participation is done to comply with local government legal precepts (compliance requirement) ($\chi^2 = 7.9$; $p < 0.0185$). These findings mirror Sprain's (2016:66) observation that done poorly, public participation can result in undemocratic outcomes by reinforcing existing power inequalities, marginalising minority perspectives, creating dysfunction in consensus or fostering cynicism. Results also suggest that the IDP process is dominated by a few committee members and that a lack of language skills during public participation negatively affected participants. As noted by Kelly, Mulgan and Muers (2002:6, cited in Spano 2009:335), local government actions or inaction can influence public value. Spano (2009:335) explains that in public value there is a fundamental idea of efficiency which 'can be both allocative – "are we doing the right things" – and technical – "are we doing them in the right way?"'. The levels of satisfaction will thus be dependent on the extent to which the created public value satisfies municipal residents' felt service needs or expectations.

Potential of public participation in the IDP to give 'voice' and to 'empower'

The study findings detected statistically significant associations for items testing whether the municipal council took into account the recommendations of ward committees ($\chi^2 = 17.6$; $p < 0.0001$) and those of the IDP representative forum ($\chi^2 = 17.4$; $p < 0.0002$). Statistically significant associations were also detected on the item testing for the availability of skills and knowledge for making informed inputs into the IDP ($\chi^2 = 7.1$; $p < 0.0289$), the item testing local community interest in participating in the IDP ($\chi^2 = 10.9$; $p < 0.0042$), the item testing for adequacy of budgets for supporting public participation in the IDP process ($\chi^2 = 15.4$; $p < 0.0004$) and the item testing whether public participation is tokenistic ($\chi^2 = 6.3$; $p < 0.0422$). These findings suggest limitations to achieving equity in representing all social establishments and interests, thereby resulting in sizeable 'community voices' and interests not being prioritised (Mbuyisa 2013:125). Friedman, Hlela and Thulare (2003:56) have similarly found that barriers such as lack of transport, lack of technical and specialised skills to provide legal understanding of documents and policy, and limitations in language skills and capacity to compile written submissions incapacitated communities during public participation. Likewise, Munzhedzi and Phago (2013:43–45) have found that political party influences, limited resources, communication, unhealthy stakeholder relations, racial alignment and patronage were further barriers to public participation.

CONCLUSIONS

While public participation in the IDP is generally perceived as a way of opening the civic, political and co-governance structures, and of providing access to policy agendas and responses, the study findings show that these forms of empowerment could be more symbolic than meaningful. Results suggest that communities often lack knowledge and capacity to grapple with the strategic nature of the IDP and therefore lack the critical empowering functions. At a theoretical level this mirrors vulnerabilities resulting from weak interrelated dimensions of human development, including process freedoms (agency), opportunity freedoms and sustainability-mobilising capacity, as well as capabilities and functional operations. It also emerged that residents were often discouraged from participating in the IDP process due to the length and incomprehensibility of the IDP documents.

Compounded with inadequate knowledge, capacity/capability and resources and language barriers, such a state of affairs further disempowers, marginalises and excludes residents from meaningfully participating and articulating community priorities and needs in the IDP. Furthermore, some residents were excluded based on their political beliefs and affiliation. The research study therefore generally concluded that public participation power dynamics shape IDP outcomes in the BCMM in multiple and complex ways that still marginalise less powerful interests and communities. The implications are that such systematic failure to include and empower stakeholders, who may also be less interested in strategic local governance issues, are less civically active and more cynical, continue to negatively influence the outcomes of public participation in the IDP process; thereby ultimately undermining the creation of public value, distributive justice and social equity, as well as the legitimacy and democratic value of public participation.

NOTE

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Collaborative Governance in Reducing Drug-related Crime in the Public Housing Environment in Cape Town

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ABSTRACT

Public housing is often associated with urban decay and high crime levels, including drug-related crime. Attempts to manage drug abuse in this environment are rarely done on a collaborative basis, which has the unfortunate effect of the potential impact of these efforts being diluted. This is due to the fact that these programmes do not benefit from the strength of a combined effort, the insights of those who can approach the problem from other perspectives, or a satisfactory level of community involvement. In an attempt to determine whether such difficulties could be overcome by means of the meticulous application of the principles of collaborative governance, a qualitative experiment was undertaken in the gang- and drug-infested public housing environment of the City of Cape Town. The experiment described in this article was therefore aimed at testing the effectiveness of a specific management approach i.e. collaborative governance; in order to determine whether it could result in a reduction of drug-related crime in Cape Town's public housing environment. A hypothesis was accordingly developed for this purpose and subjected to empirical testing. This article describes the steps taken to ensure the implementation of the principles of collaborative governance, the challenges experienced and the results achieved. This article arrives at a conclusion as to whether the particular management approach followed, i.e. collaborative governance, had an influence on the drug problem in the selected social housing complex or not.

INTRODUCTION

Public housing is often associated with poverty, urban decay and high crime levels, including drug-related crimes. This is an international phenomenon and public institutions the world over implemented numerous programmes aimed at controlling and preventing crime in public housing developments. Such programmes usually require the introduction of a number of specific crime-prevention and social development strategies, but they do not consider an integrated management approach to be followed. This practice more often than not results in potentially successful crime-prevention initiatives being implemented in isolation by the public institution that is primarily responsible for it, for example, law enforcement, to target drug dealers with sting operations and address the disorder; it also leads to the housing department separately pursuing the eviction of residents involved in criminal activity and town planners attempting to improve the environmental design by creating defensible spaces and limiting opportunities for crime. Such a disjointed approach has the unfortunate effect of diluting the potential impact of these initiatives, as they do not benefit from the strength of a combined effort, the insights of those who can approach the problem from other perspectives, or a satisfactory level of community involvement.

In an attempt to determine whether such difficulties could be overcome by means of the meticulous application of a specific management approach, rather than an exclusive focus on particular crime-prevention strategies, a qualitative experiment was undertaken in the gang- and drug-infested public housing environment of the City of Cape Town. This experiment was aimed at testing the effectiveness of a specific management approach in order to determine if it could result in a reduction of drug-related crimes in Cape Town's public housing environment. The following hypothesis was developed for this purpose: Collaborative governance is an effective management approach for addressing drug-related crime in Cape Town's public housing environment. The experiment was conducted at the 10th Avenue flats situated in the Cape Town suburb of Ravensmead. This complex comprises 144 residential units situated in five double-story blocks and it houses more than 1 100 residents.

MANAGING DRUG ABUSE: COLLABORATION REQUIREMENTS

The drug abuse problem is complex in nature with consequences that reach far beyond a single solution. Numerous arguments are therefore put forward for managing drug abuse by means of an integrated multidisciplinary approach, if sustainable results are to be achieved. This means that the problem needs to be

addressed on a collective basis by all relevant stakeholders from all four perspectives from which drug abuse can be approached, i.e. social development-based prevention, harm reduction, law enforcement, and crime prevention. This approach is supported by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) (INCB 2012:6), the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (UNODC 2013:43), the Government of the United Kingdom (Hamilton, Rubin & Singleton 2012:6), the United States Government (USA 2014:4) and the South African Government (RSA 2013:13). In practice, however, the drug problem is rarely addressed on a holistic basis.

Preliminary research pointed to the possibility that, in addressing a societal problem, collaborative governance may represent a vehicle by means of which a holistic design could be manifested. Achieving this holistic design is a prerequisite for added public value to be secured, which is an important objective of a collaborative management approach. The experiment was therefore aimed at testing the effectiveness of the practical application of the principles of collaborative governance in order to determine if it could result in a reduction in drug-related crime in Cape Town's public housing environment.

The preliminary research also pointed to the fact that past failures to achieve proper collaboration in respect of managing drug abuse is largely the result of the absence of an integrated management system that is specifically designed for the purposes of ensuring the implementation of collaborative governance as a management approach. To this end, Bond, Curran, Francis, Kirkpatrick and Lee (2000:5–6) maintain that the development of an integrated system will require: (a) the introduction of certain arrangements relating to procedures and processes; (b) the establishment of methodological guidelines; and (c) the development of an understanding of cross-disciplinary matters. In order to give effect to these requirements in the context of the proposed collaborative management approach to Cape Town's drug abuse problem, it is necessary to introduce a number of features, outlined below.

The establishment of an appropriate policy framework

The key policy requirements for applying a collaborative management approach to Cape Town's drug-abuse problem are the development of a new collaborative strategy that will guide and direct the management of drug abuse in the City as well as necessary additions to existing legislation.

In order to give effect to the above-mentioned requirements for the development of an integrated system as espoused by Bond *et al.* (2000:5–6), it is necessary that the establishment of the proposed integrated management system be rooted in a comprehensive drug abuse reduction strategy that will direct all aspects of drug abuse reduction efforts in Cape Town. This strategy should be in line with the National Drug Master Plan (NDMP), which requires that drug abuse

be addressed from all four perspectives of *social development-based prevention, harm reduction, law enforcement, and crime prevention*. The City Government of Cape Town should have ownership of the strategy, which will be regarded as fulfilling the requirements of Sections 58 (d) and 61 (b) of the Prevention of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act 70 of 2008, i.e. that provincial and local government plans should be developed that are in line with the NDMP.

Developing an ideal management structure

The use of collaborative structures has become a preferred method of implementing public programmes. This is because the integration of service delivery that is made possible by means of the collaboration of service providers will result in less fragmentation and improved coordination, which in turn leads to effective service delivery with positive outcomes (Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini and Nasi 2010:1). The establishment of a network of collaborative groups that will work together in addressing the drug abuse problem is the second requirement for the integrated management system. This network of collaborative groups is to be embodied in an integrated structure which, according to Uys and Jessa (2016:187), will contribute to establishing a community of stakeholders that are well-connected. Such a structure can be expected to provide for the necessary level of flexibility, agility and potential for growth that will enable the management system to create public value (Uys and Jessa 2016:187).

In designing the different collaborative groups making up this network, it is important to ensure that these groups should be specifically focused on what they will be aiming to achieve, that the necessary resources that will be at their disposal, and that the stakeholders that are expected to participate in them; be clearly identified (Hemmati 2002:209). It is also necessary that sufficient time and resources be invested in this design process, as failure at this critical stage can result in the collaborative group not being able to function effectively (Hemmati 2002:210). In addition, it is essential that the final design of the network of collaborative groups should ensure that a holistic approach is being implemented, i.e. not only that every collaborative group in the management process forms a whole in its own right, but also that it forms an interlocking part of a larger whole. In order to achieve this, it is imperative that every collaborative group be established and its functioning properly overseen by the collaborative group preceding it in the hierarchical sequence. If local authorities, communities or the private sector were to establish their own collaborative groups, such groups would function independently of the provincial collaborative group and might even compete for the same resources. This will most probably be a duplication of the current situation, which is not conducive to optimum collaboration, the creation of a holistic design and therefore the realisation of additional public value.

Adopting a set of management directives

In order to give effect to the requirements for the development of an integrated system as propounded by Bond *et al.* (2000:5–6), it is necessary that the implementation of the proposed collaborative management approach be underpinned by a set of management directives that need to be stipulated in the inter-governance agreement to collaborate and entrenched in the Drug Abuse Reduction Strategy. This agreement will therefore be binding on all stakeholders that are represented in the various collaborative groups. The purpose of this set of management directives is to ensure the proper implementation of the principles of collaborative governance and therefore the integrated implementation of drug abuse reduction interventions. As these directives will be incorporated into the inter-governance agreement to collaborate, and as they will prescribe procedures that ensure accountability, democracy, transparency, inclusiveness and mutual trust, they will also comply with the requirements indicated by Hemmati (2002:213) for designing a collaborative group. These directives should include:

- Understanding the concept of holism;
- All stakeholders to participate;
- Selecting appropriate persons to serve on the collaborative groups;
- Agreeing on the main objective;
- Building capacity to collaborate;
- Delegation of authority;
- Terms of reference;
- Providing feedback;
- Accountability.

Monitoring and evaluation

A monitoring and evaluation procedure should be introduced to determine whether the outcomes and impacts achieved are satisfactory or if corrective measures need to be applied.

The implementation of such an integrated management system will enable the application of the key principles of collaborative governance.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

Collaborative governance refers to the process and structures of public management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, the private sector and civil society (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh 2011:2) through coordination, cooperation and collaboration (Uys

2014:2) in order to realise a public goal that could not otherwise be accomplished (Emerson *et al.* 2011:2) and which creates public value as a result of the creative nature of the process (Huxham 1993:603; Uys 2014:2).

In order to ensure actual collaboration, it is important that the key elements of collaborative governance be observed in the integrated management process. These are outlined below.

Establishing a collaborative group

The partnerships that result from collaboration and which are formalised through an agreement between the different parties should ideally be “given concrete expression through the creation of an organisational structure”, where decisions can be taken that will direct the actions and resource utilisation of the individual parties to the agreement (Lowndes & Skelcher 2002:302). The collaborative group is where collaboration across boundaries takes place to inform decision-making and conduct (Emerson *et al.* 2011:2). Requirements relevant to designing a collaborative group include the following:

- designing the group has to be a collaborative effort;
- involving the different stakeholders in the design process;
- participants need to agree on procedures to be followed;
- procedures have to ensure accountability, democracy, transparency, inclusiveness and mutual trust; and
- adopting a Memorandum of Understanding or a Terms of Reference for the group (Hemmati 2002:213–214).

All stakeholders to participate

Participation of all stakeholders is an essential element of collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash 2008:544; Emerson *et al.* 2011:2; O’Leary & Vij 2012:508). This includes direct community involvement, which is important for effective collaboration to be realised (Emerson *et al.* 2011:2; Sullivan & Skelcher 2002:167).

Appropriate representatives to serve on the collaborative group

Simply nominating representatives from all stakeholders to serve on a collaborative group does not equate to collaboration and rarely achieves any real impact. Only stakeholder representatives with the required level of understanding of the problem and who personally support the objectives of the collaborative group should be allowed to serve on such groups. This is imperative to achieving a “whole of society approach” (Cartwright Interview 2016).

Capacity for joint action

This element represents dedicated resources, institutional arrangements, management and knowledge. Lowndes and Skelcher (2002:302) and Sullivan and Skelcher (2002:112) support the need for such capacity within the collaborative process. The establishment of a capacity for joint action will, according to Emerson *et al.* (2011:6), lead to a number of specific actions to be taken that could not have been initiated by any of the participants in their individual capacity.

Joint decision-making

A well-established collaborative group will enable joint decision-making, and hence an important requirement of joint decision-making is that stakeholders strive to reach consensus in the decision-making process. Aiming to achieve consensus is a key element of collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash 2008:544), which requires a capacity for authoritative decision-making. It is therefore necessary that all stakeholders should arrange for the appropriate delegation of authority to their representatives. This will allow individual members to officially support recommendations made and therefore enable the collaborative group to be consensus driven.

Accountability and monitoring

Accountability and monitoring are both central to the collective management process (Ansell & Gash 2008:548). Monitoring is necessary for keeping track of what actions are being taken in real time so that corrective actions can be taken if necessary (UNODC 2006:8).

Following a holistic approach

A holistic approach is essential to achieving the additional public value which, according to Huxham (1993:603), Emerson *et al.* (2011:17), O'Leary and Vij (2012:514), Huxham and Vangen (2000:273) and Lowndes and Skelcher (2002:306), is the objective of collaborative governance. Ensuring that all relevant stakeholders are represented on the collaborative group does not, however, guarantee that a holistic approach is being followed (Cartwright Interview 2016) and it is therefore imperative that the collaborative group understands the importance of addressing the problem from all possible perspectives. The perspectives from which the drug abuse problem can be approached are:

- *Social development-based prevention*, which entails the development of children and youths through healthy and safe interventions to assist them in realising their full potential in contributing to their communities and society (UNODC 2013:1);

- *Harm reduction*, which includes addiction treatment, aftercare and re-integration programmes (RSA 2013:13);
- *Law enforcement*, which refers to drug policing operations that are launched in reaction to criminal activity. These include direct patrols in known hot-spots, raids, crackdowns and buy-bust operations (Mazerolle, Soole & Rombouts 2006:410);
- *Crime prevention*, which refers to the removal of the underlying causes of crime and therefore any activity that is undertaken for the purposes of reducing the future incidence of crime (Burger 2007:13).

Striving towards a common objective

It is essential for a collaborative group to strive towards common objectives; this will foster a sense of belonging and therefore promote *esprit de corps* (O’Leary & Vrij 2012:508).

THE REQUIREMENTS OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

Experimental research has to meet certain requirements for its results to be regarded as reliable. These requirements are outlined below.

Demonstrating a causal relationship between two variables

Experimental research demands that a causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables be demonstrated. Demonstrating this causal relationship when it comes to complex societal problems like drug abuse, however, will be difficult to achieve if the duration of the experiment cannot be sustained for at least two years and in cases where there is a lack of available and reliable addiction treatment and crime statistics. In such cases, it is deemed appropriate to identify a number of alternative factors that could serve as proxies for the drug problem and by means of which the likelihood of the problem increasing or decreasing could be determined. This methodology was therefore used in the experiment to demonstrate whether or not the management approach that was followed, i.e. collaborative governance (independent variable) had an influence on the drug problem in the selected public housing complex (dependent variable). The UNODC (2006:22) maintained that the use of proxies as performance indicators is acceptable in evaluating the implementation of drug abuse-prevention programmes as long as a definite link can be identified between the proxy indicator and that which is to be evaluated. In order to demonstrate this link between a proxy indicator and the prevalence of drug-related crime, the ‘broken windows theory’, which is well-known in the policing environment, can be of value and has been employed in this study.

The broken windows theory is based on the following analogy. If a window in a building is broken and not repaired, it will over time signal to passers-by that no one cares, that there is no one looking after the building and that there will be no consequences for breaking other windows in the building. This will in turn invite further destruction, which will lead to the decay of the building and this deterioration eventually will have a spill-over effect on the surrounding area. In practice it means that if seemingly insignificant offences are left unpunished and there is no reason for the perpetrators to fear action being taken by authorities, it will signal to other potential perpetrators that disorder is tolerated in the particular area, which will invite further disorder and eventually more serious crime (Wilson & Kelling 1982:1), for example, drug dealing.

The requirement of pre-testing and post-testing

The typical experimental design requires that the dependent variable be measured prior to exposure to the independent variable. This represents the pre-test. It also requires that the dependent variable be measured again after it has been exposed to the independent variable in order to determine the effect that the latter had on the former. This represents the post-test (Babbie & Mouton 2012:209).

While performing a pre-test might be a logical requirement for a classical laboratory experiment or laboratory-like experiment, the complexity of a qualitative field experiment will understandably not permit a single test to determine the status of the dependent variable prior to it being exposed to the independent variable. To overcome this challenge, the prevailing situation at the 10th Avenue flats prior to the introduction of the collaborative management intervention was recorded meticulously by means of observations, interviews with residents and key officials working in the area, as well as scrutinising crime statistics and other relevant documentary sources.

The requirement for experimental and control groups

In order to determine if any of the resulting effects can be attributed to the experiment itself or any other factor besides the independent variable, the classical experimental design requires the existence of a control group for comparing the research results (Babbie & Mouton 2012:210).

The establishment of a viable control group for a complex qualitative field experiment on the scale of the Ravensmead public housing safety project would have been difficult. Although there are hundreds of public housing complexes in the area of jurisdiction of the City of Cape Town with similar problems and attributes, duplicating the exact same situation to what prevails at the 10th Avenue flats in Ravensmead was simply not feasible. Therefore, for this purpose two other public housing complexes of similar size and that fall within the same municipal service

area were selected and were compared to the 10th Avenue flats regarding the prevailing levels of crime and disorder (and therefore drug abuse). The level of community cooperation experienced by the City's Housing Safety Law Enforcement Unit at the respective locations was also compared. The two control groups were the 15th Avenue flats in Elsies River and the Northway flats in Ravensmead. Adequate information for such comparisons was obtained from the Assistant Chief of Law Enforcement responsible for Housing Safety and the Principal Inspector for Housing Safety in areas adjacent to Ravensmead. This allowed for appropriate conclusions to be drawn in respect of the experimental and control groups.

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

The extent to which the key principles of collaborative governance have been implemented in managing the public housing safety initiative in the Cape Town suburb of Ravensmead will be described here.

Establishing a collaborative group

The main driver for the establishment of the collaborative group was the realisation that existing law enforcement capacity could not be expected to have any meaningful impact on the safety of public housing residents in Cape Town, and that alternative drug-related crime-prevention programmes that involve other stakeholders need to be explored. The multidisciplinary Task Team established to manage the Ravensmead housing safety project represents the collaborative group within which collaboration would take place.

As a first step towards project implementation, the project manager, who represented the City of Cape Town's Safety and Security Department, embarked on a process of sensitising other relevant departments within the City government on what was intended. This was done in order to seek and secure support for possible collaboration. These initial discussions also enabled the establishment of the multidisciplinary Task Team, reaching agreement on the inclusion of community representatives and the adoption of terms of reference for the Task Team. The requirements relevant to designing a collaborative group were thus met (Charles Interview 2016; Scheepers 2016:3–4).

All stakeholders to participate

The collaborative management intervention did enable the various stakeholders to work across boundaries and to strive towards achieving a common objective.

This was evident from the level of cooperation received from relevant departments and their willingness to participate in the Task Team. Participants included representatives from the City of Cape Town's Departments for Safety and Security, Social Development, Health, Sports & Recreation and Human Settlements, as well as the local South African Police Service (SAPS) station. All these role players from different disciplines understood the urgency of an effective safety and security intervention in public housing where drug-related crime is known to be the order of the day (Scheepers 2016:3–4).

The necessary participation was achieved early in the process and this can be attributed to a shared motivation, i.e. a real desire among the different stakeholders to be part of a meaningful contribution towards improving the lives of those living in public housing. With the exception of the Human Settlements Directorate of the City of Cape Town, all stakeholders participated in the Task Team and contributed in accordance with their commitments. The participation of the Human Settlements Directorate was limited to sporadic attendance at Task Team meetings. Reasons for this lack of participation could not be established. This Directorate also failed to meet any of its commitments in terms of service delivery (for example, fixing of broken drain-pipes and filling of pot-holes) to the residents of the 10th Avenue flats. Relationship building between representatives from the City of Cape Town and the residents was required before community cooperation and participation could be achieved. As will be indicated later in this article, direct community participation was achieved, which proved to be invaluable to the collaborative process.

Appropriate representatives to serve on the collaborative group

Since the representatives from the Human Settlements Directorate of the City of Cape Town, which was a key stakeholder, failed to meet any of their commitments throughout the duration of the experiment, the collaborative management intervention experienced challenges which created a certain level of risk to the success of the project. No other challenges were experienced on this particular matter as the other members of the Task Team proved to be valuable contributors to the collaboration effort (Charles Interview 2016).

Community participation

Recent violent gang activity as well as high levels of disorder and community mistrust made it difficult to secure a key collaborative governance requirement, namely community participation. The project administrators (members of the Task Team) persisted in their endeavours to build relationships with the residents through a series of informal engagements with various residents in order to introduce City representatives to them and to enquire about the most persistent

problems experienced by them. After an initial stabilisation period that saw an increased law enforcement presence over a period of three months as well as an improved relationship with local residents, the establishment of a community action forum was realised. The forum was comprised of 16 community representatives, two of which were elected to serve on the Task Team. These resident representatives were elected at a community meeting open to all residents (Scheepers 2016:4–5).

Capacity for joint action

The *capacity for joint action* was present in the management intervention (Task Team) in the form of a project manager from the Safety and Security Directorate of the City of Cape Town and the expertise contributed by other members of the Task Team. It was also present in the extent to which the representatives from other stakeholders were able to utilise their departmental resources towards the objectives of the project and a budget provided by the Safety and Security Directorate. The Task Team's budget of R50 000 was originally earmarked for spending on the housing safety initiative and the project manager secured authorisation for the funds to be spent in accordance with the decisions of the Task Team. This arrangement provided the Task Team with a real *capacity for joint action* as decisions could be implemented without them having to be ratified by higher-level managers who might not have had the insight that members of the Task Team enjoyed. As the Safety and Security Directorate of the City of Cape Town was the only stakeholder that could commit financial resources to the management intervention, the Task Team's *capacity for joint action* was limited. Although this represented a challenge, it nevertheless afforded an opportunity to ensure inclusion of this vital component of collaboration in managing the project. As an additional management initiative, an application was submitted to the National Department of Public Service and Administration for grant funding, which constituted another important step in securing additional capacity for the Task Team to take joint action (Charles Interview 2016; Scheepers 2016:6).

As predicted by Emerson *et al.* (2011:6), the fact that a *capacity for joint action* was established meant that a number of specific *actions* could be taken that could not have been initiated by any of the participants in their individual capacity, for example, active participation of residents and achieving a decrease in the levels of crime and disorder.

Joint decision-making

Making decisions on a joint basis was easily achieved in the early stages of the collaborative process. Prior to the establishment of the Task Team, the initial

participants (the City of Cape Town's Safety and Security, Social Development and Human Settlements Directorates as well as the SAPS) agreed on the need for the security situation at the 10th Avenue flats to be stabilised as a first step. Once the Task Team was established, its members accepted the requirement of *joint decision-making* and supported it from the outset after the project manager briefed them on the principles of collaborative governance at a Task Team meeting (Charles Interview 2016; Scheepers 2016:5–6).

Consensus driven

The Task Team managed to reach consensus in all their decisions. Members of the Task Team had, in terms of their existing capacity as senior officials from the various public entities, the authority to commit limited resources to the project and this contributed significantly to their ability to reach consensus (Charles Interview 2016; Scheepers 2016:6–7).

Striving towards a common objective

The Task Team managed to maintain this requirement throughout the nine and a half-month period (duration of the experiment) by meeting on a regular basis to monitor progress and the commitment of members. The fact that the necessary buy-in from all governmental stakeholders represented in the Task Team was achieved early on, is attributed to a shared acknowledgement among these officials that public housing in Cape Town is not adequately managed and that it is a major generator of crime and disorder, which is to a large extent drug-related. Out of this acknowledgement stemmed a shared desire among these officials to contribute to the project on their own initiative. The same level of commitment and desire to participate was evident as far as the SAPS and community representatives were concerned (Charles, Interview 2016).

Accountability and monitoring

Despite a high level of collaboration being achieved within the Task Team, challenges were experienced concerning non-attendance of Task Team meetings by key role players such as the City's Human Settlement's Directorate and non-adherence to time frames in addressing service requests from the public, for example, repairing of broken drain-pipes and replacing light-bulbs. The main challenge in respect of collaborative governance was therefore the Task Team's inability to hold its official members accountable for the implementation of decisions taken and to monitor the progress made by individual members in respect of agreed-upon tasks. These failures were mainly on the part of the Human Settlements

Directorate of the City of Cape Town who, as mentioned earlier, failed to attend meetings on a regular basis and to deliver on maintenance-related commitments made (City of Cape Town 2015:15).

It was realised that this difficulty arose from the fact that support from executive management (the Executive Directors from the various City Directorates) had not been secured from all stakeholders when the project was initiated. Such support was sought only from the Executive Director of the City's Safety and Security Directorate. Participation from all the other stakeholders was obtained through negotiations with the respective area managers and mid-level management staff. The result was that the participation of key stakeholders such as the SAPS, the City's Human Settlements Directorate, the City's Social Development and Early Childhood Development Directorate, the City's Sport and Recreation Department and City Health; depended solely on the interest and level of commitment from the individual officials and that the Task Team had no authority to hold members accountable.

This lack of commitment from the Human Settlements Directorate was reported at a formal meeting of the City's Social Cluster Executive Management Team Subcommittee (City of Cape Town 2015:15). As a result, this Subcommittee decided that officials from all relevant directorates be formally nominated to serve on the Task Team. In addition, the project manager requested an audience with the SAPS Station Commander in Ravensmead for the purpose of achieving the same level of commitment from the SAPS which is a national department. These actions led to officials representing all relevant stakeholders being formally nominated and tasked with participating in the Task Team. This enabled the Task Team to hold members accountable for the implementation of decisions taken and commitments made. As a result, the monitoring of progress made by individual members of the Task Team also became possible.

Following a holistic approach

The Task Team succeeded in managing the Ravensmead public housing safety project from all four perspectives from which drug abuse can be approached, namely, *social development-based prevention*, *harm reduction*, *law enforcement* and *crime prevention*. It therefore followed a holistic approach for managing drug abuse.

OUTCOMES OF THE EXPERIMENT

The outcomes of the experiment are presented here in the context of meeting the requirements of experimental research. The manner in which these requirements have been met was described earlier in this article.

The relationship between the independent and dependent variables

In order to demonstrate a causal relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable, it was necessary to demonstrate that the particular approach followed in managing the Ravensmead Public Housing Safety Project, i.e. collaborative governance (independent variable), had an influence on the drug problem in that housing development in Ravensmead (dependent variable). As previously explained, it could, however, not be reasonably expected that a change in the status of the drug problem would be detectable in the experiment population after a period of only nine and a half months (the duration of the experiment). This is because of the complex nature of the problem (especially within a developing context), the extent of the problem within the experimental population, and the lack of available and reliable addiction treatment and crime statistics relevant to the public housing complex. As a result, it was deemed appropriate to identify a number of alternative factors which could serve as proxies for the drug problem and by means of which the likelihood of the problem increasing or decreasing could be determined. The seven proxies identified for purposes of the field experiment are described below.

Proxy 1: Residents' experience of the prevalence of crime and disorder

The two resident representatives on the Task Team were requested to give their impression on this matter during an interview. Both indicated that the prevalence of crime and disorder had been reduced since the inception of the project (Fortuin Interview 2015; Presens Interview 2015). As crime and anti-social behaviour are – in terms of the broken windows theory – associated with the creation of an environment where drug dealing can flourish, it can be deduced that drug dealers at the 10th Avenue flats had to become more cautious in their illicit activities and that the sustained reduction in the prevalence of crime and disorder would have had a limiting effect on such activities.

Proxy 2: The experience of crime and disorder by the local SAPS and municipal law enforcement

At a Task Team meeting held during the sixth month of the experiment the SAPS representative indicated that no crimes had been reported by residents during the preceding two-month period. Complaints regarding anti-social behaviour had, however, been received and the SAPS were aware of the residential units from which drugs continued to be sold. The crime statistics were encouraging and the SAPS member indicated that the residents “are heading towards a peaceful community”. This state of affairs was confirmed by Ross (Interview 2015b), who represented the City of Cape Town’s Law Enforcement Department when he also indicated a

reduced presence of drug dealers in communal areas of the 10th Avenue flats. Ross (2015a:1) also referred to a general reduction in crime in his feedback report during September 2015 directed to his Departmental Head. It therefore follows that, as is the case with Proxy 1, a sustained reduction in levels of crime could be expected to have a limiting effect on drug dealing on the premises.

Proxy 3: Any visible changes perceived in respect of the presence of suspected drug dealers on the premises

Law enforcement officers who inspected the premises on a regular basis were of the opinion that the presence of suspected drug dealers became less noticeable (Ross Interview 2015b). Fortuin (Interview 2015) and Presens (Interview 2015) confirmed that, although drug dealing on the premises was still a major concern, the higher levels of visibility that had been created with the installation of peepholes and lighting made it more difficult for drug dealers to conduct their business on the premises.

Proxy 4: The extent to which the residents are informed of actions that can be taken in the event of the possible addiction of a family member

Fortuin (Interview 2015) and Presens (Interview 2015) confirmed that the majority of residents were well aware of how to access the free addiction treatment programmes offered by the City at various centres across the metropolitan area. This was the result of the information campaign launched by City Health at the request of the Task Team. The two interviewees also indicated that the information was made available to them in a format that was easy to understand and with the necessary clarity.

Proxy 5: Perceptions on the level of community cohesion

Members of the Task Team indicated that community cohesion within the housing complex had improved since the project's inception. They attributed this to a combination of the various efforts of the Task Team, which included the establishment of the 16-member community action forum, targeted sport and recreation programmes, community-based crime-prevention training, improved law enforcement and the involvement of community members in the decision-making process. Examples of improved community cohesion provided by them during the interviews (Charles Interview 2016; Fortuin Interview 2015; Presens Interview 2015) were as follows:

- When the Task Team launched the graffiti clean-up campaign, they had no difficulty in securing the assistance of children residing at the complex. The children contributed to the effort with a sense of commitment and understood the importance of their contribution. They were of the opinion that the children's cooperation in future disorder-prevention initiatives would be relatively

easily secured and indicated that this would not have been possible prior to the inception of the project;

- The level of cooperation achieved within the 16-member community action forum was significant. These members seem to have realised that they are all members of the same team with the power to have a sustainable impact on their quality of life. This was evident by the willingness of members to make their residential units available for meetings, their willingness to become involved in arranging such meetings and a general eagerness to make sure that all attendees were served with beverages during the meetings.

After the residents were briefed on the role that the City's Safety and Security Directorate could play in supporting a neighbourhood watch, a number of residents indicated that they would be willing to participate in neighbourhood watch patrols. This level of community participation was not present during the launching stage of the project and is indicative of an improved level of community cohesion. In addition, Ross (2015a:1) reported that "a keen sense of wanting to change the neighbourhood can be felt in the project". The visible manifestation of a strong sense of community cohesion and the resulting increased sense of ownership and responsibility towards neighbours could lead to the creation of an environment that is less conducive to street-level drug dealing.

Proxy 6: Perceptions on the level of personal safety

An increased level of activity by residents could be observed in the communal areas of the premises. This is attributed to improved community perceptions on the level of personal safety that resulted from the physical improvements to the premises and the fact that disorderly behaviour such as loitering and spraying graffiti had been addressed. Fortuin (Interview 2015) and Presens (Interview 2015), supported these findings. An improved sense of personal safety can, in accordance with the broken windows theory, be expected to result in more freedom of movement of law-abiding residents, which in turn can be expected to limit opportunities for drug dealers to proceed with their illicit activities.

Proxy 7: Physical improvements on the premises that could be classified as situational crime prevention measures aimed at reducing anonymity and increasing surveillance

The improved lighting and installation of peepholes contributed much to improving the level of community surveillance and creating a level of discomfort for drug dealers and other criminals. The graffiti removal campaign also contributed to raising awareness among residents that some of their neighbours are taking a stand against anti-social behaviour. As gang activities go hand in hand with drug use and dealing, the removal of graffiti is especially relevant to drug-related crime

in cases where “gangsta tagging” (gang graffiti) has been removed. This sends a strong message to gangsters and other offenders that the community is no longer turning a blind eye to their illicit activities.

Results achieved: the post-testing situation

The impacts/outcomes of the collaborative actions that were taken by the Task Team represent the *emerging properties* that resulted from the collaborative approach that was followed. *Emerging properties* refers to the results of a holistic design being implemented successfully and therefore to a certain level of creativity or public value that could not have been achieved by individual stakeholders. Data gathered by means of the collaborative management project points to the following *emerging properties* being achieved as a result of managing the Ravensmead public housing safety project in accordance to the principles of collaborative governance:

- The level of community participation, despite the high levels of mistrust and apprehension that existed among the residents, is an achievement in itself. This includes attendance of and active participation in Community Action Forum and Task Team meetings.
- The level of support and participation from other City Departments and the SAPS at an early stage of the project was achieved relatively easily. This means that, despite the fact that the project was not initiated through a political or top management directive, the officials participating did so by choice and not on instruction. As indicated earlier, the City’s Human Settlements Directorate was an exception. Overall, however, officials from the City and SAPS displayed an exceptional eagerness to be part of the collaborative effort, which is regarded as an *emerging property*.
- The community-initiated graffiti clean-up campaign represents a significant development, as it points to an understanding of basic crime-prevention principles and an acceptance that community involvement is necessary, even if seemingly minor or insignificant. The fact that local children participated willingly – and indications are that they could be easily recruited for further community-based crime-prevention initiatives – is most encouraging. The creativity and increased public value associated with this initiative surely means that it can be regarded as an *emerging property*.
- The understanding that the resident representatives on the Task Team developed in respect of the city’s management processes to be followed in order to get things done (for example, the logging of and responding to maintenance requests, policing-related service requests and other municipal service requests); led to an improved relationship between residents and the government of the City. It contributed to breaking down the strong “us vs them” mentality which had existed prior to the intervention.

- The Ravensmead public housing safety project was elevated in a matter of months from a fairly low-key crime-prevention initiative to a project which is supported by the Executive Mayor for expansion; this results in it being perceived as having added public value. It therefore represents a significant *emerging property*.
- The increased level of community cohesion (for example, community assistance with the graffiti clean-up campaign and the level of support that the members of the Community Action Forum enjoyed) identified in the study likewise represents a significant *emerging property*.
- The general sense that the residents of the 10th Avenue flats are eager to effect change in their neighbourhood is of particular importance, as an increase in community participation will be essential for the sustainability of the initiative. It is therefore also regarded as an *emerging property*.
- The significant reduction in crime and disorderly conduct, and therefore increased levels of safety, as suggested by the data, is not something that can be achieved easily and could only be the result of the Task Team's combined efforts. It is therefore also regarded as an *emerging property*.

None of these *emerging properties* could be identified in the pre-test. The data gathered during the collaborative management project therefore supports the notion that the management of a societal problem in accordance with the principles of collaborative governance can result in *emerging properties* being realised. The *emerging properties* are the practical manifestations of a holistic approach to management being followed. It can therefore be concluded that the Task Team did succeed in applying a collaborative management approach in the Ravensmead public housing safety project.

Comparing the experimental group with the control group

The way in which the requirements for experimental and control groups were met was described earlier in this article. To this end, Ross (Interview 2015b), Snyders (2016:1) and Petersen (2016:1) confirmed that:

- the reduction in crime and disorder experienced at the experimental group (10th Avenue flats in Ravensmead) was not experienced in any of the two control groups (the 15th Avenue flats in Elsie's River and the Northway flats in Ravensmead);
- the poor level of cooperation from the community at the control groups prior to the experiment remained constant.

It can therefore be deduced that the positive results achieved with the experimental group resulted from the effective management intervention that had been introduced.

CONCLUSION

Judging from the research results, it can be concluded that the Task Team succeeded to a large extent in managing the Ravensmead public housing safety project in accordance with the principles of collaborative governance. The main challenges in this regard proved to be the Task Team's inability to hold members accountable for attendance of meetings and implementation of the decisions it took, as well as the difficulty in monitoring the progress made by individual members in respect of agreed-upon tasks.

The data gathered as a result of the experimental research described in this article has provided valuable insight into the contribution that the actual implementation of collaborative governance can have in managing a proven drug-related crime-prevention strategy, i.e. in securing safe public housing. It is, however, interesting to note that the decision to manage the Ravensmead public housing safety project in accordance with the principles of collaborative governance resulted in what was essentially a 'crime-prevention' initiative to be managed from the other three perspectives as well, i.e. *social development-based prevention*, *harm reduction* and *law enforcement*, and therefore from a holistic perspective.

For meaningful progress to be achieved with the reduction of drug abuse, the problem should be approached holistically and managed from an all-inclusive collaborative perspective. This means that if the benefits that such an approach can bring (*emerging properties*) are to be pursued in the management of a societal problem, a particular set of management principles that is conducive to creating the ideal environment for a holistic design to be implemented, will have to be adopted. The key to effectively addressing the Western Cape's methamphetamine problem therefore does not lie in specific drug-reduction strategies or practices, but rather in following a specific approach to managing the problem, i.e. collaborative governance.

NOTE

- * This article is based on a thesis entitled *Collaborative Governance: A Holistic Approach to Managing the Methamphetamine Problem in the Western Cape* by Dr A J Visser under the supervision of Prof F Uys.

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Remuneration Variables that Play a Role in Attracting and Retaining Academic Staff at Public Higher Education Institutions

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ABSTRACT

The article focuses on the core elements that attract employees to join an institution, as well as aspects that encourage staff retention. Employee-based rewards and continuous engagement are interdependent. When aligned with employee preferences, these variables could play a significant role in institutional performance and employee turnover. More specifically, the article aims to determine how fair, equitable, consistent and transparent remuneration structures could attract and retain employees. In addition, performance-based remuneration is examined within an environment where both internal and external factors influence an institution's remuneration policy. The article concludes with a short summary of the possible impact that remuneration may have on attracting and retaining academic staff; specifically from different generational groupings, gender and racial cohorts.

INTRODUCTION

In the doctoral study by Kissoonduth (2017), the challenges in attracting and retaining academic staff at higher education (HE) institutions were investigated.

Given the South African context of university governance and the imperatives of transformation, Kisoonduth (2017) focused *inter alia* on recruitment and selection, training and development and remuneration of black academic staff. For the purposes of this article, the authors specifically report on the effect of remuneration in attracting and retaining academic staff.

Attracting and retaining talented staff plays a key role in any institution's success. When employee rewards and engagement structures are aligned with employee preferences, it helps bolster institutional performance and lowers employee turnover (Nienaber 2011:1–40).

Remuneration can reinforce positive behaviour, which invariably serves as a catalyst for high institutional performance (Stone 2014:466). The Corporate Leadership Council (CLC) (2002a:8) reports that remuneration is the most important reward element that attracts employees to join an institution. However, the evidence suggests that it plays a less-important role in retaining skilled and experienced employees (Kisoonduth 2017:407–408). On the other hand, effective remuneration practices are viewed as a viable tool to meet institutional objectives, such as boosting employee morale and attracting and retaining talented employees (Kurlander & Barton 2003:31–36). The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) (2015:38), confirms the positive correlation between employee retention, engaged employees and the financial sustainability of institutions.

In line with this, the authors commence by providing a conceptual clarification of the term 'remuneration'. In this regard, the institutional objectives and behavioural effects of remuneration are discussed with specific reference to HE. Hereafter, the authors proceed to analyse the challenges relating to attracting and retaining adequately qualified applicants to HE institutions.

In order to facilitate a performance-oriented culture within HE, job analysis and evaluation are linked to desirable payment structures and remuneration policies. Moreover, core aspects such as effective leadership and financial capacity, both within an institution and broader landscape, are analysed. The authors conclude by providing recommendations on best remuneration management practices to facilitate employee retention in HE institutions.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF REMUNERATION

Dessler (2012:240–241) defines the term 'remuneration' as providing financial reward to employees. It includes guaranteed remuneration and performance-related variables. In turn, Swanepoel, Erasmus, Van Wyk and Schen (2005:488) define remuneration as the financial and non-financial rewards that an employer provides for an employee's time, skill and effort towards fulfilling institutional job requirements.

Competitive institutions distinguish between employee remuneration and implementing strategic remuneration. With employee remuneration, staff members receive an income for performing their duties. With strategic remuneration, employers align their remuneration-related policies and practices to predefined institutional imperatives (Stone 2014:466–467).

In recent years, the definition of remuneration has evolved from mere financial rewards to a broader service-based approach. Employers have recently identified the strategic advantage of aligning remuneration with employee performance, which has a positive effect on institutional performance (Bussin 2014:149–156).

BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT OF EMPLOYEE REWARDS

Employees have five levels of needs. According to Kissoonduth (2017:112–134) these are ranked hierarchically, from physiological needs at the lowest level, to security, social, esteem and self-actualisation needs. Employees seek to satisfy each need from the lowest to the highest level. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs implies that:

- when needs on the lowest level (that is, physiological) are not met, higher-level needs will remain unfulfilled;
- the need to be remunerated for work may be aligned to the need for employment security to manage personal and professional financial commitments;
- social needs may be aligned to the need to fit into a workplace environment;
- esteem needs may be aligned with the need to be acknowledged by their peers for an area of academic excellence; and
- self-actualisation needs could relate to a sense of achievement when academics have a high research output.

Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene or dual-factor theory (Nel, Van Dijk, Haasbroek, Schultz, Sono & Werner 2005:314–379) highlights certain factors in the workplace that lead to job satisfaction, while a separate set of factors cause dissatisfaction. In this context, employee remuneration could lead to job satisfaction. However, if a talented employee feels that they are not being remunerated fairly, it could compromise retention.

Employees tend to attach their personal value to their income (Ogedegbe & Bashiru 2014:114–115). The CIPD (2015:13) indicates that employees have a subjective view of their own worth, which taints their perception of how much they should earn. Behavioural scientists (cf. Ivancevich & Matteson 2002; Newstrom & Davis 1997) add that the need for fairness is fundamental to a human being’s way of engaging with society. This interaction with one’s environment also underlines

the need for an employer to manage employee remuneration in a fair, consistent and transparent manner (Tabibinia & Lieberman 2007:90–101).

Male and female employees appear to value remuneration quite differently within the workplace. Thomas and Wise (1999 in Kissoonduth 2017) suggest that, compared to white males, previously disadvantaged groups value reward dimensions offered by the employer in a different way. Females tend to attach more value to work-life effectiveness initiatives in the workplace. In this regard, a premium is placed on remuneration based on an increase in single-parent homes. On the other hand, males tend to value competitive remuneration as they are often the main breadwinner (MacGrain 2000).

The financial investment that an employer makes in an employee should contribute towards achieving institutional objectives. Based on available literature (cf. CIPD 2015:4; Deci & Ryan 2000; George & Jones 1999; Ivancevich & Matteson 2002; Nienaber & Bussin 2009), it would appear that employers should remain mindful that remuneration has a powerful effect on human behaviour.

OBJECTIVES OF REMUNERATION

Tangible rewards appear to have a significant influence on employee retention, as monetary incentives support the employee's need for work autonomy and respect from peers. Implementing a competitive reward system is therefore a primary area of focus to change institutional behaviour (Risher in Kissoonduth 2017). It is crucial that employers align monetary investments in employees with institutional strategies (Gomez-Mejia *et al.* in Kissoonduth 2017). The payroll manager plays a key role in customising the remuneration strategy to accommodate market-related principles, as well as creating a positive institutional culture (Gerhart 2000:151).

Attracting qualified applicants

Employers that offer competitive remuneration will attract candidates with the necessary experience, skills and knowledge. However, it is debatable whether remuneration is the primary motivator for talented employees to apply for advertised vacant positions. Employers are compelled to maintain competitive remuneration standards by participating in income-related market surveys (Swanepoel *et al.* 2005:490). In Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan and the United States (US), competitive remuneration ranked the highest in terms of persuading quality applicants to join an institution (CLC 2006b:1).

Academics are attracted to HE institutions based on remuneration for their core role of teaching, research and community engagement. However, they

remain within the profession based on initiatives that influence their development and contribution to the academic profession (Bussin 2013a; Metcalf *et al.* 2005:89–101; Weale 2005 in Kisoonduth 2017).

The steady rate of retirement among seasoned academics (Tetty 2006; Kisoonduth 2017) is a concern in international HE circles. This highlights the need to recruit and retain talented younger academics. However, academics are concerned that their remuneration is not as lucrative as in the private sector (Bussin 2014). HE South Africa (HESA 2014) adds that talented black academics are leaving the HE sector for more lucrative remuneration in the private sector.

To counter the negative perception of HE income structures, Vermeulen (in Kisoonduth 2017) emphasises the importance of fair and competitive market-related remuneration to attract talented employees. The author further suggests that employers should consider paying a monetary incentive to persuade new employees to join an institution, as well as an allowance to employees who remain with the institution for a long period.

Netswera, Rankhumise and Mavundla (2005:36–40) point out that contrary to popular belief, remuneration and employee benefits are not the driving factors behind employees terminating their employment. Instead, employees review the total rewards package that the employer offers. Employers need to test employees' perceptions surrounding remuneration and benefits from time-to-time. According to the CLC (2004:1–22), employers should move away from a one-size-fits-all approach to a customised reward offering that suits employee needs. The CLC identifies competitive remuneration and employee benefits, quality managerial leadership, job fit and an enabling institutional culture that embraces diversity, as key retention drivers. Bussin (2014:110–130) agrees that employees seek a total reward package that appeals to a combination of personal and professional interests.

Retaining adequately qualified employees

Employers spend a significant amount of funds on filling vacant positions, training new appointees, as well as reskilling and upskilling existing employees to help achieve key institutional deliverables (Holtom, Mitchell & Lee in Kisoonduth 2017). Hale and Bailey (in Kisoonduth 2017) emphasise that competitive employers must subscribe to basic reward principles when striving for premium institutional results. This includes:

- paying for employee performance;
- ensuring synergy between monetary rewards and key institutional drivers;
- implementing a consulted and enabling performance management system;
- communicating the reward strategy to all role players; and
- recognising employees for excellence.

Bussin (2014:110–130) points out that remuneration is the key driver when an employee contemplates joining a new employer. However, this factor is not a priority when it comes to employee retention. As long as employee remuneration is not a source of dissatisfaction, employers should consider other reward systems that employees view as important (Nienaber & Bussin 2009:3–41). Swanepoel *et al.* (2005) emphasise that employers should maintain competitive remuneration systems.

In addition to core remuneration, Nel *et al.* (2005:278–279) highlight that talented employees place a premium on monetary and non-monetary benefits. This ranges from generous leave, retirement and medical aid provisions to work-life balance initiatives. Salisbury (in Kissoonduth 2017) adds that younger employees prefer a savings plan, while older employees prefer health insurance and a sound pension plan. Employees appear to respond positively to a competitive remuneration package, performance-linked incentive rewards and participation in institutional profit-sharing (Kinneer & Sutherland in Kissoonduth 2017).

Higginbotham (in Kissoonduth 2017) cautions that competitive remuneration is not as important as fair remuneration. This implies that employees want to know that they are being remunerated fairly compared to other employees. Lawler (in Kissoonduth 2017) proposes a pay satisfaction model that explains how employees are paid from an internal equity point of view. The author argues that pay satisfaction is influenced by congruence between the income an employee feels they should receive and the amount they actually receive. Once an employee reaches a certain pay level, respect by peers, supervisory support, development opportunities and work-life balance appears to increase in importance (Tomlinson in Kissoonduth 2017). An employee's perception of whether they receive a competitive income is linked to their commitment to achieving institutional objectives (Ogedegbe & Bashiru 2014:112–115).

Equity theorists such as Subotzky (2003 in Kissoonduth 2017), Thomas (2004 in Kissoonduth 2017) and Booysen (2007 in Kissoonduth 2017) highlight that employees seek a balance between their investment in their work, and remuneration or employer recognition (Adams 1963 in Kissoonduth 2017). An employer who prioritises work-life balances initiatives in the workplace shows visible and targeted support to facilitate employee effectiveness at work and at home (Rose in Kissoonduth 2017). By emphasising the need for work-life effectiveness initiatives, the employer acknowledges the importance of the employee's personal and family commitments and the role this plays in facilitating employee performance in the workplace.

Remuneration offers an employee the prospect of security, autonomy, recognition and a better self-esteem, which could bolster an employee's level of commitment (Hoyt & Gerdloff 1999:275–294). Likewise, Mathieu and Zajac (1990:171–94) point to a positive link between remuneration and commitment.

However, Igbaria and Greenhaus (1992 in Kissoonduth 2017) found that remuneration is positively related to institutional commitment and negatively related to turnover – provided that the remuneration was competitive. As such, competitive remuneration within the HE sector – in relation to the private sector – may be the deciding factor in terms of employee commitment and turnover.

Lucrative remuneration packages influence the retention of academics, as it fulfils a material need (Shoailb, Noor, Tirmizi & Bashir 2009 in Kissoonduth 2017). Rosser (2004 in Kissoonduth 2017) emphasises that, as remuneration affects one's ability to maintain a specific living standard during retirement, this variable plays a key role in academics' decision to remain in the profession. Tettey (2006 in Kissoonduth 2017) agrees that poor remuneration is one of the key drivers for a lack of commitment and a high turnover rate among academics. Thus, competitive remuneration will contribute positively towards retaining academic staff (HESA 2014).

The alignment between academic remuneration and career prospects in the private sector was a concern for HE leaders, as the latter is a significant drawcard (Schreuder & Coetzee in Kissoonduth 2017). Webster and Mosoetsa (2002 in Kissoonduth 2017) add that a lack of personalised remuneration-based flexibility plays a role in academics' decision to stay with an employer. Pienaar and Bester (2008:32–37) add that non-competitive remuneration is one of the most important reasons why employers find it challenging to recruit and retain academics within the HESA system. This ranges from Baby Boomers (born between 1946 and 1964) to Generations X (born between 1965 and 1980), Y (born between 1981 and 2000) and Z (millennials) (born from 2001 to date) (Lancaster & Stillman 2003 in Kissoonduth 2017).

Potgieter (2002 in Kissoonduth 2017) and Nieuwenhuizen (2009:310–324) add that being rewarded financially to finalise research publications has a significant influence on academics' retention, while a lack of research funding is a major frustration. Academic staff should be granted the opportunity to work more flexible working hours so that they can supplement their salaries by performing academic-related work in the private sector (Bussin 2014). Flexible working hours would enable academics to conduct research, perform teaching and learning duties and supervise postgraduate students (Nieuwenhuizen 2009:31–324).

In some countries, such as South Africa and Austria, workplaces have become highly unionised. In their study, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1984:594–601) found that employees who were members of a labour union were more satisfied with their income than non-unionised employees. The authors indicate that unions influence income levels through collective bargaining initiatives, which lead to signed-off agreements that increase employees' remuneration. In addition, unions also encourage employees to follow a grievance procedure when they experience unfair practice regarding their personal remuneration (Ogedegbe & Bashiru

2014:112–115). Non-union employees tend to benefit from these negotiated collective agreements (Bussin 2011). Thus, if union members fail to perform their role effectively, it could have a detrimental effect on employee motivation, productivity and staff retention.

Maintaining remunerative equity

In this regard, equity refers to whether employees perceive an employer's distribution of rewards as fair (Bussin 2014). External equity compares remuneration and job-grades across an industry, while internal equity compares the relative worth within the same institution (Swanepoel *et al.* 2005:490). Subramony (2008:786) found that employees who feel that their employer provides competitive remuneration compared to peer institutions are more likely to contribute to client satisfaction. A key factor in achieving remunerative equity would be to conduct a thorough analysis of each position's key performance indicators (KPIs) before linking it to a specific pay scale (Bussin & Huysamen 2004 in Kissoonduth 2017).

Job analysis

A job analysis process attempts to gather as much information as possible regarding different positions in the institution, their relationship with one another, their alignment with institutional direction and detail about the complexity and volume of each position (Nel *et al.* 2005:13–195). According to Nel *et al.* (2005:272–275) job analysis aims to gather and organise information concerning the tasks, duties and responsibilities of specific jobs. Employees' dissatisfaction regarding their remuneration often stems from their job grade (Nel *et al.* 2005:205). They tend to believe that their job grade should be higher, especially where they are subject to a higher workload and more complex responsibilities (Oshagbemi 1996 in Kissoonduth 2017).

Job evaluation

Job evaluation determines the worth of a position's content in relation to other jobs within the same institution (Dessler 2012:244). Job evaluation aims to identify and weigh the important characteristics that define each position (Cascio 1991:429). The job description's content must be up to date, relevant and agreed-upon between the line manager and the department responsible for structural design before the job description is evaluated (Nel *et al.* 2005). Using an inaccurate job description in the workplace will lead to a misalignment in KPIs and wasteful expenditure (Swanepoel *et al.* 2011 in Kissoonduth 2017).

Each job description should be evaluated in terms of the complexity, skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions (Bussin & Huysamen 2004:45–54). To enable an accurate evaluation of a position, subject matter experts should present

the content of the job description to a trained and experienced job evaluation panel (Main *et al.* 2008 in Kissoonduth 2017). Job evaluations enable employers to create and implement a market-related hierarchical pay-scale (Nel *et al.* 2005:272–273).

If the job evaluation panel presents a flawed job description, incorrect remuneration will be attached to a particular job. This will ultimately contribute to the loss of skilled employees (Stone 2014:469). Nel *et al.* (2005:314–379) add that a common misconception is that the job evaluation process determines the value of the individual in the job, instead of the KPI of the actual job.

Pay surveys

This vehicle links an institution's salary ranges to similar jobs in other institutions (Bussin 2014). Industry-specific market surveys track the income ranges within specific job categories and align them with general factors such as inflation or scarcity in the market, thus maintaining external equity (Stone 2014:476).

Nel *et al.* (2005:273) highlight that most remuneration specialists compare internal remuneration with industry-related market surveys before determining pay scales. Institutions could also request a unique survey for its unique purposes (WorldatWork 2011b). After jobs have been evaluated and the grades have been established, the institution's pay structure is then updated or adjusted accordingly. However, WorldatWork (2011a) cautions that internal equitable remuneration might be compromised if credible market surveys are not used. Thus, data obtained from income surveys should be validated and tested for reliability before it influences management decision-making.

The Association of Commonwealth Universities (ACU) conducted a survey of academic salaries in 46 HE institutions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom (UK). It was found that Australia's academic salaries were most competitive, followed by Canada, the UK and South Africa (HESA 2014).

At the time of the research, Canada paid the highest appointment salaries for academics, while in the UK lower-level academics were paid most generously. In all countries, academic salaries compared poorly to corresponding roles in the private sector (ACU in Kissoonduth 2017).

Pay structure

Employee remuneration is determined by the employee's job grade and performance (Bussin 2014). Once all job grades have been determined, an institution establishes a pay range for positions with a similar weighting (Nel *et al.* 2005:272–274). The salary range starts at the bottom and extends to the top of the pay scale (Stone 2014:477). Thus, employers would need to justify the relative position of an employee on the pay scale in terms of experience, skill, knowledge and performance (Bussin 2013b).

According to Swanepoel *et al.* (2005:508), the pay structuring process entails combining information from job-related evaluation with data from the market survey to establish an institutional pay structure. Importantly, pay structures should be revised according to annual salary increases so that employees maintain their relative position in the salary structure (Bussin 2013a). To promote the transparent and fair management of employee remuneration, the annual pay scale should be made available to employees on the institution's intranet (Bussin & Huysamen 2004:45–54). Swanepoel *et al.* (2005) add that a holistic pay structure with information from previous years gives employers access to employees' income history.

Remuneration appears to have a positive effect on employee retention; specifically where employees believe that their remuneration is in line with that of their peers (HESA 2014; Main *et al.* 2008:225–238). Maintaining internal and external remuneration equity implies a dependence on reliable and valid pay surveys, as well as an effective institutional job evaluation process. Moreover, the remuneration-related governance framework should be sound, transparent, consistent and secure (Bussin 2011:101–118).

Rewarding desired behaviour

The principle of performance-based monetary incentives (Bussin 2013b) is based on a return-on-investment approach within the employment market (Bussin 2014). Due to increased global competition and financial sustainability concerns, there is significant pressure on employers to perform (Stuart-Kotze 2006). Subsequently, employers resort to flexible remuneration packages that are linked to individual, group or institutional performance (Bussin 2014). Unlike guaranteed base-pay that is not linked to employee performance, incentive remuneration is aligned to employee performance (Stone 2014:493).

It can be argued that employees would have a positive attitude towards this principle if it is applied consistently, from the highest managerial level downward (Bussin 2011). However, in practice, a misalignment between performance and rewards leads to a negative institutional culture (Reingold & Wolverton 1998 in Kissoonduth 2017). Taylor (1997 in Kissoonduth 2017) and Gerhart (2000) add that the average employee is frustrated with employers who are not putting performance-based remuneration into practice.

Linking pay to performance

Employees who exceed a particular standard or performance target could benefit greatly from performance-based remuneration (Gregg, Jewell & Tonks in Kissoonduth 2017). Competitive employers argue that only employees who tend to underperform would oppose the principle of performance-based remuneration

(Purcell, Kinnie, Hutchinson, Rayton & Swart 2009). Performance-based remuneration would extend beyond short-term incentives to longer-term profit-sharing, stock ownership and gainsharing plans (Stone 2014:466–467).

In the recent past, remuneration was determined by an employee's loyal service (Bussin 2014:2–230). Bussin (2011) adds that employees would work within a bureaucracy in return for permanent employment and fixed remuneration. This trend has gradually changed. Performance-based pay has become the most significant remuneration trend in the workplace and it appears to influence employee absenteeism, turnover decisions and employee productivity (Dessler 2012:249). Gregg *et al.* (2012 in Kisoonduth 2017) point to a direct correlation between variable pay and better employee performance. Peetz (2006:132) notes performance-based remuneration reinforces line managers' prerogative to gain return-on-investment that is made in employees.

Metcalf *et al.* (2005:89–101) emphasise that academics must be rewarded for superior performance. However, employee performance must be managed fairly to ensure that the principle is respected as a differentiator (Barkhuizen & Rothmann 2006 in Kisoonduth 2017). While academics generally earn less than employees with comparable qualifications and experience in the private sector, they enter the profession based on their passion for conducting research, teaching and community engagement (Pienaar & Bester 2009:376–385; Bussin 2013a; Bussin 2014 HESA 2014). Non-competitive remuneration has necessitated academics earning additional income through other academic-related initiatives outside the institution (HESA 2014; Main *et al.* 2008:225–238). Thus, academic output should be recognised and rewarded to bolster employee performance (Ogedegbe & Bashiru 2014:112–115).

The University of South Africa (Unisa) (2013b) and the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) (2012a) found that, in practice, employers tend to reward mediocre performance that has little effect on achieving strategic deliverables. If rewards are not perceived as being allocated fairly in the workplace, it might discourage high performers (Subramony 2008:778–788). In addition, there seems to be a lack of objective job-specific performance measures, poor communication on performance-based pay, union resistance to performance-based schemes and resistance to change from pay relating to loyal service to performance-based incentives (Bussin 2014; Purcell, Kinnie, Hutchinson, Rayton & Swart 2009).

Creating a performance-oriented culture

There is a link between managing employee performance and staff retention. Institutional culture should be conducive to employee performance, while rewards should be aligned with performance (Underwood 2007b). This type of workplace culture involves a coordinated effort between interdependent partners

to convey the message of performance-related pay and should be visibly supported by institutional leaders (Spangenberg 1993:30–34).

Gerhart and Rynes (2003:189) highlight the correlation between job satisfaction and performance-related rewards. An institution's performance management system plays a key role in creating a performance-orientated culture (Ivancevich 1998 in Kissoonduth 2017). Institutional health is determined by the extent to which the work environment is supportive towards the employee and promotes an inclusive culture. Testing the institutional health index and culture will guide employers on whether there is adequate understanding regarding performance-based reward in the workplace (Kupperschmidt 2000:65–76). To optimise job retention, a performance-based reward intervention for academics should remain competitive in relation to other careers (Metcalf *et al.*; Weale 2005 in Kissoonduth 2017).

Establish 'line of sight'

Where employers implement strategic remuneration policies, line managers should ensure that employees establish a line of sight between their individual performance and that of the institution (Stone 2014:468). Employees in more senior positions tend to establish a line of sight with relative ease, as their employment contract is based on performance (Department of Education (DoE) 2009; Kakabadse, Kakabadse & Kouzmin 2004:561–582; PWC 2013).

Employers need to invest more time in ensuring that permanent lower-level employees understand how their performance influences the institution's productivity (Bussin 2013a, 2014). This is particularly relevant in institutions that are not driven by profit, such as universities or public service departments. Where employees who function individually or as part of a team are remunerated through productivity-based commission, they soon realise how non-performance affects their personal income (Heneman, Ledford & Gresham 2000).

Establish clear performance standards

When an institution makes a business decision to become a high-performing entity, leadership should implement processes to ensure that all policies, practices and resources are aligned in the same direction. The policy framework that governs performance must include clearly articulated standards to assess the relative quality and quantity of employees' work output. If the employee performance appraisal system is unreliable and lacks validity, it is unlikely that the monetary or non-monetary rewards will have any effect on future productivity levels (Franzsen 2003:131–138; Hijazi & Bhatti 2007:58–68).

The targets in the appraisal system must also inspire employees to strive for a particular performance standard (Swanepoel *et al.* 2005:511). In this regard, establishing accurate standards for job descriptions is essential to reinforce the concept of performance-related pay (Bussin 2014).

Implementing effective leadership

Institutional leadership is being compromised by top-management's excessive salaries despite a lack of actual performance (Peretomode 2012:13–17; CLC 2006a 2013). Bogle (2008 in Kissoonduth 2017) adds that in the US, the ratio of total rewards to top-management leaders of institutions to the average workers has risen from 42:1 in 1980 to 280:1 in 2004. This implies that the payment gap between top- and middle-management has grown. Bussin (2014:12–14) adds that in recent years the payment gap has narrowed slightly, as executives tend to be employed in fixed-term contracts that are aligned to individual performance. Thus, executives instil a performance-orientated culture in the institution through their own example.

Modern workplaces tend to align variable remuneration with the employee's performance. Such alignment contributes to the meaningful investment of resources and bolsters institutional performance. This is particularly the case where institutional leaders lead by example in terms of performance (Bussin 2014:133–186; Unisa 2013b; Wits 2010b; Stuart-Kotze 2006).

THE INFLUENCE OF REMUNERATION POLICIES

Remuneration policies must capture principled issues governing employee remuneration, ranging from internal and external equity, to performance-related rewards, market comparisons, salary structures, governance and communicating remuneration (Bussin & Huysamen 2004:45–54; Anthony, Perrewé & Kacmar 1999). As remuneration committees help ensure the sound governance of remuneration, they need to maintain objectivity, fairness, transparency and consistency in their resolutions (Main *et al.* 2008:225–238). Bussin and Huysamen (2004:45–54) indicate that remuneration policies are influenced by the retention of key staff, strategic thrusts, benchmarking and affordability. Ogedegbe and Bashiru (2014:112–115) add that pressure from competitors and the continuous redesign of institutions have a significant effect on the design of remuneration policies.

External factors

Institutions do not function in a vacuum and are influenced by a range of internal and external interdependent variables. The manner in which an institution reacts to interdependent variables will influence how successful it is in attracting, motivating, engaging and retaining talented employees (Bussin 2014).

Statutes

The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 regulate fair remuneration to

employees in the workplace. Fairness in terms of remuneration is linked to defensible, transparent and consistent remuneration practices. The principle of remunerating employees should withstand labour-related tests. Loopholes will result in changes to the applicable legislation, so that the remuneration of permanent and temporary employees remains defensible.

Economy

A country's economy is influenced by the consumer price index (CPI), periods of recession, the general employment rate and political factors. All of these factors play a role in whether an employer can pay employees market-related salaries (Samuel & Chipunza 2013 in Kissoonduth 2017). This implies that the annual budget National Treasury allocates to the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) to fund HE institutions might be compromised if the economy is unstable. In light of this, institutions would need to review their annual budget allocations and prioritise items that have a direct bearing on institutional objectives. Areas of over-expenditure or wasteful expenditure should also be realigned (DoE 2009:1–10). If tuition fees do not generate sufficient income and the DHET provides limited funding, universities might need to secure third-stream income sources to cover institutional priorities (HESA 2014).

Labour market

The institution's ability to remain competitive in terms of remuneration will depend on the need for a particular skill in the labour market (Swanepoel *et al.* 2005:494). The market within which an institution operates has a direct bearing on employees' salaries. Regular income-related market comparisons enable employers to keep their remuneration strategies as competitive as their budget will allow (Kakabadse *et al.* 2004:561–582). Towers Watson (2011:1–24) identifies a labour market trend where employees seek a competitive reward package as opposed to stand-alone reward elements when applying for advertised positions.

All institutions are influenced by external factors over which they have little or no control (Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) 2009; DHET 2015; Shanghai Ranking Consultancy 2015). An institution's ability to respond positively to changes in the external environment bolsters its ability to compete for knowledgeable and skilled employees within the broader national talent pool (Bussin 2014:25–44).

Internal factors

An institution's ability to pay its employees market-related salaries depends on its productivity, size and the availability of funding (Mondy, Noe, & Premeaux 1999:379).

Positioning remuneration in relation to the market

An institution needs to make a strategic decision regarding positioning its remuneration structure in the external market. Three broad pay-level options are available: The employer pays:

- higher comparable salaries than its competitors;
- below the market average; or
- higher salaries for the first six months and lags behind for the last six months of a calendar year (Bussin 2014).

Employers often compare institutional remuneration to the median of the relevant industry (50% of the market sample earns more and 50% of the market sample earns less) (Bussin 2011). Competitive employers who want to attract qualified, skilled and experienced candidates would most likely consider a leading strategy in terms of market-related remuneration (Bussin & Huysamen 2004:45–54). When adopting a leading strategy, the most important consideration is whether the institution can maintain the market position from an affordability point of view. This would depend on their funding model (Bussin 2011:79–100).

Affordability

Remuneration has a major influence on employee motivation and behaviour (Deci & Ryan 2000:227–268). However, Nel *et al.* (2005:284) state that employers should be mindful of the escalating costs of employee rewards in relation to:

- total annual cost;
- the cost of remuneration per employee;
- the ratio of human resources related to the total payroll expenditure; and
- the cost of an employee per hour to the institution.

The rate of productivity, the profit margin and the alignment to competitors determine an institution's ability to generate revenue to pay a competitive remuneration (Mondy *et al.* 1999:379).

The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC 2004 in Kissoonduth 2017) highlights the challenge HE institutions face to retain talented academics when considering financial constraints and more lucrative employment offers in the private sector and public service. This has led to a decline in productivity and increased levels of job dissatisfaction (Naidu & Govender 2004:5). The cost of replacing an employee is calculated conservatively at a minimum of 30% of an employee's annual salary and can rise to two-thirds of the annual employee salary (Netswera *et al.* 2005:36–40). In this regard, employers may have to assess the unique needs of high performers to tailor unique remuneration packages.

Employee needs

Katz and Kahn (1996:355–356) highlight that aligning remuneration to loyal service does not boost performance. Grant and Shields (2002:313–334) add that, while employers are moving towards performance-based remuneration, the previous practice eliminates the problem of biased line managers. Employees' preference for reward elements appear to be influenced by their generational grouping. Younger employees may prefer cash at the end of the month, whereas older employees may prefer a total package with an emphasis on work-life balance initiatives (Swanepoel *et al.* 2005:495).

In general, employees tend to prefer a total rewards package to a single reward system. Total rewards packages are designed in accordance with employee preferences and contribute positively to employee engagement and retention (Salaam, Alawiye & Okunlaya 2013:1–9). As these packages are more effective, employers may be required to allow employees to make distinct choices as to how their packages should be structured (Nienaber 2011:7). Small institutions might find it easier to incorporate individual choices to their payroll system. However, in large institutions, employers should consider a limited number of employee benefits catering for distinct groupings in the workplace (HR Highway 2007:18).

Academics are generally passionate about research and are motivated by the incentives that can be earned (Oosthuizen, McKay & Sharpe in Kissoonduth 2017). HE managers need to find creative solutions to reward academics adequately (Koen 2003b:511). Mid-career academics highlight that salary compression has a negative effect on employee morale (Swanepoel *et al.* 2005:493), where the gap between the salaries of top management and lower-level employees is continually growing (Randall 2006:2). Academics appear to value reward packages that include total cost to company plus the additional employee benefits (Metcalf *et al.* 2005:89–101). To curtail academic turnover, Pienaar and Bester (2009:376–385) propose an improved remuneration system, that includes a combination of remuneration plus additional employee benefits.

Job requirements

Job requirements dictate the minimum level of skills, experience and qualifications an employee needs to fill a position within an institution (Swanepoel *et al.* 2011). Skill-based pay implies an engaged and competent workforce with a positive effect on service delivery (Nel *et al.* 2005:275; Mitra, Gupta & Jenkins 1995:71–73). Where employers invest in the skills of junior employees, it may boost their level of commitment and retention. Highly skilled employees generally get rotated between jobs to enhance their development (Milkovich & Boudreau 1997:481).

Aligning remuneration with institutional results

Competitive remuneration is a strategic driver to sustain employee motivation, reduce absenteeism and enhance productivity (Bussin 2014). Van Dijk (2008 in Kisoonduth 2017) adds that investing in employee remuneration must support the employee's talent management. This implies that the role of remuneration in the attraction, retention, development and deployment pillars of talent management is interdependent and must not be managed in silos (Mshana & Manyama 2013:88–90). Lau and May (1998:211–226) highlight that top employers who are identified in credible surveys should receive competitive reward and recognition packages. Academics are motivated by the intellectual challenge of research, as well as competitive remuneration to ensure a comfortable retirement (Srinivasan 2011:81–93). Bussin (2014:130–150) adds that the remuneration policy must focus on a strategy to retain employees with scarce and critical skills.

To maintain a competitive edge within a particular industry, an employer needs to strike a balance between responding to internal and external influences of an institution. It would be impossible to survive among peer institutions if the focus remained on one area of influence (Bussin 2011:101–118).

BEST REMUNERATION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR EMPLOYEE RETENTION

From the Kisoonduth (2017) study, it was evident that HE institutions should design their remuneration practices to suit specific employee groupings. In the study by Kisoonduth, the researcher reviewed the literature on recruitment and selection, retention, training and development, and remuneration and collected data on the views of academic staff from three different HE institutions on *inter alia* remuneration. The findings suggest that a competitive employer value proposition, the reward of team performance, and the communication of remuneration strategies; are crucial to successful attraction and remuneration.

Competitive employer value proposition

Within the context of aligning remuneration to inherent talent, a number of best practices are relevant. Nienaber and Bussin (2009:5–41) highlight a trend among employers to offer a total guaranteed package system, customising remuneration to suit individual needs and lifestyle preferences, as well as an emphasis on performance-related pay structures. Bussin (2014:92) adds that employers tend to provide a combination of offerings that are relevant to an employee. This competitive employer value proposition includes progressive career paths, inspirational leadership, a healthy organisational culture and differentiated employee rewards.

An attractive all-inclusive employer value proposition plays a more significant role in employee retention than a stand-alone item, such as competitive remuneration (CLC 2006a:1–30).

The study by Kissoonduth (2017:407–408) provided for an even more nuanced approach to remuneration. Respondents indicated that remuneration was the most appealing reward factor influencing their recruitment. Work-life balance initiatives and performance and recognition interventions followed remuneration as appeal factors. Female respondents preferred work-life balance initiatives, possibly due to the flexibility of working hours combined with their responsibilities toward families. Remuneration also appeared to influence the single category academics most when compared to academics in the “golden nest” category. The senior academic level appeared to place a premium on employee benefits possibly in view of pending retirement. Remuneration appears to be a more important consideration during the attraction phase as compared to the retention phase.

Rewarding team performance

Bussin (2013a:107–115) highlights that, in future, remuneration packages will be aligned towards team performance, as opposed to individual performance. Thus, employees would need to excel within a team environment and appreciate how group performance influences the institution.

Communication of remuneration strategies

Ivancevich and Matteson (2002:200) emphasise the importance of communicating crucial aspects of the remuneration strategy to employees to elevate their understanding and to build trust in the employer. Where competitive reward offerings are not communicated adequately to staff, retention of experienced and skilled employees will continue to be a challenge. Lastly, auditors Price Waterhouse Cooper (2013:9) adds that institutional remuneration offerings should be as simple as possible to ensure effective management and adequate understanding by employees.

CONCLUSION

Employee rewards, specifically remuneration, is a strategic enabler to ensure a high-performing institution. To reach that goal, institutional and human resource (HR) leaders must understand that employees attach their personal worth, and the value that the employer ascribes to them, to their income. Remuneration appears to be more important for job-seekers than after being employed at an institution.

Moreover, employees seem to prefer a total rewards package that is personalised to suit individual and generational preferences.

An institution's remuneration strategy determines to which extent the economy affects its ability to pay market-related salaries. The institution's market-related remuneration strategy also depends on its financial position. The retention of talented employees is based on whether an employer offers competitive remuneration packages and not purely remuneration in exchange for employment.

There is no such thing as a perfect employee remuneration system. Each institution needs to draw from best remuneration practices within a specific industry and tailor-make its remuneration strategy to suit unique needs. A fair, consistent and defensible remuneration strategy is likely to earn the employees' trust. While employees tend to look for a total rewards package that addresses personal and professional needs, employers are willing to pay the required remuneration for employees who are skilled and experienced.

NOTE

- * This article is partly based on an unpublished doctoral thesis of Dr K Kisoonduth. The doctoral thesis is entitled: *Talent Management: Attracting and Retaining Academic Staff at Selected Public Higher Education Institutions*. The degree was conferred in 2017. Dr Kisoonduth was supervised by Prof W N Webb and Prof S B Kahn at the University of South Africa. For more information on the empirical findings of the impact of remuneration on the attraction and retention of academic staff, the reader is advised to consult the original thesis.

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Public Service Reform

The Case for Police Reform in the Bangladesh Police Service

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ABSTRACT

After independence, all commonwealth countries undertook public service reform, which is deemed crucial to promote a safe and secure environment that is conducive to economic and social growth. Police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service, as part of a larger public service reform programme was explored in this article. The purpose of the article was to unravel the reasons why administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service had not fully achieved its intended outcomes. The objective was to identify the challenges preventing effective administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. The study adopted a qualitative approach and included quantitative elements. A literature study was undertaken and semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather information. A purposive sampling method was used, which comprised of 50 participants. Based on the findings of the research study for this article, it was deduced that the progress that was made in police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service was not sufficient to translate into improved service delivery to communities. The findings of the study indicated that police reform was hampered mainly by a high degree of politicisation, a lack of political will, poor working conditions and corruption. The article argued that such challenges are likely to continue to prevent meaningful administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. A number of recommendations are therefore made in an effort to address the challenges preventing effective police reform. The aim of the article is to promote 'real and committed' reform in the Bangladesh Police Service.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Since independence the majority of Commonwealth and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries undertook administrative reform initiatives in the public service. However, it is evident that since independence in Bangladesh in 1971, the public service has mainly preserved bureaucratic practices and a hierarchical management structure (Redman 2017:1). The lack of good governance practices was also evident, such as poor accountability and public participation (Redman 2017:1). According to Jahan (2006:1), this is particularly evident in the administrative policies, procedures and systems in the Bangladesh public service. In addition, there was political interference that stifles administrative reform in the public service. This could be attributed to a lack of political commitment towards reform (Ferdousi & Qiu 2013:online). According to Ferdousi and Qiu (2013:online), there was also a misuse of power for personal gain by members of the ruling party. This state of affairs has inevitably had an impact on the role and functioning of the Bangladesh Police Service, which is part of the Bangladesh public service.

Although the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) police reform programme (PRP) was implemented in the Bangladesh Police Service, much needs to be done (International Crisis Group 2009:(i)). In addition, poor working conditions and human resource practices, as well as pervasive institutionalised corruption and the lack of service delivery further compounded the problems in the Bangladesh Police Service (Redman 2017:16–18). A Human Rights Survey undertaken by the United States Department of State (2012:1) identified significant human rights violations in Bangladesh. Among others enforced disappearances, killings, kidnappings, arbitrary detentions and torture were identified. The Bangladesh Police Service was rated as the second most corrupt department in the Bangladesh public service by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) (Transparency International Bangladesh 2012:online). The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for 2014 rated Bangladesh 144 out of 174 countries (Transparency International 2014:online).

The negligible role played by the police in Bangladesh, is undeniably a key issue facing the citizenry. In a survey undertaken in Bangladesh in 2010, the majority of citizens indicated that effective policing was lacking in communities. Furthermore, 78% of the public indicated a need for responsiveness and improved police services in communities (Redman 2017:1). It is argued that there is a need for police services by the Bangladesh Police Service in contributing to safer communities in Bangladesh.

It is against this background that the major challenges to administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service are determined and recommendations are provided to address these challenges. The article is based on a study which

aims to unravel the reasons why administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service has been ineffective. The objective of the article is to identify the challenges preventing effective administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service (Redman 2017:16). The article further premises that administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service has not translated into improved services to communities. It is also argued that political and institutional issues are mainly responsible for inhibiting tangible administrative reform (Redman 2017:16). The article confirms that the government of Bangladesh is reluctant to implement far-reaching reform, including legislative reform in its Police Service. For example, the Bangladesh Police Service is presently governed by the outdated “Colonial” Police Act of 1861.

It was important to undertake this research as there is a distinct lack of literature on police reform in the field of Public Administration, especially in developing countries such as Bangladesh (Call 2003:3). The article therefore first, provided a general introduction and a background to police reform. The research approach used in this study was also briefly outlined. Second, an overview is provided of administrative reform in Bangladesh. Third, the role of donor organisations in promoting police reform in Bangladesh was explored. Fourth, the major challenges impacting effective police reform in Bangladesh were identified and the research findings were reported. Finally, the article presented conclusions based on the findings of the research study undertaken, and it provided recommendations for consideration and possible implementation. It is argued that the findings, and recommendations of this research study as discussed in this article, would therefore be beneficial in promoting administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The research study for this article covered a period of approximately 12 years, from 2005 to 2017. The article predominantly adopted a qualitative research approach, which was deemed to be most suitable for this research. An extensive literature study was undertaken and thereafter semi-structured interviews were undertaken to gather information on the experiences, perceptions and opinions of participants (Redman 2017:16–17). An open-ended questionnaire was therefore used for this purpose. A purposive sampling was deemed suitable for this study. The sample comprised of 50 participants, high- and low-ranking officers (including retired police officers from the Bangladesh Police Service), development and aid organisations, civil servants, members of civil society and the media. The selected individuals were either directly or indirectly involved with police reform in Bangladesh. The researchers obtained permission to conduct the research study

from the government of Bangladesh. An information sheet was handed to each participant, explaining the purpose of the study, the anticipated research study outcomes, the particulars of the researcher, voluntary participation and confidentiality. The detailed information gathered in this research study during the interviews was categorised into broad themes that were compared with the existing literature. An inductive process was therefore followed for this research study as referred to by Creswell (2003:150).

OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM IN BANGLADESH

Since independence in 1971, public service reform in Bangladesh has been the leading impediment to development in the country. Although successive governments in Bangladesh have prioritised reform in the public service, the country has made very little progress. There is a lack of good governance practices, a weak economy, an unstable political system, pervasive corruption is evident, as is a lack of effective public service delivery (Ferdousi & Qiu 2013:online). The previous Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, stated that “good governance is the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting stability, peace and development in a developing country” (UNDP 2005:2).

Since 1974, public service reforms in Bangladesh have been mainly driven by international development agencies (IDAs) such as UNDP, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Rabbi & As-Saber 2012:online; Redman 2017:34). In the 1980s, the IDAs funded various development programmes in Bangladesh (Ferdousi & Qiu 2013: online). Since independence, the government of Bangladesh (GoB) introduced more than 17 reform commissions or committees to promote public service reform. More than 20 reports were prepared, which was supported by the World Bank, UNDP, ADB, Department for International Development (DFID) and USAID (Ferdousi & Qiu 2013:online). These international partners and the Bangladesh Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) emphasised areas where action was needed in order to promote administrative reform in the public service. These areas included “the elimination of outside interference in administrative decision making; the independent exercise of delegated authority by mid-level and local-level public officials; and increased public scrutiny of administration” (Redman 2017:34). Other recommendations included the promotion and continuous improvement of service delivery; the need for merit-based appointments, the promotion of professionalism and training thereof. Also, the need for suitable salary packages, the implementation of performance reviews and the review of promotion practices was recommended (Redman 2017:34). Civil society groups campaigning for civil and human rights, such as TIB and *‘Adhikar and Shushashoner*

Jonney Nagorik' (SUJON) have also recommended that the GoB implement good governance principles, such as transparency, accountability and public participation (Rabbi & As-Saber 2012:online). Most of the reports prepared, recommended the adoption of the New Public Management (NPM) model. This included interventions such as the privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Also, the contracting out of public services was highlighted. The streamlining of staff was also recommended under the NPM model. In addition, a citizen's charter was deemed essential to improve service delivery. The combating of corruption, devolution of authority to local government and the adoption of electronic governance were other critical recommendations made by most reports (Redman 2017:64; Ferdousi & Qiu 2013:online). However, very few of these recommendations were implemented by Bangladesh (Momen & Begum 2005:166; Redman 2017:34). Although the government has focused on information technology under the theme "*Digital Bangladesh*", Ferdousi and Oiu (2013:online) reiterated that public service reform in Bangladesh has degenerated into a sequence of studies and proposals or recommendations. There was little evidence of real change in the public service (Ferdousi & Qiu 2013:online). Islam (1999:1) and Redman (2017:19–20) argued that poor public administration and management in the Bangladesh public service was obvious. Islam (1999:1) and Redman (2017:19–20) therefore argued the need for 'real' and 'committed' administrative reform in the Bangladesh public service.

Administrative reform is defined as "the deliberate use of authority and influence to apply new measures to an administrative system so as to change its goals, structures and procedures with a view to improving the system for developmental purposes" (UN 1983:1). Pollit and Bouckaert (2004:5) suggested that administrative reform involves deliberate changes to the structures, processes and systems in the public service. The objective is to have a public service that is more effective, efficient and economical. The UNDP perceives effectiveness, efficiency and economy as impacting on the quality of services provided to communities (UNDP 2005:3).

Police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service is a key element of the administrative reform, which is a prerequisite for social, economic and human development in Bangladesh. While the state is responsible for rendering public services to the citizens, it is the Police Service that is to provide a safe and secure environment conducive to both development and economic growth in a country. Administrative reform is therefore essential in the Bangladesh Police Service to improve services to communities (Redman 2017:5). According to Redman (2017:5) numerous donor organisations have made efforts to promote administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service, with the aim to improve police services to communities. It is therefore essential to explore the role of donor organisations in meeting this objective.

ROLE OF DONOR ORGANISATIONS IN PROMOTING POLICE REFORM IN BANGLADESH

The United Kingdom (UK) was a major contributor to global development aid (Greening 2014:online). The total development aid for Bangladesh amounted to £300 million for 2014/2015. This included aid for the police, courts and community justice (Rogers & Evans 2011:online). In the 2013–2014 fiscal year, the UK's global security and justice assistance totalled £95 million. The PRP in the Bangladesh Police Service was also funded by other international donors (The International Crisis Group 2009:1). The PRP also received technical assistance that consisted of the dissemination of knowledge and skills, including technology sharing, training, improving efficiency, teaching, empowerment and strategic development (Redman 2017:38).

Phase I of the PRP was a five-year project funded by DFID, the European Union (EU) and the UNDP. Phase II of the project was a five-year project (2009 to 2014) with an additional year (2015) on a 'no-cost' extension basis. Phase II was funded by the DFID and the UNDP. The GoB contributed a minimal amount for Customs Duties and Value Added Tax write-offs (UNDP 2009:1). The majority of the development projects were therefore joint ventures between the international agencies and the GoB. It was thus the responsibility of the GoB to ensure that the aid money was used to serve the national interest. In the PRP, an agreement was entered into between the GoB, UNDP and the Bangladesh Police called PRODOC (Project document) to promote this goal (UNDP 2009: online).

The PRP was required to adhere to the financial rules and regulations, such as an annual audit by the Foreign Aided Projects Audit Division (FAPAD). Accountability was promoted by the UNDP mid-term reviews, annual reviews, country development document review, internal UNDP financial audit and annual DFID review. The GoB conducted monthly reviews to monitor project delivery and expenditure (Call 2003:12). Unfortunately, Phase II of the PRP ended in December 2015, with no commitment to continued support from the international donors.

Islam (1999:12) stated unequivocally that Bangladesh as a developing country, is aid-dependent. Therkildson (2001:3) argued that donors are "de facto an integral component of the reform process". Redman (2017:50) argued that administrative reform of the Police Service in Bangladesh will progress only with international support, particularly in view of the local political situation. However, DFID (2003:1) claimed that international development agencies are not efficient at assisting with development in developing countries. Nonetheless, Redman (2017:50) further argued that monitoring, evaluation and risk management should be an ongoing task of international development agencies. Redman (2017:50)

maintained that this is essential to ensure development work ‘stays on track’ and adapts to the prevailing local conditions and challenges.

The DFID (2003:1) stressed that

“donors tend to be ahistorical, apolitical and technocratic in their approach. It can be said that donors state ‘what needs to be done’ in developing countries, [rather] than to ‘make it happen’. It is obvious that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach does not work in developing countries because of the unique local context in these countries. There is a recognition that effective development aid programmes must be grounded in an understanding of the economic, social, political, cultural and institutional factors that drive change within a country” (DFID 2003:1).

Desilets-Bixler (2002:15) argued that the success of internationally aided organisations in promoting police reform is dependent on local support. Redman (2017:37) stressed that local support was clearly lacking in Bangladesh. International aid organisations therefore found it difficult to play an influential role in promoting police reform. An alarming aspect was the tendency of international donor organisations not to financially sustain police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service over an extended period (Desilets-Bixler 2002:15). It can be argued that this posed a danger to the success of police reform in Bangladesh. However, it is also crucial to explore the challenges impacting the administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service based on the empirical research undertaken in this study.

CHALLENGES IMPACTING POLICE REFORM IN BANGLADESH

Various scholars have argued that administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service has been insignificant (Redman 2017:63). In this regard, Ferdous (2014:477) claimed that research on police reform efforts in Bangladesh suggests that reform efforts have been negligible in the Police Service. Furthermore, Redman (2017:63–65), indicated that the management in the Police Service is said to be incompetent and in dire need of clear direction and that there is a clear lack of accountability and inefficiency in the Police Service. Prasad, Srivastava and Nagar (2012:5) attributed the poor police performance in Bangladesh to dysfunctional governance systems. They also claimed that the political, economic and social conditions resulted in poor policing that has hindered the reform initiatives. The political scenario of Bangladesh has been cited as one of the main causes of dismal policing (Prasad *et al.* 2012:5 in Redman 2017: 63–64).

Redman (2017: 63–64) argued that organisational changes to promote reform are the most difficult to make in the Bangladesh Police Service. This is complicated by the relations of police with government and social structures. The government and social structures tend to interfere with the functioning and the role of the Police Service. The failure of the administrative reform efforts in the Bangladesh Police Service, however, stretches over several decades (Redman 2017:63–64).


According to Rahman, Liberman, Giedraitis and Akhter (2013:4), the Bangladesh public service, has made some attempts to move away from the traditional Public Administration model and promote administrative reform (see Figure 1). The reform initiatives were aimed at implementing the NPM approach. Key targets were therefore aligned to the NPM approach in the Bangladesh public service. The goal was to be more responsive to the public needs, promote accountability and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Bangladesh public service. The aim was to also promote decentralisation; a lean public administration; improve the management processes; introduce performance incentives; promote public-private partnerships and privatisation, especially with SOEs and to ensure the achievement of specific outcomes in the Bangladesh public service. The objective was to promote administrative reform in the Bangladesh public service by moving away from the traditional Public Administration model and the adoption of the NPM approach. However, various challenges impacted the success of the reform initiatives, and caused failure. A flow diagram reflects this in Figure 1.

From Figure 1, it is evident that the major reasons for the failure of the public service reform initiatives in Bangladesh have been identified as corruption, bureaucratic obstacles such as red-tape and resistance, resulting in a failure to implement the reform initiatives. Other major reasons for the failure of the public service reform initiatives in Bangladesh are ineffective management processes; clientelism in politics; the lack of foresight and commitment; government inefficiency; politicisation in politics; factionalism and centralised administration.

Kim and Monem (2009:13), reiterated that lack of ‘political will’ to support or implement the reform initiatives has resulted in failure in public service reform initiatives. In addition, Kim and Monem (2009:13), has indicated that the externally supported reform programmes were regarded as over-ambitious and were not focused on the local context. Furthermore, reform initiatives were implemented on an *ad hoc* basis, without any strategic direction. Also, the majority of reform initiatives were not sustained over a long period. Reform initiatives were implemented as a result of pressure from donor organisations. Kim and Monem (2009:13), argued that the public or civil society were rarely consulted and that the pressure from donors was perceived as the donors having their own self-interest.

According to Redman (2017:64–65) the majority of key targets for reform had either never been implemented or had been implemented haphazardly. The result was that the ‘real’ reform initiatives had lost momentum. Unfortunately, Redman

Figure 1: Failure of reform initiatives in the Bangladesh public service



Source: (Redman 2017:63–64; Kim and Monem 2009:13. Adapted from Rahman et al. 2013)

(2017:64–65) states that no reference could be made to previous studies on the effect of the public service reform initiatives within the Bangladesh Police Service, as no studies had been undertaken prior to 2017. However, it is evident from Figure 1, that many factors have hindered the implementation of the NPM approach as a reform initiative in the Bangladesh public service. These factors were still evident at the time when the research was undertaken in 2017 (see Figure 1).

Adopting the NPM approach to promote public service reform in Bangladesh was therefore no guarantee for success in the Police Service. Polidano (2001:345–362), Rahman *et al.* (2013:298–302), UNDP (2005:10–12), Redman (2017:58) and Schacter (2000:7–8) reiterated that these public service-wide challenges in Bangladesh are the bases for failure in administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. It was therefore necessary to explore the research findings based on empirical research undertaken in this study.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

A review of existing literature (Polidano 2001:345–362; Rahman *et al.* 2013:298–302; UNDP 2005:10–12; Schacter 2000:7–8; Redman 2017:58) suggests that inadequate or outdated human resources management practices (HRM), a lack of political will, bureaucratic obstacles resulting in the failure to connect higher managerial levels with operational activities, pervasive corruption and the lack of accountability, transparency and oversight; resulted in reform being hindered in the Bangladesh Police Service.

Other key challenges identified by Redman (2017:58–59) included political interference, external pressure, poor leadership and lack of institutional capacity, low skills levels, limited development opportunities, resistance to change and reform policies (known as reform ownership). In addition, poor work ethic or poor work culture, a lack of strategic direction and organisational development, a lack of resources, a lack of legislative or policy reform and limited stakeholder involvement hampered reform initiatives. A disregard for human rights, gender intolerance and inequality, poor police and public relationship, negative reporting and poor media communication, extremism, a lack of political commitment, weak coordination, pervasive corruption and the lack of accountability for the intended outcomes; were challenges that stifled police reform.

The major challenges to police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service as identified by research respondents in this study are summarised in Table 1.

The research respondents provided in-depth and well-defined responses to the major challenges in police reform in Bangladesh as reflected in Table 1. The respondents identified 21 major challenges to police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. The “**Frequency**” column in Table 1 indicates the frequency

Table 1: Major challenges to police reform as identified by research respondents

Major challenges to police reform in Bangladesh	Frequency	Percentage
Inadequate or outdated HRM practices	41	82
Political interference	31	62
Lack of political will	14	28
Poor culture on the part of the police	23	46
Strategic direction/organisational development lacking	23	46
Corruption	21	42
Lack of resources	21	42
Bureaucracy/disconnect from Ministry of Home Affairs	15	30
Lack of legislative reform	16	32
Limited external reform support	12	24
Limited stakeholder involvement in reform	10	20
External pressure	10	20
Poor leadership/institutional capacity	10	20
Low skills levels and limited training received	9	18
Resistance to change/reform ownership	9	18
Disregard for human rights	6	12
Gender intolerance and inequality	6	12
Poor police/public relationship	6	12
Lack of accountability/transparency/oversight	4	8
Negative reporting and poor police/media communication	2	4
Extremism (crime-related challenge)	1	2

Source: (Redman 2017:69)

with which a specific challenge was stated (Redman 2017:59). This frequency was measured against the total number of respondents and translated into a percentage. A respondent was allowed to cite a specific challenge more than once (Redman 2017:69). The most critical challenges impacting on police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service are elaborated below.

Human Resource Management (HRM) challenges

From Table 1, the majority of the respondents (82%) indicated that HRM practices in the Bangladesh Police Service represented the main challenge to administrative reform. This is supported by the comments made by the research respondents, which include among others: *“The lack of proper remuneration...”* Another research respondent cited the need for *“...a more flexible career structure to allow lower ranked officers a possibility of merit-based promotion.”* The challenges identified by the research respondents point to the lack of merit-based promotions and poor remuneration. Also, unsuitable recruitment practices, unacceptable performance assessments, a lack of career planning, an absence of incentives and long working hours are evident (Redman 2017:71). These findings support the deductions made in the 2009 International Crisis Group report. In this regard, inefficient and obsolete HRM practices and policies in the Bangladesh Police Service were strongly condemned (International Crisis Group 2009). The majority of the respondents in this study indicated that very little had been achieved since 2009 (BRAC 2013:109; TIB 2014:130).

The Bangladesh Police Service is also compromised by political patronage, mainly in recruitment and promotions (Kimani 2009:online; Redman, 2017:72–74). There are 18 rank levels in the Bangladesh Police Service. However, recruitment is conducted for only four of these ranks (Asian Centre for Human Rights 2014:23; Redman 2017:72–74). The International Crisis Group (2009:10) indicated that bribes for the entry level ranks of constable or sub-inspector were evident. These bribes are paid to the local recruitment officer, who is normally the area Superintendent of Police (regional head of the police) or to the local Member of Parliament (MP) (Redman 2017:72–74). Redman (2017:72–74) and Mabomba (2012:5) indicated that some Superintendents of Police reserve a portion of vacancies for constables, which are thereafter sold by MPs. According to Rahman *et al.* (2013:302), this practice has compromised the effective functioning of the Police Service in Bangladesh. Professional advancement in the Police Service is therefore often unrelated to either performance or integrity.

According to Loh (2010:6), there is also a mismatch between the citizens’ expectations and police capacity to deliver services to the community. The police versus the population ratio by the UN’s minimum standard is 1:450 (Kimani 2009:online). Bangladesh has an estimated population of 160 million people. It

has a police force of 152 000. The police versus the population ratio is therefore 1:1222 (Abbas 2011:6). This is well over the UN recommended average. This will undoubtedly have an impact of effective policing to communities. Furthermore, Bangladesh has the highest population density a total of 1 237.51 persons per km². The world average is 56.627 persons per km² (Redman 2017:61–62). The high population density therefore has the potential to cause major ‘law and order’ challenges for policing. More police resources may be needed in an area with a high crime rate which is densely populated.

Another HRM challenge is that the lower rank officers are not provided with either operational authority or satisfactory training (Human Rights Watch 2009:4). The largest number of police officers are constables, namely, 115 000 out of a total of 152 000 police officers (Redman 2017:62–74). The constables primarily undertake security and guard duties. They, however, do not contribute directly to operational duties, such as crime investigation. Constables and lower ranking police officers feel dejected, as they often perform disparaging work. They also live in deplorable conditions in the police barracks. They have little or no social life. They have almost no time off, as they often work up to 18 hours a day (TIB 2014:130). The constables work an average of 13–18 hours a day, while officers in charge of police stations, work an average of 15–18 hours a day (Redman 2017:62–74). This is primarily due to the shortage of police officers (TIB 2014:130). Also, there are severe constraints in terms of the physical resources required such as vehicles, accommodation and equipment (Wilson & Weiss 2012:11).

As per recruitment policy, recruitment is directly at the level of sub-Inspector. However, a small number of sub-Inspector posts are available. Also, a large number of constables retire on the same level without having been promoted during their 30-year career (Redman 2017:62–74). Therefore, there is no opportunity for career growth in the Police Service (Human Rights Watch 2009:18). Such an unfavourable work environment will not promote job satisfaction among its staff.

According to the Human Rights Watch (2009:4), the Bangladesh police officers are poorly remunerated. Although housing, food and uniforms are provided for the constables, it is argued that their salaries are inadequate. In view of the low salaries, it is suggested that a salary increase may perhaps remove the temptation to collude in corruption. It can also be argued that the government should pay its police a living wage to enable them to support themselves and their families.


It is, however, recognised that addressing HRM challenges alone will not have a significant impact on police reform in Bangladesh. It is also essential to adopt a holistic approach over a sustained period when dealing with police reform in Bangladesh and critical to address the other challenges that hinder police reform in Bangladesh.

External pressure and interference with the Police Service

The 2011 UNDP Baseline Survey reflected that, 64.4% of respondents indicated that they believed that “the police were subject to external pressure and interference”. While the majority (72.3%) stated that the interference and pressure came from political leaders in Bangladesh (PRP 2011:37). This research study reflected that 98% of all respondents stated that “the police were subject to external pressure” (Redman 2017:75–77). This finding supports the views by Ferdous (2014:477) and the International Crisis Group (2009:i). In this regard, the research respondents indicated that the external pressure emanated from diverse leaders and officials such as, local political leaders (95.83%), national political leaders (85.71%) and central government officials (35%) (Redman 2017:75–77). The sources of the external pressure on the Bangladesh Police Service included business leaders and the local elite (see Figure 2). The “types” of interference are also reflected in Figure 2.

Ferdous (2014:477) confirmed that this external political interference creates a major challenge to police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. It is clear that external pressure and interference with the police has a tremendous impact on police reform, as the Police Service never proceeded beyond the implementation phase. Reform efforts are often blocked outright by different leaders and officials. Political instability can be cited as the main issue facing Bangladesh (International Republican Institute, 2015: online). It can be argued that even with the support and funding of international donors, no substantial change is possible in police

Figure 2. Perceived external interference with the police as indicated by the respondents



Source: (Redman 2017:76)

reform. The reform initiatives become distorted and superfluous, due to the ongoing conflict between political parties and the opposition.

Politicisation of the Bangladesh Police Service

Bangladesh is part of the Commonwealth and was formerly part of British colonial India (Redman 2017:16). The British government introduced a formal, 'state-administered system' of policing during colonial rule in India. This meant giving the government executive control over the Police Service. The British adopted the Irish Constabulary Model for colonial India, which provided for a 'militaristic approach' to policing (Redman 2017:76–77). The Police Act of 1861, enforced extreme control on their subjects (Indian Police Service n.d.a:online; Human Rights Initiative n.d.a:online). The aim of the Police Act was to maintain colonial rule in India. It was also used to control the entire population by developing a culture of fear for the state (Das & Verma 1998:5; Human Rights Initiative:online). The 1861 Act also introduced a system whereby the Police Service was subservient to the executive and legislative authority of government. The District Commissioners, as representatives of the colonial government, were thus authorised to intervene in the management of the Police Service, which was managed by the District Superintendent. This considerably influenced police autonomy in the Bangladesh Police Service.

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2007:3) claimed that the most significant reform initiative in the Bangladesh Police Service was the drafting of the Draft Police Ordinance of 2007. The Draft Ordinance embodied the principles of democratic policing which entailed citizen-centric policing. A substantial importance was given to accountability. However, since 2007, the draft Ordinance of 2007 and the 2013 Reviewed Act, have been stalled at a political level. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the amendment of the Act, it was not possible for the PRP to be propelled forward for implementation.

Ferdous (2014:483) and Redman (2017:77) stated that any reform initiatives became counter-productive, when HRM decisions on recruitment and promotions were based on an individual's political affiliation rather than on suitability for the job. Ferdous (2014:483) argues that the recruitment of "party bureaucrats", regardless of their suitability was to promote "party political alliances". The International Crisis Group (2009:i) affirms that this results in a weak, corrupt and politicised police force and reform initiatives in Bangladesh are always delayed, as a new leader who is appointed nullifies the efforts of the previous leader.

The politicisation of the Bangladesh Police Service stifled reform initiatives. Also, politicisation was detrimental when decisions were made based on political affiliation rather than competence. Politicisation impacted the efficiency and effectiveness of the Police Service. It can be concluded that the Bangladesh Police Service is dysfunctional and corrupt, due to politicisation.

External interference from elites on the Police Service

Bangladesh inherited an “elitist and centralised” public administration (Parnini 2011:online). The International Crisis Group (2009:7), stated that the “ruling elite”, strongly opposed police reform. In the Bangladesh Police Service, there is also a culture of wealthy businessmen “buying” police support, in order to increase their profit margins. The clothing industry is a typical example where the owners bribed the police. For example, the police abused its power by coercing workers who were protesting against low wages, to return to work. A new Police Act should therefore be promulgated, to prevent this type of abuse. A new Police Act, should also curb the bureaucracy’s hold over the Police Service.

Corruption

According to TIB (2014), the corruption in Bangladesh society has become an inseparable part of the country’s fabric (The Lawyers & Jurists 2013:online). Parnini (2011:online) reiterated that corruption is endemic in the Bangladeshi Police Service. An International Republican Institute (2015:online) survey found that the citizens of Bangladesh perceived corruption as the main problem facing the Police Service.

In a PRP (2015:30) survey it was found that 75% of the respondents stated that the Bangladesh Police Service was involved in a number of corrupt practices. In the findings of the research survey for this article, 13 of the respondents indicated that they had paid a bribe to the police. Corruption is a significant barrier to police reform. The community therefore does not have confidence in the Police Service. Table 1 reflected that 42 of the respondents regarded corruption as one of the major challenges affecting police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service (Redman 2017:68).

In light of the above-mentioned, it can be argued that the Bangladesh Police Service is used by the ruling party to propagate its own party interests. It could also be argued that the salaries of the police are deliberately kept very low to create the need for the police to accept bribes. This state of affairs has undoubtedly affected police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service.

Resistance to change

According to Loh (2010:8), police reform triggered resistance from within the Bangladesh Police Service. It also caused some stakeholders to become “spoilers”, as they were afraid to lose their privileges (Loh 2010:8). This is reiterated by Mabomba (2012:57), who was of the view that senior public servants resisted any form of police reform, if it was perceived to affect their own personal

interests. On the contrary, the International Crisis Group (2009:5) found support for police reform within the Bangladesh Police Service. The research undertaken for this article, reiterated the support for police reform in Bangladesh (Redman 2017:69). In this regard, 89% of the research respondents in this study indicated that they either “fully agreed” or “agreed” that police officers in the Bangladesh Police Service were willing to participate in police reform. While five respondents indicated that they “didn’t know” and seven indicated that they “disagreed” with police reform (Redman 2017:69). No respondents indicated that they “fully disagreed” with police reform. It is important to note that the responses from the police and non-police were uniform (Redman 2017:69). The research findings therefore indicated an enthusiasm by the Bangladesh Police Service to participate in police reform.

Ownership

The UN highlights the significance of strong ownership to reform by national governments (Swanson 2015:10). The principle of ownership implies that reform initiatives must be developed and implemented by local actors, rather than international donor organisations (Nathan 2007:online). The concept of “local ownership” was coined in 2001 by the ‘then’ UN Secretary, General Kofi Annan. He declared that reform can only be successfully implemented by the local population itself and that external actors should merely play a facilitative role (United Nations Security Council 2001:online).

During the PRP Mid-Term Review, it was found that ownership was apparent between “participating” police officers and those implementing the PRP (Barnsley & Huda 2012:50). This was reiterated in the UNDP report on ‘the Assessment of Development Results’ in the PRP in Bangladesh. The degree of ownership, however, weakened in terms of ‘government ownership’ in Bangladesh (UNDP 2011:50–51; Barnsley & Huda 2012:51). However, specific ownership was evident which included the development of the Bangladesh Police Service’s 2012–2014 Strategic Plan. It also included the acceptance of total responsibility for the ‘Victim Support Centres’ and the implementation of community policing. The establishment of national or local ownership is therefore critical to facilitate the police reform initiatives in the Bangladesh Police Service.

The findings of the research study for this article revealed that the respondents had expressed varied opinions on the causes of the failure of police reform in Bangladesh and the challenges facing such reform initiatives. The major challenges that hindered police reform related to HRM issues such as working conditions, training and career progression. Also, the executive exercised control over appointments and promotions in the Police Service (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2007b:41). The other major challenges are ‘lack of political will’

and political and external interference with the Police Service. The study found political patronage was prominent by the ruling political party. Moreover, national governmental ownership for reform initiatives was weak. It is therefore essential to address the numerous challenges identified in police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

Administrative reforms in the Bangladesh public service have been ongoing since the country's independence in 1971. However, past reform initiatives did not effectively reform the Police Service (Ferdous 2014:477; TIB 2014:11; Rahman *et al.* 2013:300). In this article, a general introduction to the study, the research problem, research objectives and the research methodology were given. In addition, background information on administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service was provided. A brief summary was provided of the role played by international development and aid organisations in Bangladesh.

The study findings specifically indicated that a number of challenges hindered police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. The predominant challenge was employment and working conditions in the Bangladesh Police Service. The HRM challenges which were identified included poor salaries, no career plans, excessive working hours and promotions not based on merit. Another challenge was undue interference with the police. The lack of political will to reform the police force seemed to be another “stumbling block” identified. Other challenges, such as corruption, also hampered police reform. The literature corroborates the empirical research findings of the study for this article.

It was therefore essential to explore what could be done to promote public service reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. It was also deemed necessary to provide recommendations to address the challenges to police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. These are discussed below.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations proposed here are based on the findings of this research study.

- One of the major challenges to police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service is ‘obtaining political commitment’ to reforming the police. It is recommended that, through high-level advocacy, international development and aid organisations should lobby the GoB to support interventions to reform the Police Service. It is, however, imperative that the Police Act of 1861 be reformed as

a matter of urgency. Without an amended Police Act, there would be little success to reform.

- External international pressure should be exerted on the GoB to address the corruption in the Police Services. One such measure could include the implementation of funding restrictions on bilateral assistance from other countries. This measure may be one intervention to address the corruption and promote accountability in the Bangladesh Police Service (Redman 2017:90–95).
- A “Change Management Team” in the Police Service should be appointed to drive the implementation of reform initiatives, so that the desired outcomes are achieved.
- The inclusion of reform initiatives in the strategic plan of the police may also facilitate the implementation of police reform.
- The reform of HRM policies and procedures are essential to police reform. In addition, the regulatory framework of the Bangladesh Police Service should be modernised in its entirety.
- The Bangladesh Police Service should ensure that the interventions undertaken to promote reform do not overlap and that all projects implemented should be aligned to achieving to desired outcomes.
- Independent oversight is essential to ensure accountability on the part of the police and sanctions should be imposed for police wrongdoings.
- There should be more open and transparent information available to the public.
- Coordinated and consistent community policing interventions are essential.
- The reform scope should not be over-ambitious.
- The role of development aid donors should be limited.

The lack of political will and patronage proved the hypothesis to be correct. Therefore, it can be concluded that the reform initiatives have not been sufficient to promote meaningful police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. The recommendations are therefore required to address the major challenges identified and promote effective police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. The role of the Police Service in providing a safe and secure environment in Bangladesh is critical for its success.

CONCLUSION

The article provided a general introduction and a background to police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. An overview was provided on administrative reform in the Bangladesh Police Service. The role of donor organisations in promoting police reform in Bangladesh was also provided. The challenges to

police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service were ascertained in the research study for this article. The research hypothesis was moderately correct, as police reform at the time of the study had translated into some improvements in areas of service delivery. This was confirmed by research respondents. Some progress has also been made in police and community partnerships. Commitment by the Bangladesh police, to police reform was also evident. However, the reform initiatives have not been sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes. Also, the inherent lack of political will and bureaucratic patronage proved that the hypothesis is correct. A number of recommendations for consideration and possible implementation to address the identified challenges were made to promote police reform in the Bangladesh Police Service.

NOTE

- * Andries Redman completed his Master's Degree with the title Public Administration and Management Challenges in Police Reform in Bangladesh, under the supervision of Prof G Naidoo.

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Citizen Participation in the Developmental State

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ABSTRACT

Citizen participation is seen as the most important element of a democratic developmental state. On a local level, the developmental state should ensure that communities have access to basic services. Citizens should participate in planning and decision-making processes through available local governance structures. Furthermore, there should be a focus on growing the local economy and creating more job opportunities. Importantly, citizens should be educated about the importance of maximising scarce local resources to improve living standards. Lastly, citizens should take responsibility and use available resources to facilitate development within their communities. Thus, there should be a strong focus on independence and not on government intervention.

In South Africa, legislation and policies outline the establishment of structured and institutionalised frameworks for participatory local governance. However, it has become evident that statutory instruments, structures and mechanisms do not guarantee accountable local government that is underpinned by the key tenets of developmental good governance. This article discusses the role of local government in a developmental state. More specifically, it focuses on participative democracy in South Africa and networking between the government and its citizens and investigates sustainable ways to transform South Africa into a truly developmental state.

INTRODUCTION

Public governance reform in South Africa has come a long way since 1994. What was once a fragmented, undemocratic, racially divided system is now a unified,

integrated and decentralised government with national, provincial and local departments and authorities. More specifically, the state has seen transformation in the fields of governance, accountability, capacity development, financial and administrative management and service delivery (Maphunye 2014:150). Notably, South Africa has provided a firm legislative and policy framework for democratic socio-economic development. However, these policies and pieces of legislation are not always easy to implement on a practical level.

Democratic service delivery implies that service delivery-related decisions should be decentralised, accessible and transparent to citizens (Muthien Internet Source). For democratic service delivery to succeed, community-specific principles, circumstances, demographics and ideologies should be applied. Moreover, local government should have the financial and human resource capacity to facilitate a citizen-focused approach and ensure quality service delivery.

The *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution of South Africa, 1996) forms the foundation for ethical behaviour in the South African public sector. Public administration's role in democratising service delivery, as well as its principles and values are outlined in Section 195 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. According to Section 195(a) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, "public administration must be accountable, and a high standard of professional ethics must be promoted".

Although there have been significant improvements in the well-being of some South Africans over the past 20 years, most citizens still live a life of disempowerment and inequality. They do not have access to quality medical care and face high levels of disease. Moreover, a lack of proper infrastructure, poor municipal services, sub-standard education systems, low skills levels and high unemployment rates contribute to an endless poverty cycle within disadvantaged communities. Undeniably, these issues need to be addressed urgently. South African politicians agree that a developmental state could help resolve these matters (National Planning Commission (NPC) 2012). The Public Service Commission (PSC) (2014) confirms government's commitment towards building a developmental state.

There is no consensus among policymakers and academics on what the nature, objectives and institutional characteristics of a democratic developmental state entail. This is especially true for local government. It is important to unravel the complex nature of governance to truly understand the concept 'developmental state' and the subsequent role government and citizens play on a local level. Notably, governance encompasses all the structures and processes that determine available resources, as well as how these resources can be maximised within a public-focused developmental state.

The developmental state entails more than the primary symbols of Western-style democracy – elections, a judiciary and a parliament. Other notable variables that play a key role within a developmental state include political freedom,

effective and visionary leadership, skilled office-bearers, governance networks, participation, cooperation, accountability, transparency, rule of law, responsiveness, impartiality and inclusivity, ownership and capacity to monitor and develop (Zurbriggen 2014).

As local government plays a facilitative role in a developmental state, it is important to investigate what is needed to develop a participative democracy within this governance tier. To shed more light on the subject, the article discusses networking between the government and citizens. The key aim is to find sustainable ways to democratise the South African state to become a truly developmental state. As such, the authors aim to earmark important function-driven variables within governance networks, as well as capacity-building strategies to promote partnerships between the state and the people it serves.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

In its widest sense, the developmental state is built on government-led macro-economic planning. Within this capitalist model, government exercises strong control over the economy and intervenes through independent political power, regulation and planning. The developmental state steers economic development by creating a strong public service, facilitating an investor-friendly environment, supporting small-business efforts, managing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) efficiently and effectively and driving strategic investment initiatives. As such, the developmental state aims to promote economic growth and address social objectives such as poverty alleviation on a practical level (Baissac 2009; Spector 2017).

National government and the ruling African National Congress (ANC) have shown a firm commitment towards creating a developmental, democratic state. This is driven by the belief that South Africa – and Africa – will remain poverty ridden should this approach not be taken. In line with this, the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 emphasises the need for human development, management and empowerment to accelerate transformation and service delivery throughout South Africa. Spearheaded by the NPC (2012), the NDP 2030 highlights the importance of reaching key objectives, such as ensuring economic growth, eradicating poverty, creating jobs, reducing income inequality and bolstering service delivery standards (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:5).

From a developmental state perspective, there is a strong imperative to mobilise and direct available resources towards achieving these goals within national, provincial and local government, and beyond. According to Spector (2017), “At this point in the country’s political discourse, in fact, virtually every political party in South Africa has signed on to the NDP, effectively turning it into an apolitical football and a technocratic roadmap for national advancement”.

Nonetheless, the interrelationship between democracy and development presents key challenges to developing countries such as South Africa. The challenges relating to poverty and inequality place democratic systems under severe pressure. Furthermore, it is often unclear what role democratic structures and development processes should play in alleviating these challenges (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:5).

In South Africa, public governance systems have shown a lack of capacity to deliver basic services to all citizens, especially those living in the country's most poverty-ridden communities (PSC 2014). Service delivery within a democratic developmental framework implies that communities should be involved in decision-making processes regarding the type and standard of services needed. A democratic state's governance capacity depends on the competence and effectiveness of its state machinery and the capacity of its public administration (PSC 2014). This includes:

- **State structures:** The state – including the public service – should operate efficiently and effectively. In line with this, departments should be structured in such a way that they are able to optimise service delivery using allocated resources.
- **Public governance:** Public servants should be recruited and promoted according to merit, be trained according to the ethics of public interest, and be committed to an effective state and the rule of law.
- **Professional management practices:** Managers should be skilled in managing public institutions and optimising the use of scarce resources to render the desired results (PSC 2012; White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery 1997).

NETWORK GOVERNANCE

Internationally, there is an ever-increasing body of policies, legislation and regulations that favour network governance. Network governance allows governments access to a wider pool of information, ideas and potential solutions. Thus, it could bolster the quality of policies and programmes that are developed and implemented. Moreover, network governance has the potential to build public trust in government, which raises the value of democracy and strengthens public capacity (Evans 2011). By drawing on the strengths of governance networks, South Africa can bolster state capacity to facilitate good governance and adequate public service delivery (NPC 2012).

The challenge lies in developing public institutions that are held accountable for meeting citizens' needs. Within this context, the NDP (NPC 2012) distinguishes between hierarchical and bottom-up accountability. With hierarchical

accountability, public officials are accountable to the public. In the case of bottom-up formation accountability, citizens hold public officials directly accountable at the level where services are delivered. The NPC found that both these forms of accountability should be strengthened (NPC 2012). As such, the state should define a shared resource-maximising national agenda that focuses on citizen participation. Furthermore, it should establish clear, measurable and time-bound objectives (PSC 2014). This will help ensure that citizens can monitor the implementation of programmes, while the state is held accountable for its actions.

Undeniably, networking and participation can create social capital within the developmental state framework. In this regard, networking can exert influence within a socio-political environment and help maximise the impact of development-focused resources (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:5). The true value of network governance lies in its ability to provide the required information or skills to help overcome societal challenges. From a theoretic perspective, network governance should benefit all stakeholders (Muijs, West and Ainscow 2010).

A developmental state should encourage interactions between formal institutional structures (for example, the legislature), as well as between the state and informal networks. It should unite the public sector, citizens, business, labour, civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academia in a network-gearred environment. The nature and character of these interactions determine the state's capacity to formulate and implement its development agenda in a coherent and sustainable manner (PSC 2014). To function effectively, these relationships should be based on common goals and shared sacrifices under the rule of law.

A developmental state should have the institutional capacity to alter a country's development course (PSC 2014). Within this context, society should be mobilised to earmark and pursue collective goals. Importantly, the above networks need to slot into an overarching national framework that is based on a country's situational requirements (PSC 2014). In this regard, the concept of 'synergistic autonomy' best describes the nature and character of developmental institutions and partnerships (Provan and Kenis 2008).

Structural elements of network governance

The following structural elements of network governance play a key role in citizen participation within a developmental state:

Political freedom and democracy

State capacity is a function of both political and governance institutions. However, when high-ranking officials are subject to intense political pressure, they could

end up prioritising their personal agendas to the detriment of collective development (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:5).

The first prerequisite of sound developmental governance is protecting officials from direct political pressure. If leadership is not developmental and partnership-driven, there will be little difference in outcomes. “There is therefore an interconnection between economic freedom and political freedom” (PSC 2014:33).

In order to reach its goals, the developmental state must inherently be democratic (PSC 2014). Excellence is needed in electoral (participation), legislative (policy) and justice (rule of law) systems, as well as in public administration in order to strengthen state capacity to adhere to democratic ideals and to deliver the needed services (NPC 2014).

State leadership

Strong leadership is needed to unite the public sector, business, labour and civil society in a network-gearred environment. There should be a focus on setting guidelines according to the rule of law. Effective public leadership could enhance citizens’ well-being if (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:8):

- it is mobilised towards meeting public goals;
- effective policymaking and implementation take place; and
- there is a focus on efficient service delivery.

It is vitally important to build a local government that is capable of playing a stable leadership role in development and transformation. In this regard, capacity and know-how are needed to create effective, efficient structures and systems to facilitate cohesion and translate broad-based objectives into viable programmes and projects. These duties require an emphasis on maximising state resources through proper budgeting and meeting human resource (HR) requirements (NPC 2014).

Educated, professional and skilled office-bearers

Educated, professional and skilled office-bearers form the cornerstone of a well-functioning developmental state. As such, public servants need to be recruited and appointed based on educational qualifications. Moreover, office-bearers should follow a clear career path and promotions must be merit based (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:8).

In South Africa, an inability to place professionally trained public servants in the right positions continues to pose several challenges. The PSC (2012) states that, while 84% of departments had skills development plans in 2010, less than half was based on a thorough analysis of the skills at that stage. Moreover, only 12% of skills development plans had an impact on service delivery (PSC 2014). The NPC’s diagnostic for 2013 indicated that little had improved (NPC 2013). To

promote efficient and effective service delivery, the PSC (2014) suggested implementing a reward system for innovation.

Governance networks

A developmental state embodies the principles of democracy and strong leadership, as well as the participation of citizens in the development and governance processes (Edigheji 2005). "Networking with civil society is based on close co-operation, coordination and partnerships. Effective partnerships consist of shared roles, responsibilities and decision-making powers" (Edigheji 2005:9). What is needed is to develop participatory and democratic governance systems that are characterised by accountability, transparency and participation. Therefore, 'partnership' implies effective participation and the close involvement of citizens.

Participative democracy is said to have several functions within a developmental state. First, the education function could enhance citizens' civic skills, as they become more knowledgeable when participating in public decision-making. Second, integration could help ensure that citizens develop a sense of belonging and feel more responsible for community decisions. Third, participation bolsters the legitimacy of decisions and helps create a set of rules for participation (Michels and De Graaf 2010).

The success of public-private relations in Asia serves as a clear example of how state processes can be integrated with consultative mechanisms. For example, networks create a forum where state officials and non-state actors share information, reach agreements, negotiate development objectives and develop policies and programmes (PSC 2014). From the state's perspective, these networks are channels to pursue public input and solicit the consensus and support of non-state partners. These networks could also serve as mechanisms to promote accountability among government officials. Furthermore, non-state stakeholders' participation in policy and programme development processes helps legitimise governmental development plans (PSC 2014).

National development challenges can only be overcome through mutual co-operation between the state and private enterprise (PSC 2014). The South African government has progressively devoted more resources to local government to facilitate quality service delivery and citizen participation. In line with this, participative democracy has become a key principle to achieve an effective and accountable local governance system (PSC 2014).

Much has been written about the legislative and policy arrangements for citizen participation in different countries around the world. According to the Department of Local Government (DPLG) and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) (2005:10), "One way of achieving successful and lasting models for citizen participation is the establishment of structured and institutionalised frameworks for participatory local governance". This is one of the main trademarks of the

developmental state (PSC 2014). Various intergovernmental structures and strategies have been developed to achieve citizen participation in the South African governance. These include the following:

Ward committees

The Municipal Systems Act of 2000 and the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 focus on local community participation in municipal planning processes through integrated development planning (IDP) processes. Within a developmental local government context, an IDP presents a firm framework to establish a public participation culture. Area-based ward committees are expected to play a crucial role in linking communities' needs to IDP planning processes (Ngqele 2010) and thus to assist local government in bringing about people-centred, participatory and democratic local governance.

Ward committees were introduced to give practical effect to democratic governance. The rationale behind these structures is to extend elected ward councillors' roles by creating a link between communities and local government. As such, these structures are expected to facilitate local community participation in municipal planning and decision-making, as well as to represent local community interests within local government structures (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:9). The overall aims of these representative structures are to enhance:

- economic empowerment of communities;
- infrastructure and services in the community;
- local democracy and accountability; and
- social cohesion, nation building and integration of communities across class, race, culture and religion (Esau 2007:14).

The challenge is that structured participatory bodies such as ward committees can only be effective when community members view them as legitimate structures (Bekker 2004:46). Furthermore, the establishment of a ward committee is not mandatory and therefore not all municipalities have these representative structures (Putu 2006 in Maloba 2019:56). Furthermore, ward committees can only function in an advisory capacity and there is no guarantee that they serve their true purpose.

Traditional leaders

Traditional leadership shares a meaningful relationship with the national, provincial and local spheres of government. As such, the Preamble of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 emphasises that traditional leadership must promote the principles of cooperative governance in its interaction with all spheres of government and state organs.

In most rural areas, municipalities and traditional leaders share the same geographical space, communities, infrastructure, services and amenities. The

two institutions are both subject to the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, operate within a legal framework and need to adhere to democratic values and principles (for example, consultation, mutual respect, transparency and accountability). Traditional leaders and municipalities could form partnerships to eradicate poverty in rural communities (Independent Projects Trust (IPT) 2002:33).

Government Lekgotla

This effective participatory form of democracy operates on consensus and therefore ensures social cohesion and harmony. Unlike a municipal council or cabinet, the *Khosi* or *Khosigadi* in-council discusses issues with the community as a whole at the *Kgotla* or *Imbizo* for deliberation. According to the former Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJandCD) (1999), “In some rural areas, citizens can participate in the proceedings of the council through traditional authorities. Those traditional leaders identified by the members of the executive council (MEC) can attend and participate in any meeting of the council. A good and constructive relationship or partnership between the municipality and traditional authorities will help to ensure that people’s needs are effectively conveyed”.

Thusong Service Centres

The *Thusong* Service Centres were initiated in 1999 as multipurpose one-stop community centres (MPCCs). Mostly located in rural areas, the centres aim to empower the poor and disadvantaged by providing them access to information, services and resources from government, NGOs, parastatals, business, etc. This enables them to participate in government programmes and play an active role in improving their lives. By the end of March 2012, 171 *Thusong* Service Centres were in operation.

Community workers

Throughout South Africa, multiskilled community development workers (CDWs) act as a direct link between government and communities to promote democracy, socio-economic integration and social justice. Section 108 of the Public Service Regulations of 2016 outlines the following aims of CDWs

- “Work towards improving service delivery and accessibility of services to the public;
- Facilitate intergovernmental coordination both between government line departments and the three spheres of government,
- Enable community development and interaction and partnerships between government and communities; and
- Support a participatory democracy”.

CDWs are described as change agents who work in the communities in which they live. They are required to provide community members with information and inform citizens – especially the poor – of their constitutional rights. This includes their right to basic service delivery, such as social grants and services, health care and participating in IDP processes. CDWs are also expected to facilitate community participation in policymaking and implementation (South African Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) 2005 in Maloba 2019:67; RSA 2007 in Maloba 2019:67).

The development of CDWs is viewed as an important initiative to bring government closer to the people and to enable it to respond to community needs. With the emphasis on radical economic transformation, CDWs also help communities to access funds for socio-economic and social development from different sources, such as government agencies and the private sector (GCIS 2005).

Despite the difficulties during pilot programmes, as well as continuous frustrations regarding a lack of resources and political interference from ward councillors, CDWs could play an important role in their communities (GCIS 2005; Gray and Mubangizi 2009; Mubangizi 2009; Martin 2014). Regional coordinators, supervisors and CDWs have a good understanding of their responsibilities as change agents. In this regard, community workers have also expressed their appreciation and support for the work done by CDWs (GCIS 2005).

In South Africa, great strides have been made in developing avenues for citizen participation. In this regard, the White Paper on Local Government of 1989 outlines a framework for establishing a developmental local government framework that is committed to involving both urban and rural communities in governance structures. However, institutional arrangements and structures alone do not guarantee accountable local government. Certain public administration principles play a central role in democratic service delivery (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:11). The following section discusses the ethical principles of citizen participation that underscore the developmental state.

Ethical principles of network governance

In South Africa, specific circumstances, demographics, and ideologies play a fundamental role in democratic service delivery. The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 forms the foundation for ethical behaviour in the South African public sector. In this regard, Section 195 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 outlines the principles and values that pertain to the public administration, as well as their role in democratising service delivery.

Importantly, these principles recognise the supremacy of the country's Constitution, which focuses on democratising the government system and service

delivery. The following ethical variables play a central role in sound public governance within a developmental state framework:

Cooperation

Good governance rests on a healthy relationship between national, provincial and local government. The IDP is viewed as the main mechanism for coordination between the state and CSOs. Also, it is the ideal environment for participatory development planning, budgeting and inclusive service provision (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:11).

Accountability

All tiers of government should be transparent in terms of information-sharing and take responsibility for decisions made on behalf of citizens. While accountability paves the way for cooperation between citizens and the state, it is easier said than done. The PSC states that it remains a serious challenge to implement frameworks that focus on improving citizens' well-being (PSC 2014). In this regard, the PSC adds that weak accountability systems lie at the heart of poor service delivery. To remedy the situation, the commission suggests that the focus should shift to developing structures and strategies that prevent and control corruption.

Transparency

Theoretically, transparency and the protection of human rights go hand-in-hand. It nurtures cooperation and trust between the state and the citizens it serves. Moreover, access to information stimulates active public participation in establishing policies and programmes. Based on the above, ordinary citizens have the right to understand how and why certain decisions were made. To accomplish this, they should have reasonable access to material that is in the public's interest. Moreover, citizens have the right to question any potentially harmful administrative action through written objections (Zurbriggen 2014).

Trust

Trust and building trust through collaboration are key elements within a developmental state. There should be no dominant party in a partnership, since partners should collaborate and complement each other. Citizens have lost trust in the South African government. As such, it should make a concerted effort to build a relationship of trust between state sectors and between state and private sectors (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:12).

Community leaders (traditional leaders) and ward committee members have limited voting power, while decisive legal power in a municipality rests with formal council meetings. This is not helping to build the trusting relationship (Ngqele

2010:23). Currently, stakeholders such as traditional leaders believe that their participation in governance sectors is artificial and pointless. In a recent study, Doyle (2017) found that the South African government uses citizens as “a rubber stamp of approval”. Thus, national government’s strategies and policies should focus on true stakeholder participation and cooperation in policy and programme development.

Other problems that the PSC pointed out (2014) include elitist control, the marginalisation of the poor, party politics and citizens’ perception that the government is solely responsible for service delivery. Therefore, service delivery problems are increasingly blamed on the government. As a result, violent protests are escalating, while citizen dependency is growing.

Rule of law

Good governance follows the rule of law. This implies that decisions are made in accordance with relevant legislation, policy and regulations. As South Africa is a constitutional democracy, the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 is the highest ruling authority in the country. Established in terms of Section 167 of the Constitution of 1996, the Constitutional Court is mandated with honouring the development and implementation of all legal instruments, policies and strategies (PSC 2014). To ensure effective democratic governance, citizens should be involved in ensuring that legal instruments and policies are implemented (PSC 2014).

Responsiveness

Public governance structures should always aim to serve citizens’ needs in the most responsible way possible. The *Batho Pele* values and principles were introduced to help ensure that the public service becomes more responsive to the public’s needs. Importantly, *Batho Pele* is based on eight principles, namely setting service delivery standards; ensuring that all citizens have equal access to services; being considerate when dealing with the public; being accountable to the public for services delivered; and ensuring openness and transparency regarding budgets, expenses and responsibilities (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:12). As such, these principles provide predetermined standards and mechanisms to address customer complaints, allow citizens to evaluate public servants’ performance and hold public servants accountable (PSC 2014).

Impartial and inclusive conduct

The public governance sector should serve the interest of all citizens to the best of its ability. This also means that all citizens, particularly the most vulnerable, should have the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:13).

Ownership

Decentralisation of programme planning, or participatory planning, has opened up new avenues for democracy and the development of sustainable governance. The importance of ownership is not often discussed in the literature (Chirenje, Gilibab and Musamba 2013). However, Chirenje *et al.* (2013:10) highlight that the state and the powerful are usually responsible for budgeting and programme planning, while citizens are often responsible for implementing the programmes. Chirenje *et al.* (2013:10) argue that this “results in [a] dependency on central planning and discourages local creativity and innovation” – especially in African countries where community participation is limited. Due to this state of affairs, rural communities remain isolated from key resources (Chirenje *et al.* 2013).

Effective and efficient service delivery

Public governance should make the best use of the available social capital, resources and time to ensure economic growth and development. Undeniably, municipalities’ inability to mobilise the required resources hampers local governance. Functional governance structures were developed to provide a platform for municipalities to strengthen their overall institutional capacity (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:13). Furthermore, measures have been taken to counteract corrupt activities by implementing stronger financial accountability mechanisms. This was done through the Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003, as well as through various financial support programmes and systems.

From an education perspective, partnerships have been formed with private and public higher learning institutions to train public servants (PSC 2014). More recently, the senior management ranks were restructured to become the senior management service (SMS). This restructuring introduced performance management provisions and competency-based management for senior managers.

Despite these strides, it has been challenging to educate and empower citizens to fully participate in reconstruction and development and network governance structures, such as ward committees. In this regard, the lack of capacity and skills of ward committee members has led to the ineffective functioning of ward committees (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:13).

The capacity to monitor and develop

The developmental state should have the capacity to gather high-quality, timely and reliable data to monitor development and progress. This includes developing performance-based criteria, adopting new technologies and meeting set criteria and targets for effective service delivery (PSC 2014).

As developmental leader, the state should steer all sectors of society towards implementing a common developmental agenda. The developmental state thus also requires strong institutions that can mobilise society and help the state to

respond to a complex and ever-changing environment. This also requires the state to diagnose institutions and managerial weaknesses and propose innovative solutions (Meyer and Auriacombe 2019:14).

CONCLUSION

The South African government has developed an extensive legislative and policy framework and has made a firm financial commitment towards participative governance structures, such as ward committees and community development workers. However, the country's level of participative democracy has not improved service delivery, identified community needs and interests, or created a relationship of trust between communities, officials and politicians. The Presidency (2012 in Maloba 2019:102) states that: "The foundations for a capable state has been laid, but there are major concerns about the weaknesses in how these structures function, which concerns the state's ability to pursue key development objectives".

Despite extensive debate surrounding the importance of a democratic society, in practice, very little is done on a local government level to promote public participation in the true sense of the word. In fact, most municipalities do not even meet the minimum statutory requirements in this regard (Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 2007). Unsurprisingly, the public has shown its growing frustration with service delivery on a local government level through mounting countrywide community protests and violence (Esau 2007:15; Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) 2009). Therefore, there is an ever-growing gap between the intention and implementation of legislation and policies. In fact, scholars observe that South Africa has no coherent model of public sector reform and public management (Chipkin and Lipietz 2012 in Maloba 2019:123). The State of Local Governance Report (CoGTA 2009) highlights that "...it is clear that much of local government is indeed in distress, and that this state of affairs has become deeply-rooted within our system" (CoGTA 2009A:4).

It would seem that government's inability to implement the NDP 2030 (NPC 2014) is a major obstacle. Structures, mechanisms and procedures alone do not guarantee good governance and local government that is accountable. Undeniably, the current government system is still trapped in an elitist democracy culture. As such, a shift should be made from the dependency model where government is expected to do everything for communities, to a community empowerment model, where citizens take control of their destinies (Mathie and Cunningham 2002 in Maloba 2019:134).

Streamlining the country's developmental philosophy will help address the challenges associated with advancing citizens' potential and capabilities. There should be a concerted investment in education, health care and job opportunities to uplift

millions of people from poverty. As a developmental state is built on the principle of citizen participation and network governance, institutions and participative processes should be responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens. However, as pointed out by Esau (2007:1), this is no easy task, as most South African citizens are disempowered, poor and marginalised and not schooled in meaningful democratic participation. The country's history of a highly segregated, over-centralised elitist government has made it difficult to establish a participative democracy, which is the landmark of a developmental state. In a country where citizens receive rational feedback from government without taking part in governance processes, it is understandable that decentralisation would not automatically bring about public participation. This is especially the case in South Africa with its history of violent protests.

Previously marginalised citizens, especially those living in rural areas, now face the challenge of participating in network governance. As Rahman (1993 in Maloba 2019:124) explains: "In a given country, with an oppressive social structure, organised struggle by the oppressed classes may bring down the prevailing social order. But unless the masses can take a leading role in rebuilding the society they will be liable to become subordinate again to some other social class or classes and lose the power to participate in the process of social reconstruction and development as full subjects".

An enabling environment is needed to ensure the success of existing community participation structures, systems, procedures and mechanisms. This environment should empower both public officials and community members (including the illiterate and disabled) to exercise their right to participate in municipal decision-making structures and to hold public officials accountable. Furthermore, cooperation, accountability, transparency, trust, the rule of law, responsiveness, impartiality and inclusiveness, ownership, effectiveness, and the capability to monitor and evaluate progress; could play a facilitative role in citizen participation within a developmental state.

The current state of local government concerning its developmental mandate, service delivery and institutional capacity, shows that serious changes are needed to ensure public participation in governance networks. In this regard CDWs could serve as change agents for sustainable community development. They could play an important role in bringing various stakeholders in the public sector, business, labour and civil society together and helping them find common ground.

NOTE

- * This article is partly based on an unpublished MA dissertation: Maloba, T. 2019. *Variables influencing network governance to promote good developmental governance*. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg.

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Towards a Developmental or Welfare State

The Case of South Africa

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ABSTRACT

Developmental states are often associated with high economic growth; however, South Africa's economic growth remains stagnant and has recently even experienced negative growth. Government budget and spending in South Africa has been shown to allocate more funds each year to the social welfare system and less to economic growth and development. The country aspires to become a developmental state as stated in the National Development Plan (NDP), yet the composition of expenditure does not corroborate this pursuit. South Africa was selected as the case study due to the fact that this country serves as a proxy for emerging countries. The aim of this study was to analyse the relationship between economic growth as the dependent variable, and government effectiveness, corruption perception and social welfare spending, as independent variables. The study followed a quantitative research approach, employing time series data from 1998 to 2017. The relationships between the variables were analysed by making use of an Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) econometric model. The results indicated that there are both long- and short-run relationships between the variables. A number of recommendations that could potentially lead to the country morphing into a developmental state include improved government effectiveness, reduced corruption and an increase in developmental spending if compared to social welfare spending.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1994 and after the first democratic election in South Africa, this country's economy has been characterised by extensive unemployment, poverty and inequality (Leibbrandt, Finn and Oosthuizen 2017:396). The election resulted in a victory for the ANC (African National Congress) which committed itself to transforming the economy through reconstruction and development (Seekings 2015:1). A developmental state is vital for this vision, and the ANC inherited a state which provided quality infrastructure and services such as health care and educational services to the minority white citizens of the country (Patel 2008:73). However, since then, poverty and inequality have been anything but 'radically transformed' as promised by the ANC (Spren and Vally 2006:355). Lingenheld (2016:1) has even expressed concern over South Africa's risk of becoming a failed state, as most emerging economies have been negatively affected by decline in demand for commodities, volatile currency and relatively low growth. South Africa, in the last decade, has been suffering from all of these issues, experiencing subdued economic activity (Meyer 2018:2; Nissanke 2018:4). Considering the fact that South Africa's main objectives are to reduce poverty and achieve sustained growth, the state has been more effective in addressing the inequalities that exist in the market, but less so in steering the country towards higher economic growth (Dash 2011:599). Therefore, South Africa could possibly be characterised as a welfare state with developmental elements (Seekings 2015:1). In modern times there still exist different interpretations as to what the role of the state should be concerning the level and type of intervention. South Africa's NDP declares the intention to transform governance of the country into a 'capable and developmental state able to intervene to correct historical inequities' (National Planning Commission 2011:1), with the hope of eventually becoming a developmental state. This underscores the importance of the role of the state as interventionist, as well as the effectiveness with which the government can achieve its objectives. It is necessary for this role to be clearly defined and enacted in order to achieve the macroeconomic objectives set out for the economy.

In the literature, the 'Asian Tigers' are listed as a group of countries that have achieved success through being developmental states (Johnson 1982:1; Woo-Cummings 1999:16; Edigheji 2010:1). The 'Asian Tigers' were well known for their rapid, sustained development and growth, and serve as shining examples of what a developmental state can achieve (Burger 2014:160). In an economy such as South Korea, one of the 'Asian Tigers', the role of the state is clearly defined as a developmental one and this clarity has enabled the rapid economic growth experienced in the country through industrialisation and improved technology (Storm 2017:7).

Effective government spending, income and policy, buttress some of the roles the state wishes to fulfil. However, if government spending and policy are not

aligned, it is inevitable that there will be less success in achieving high levels of sustained economic growth (Bason 2018:1). The ever growing budget deficit in South Africa is indicative of ineffective governance, wasteful spending, corruption and maladministration (Haines 2018:1). The rapidly increasing public debt levels in South Africa are also a worrying factor, as the country has been required to increase borrowing to sustain the expenditure needed to save the economy (Phiri 2017:234).

Although social welfare spending is a crucial element in a developing country such as South Africa with high levels of poverty and inequality, in recent years such expenditure has outweighed spending on development as outlined in the budget (National Treasury 2018:1). The likelihood of becoming a developmental state, considering the current economic challenges, coupled with declining government effectiveness, indicates that the state may not achieve its developmental goals in the near future. Consequently, this study analyses the South African environment concerning economic growth, government effectiveness, social welfare spending and perceptions of corruption, with the aim of determining whether the country is moving towards a developmental state or a welfare state. A gap exists regarding this type of research as much of the existing research has not made use of an econometric time series analysis to make this classification.

THE WELFARE VERSUS DEVELOPMENT STATE

The type of state, whether developmental or welfare, falls within the theoretical framework of Keynesian economics, as it advocates for government intervention to achieve economic objectives such as growth and equality (Pigou 2017:1). Peet and Hartwick (2015:154) argue that the developmental state is formed through making use of Keynesian principles: for example, the high level of government involvement evident in certain instances in the so-called developmental states. In Keynesian economics, government spending is thought to boost the economy by more than what is spent; this phenomenon is referred to as the Keynesian multiplier (Kiley 2016:3).

The success of the 'Asian Tigers' growth experience, since the 1960s through to the mid-1990s, has generated a great deal of interest. Although the high levels of economic growth can be linked to industrialisation, the latter is largely due to the different forms of government intervention that made this possible (Meyer and Van Der Elst 2014:76). The countries experiencing this intense growth include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (Burger 2014:162). The 'Asian Tigers' have provided a framework for a successful developmental state and serve as examples of how accelerated growth may be achieved through effective government intervention and industrialisation. For instance, Japan's growth

after World War II highlights the pivotal role the Japanese state played in stimulating economic growth, with a particular focus on developing the private sector and leading economic activity (Johnson 1982:4). Woo-Cummings (1999:17) identifies the main component of a developmental state as the state's ability to link state guidance and private ownership through partnerships. Developmental states may suffer from structural corruption and inefficiency; nevertheless, the state continues to play an important role in garnering national competitiveness in global markets (Woo-Cummings 1999:17).

Moreover, Mkandawire (2001:289) defines a developmental state as "a state whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development". Gumede (2009:1), in this regard, emphasises the need for activity to add value and improve individuals and firms, rather than allowing for 'rent-seeking' and opportunistic behaviour which detracts from overall productivity and economic well-being. According to Turok (2010:499) a developmental state exhibits the following features: the ability to make long-term strategic decisions (by planning ahead), the ability to separate problems from symptoms, early action in order to reduce risks, and acting for the sake of the national interest. In essence, this process is one of building a unified, resilient and dynamic economy through investment that accesses untapped economic potential (Evans 2009:7).

By contrast, a welfare state contributes to the economic well-being of the economy by improving the lives of individuals through provision of basic services and fulfilment of basic human rights (Jackson 2009). Thus, this type of intervention ensures equity, fairness and social justice for all (Meyer and Van Der Elst 2014:78). This can be achieved through the provision of grants, health care and free quality education. This type of state has considerable implications for the fundamental economic problems such as allocation of resources and distribution of wealth (Kishtainy *et al.* 2012:52). In order for a welfare state to reduce poverty, political processes are crucial since they lead to the effective or ineffective outcome of a desirable economic output (Leftwich 2008:1). Therefore, the welfare state can be regarded as an approach taken to protect the poor from capitalism through redistribution of revenue, in an effort to minimise the prevalence of social inequality.

Classifying the type of government that exists within a country, can usually be done through analysing the type of spending which takes place. According to Lindert (2004:14), a country in which social transfers are greater than or equal to 20% of GDP is considered to be a welfare state. Bernard and Boucher (2007:216) identify two types of welfare state: a 'social investment state' and a 'transfer welfare state'. A social investment state, from these perspectives, takes responsibility for the care of its dependents, education, as well as training and learning (Bernard and Boucher 2007:219). This type of state focuses on providing all its citizens with services; therefore it does not distinguish between the poor and wealthy but offers the

same services to all (Burger 2014:171). Countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden are examples of this kind of state, where high taxes are paid (approximately 50%). Even though these countries have an unusually large public sector, their economic outlook remains positive with effective governance in achieving objectives (Fouché 2009:1). The above countries indicated strong resilience to the 2008 financial crisis, proving the adequacy of an effective state in such circumstances (Fouché 2009:1). The transfer welfare state contrasts with the social investment state as it contains a greater portion of social transfers that are ‘passive’, which include: pensions for the elderly, liberal unemployment funding as well as retirement compensation (Bernard and Boucher 2007:173). According to Burger (2014:173), in this type of state, inequality might be reduced; nevertheless, the spending to achieve this does not enhance global competitiveness and productivity in the country.

Both the developmental and welfare states are perceived as forms of government intervention. However, it is important to note the difference between the level of government spending and government intervention. Government intervention is defined as government actions to influence the way financial markets or particular industries operate, whereas government spending is the amount a government spends in a certain period on specific functions or services (Niskanen 2017:1). Intervention falls into three main categories: direct provision, subsidised provision and regulation (Hacker 2002:1). Direct provision is simply the supply of public goods at no cost, while subsidised provision exists when a portion of these goods is paid for by the government and consumers pay for the rest; finally, regulation occurs where the private sector provides certain goods and services

Table 1: Summary of some of the characteristics of a developmental state and a welfare state

Developmental state	Welfare state
Single priority is to attain high levels of economic growth (Turok 2010:500).	Democracy, welfare and capitalism are equally prioritised (Mead 1997:224).
Government is not expected to provide subsidised services and financial benefits to the poor citizens (Alber and Flora 2017:43).	Provides services and financial benefits to citizens (health, education, grants, etc.) (Burger 2014:171).
Has a high implementation capacity of economic policy and objectives, with a compact government (Xia 2017:9).	Large bureaucratic structure (Fouché 2009).
Relatively low tax burdens and budget pressure (Lincoln 2016:64).	Usually has high tax burdens on society along with budget pressure (Bernard and Boucher 2007:221).
The government could in some cases be autocratic (Xia 2017:9).	The government is usually democratic (Fouché 2009:1).


but rules and regulations are imposed on certain aspects (Hacker 2002:1). Table 1 offers a summary of the features of a developmental versus a welfare state.

With the aforementioned in mind, effective governments with quality institutions play an important role (Nawaz 2015:121). Effective governance can be defined as the quality of public services, the quality of civil service, the amount of independence the government has from political pressure, the quality of policy formation and implementation, as well as the government's commitment to these policies (World Bank 2018:1). Good governance is needed in order to promote efficient division of labour, increase productive investment and implement social and economic policies, all of which will lead to higher economic growth (United Nations 2011:1). Alexander (2010:25) conducted a preliminary analysis on the amount and cause of service delivery protests in South Africa and has identified the main causes as being lack of employment and the corruption that takes place in local municipalities. The continued increases in the service delivery protests point to a government that is losing its effectiveness and suffers from a lack of good governance.

From the South African perspective, the country has moved into a democracy since 1994 and has a population of around 56 million people (World Bank 2018:1). According to Swilling, Musango and Wakeford (2016:652) the country possesses a strong democratic constitution, a developed institutional infrastructure and an open market economy. South Africa can be described as a country in transition as it has moved away from apartheid towards a democratic dispensation. Despite this, the Gini coefficient indicates that the country remains one of the most unequal societies in the world, with low growth and high unemployment acting against the country's social progress (OECD 2017:1). StatsSA (2018:1) has pinned unemployment at 54% in quarter two of 2018, according to the expanded definition, thereby stressing the importance of reviving growth in the country. South Africa's municipalities have been experiencing low outcomes as wasteful and irregular expenditure increased to around 70% in 2016/2017 (Omarjee 2018:1). The policy framework for economic development in the country is complicated as different spheres of government are unsure about their specific roles and responsibilities towards achieving economic objectives, in this way reducing the effectiveness of government (Turok 2010:513).

Over the last 20 years South Africa's social welfare spending has been on the rise, with more than 60% of the national budget being spent on social welfare (Meyer and Van Der Elst 2014:74). The country boasts the most comprehensive social-welfare support system in Africa (Meyer and Van Der Elst 2014:74). This type of spending can be linked to the country being a welfare state rather than a developmental one, as spending indicates that the areas of focus are placed on reducing poverty and inequality rather than on the economic development of the country. Figure 1 indicates the amount of social development spending and economic development spending for the period 1998 to 2018. Social development spending, indicated with a solid line, shows a significant upward trend; whereas

Figure 1: Social development vs economic development spending (1998–2018)



Source: (National Treasury 2018)

economic development spending, shown by a dotted line, can be seen to be declining. Therefore, social transfers may become unaffordable, forcing government to cut back on transfer payments and eventually rely on private investment to produce education, health and local services (Burger 2014:179).

South Africa's debt has been increasing along with weakening growth, higher unemployment levels as well as weakening investments. This increase in debt may result in less social spending as a consequence, which would negatively affect the social stability of the country (Monteiro and Mkokeli 2018:1). The high levels of debt may also hinder the achievement of a developmental state. An extensive amount of economic literature examines the relationship between government spending and economic growth. At first it was theorised that any government spending is productive and could lead to economic growth (Arrow and Kurz 1970:335; Barro 1990:108). Later, government spending was characterised as being either productive or non-productive (Barro 1991:121). The main empirical finding is that a positive relationship exists between public investment and economic growth, whereas a negative correlation exists between economic growth and the share of the government's consumption in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Therefore, the composition of expenditure in an economy has a significant effect on whether economic outcomes are achieved rapidly or not.

Mauro (1998:710) found that corruption leads to lower spending on education and, sometimes, health. This is an undesirable situation and in some studies, there

is a positive and significant relationship between education and economic growth (Karacor *et al.* 2018). Available literature states that corruption has a negative impact on development in a country (Jajkowicz and Drobiszova 2015:1259). Empirical studies by Gupta, Clements, Baldacci and Mulas-Granados (2005:463) have argued that the negative correlation between government spending and growth is due to corruption that leads to larger economic inefficiencies as the size of the public sector increases (Dzhumashev 2014:215). According to Jajkowicz and Drobiszova (2015:1259) corruption leads to an increase in production costs, decreases in national and foreign investment, inefficient allocation of national resources, an increase of inequality and poverty in the society concerned, and/ or uncertainty in decision-making.

Barro (1990:123) lists the effectiveness of government as a determinant for economic growth. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008:1) found empirical evidence that good governance and institutions stimulate economic growth in a country, while less effective governance will negatively affect economic growth there. Acemoglu and Robinson (2010:32) argue that the main reason for differing economic prosperity across countries comprises the differences that exist in the economic institutions. A variety of empirical studies have found that corruption and public debt have a significant relationship; hence the effect of corruption on public debt is increased by government expenditure (Cooray, Dzhumashev and Schneider 2013:1). Corruption has also been shown to reduce economic growth, discourage investment and limit productivity in an economy (Mauro 1995:700). Wilensky (2017:351) found that in general, welfare states in developing countries function under conditions of slow economic growth, inflation, unemployment, energy shortages, and rising aspirations for equality and security, all of which are negatively affected and controlled by politics. The welfare state focuses largely on the well-being and equality of its citizens through programmes that provide social welfare and ensure all basic needs are met for all, whereas the developmental state does not prioritise the well-being of individuals, but rather the well-being of the economy, which eventually improves social well-being for all in the country. This is achieved with policy that is concise and enables high levels of innovation and collaboration between sectors, infrastructure development and human capital development (Meyer and Van Der Elst 2014:81). Moreover, (Máté 2015:2) analysed the time series panel data of various OECD countries, and yield valid relationships between the level of education, property rights (patents and trademarks) and productivity growth in different industries (Máté *et al.* 2017:12).

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this study is based on a functionalist paradigm making use of a quantitative approach (Weigend 2018:3). An econometric analysis was

conducted using Eviews 9 software. The data used in this study is based on annual observations beginning in 1998 and continuing up until 2017. The study is conducted in the context of South Africa, as a means to analyse trends in government spending and how this impacts economic growth, with the aim of attempting to classify South Africa as either a welfare or development state. The raw data for each variable was transformed to a natural logarithm, in order to convert all variables to the same scale of measurement and reduce data set variation. In order to analyse the impacts which government spending (specifically social welfare spending), effectiveness of government and perceptions of corruption have on economic growth, the following variables were used:

- **GDP per capita:** sourced from the South African Reserve Bank (2018:1), at constant prices. [LGDP]
- **Social welfare spending (as % of total government spending):** The percentage of the government's total yearly expenditure that is allocated to social welfare spending according to the National Treasury (2018:1). [LSWE]
- **Government Effectiveness Index:** The Government Effectiveness Index reflects the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2018:1). The index ranks a country's effectiveness on a scale between -2.5 and 2.5, where -2.5 indicates weak government effectiveness and 2.5 indicates strong government effectiveness. [LGE]
- **Corruption Perceptions Index:** The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 180 countries and regions by their perceived level of public sector corruption; it makes use of a 0 to 100 scale where zero is highly corrupt and 100 indicates zero corruption (Transparency International 2018:1). [LCPI]

In order to analyse both the long- and short-run effects of the independent variables on economic growth per capita, an ARDL model was used (Pesaran *et al.* 2001:325). This model was chosen in order to ensure more accurate results as the sample used was relatively small (Nkoro and Uko 2016:97). In addition, the ARDL model was used due to the fact that the variables have mixed levels of co-integration at I(0) and I(1) as shown in section 4.2. The following model was used:

$$LGDP = f(LSWE, LGE, LCPI, e) \quad (1)$$

Where: LGDP is the log of GDP per capita; LSWE is the log of social welfare spending; LGE is the log of the Government Effectiveness Index; LCPI is the log of the Corruption Perceptions Index and *e* is the error term. The study made use of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) (1981:1057) unit root test for all the

concerned variables, to determine whether they are stationary at levels I(0) or first difference I(1). The model selection criteria graph was used in order to determine the model best suited to the variables in ARDL. The long-run relationship was then assessed between the variables and a causality test was conducted, to determine the direction of causality among the variables. Lastly, diagnostic and stability tests were conducted in order to test the robustness and stability of the model.


RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 2 and Figure 2. The Jarque-Bera probability values for all the variables are above the 0.05% critical level, indicating that the variables are normally distributed. GDP per capita achieved an average of R46 583 over the time period, with a steady overall increase. However, even though there is a steady overall increase, GDP is increasing at a declining rate, indicating the subdued economic activity in the country. Social welfare spending in South Africa achieved an average of 13.4%, with a maximum percentage spending in 2005 of 17% of total spending. In 2018 the percentage of spending on social welfare amounted to 15.5% (National Treasury 2018:1). Expenditure on social welfare in 2018 was the second most costly category, with education being the highest. As noted, effective government spending is measured as an index between -2.5 and + 2.5; it achieved an average of 0.47 over the period with a low point of 0.20 in 2018 and a high point of 0.69 in 2002 (World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2018:1). Lastly, corruption levels were scored on a 0 to 100 scale, with 100 indicating the best possible system with no corruption. Since 1998 on average the index scored 46, with the highest

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variables	LGDP (in Rand at constant prices)	LSWE (in % of total government spending)	LGE (ranging between -2.5 to 2.5)	LCPI (ranging between 0 to 100)
Mean	46583	13.4	0.469	46.0
Maximum	83390	17.0	0.690	52.0
Minimum	18162	11.1	0.210	41.0
Std. Dev.	21213	1.837	0.161	3.105
Jarque-Bera	1.524	1.306	1.482	0.901
Probability	0.467	0.520	0.477	0.637

Figure 2: Trends analysis



level of corruption being 41 in 2011, and a lower level of corruption when ranked 52 in 1998 (Transparency International 2018:1). Since the highest level of corruption in 2011, corruption has shown little improvement as the perception of it remains high, and indicates declining improvement in the government's management of funds. The state's borrowing costs have increased, leading to a sustained and rapid increase in debt-service costs which have tripled since R56.10 billion in 2007, to R180.10 billion in 2018 (National Treasury 2018:1).

Figure 2 is a graphical indication of the trends in all of the variables used in the study. GDP per capita indicates a constant positive increase, while social welfare spending as a percentage of total spending has increased rapidly up to 2006 but appears to have decreased since then. Effective governance has deteriorated over time while the corruption index has shown a negative trend with some improvement from 2003 to 2007, but has since then declined. Consequently both corruption and effective governance have worsened within the period.

The first step in the analysis was to conduct the unit root test for each of the variables. Table 3 depicts the unit root test of the variables at I (0) and I (1). Mixed results were obtained, where GDP per capita (LGDP), social welfare spending

(LSWE) and Government Effectiveness (LGE) were shown to be stationary at first difference or I(1); and the Corruption Perceptions Index (LCPI) was shown to be stationary at I(0). Therefore, no variables were shown to be stationary at second order; as a result, the ARDL model can be used for co-integration testing. This will assist in determining if the variables assimilate in the long-run.

Table 3: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test

	Levels i(0)		1st difference i(1)		Result: Order of integration
	T-stat	P-value	T-stat	P-value	
LGDP	-2.8183	0.0744	-5.0006	0.0045*	I (1)
LSWE	-1.6199	0.4535	-3.9285	0.0087*	I (1)
LGE	0.0145	0.9489	-5.6807	0.0003*	I (1)
LCPI	-4.5718	0.0119*	-3.9869	0.0367*	I (0)

Note: * symbolises the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 5% significance level.

The optimum number of lags was determined to be two lags, by making use of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and the best model as selected is the ARDL (2, 2, 2, 0). Table 4 displays the results of the Bounds test for long-run co-integration analysis. The Wald test statistic is 10.2753 while the corresponding lower and upper critical bound values are 2.86 and 3.52. The F-statistic is greater than the upper bound value; as a result the null hypothesis of no co-integration can be rejected. This consequently indicates that a long-run relationship does in fact exist between the variables.

Table 4: Results of Bounds test of co-integration

Test statistic	Value	K
F-statistic	10.2753	3
Critical Value Bounds		
Significance	I(0) bound	I(1) bound
10%	2.86	3.52
5%	2.62	4.35
2,5%	3.69	4.89
1%	4.29	5.61

Equation (2) reveals the long-run relationship between the variables with LGDP as the dependent variable. Results from the equation indicate that the long-run relationship between LGDP and LSWE is negative. In consequence it can be inferred that every 1% increase in social welfare spending could lead to a 1.41% decrease in GDP per capita. Government effectiveness (LGE) also demonstrates a positive relationship with GDP per capita. Therefore, it can be inferred that for every 1% increase in government effectiveness (LGE), GDP per capita could increase by approximately 0.95%. Corruption perception (LCPI) and GDP per capita have a negative relationship (a lower corruption index indicates higher levels of corruption). Hence, for every 1% increase in corruption perception (improved corruption perception) (LCPI), GDP per capita could increase by 0.28%. Del Monte and Papagni (2001:13) made use of ordinary least squares and dummy variables and also reached the conclusion that corruption has a direct negative effect on economic growth.

$$LGDP = -1.1412*LSWE + 0.9486*LGE - 0.2826*LCPI + 8.7543 \quad (2)$$

After the establishment of the long-run relationship between variables, the error correction term (ECM) was estimated to analyse the short-run dynamics of the model. The results are listed in Table 5 (the ARDL co-integrating and long-run form), which indicates that the ECT is negative and significant; these are requirements for a long-run relationship. The coefficient of -0.1361 indicates that approximately 13.6% of the deviations from the equilibrium is addressed in each period. It could be forecast that it takes about 7.3 (1/0.1361) periods to restore the situation to long-run equilibrium in GDP per capita. A number of the short-run coefficients are significant at the 0.05 significant level, which implies that these variables have a short-run effect on GDP per capita. For example, in the short-run GDP per capita responds negatively and significantly to social welfare

Table 5: ARDL co-integrating and error correction term (ECM)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	T-statistic	Prob.
D(LGDP(-1))	-0.2010	0.1269	-1.5834	0.1520
D(LSWE)	0.0491	0.0330	1.4879	0.1751
D(LSWE(-1))	-0.2095	0.0368	-5.5841	0.0005
D(LGE)	-0.0063	0.0211	-0.3028	0.7698
D(LGE(-1))	0.0985	0.0236	4.1731	0.0031
D(LCPI)	-0.0384	0.0650	-0.5920	0.5702
CointEq(-1)	-0.1361	0.0293	-4.6333	0.0017

government spending; in addition, GDP per capita responds positively and significantly to improved government effectiveness. According to Gani (2011:32) effective governance is especially important in developing countries as it has a positive short-run and long-run relationship with growth; lack of growth in developing countries has been attributed to poor governance and low institutional capacity (Venables 2016:163). GDP per capita responds negatively to higher levels of corruption but the impact is not significant at the 5% level.

Table 6 indicates all the causal relationships between the variables. The results are interesting in the analysis of the causality between all the variables. First, a bi-directional relationship and causality exists between GDP per capita and effective government. This finding has been supported by many who have found that good governance causes economic growth and vice versa (Levine 1997:1; Evans and Rauch 2000:62; Kaufmann and Kraay 2009:1). It has also been stated that good governance is crucial for economic growth, as it has a positive effect on growth (Cooray 2009:126).

Second, it was established that social welfare spending has a negative impact on GDP per capita while improved levels of corruption (less corruption)

Table 6: Toda-Yamamoto (T-Y) causality test results

Null Hypothesis	Chi-sq	Prob.	Direction of Causality
LSWE does not Granger cause LGDP	22.7799	0.0011*	L_SWE→L_GDP
LGE does not Granger cause LGDP	7.1242	0.0073*	L_GE→L_GDP
LCPI does not Granger cause LGDP	0.3146	0.9573	No causality
LGDP does not Granger cause LSWE	0.0457	0.9974	No causality
LGE does not Granger cause LSWE	0.6427	0.8866	No causality
LCPI does not Granger cause LSWE	0.5639	0.9046	No causality
LGDP does not Granger cause LGE	37.2550	0.0239*	LGDP → LGE
LSWE does not Granger cause LGE	4.1764	0.2430	No causality
LCPI does not Granger cause LGE	22.0270	0.0352*	LCPI → LGE
LGDP does not Granger cause LCPI	2.4139	0.4910	No causality
LSWE does not Granger cause LCPI	3.0403	0.3854	No causality
LGE does not Granger cause LCPI	3.1793	0.3648	No causality

(*) Symbolises the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% significance level

have a positive impact on the effectiveness of government. Research by Huang (2016:255) found that government effectiveness (LGE) causes economic growth (LGDP) as well as less corruption (LCPI), but not vice versa. Corruption also has a causal relationship with social welfare spending, which implies that a long-run change in corruption will lead to a change in spending on social welfare. In South Africa it has been seen that in the long run, economic growth causes government spending (Odhiambo 2015:405). Economic growth (LGDP) has a causal relationship with social welfare spending (LSWE); for this reason a short-run change in economic growth would lead to a change in social welfare spending.

In order to assess the robustness of the model, various diagnostic and stability tests were conducted. The results as listed in Table 7 indicate that the sample does not suffer from autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity and that the residuals were found to be normally distributed. The CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares tests both remained within the upper and lower boundaries, thereby indicating that the model is dynamically stable; further indicating that changing economic conditions in the sampled time period did not change the relationship between the variables.

Table 7: Diagnostic and stability tests

Test	Hypothesis	Probability	Decision
Breusch-Godfrey test	No serial correlation	0.4337	No serial correlation
Breusch-Pagan test	No heteroscedasticity	0.6265	No heteroscedasticity
Jaque-Bera test	Residuals are normally distributed	0.6426	Residuals are normally distributed
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ	Both models remained within upper and lower critical boundaries	Models are stable at 0.05 level of significance	

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study had the primary objective of analysing the relationships between GDP per capita, government effectiveness, social welfare spending, and corruption perceptions in the South African economy; as well as of determining whether or not a developmental state is likely in the current South African economy. As with many developing countries, South Africa faces major socio-economic challenges such as unemployment, inequality and poverty. The economy has been skewed to serve the few in the past, and in order to correct this situation,

more funding has gone towards social welfare projects and programmes than to developmental projects such as mass infrastructure. Economic growth and development need to become a higher priority for government, to ensure the country moves forward in a positive and growth-orientated manner so as to achieve the same rapid growth as an East Asian developmental state. In becoming a developmental state, South Africa would need to reach levels of growth high enough to reduce unemployment and improve income levels for all citizens, as a result reducing the citizen's dependency on the state. There is a need for effective policy coherence as well as institutions that possess the capacity to enforce these policies. Institutions will only achieve this state if corruption is rooted out and civil service honesty is promoted.

The NDP has not been accepted on a broad front by all stakeholders as the national vision for the country and has failed to facilitate the implementation of effective policies and policy certainty. Consensus and partnerships are required to stimulate the economy. Government should aspire to minimise its involvement in regulating firms, so as to allow a free market to develop, create an enabling environment, promote competitiveness and the initiative to prosper (Nee 2000:641). This can also be linked to the state-owned enterprises which have fallen victim time and time again to political pressures in the country. In conclusion, when the definitions and characteristics of developmental state versus a welfare state are taken into account, South Africa leans more towards being a welfare state. It lacks the capacity and competence to achieve the East Asian developmental state ideology, as the country does not have a single vision and coherence, such as economic growth, as its single focus. The country has also been experiencing lethargic economic growth in current years.

NOTE:

- * The article is partly based on a Master's dissertation of T.J. Cooper, titled: *An analysis of the size and intervention of government and the impact on economic growth*, under the supervision of Prof D Meyer.

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The Politics of Road Tolling in Zimbabwe

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ABSTRACT

Politics have a universal presence, as it affects our lives on a macro and micro level. The same can be said for road-tolling systems around the world. In Zimbabwe, road tolls were introduced to raise money for the rehabilitation, maintenance and construction of existing and new highway infrastructure. Politics helped steer the course in several ways. Many scholars have developed diverse and complementary definitions of the term 'politics'. This article is underpinned by Lasswell's (1936) definition of politics, namely "who gets what when and how". As such, it focuses on the key actors or role-players in the road-tolling discourse (who), the services that they receive from the road-tolling system (what), at which times they receive these services (when), the strategies and routes used to access the services (how) and the reasons for accessing these services (why). Against this backdrop, this article seeks to explore the politics that surrounds Zimbabwe's road-tolling processes and practice by using the 'Lasswellian lens' or 'definitional framework'.

INTRODUCTION

Tollgates play a crucial role in financing highway infrastructure construction and rehabilitation. Moreover, they have become policy instruments to raise additional revenue for the Government of Zimbabwe. Despite being a more viable

long-term option, the mobilisation of domestic revenue was neglected for many years. The issue of toll roads was first discussed in 2000 after concerns were raised regarding the poor condition of Zimbabwe's road infrastructure. Several incomplete road projects around the country further aggravated the situation (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:199). Nonetheless, the proposal to introduce road-tolling systems was shelved until 2008. Two reasons for this was because the Government had embarked on its land reform programme which attracted intense opposition from the West, as well as the emerging voice of the country's main political opposition – the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). According to Biti (2015:9), Zimbabwe's economy shrank significantly during this period, as Western powers had imposed sanctions to show their opposition to the land reform programme. Subsequently, Zimbabwe faced an increasingly severe economic crisis characterised by rapid hyperinflation and corresponding devaluation of the local currency. During this severe economic downturn, government coffers were depleted, and there was no surplus funds to support road maintenance (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:193).

The period of hyperinflation from 2000 to early 2009 had a debilitating effect on the country's economy (Chitiyo, Vines and Vandome 2016:9). While the Zimbabwean Government tried to still the West and opposition parties' outcries regarding the land reform programme, it also faced the pressing issue of feeding and sustaining its citizens. As such, it focused on providing essential goods and services such as healthcare, while the introduction of the road-tolling project took a backseat.

Before sanctions were imposed, road maintenance and infrastructure development depended on budgetary allocations and donor support by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), among others (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:190). Due to their opposition to the land reform programme, donors pulled out from investing in Zimbabwe's road infrastructure in the early 2000s. During this time, government needed to step up to the plate as the country's road infrastructure needed urgent attention. The Government subsequently established the Zimbabwe National Roads Administration Fund (ZINARA), under the Roads Act No.18 of 2001. This parliamentary Act mandated ZINARA to mobilise funds to maintain the country's road network (ZINARA 2017:2; Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:189).

At the end of 2008, the country's Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Transport and Infrastructural Development conducted an audit of ZINARA's operations, such as fuel levies, transit fees, overloading fines and abnormal load fees (ZINARA 2017:1; Zhou and Chilunjika 2013). After these revenue sources were found inadequate, the Government mandated ZINARA to bankroll the road-tolling project. Given the urgency of the project and ZINARA's capacity constraints, it had to engage the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) to administer and collect the toll revenue for the highway network investment (Zhou 2012:89).

According to Zhou and Chilunjika (2013:188), road tolling has become a new revenue source, as government revenue previously supported the construction and maintenance of roads. However, Dr Obert Mpofu, former Zimbabwean minister of transport observed that the road access and tolling fees could help supplement public funding for road infrastructure maintenance and construction without straining the national fiscus (Chideme 2013:1). While toll fees helped alleviate the burden of road maintenance and construction, revenue needs to be managed and monitored more efficiently to ensure transparency. In light of this and other related operational hiccups, it can be argued that road tolling is not insulated from politics.

Although we do not always realise it, our daily lives are interwoven with political decisions that can have widespread ramifications (Uwizeyimana 2011:95). In light of this, the article will commence with conceptualising the term 'road tolling'. Within this context, key definitions will be explained. Hereafter, the article will proceed to unpack different scholars' definitions of the term 'politics' and endeavour to contextualise them within the paradigm of Zimbabwean tolling practices. The article will examine the political processes that inform and undergird the tolling processes and practices in Zimbabwe, where after a critical analysis will be conducted of the road-tolling system in Zimbabwe by applying Lasswell's (1936) definitional framework of politics. To draw critical conclusions, the article will synthesise salient issues associated with the politics of road-tolling in Zimbabwe.

CONCEPTUALISING ROAD TOLLING OR ROAD PRICING

Ergas and Greig (2012:8) trace the origins of the concepts 'road pricing' or 'road tolling' back to Arthur Pigou's 1920s book, *The Economics of Welfare*. Pigou argued that charges should be applied on roads to internalise external (outer) costs. From this perspective, it is important to clarify key terminology used in tolling discourse. According to the Connecticut Report (2009:4), the words 'tolling' and 'pricing', among others, are sometimes used interchangeably. However, they have taken on subtly different meanings in transportation discourse. As a general term, it refers to any direct client charge on highway and parkway transportation (National Cooperative Highway Research Programme (NCHRP) 2008:108; March 2007:23; Samuel 2005:9). In light of the above, Zhou and Chilunjika (2013:188) define 'tollgates' as privately or publicly built roads where a driver pays a toll (a fee) to use. As such, tollgates are a form of usage-based taxation levied on roads to support road construction and maintenance (Kirk 2017:12). Pickford and Blythe (2006:1) go on to state that tolling or toll collection helps mobilise road-use fees on certain roads, bridges or tunnels to recover all or part of the road's capital, operation and maintenance costs. As such, road tolls are levied for specific admittance and infrastructure.

Tolling is an equitable method for road-users (motorists) to pay directly for using a particular road (Chilunjika 2018:41). On the other hand, road pricing entails using toll funds to accomplish a target or objective, such as alleviating traffic congestion (Sweet, Harrison and Kanaroglou 2015:78; Transport Research Centre 2007:14; Zupan and Perrotta 2003:106). Therefore, road pricing helps fund road infrastructure, manage transportation demand by reducing peak-hour travel and associated traffic congestion, as well as control external factors such as air pollution, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, visual intrusion, noise and road accidents (Johnson, Leicester and Stoye 2012:3).

Since its inception in Zimbabwe, the term 'tolling' has applied to parkway or highway transportation (Chilunjika 2018:41). Unlike pricing, its primary aim was not to realise targets, such as congestion relief and reliable traffic flows. Instead, tolling was implemented to charge motorists for road usage in order to raise revenue for road infrastructure development and maintenance in Zimbabwe (Pickford and Blythe 2006). While terms like 'road pricing' and 'road charging' can be used interchangeably with the term 'tolling', the current article uses the term 'tolling' for the sake of consistency (Chilunjika 2018:41).

Road tolling is a type of taxation that is used to recover costs associated with road infrastructure development and maintenance (Chilunjika 2018:41). Notably, this policy instrument can help achieve a government's objectives of investing in transport infrastructure (Chilunjika 2018:41). Within this context, it is also imperative to explore the related concept of value pricing. As a critical component of road pricing, it is used in developed countries where road pricing focuses on regulating travel behaviour and managing demand. Wachs (2003:137) defines the concept of value pricing as "...the use of prices, charges for travelling in order to produce needed revenue and simultaneously to influence travel behaviour so that travellers make decisions that use highways and systems more efficiently and more equitably".

People and goods pass networks at certain speeds. In this regard, demands for the road networks tend to peak if their use is not linked to the concept of value pricing (Wachs 2003:137). Yang and Huang (2005:5) state that in transport economies, demand can be measured by the number of journeys made, or in terms of the total distance of all journeys (e.g. passenger kilometres for a public transport or vehicle kilometres of travel for private transport). The general cost of travel, which includes both money and time expenditure, is used to measure the price of the goods (travel) (Chilunjika 2018:69). The effect of supply increases (capacity) is of particular interest in transport economics, as the potential environmental consequences are significant (De Jong and Gunn 2001:15 in Flyvbjerg 2005:522).

Roads facilitate economic activity, link communities and provide access to vital services. This justifies using public funds to pay for the construction and maintenance of roads. In this regard, road-user charges are in direct proportion to how often people travel (Chilunjika 2018:42). Thus, motorists are obliged to pay an

amount that is proportionate to how often the service is used. Vickrey (1968:454) supports the need for setting a toll fee or a road price. The author highlights that a road becomes “worthless” precisely because it is free. Given this perspective, it can be argued that resources are wasted when road users are not charged for using the road. From an economics perspective, failing to charge road tolls can be seen as policy failure. Ergas and Greig (2012:56) go one step further to call it a form of market failure. The authors argue that a government controls a country’s road network. As such, they have the power to levy charges and to determine the pricing of access to parts of the road network (Ergas and Greig 2012:56). In line with this, Levinson (1998:120) suggest that: “Road pricing is a necessary prerequisite to congestion pricing”. Similarly, Pigou (1920) predicted that such charges would become necessary to deal with ever-increasing congested roads. Many economists regard road pricing as an instrument to optimise resource usage. Since tolls provide an ongoing revenue source that is not tied to the annual government budgetary process, funds can channelled directly to the construction and maintenance of a particular road. This ensures that maintenance funds do not compete with the requirements of other roads in the network. Governments are legally bound by laws and statutes that provide specific guidelines on how to use toll fees.

The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) (2011:11) states that mobilising domestic resources through road tolls has become an important development issue. According to Ergas and Greig (2012:78), the idea of road tolling is based on the theory that more road capacity attracts sufficient additional road usage to cancel out the congestion-alleviating effect of costly road-capacity increases. Commenting on the economics of tolling, contemporary scholars such as Hau (1991:12), Levinson and Kumar (1993:70), Denghai and Olsen (1998:15), Small, Winston and Yan (2002:42), Wu, David and Levinson (2004), Han and Yang (2008) Yang and Huang 2005, Rotaris, Danielis, Marcucci and Massiani, (2009:123), Peters, Kramer and Kress (2010), Ergas and Greig (2012:24) and Venter and Joubert (2013, 2014) contend that road tolling and pricing has proved to be a welfare-increasing policy. It is argued that, when used in conjunction with network-capacity provision, road tolling and pricing can contribute to the financial sustainability and cost-effectiveness of infrastructure investment (Ergas and Greig 2012:24 and Venter and Joubert 2013 2014). After exploring the economic underpinnings of road tolling or road pricing, it is imperative to capture the political dynamics of road tolling.

CONCEPTUALISING POLITICS

Politics is a complex discipline with several critical dimensions. Hague and Harrop (2013) state that throughout the history of the discipline, political theorists

and practitioners have offered multiple definitions of the term 'politics'. As such, it is difficult to provide an umbrella definition of the term (Uwizeyimana 2011:69). To overcome this challenge, it is advantageous to unpack some of the more noticeable and striking definitions of politics and see how they compare and relate to each other.

As a point of departure, Schmitter (2009:33) defines politics as a "science of government". As a scientific tool, politics is a systematic body of knowledge that deals with the governance, regulations, maintenance, development and defence and augmentation of the state. It also deals with protecting citizens' rights, safeguarding and enhancing moral values and ensuring that human relations are characterised by harmony and peace. Zimbabwe's road-tolling system is characterised by several role-players. From a regulatory perspective, Central Government is represented by the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development and ZINARA. Regulations have been set on how ZINARA disburses money to specific road authorities. On an operational level, ZINARA is mandated to monitor the progress of road projects. According to Tamayao (2014), political scientists prefer to define the term 'politics' as the "art", rather than the "science" of government. It is regarded as an art form, as it requires exercising control or authority within society by creating and enforcing consensus. With this process, government skilfully addresses society's needs by carefully allocating benefits, rewards and penalties. Thus, it can be argued that politics is both the art and science of government (Uwizeyimana and Cloete 2013:50).

Politics is the process of making decisions that applies to all members of respective groups. Siddique (2017) argues that politics refers to organised control over a human community, which focuses on achieving and exercising positions of governance. Within the context of this article, decisions about road tolling are made by policy-makers and ZINARA and apply to motorists, toll collectors and the management. In politics, a variety of methods are used to promote one's political views, such as coercing subjects, negotiation with other political subjects, making laws and exercising force. Within this context, Foed (2015) defines politics as a governing system where individuals or groups with different perspectives argue and challenge each other for the supreme good. At the heart of politics lies an understanding of the relationship between authorities and citizens and questioning how people perceive this authority. In addition to interacting with the toll collectors and motorists, ZINARA makes policies that regulate interactions with motorists, road authorities, management and toll collectors. The thrust of these interactions is to ensure that all role-players achieve their required services.

Easton (1965:21) defines politics as the authoritative allocation of resources. In this vein, Easton views 'politics' as human activity involved in the operation or functioning of the political system. As such, political activity is concerned with sound decision-making and action by a government, which spearheads the

authoritative allocation of value-added goods in society. As such, the Estonian definition of politics focuses on government's authoritative decisions and how these decisions affect the allocation or distribution of rewards and values among the different segments of society (Heywood 2002:4). Within this context, values can be defined as any object, activity, idea, principle, goal or phenomenon that many individuals and groups within the political community consider to be good, desirable, attractive, useful, rewarding, beneficial or advantageous (Way n.d:1). The values can either be tangible or material (e.g., money, property or other economic goods, services and conditions) or intangible (i.e. symbolic, moral, ethical, ideological, cultural or religious) in nature (Way n.d:1).

Interactions are characterised by a legitimate authority or political power that is responsible for allocating positive and negative values to the society (Heywood 2002:4). When the provision of these goods and services are up to standard, it will bring about peace and prosperity in the country. Similarly, Dibia (n.d:1) asserts that politics focuses on how to harness societal good. Importantly, the emphasis is on public good, not on individual good. The Zimbabwean Government, through the ZINARA, should strive to allocate the required resources to road authorities, which have the enormous task of constructing, rehabilitating and maintaining the highway infrastructure. Undeniably, this will help provide value for money to the motoring public, as they have access to trafficable, top-quality roads. Way (n.d:1) argues that political discourse resonates around the distributive or allocative consequences of decision-making and governmental action to resolve questions and solve public problems. Thus, politics encompasses the various processes through which government responds to societal pressures by allocating benefits, rewards or penalties.

Also, politics can also be perceived as the pursuit and interplay of interests. Deutsch (1980:11 in Way (n.d.:1) defines politics primarily in terms of the pursuit and interplay of interests. As such, politics largely focuses on the pursuit of particular individuals or groups' interests. Moreover, it deals with the interplay of interests, which centres on claiming and distributing rewards (e.g. values, things or relationships). In some cases, role-players in the Zimbabwean road-tolling discourse possess and pursue complementary interests. However, the opposite also rings true. ZINARA seeks to maximise its toll collections from the motorists, who in turn expect sound service delivery at tolling points. The motorists expect the tolling system to be fast and efficient in terms of vehicular processing. The maintenance of roads and related highway infrastructure is of equal importance.

The road authorities also expect ZINARA to respond to financial requirements. When resources are allocated to road authorities, ZINARA expects the allocated money to be used specifically for road construction, rehabilitation and maintenance. After toll collectors have collected toll revenues, they also expect to get paid by ZINARA at the end of each month. In similar vein, ZINARA expects

toll collectors to collect the toll revenue from the motorists without any pilferage. Within this context, interested individuals and groups strive to further their special interests by making particular demands or claims on the entire political community. Accordingly, Boudreaux and Dwight (1997:367) argue that politically interested and active individuals and groups seek to influence governments' authoritative allocation of societal resources and values. Within this context, each group hopes to maximise, increase or prevent losing benefits, rewards and advantages. Likewise, they aim to minimise or prevent an increase in costs, benefits and deprivations. In light of this, role-players within the tolling discourse try to maximise their utility and express a certain degree of aversion to risk, costs and losses. Any decision that is made should strive to promote, uphold, maximise and increase their utility.

UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICS OF ROAD TOLLING

Lasswell (1936) asserts that politics is concerned with official governmental decision-making and action. As such, the author defines politics as "who gets what when and how" (Lasswell 1936:1). However, the economic dimension to politics (the distribution of values and scarce resources), cannot be overlooked. As such, Sangale (2017) contends that politics is associated with production, distribution and resource usage. Tamayao (2014) adds that the definition underscores the reality of resource scarcity in society. While human needs and wants remain diverse, resources are always limited.

It remains challenging to allocate resources effectively, to determine what to produce, as well as how to distribute and use scarce resources (Heywood 2002:429). Within this context, Tamayao (2014) raises the following pertinent questions: "Who in the political society enjoys benefits, rewards and advantages?", "What types of benefits and rewards are received?" and "How are these benefits distributed?" Tamayao (2014) adds to the governmental decision-making debate by focusing on citizens. Within this context, the author underscores the importance of determining who in society is denied what benefits, rewards and advantages; when and how long have they been denied benefits; and the methods used to subject them to such deprivations.

To understand the Lasswellian definition of politics, one must firstly deconstruct and explain the elements within this definitional framework. The statement, "who gets what", refers to the actors or role-players associated with road tolling, as well as the nature and type of services they receive. The "when and how" denotes the time it takes for respective actors to access their services, as well as the methods or strategies that they use to access services. In light of this, the article identifies the government agencies, road authorities, toll collectors

and the general populace (motorists) as the key role-players or tolling actors. To shed more light on this intricate process, the authors will explore key actors, the services received from toll roads, as well as the methods, strategies and approaches that connect role-players to the services required from the tolling systems.

The Government: The Zimbabwe National Roads Authority

The Government, through ZINARA and the Ministry of Transport, is a key player in the Zimbabwean tolling discourse. As a Zimbabwean parastatal, ZINARA falls under the Ministry of Transport, Communication and Infrastructure Development. It was established in terms of the Roads Act of 2001 to enhance road network systems throughout Zimbabwe. ZINARA is responsible for the management, maintenance and development of Zimbabwe's road network (Chilunjika 2018). In light of this, ZINARA's vision and mission, as enshrined by the African Road Maintenance Fund Association (ARMFA) Focal Group Report (2011:1), is to become a world-class roads authority.

Key performance indicators include providing secure, stable and adequate reservoir of funds. Also, it is responsible for funding the maintenance of the national road network by fixing, collecting, disbursing and monitoring funds usage to preserve and enhance sustainable development. In addition, ZINARA is responsible for collecting, managing, administering and disbursing revenue that is used for the construction, maintenance and rehabilitation of Zimbabwe's highway infrastructure. Within this regard, ZINARA receives funds from the motoring public who pay toll fees at the respective tolling points dotted through the country.

According to Chilunjika (2018:254), a general trend of shrinking budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development saw highway infrastructure falling into disarray. This backlog in the maintenance and construction of the road infrastructure necessitated Government to adopt a revenue-generating instrument to fund road infrastructure without straining the national fiscus. Toll gates were introduced in 2009, and there are currently 36 tolling points situated between 15 to 20 kilometres from major cities and towns across Zimbabwe (out of the 36 tolling points, five are yet to be opened) (Matabvu 2018:1; Chilunjika 2018:3; Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:182). ZINARA currently collects toll revenue from the 31 tolling points, and the motoring public pay their toll fees at the toll gantries. Upon the completion of transaction, the boom gates open and motorists are given free passage. Motorist who paid toll fees gain passage are allowed passage through the tolling points. Drivers are then issued with a receipt to serve as proof of payment. Toll fees are \$2 for light motor vehicles, while mini-buses and buses pay \$3 and \$4, respectively, while haulage trucks are required to pay \$10 (Chilunjika 2018; Matabvu 2018:1).

The tolling points are installed with the state-of-the-art technology to process transactions. The Zimbabwean automated tolling systems also incorporate four major components, namely automated vehicle identification (AVI), automated vehicle classification (AVC), customer service or transaction processing and violation enforcement (VE) (Vats, Vats, Vaish and Kumara 2014: 444). These features help ensure that the toll facilities identify and record vehicles accurately and precisely as they pass through the toll collection points. In light of this, it can be argued that ZINARA is responsible for providing motorists with state-of-the-art technology that makes it easier for road tolling to take place without any delays and hassles.

When road tolls were established in 2009, structures were rudimentary and toll revenues were collected in the open (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:189). In October 2013, ZINARA formed a joint venture with the South African construction company, Group Five. Through Infralink, quality roads were constructed, and state-of-the-art tolling technology was installed across Zimbabwe (Mugabe and Ruwende 2017:1). In this regard, it can be argued that ZINARA is responsible for creating a hassle-free environment where the motoring public can pay their toll fees without any delays. Automated toll roads enable quick and efficient transactions, which has increased vehicle-processing rates and toll revenue generation. During the manual tolling era, Musarurwa (2015:5) notes that unscrupulous tolling officers made a significant dent in the finances designated for the country's road fund.

The computerisation and automation of road-tolling systems and the widening of toll-collection points were meant to enhance the processing rates of vehicles, thereby eliminating unnecessary queues. However, ZINARA's migration from manual to automated tolling systems, peak-hour queues are still observed at tollgates along significant highways in Zimbabwe. Notably, information and communication technology (ICT) was introduced to bolster the vehicle processing rate and eliminate the pilferage associated with the manual tolling (Duve and Zachary 2015:6). Also, the road authorities introduced alternative untolled routes to help shorten queues. Unlike other systems across the globe where alternative untolled routes are provided, it was found that Zimbabwe's tolling system does not make provision for alternative untolled routes. As such, the country's tolling arrangement facilitates maximum toll revenue collection, as all vehicles are subject to toll fees. ZINARA, therefore, generates maximum toll revenues as their tolling model has a 100% charging rate as all the vehicles that pass through the tolling points are charged the required toll fees.

In October 2013, the computerisation of the country's tolling points marked the dawn of a new era. According to Chilunjika (2018:297), "...toll revenue yield shot up by almost +80% due to the computerisation and subsequent takeover by ZINARA". In October 2013, ZINARA collected US\$2 330 943, while US\$1 613 941 was collected in October 2012. Musarurwa (2015:5) highlights that

computerisation helped curtail transgressions, as collections now takes place under the tight monitoring and surveillance of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras. Former acting chief executive officer (CEO) of ZINARA Moses Juma stated that, “The monthly toll revenue has increased by almost US\$1 million (from US\$1.2 million to about US\$2.1 million)” (Juma 2016:2). Furthermore, statistics indicate that US\$7 612 183 was collected between October and December 2013.

Undoubtedly, the computerisation process has yielded tangible results. Ruwende (2014) states that, since the computerisation of the tolling system, the Government collected US\$40 million annually in toll revenue. Moreover, a total of US\$200 million had been collected since the inception of the country’s tolling project (Mugabe 2016). However, the figure of US\$200 million falls far short of the country’s toll revenue requirements, as Zimbabwe needs a total of about US\$2.5 billion to rehabilitate its roads (Moyo 2016:1).

ZINARA receives a certain percentage of revenue from the motoring public in the form of toll fees, which should be channelled towards road infrastructure investment. However, some reports underscore the inadequacy of toll revenue to support highway infrastructure and maintenance requirements. Given this scenario, Moyo (2016:1) argues that the annual toll collections fail to meet road requirements. Nonetheless, there are some contestations on how mobilised revenue is channelled and used to fill other fiscal gaps.

According to Matabvu (2018:1), the main challenge is that of funding. The author argues that a minimum capital injection of US\$2 billion is needed to rehabilitate the existing road network, which excludes the construction of new roads (Matabvu 2018:1). ZINARA has been involved in negotiations with regional financial institutions to secure loans for funding the national road network. However, lines of credit for capital investments and donor funding have not been forthcoming. This leaves ZINARA in a challenging situation where it cannot meet the country’s road infrastructure requirements. Correspondingly, road authorities are not receiving adequate funding from ZINARA due to limited resources (ZINARA 2012:45).

The country’s road infrastructure development programme is not free of allegations of corruption. When the rigorous and meticulous process of assessing and comparing bids by potential suppliers is bypassed, tender procedures short-circuit. It opens the door for political interference, as is the case with ZINARA. It is alleged that public officials use their political influence to appoint loyalists to secure tenders. Moreover, it could leave room for collusion between service providers and ZINARA officials. It also introduce an element of coercion. Should service providers refuse to comply, they run the risk of losing future contracts.

Nyamukondiwa (2014:1) argues that, when toll-related tenders are not allocated according to procedure, revenue goes to waste or is misappropriated. For

example, ZINARA is alleged to have acquired 40 graders at a cost of more than US\$8 million without going to tender (Langa and Manayiti 2017). As the graders were overpriced and acquired irregularly, there was a severe breach of corporate governance principles. Furthermore, there have been allegations that road fund revenue is misappropriated to support political campaigns. It was alleged that the former acting president, Phelekezela Mphoko, joined ranks with top ZINARA officials to fund Grace Mugabe's political rallies in 2014. According to Zhangazha, Mambo and Moyo (2016:1), Mphoko was drawn into the on-going corruption saga at ZINARA after ordering the release of the acting CEO, Moses Juma, and non-executive director David Norupiri. Juma and Norupiri were later arrested by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) on allegations of defrauding the parastatals of US\$1.3 million. Mphoko later arrived in person at Avondale Police Station in Harare, where he secured the immediate release of Juma and Norupiri (Chidza, Mushava and Taruvinga 2016:1; Zhangazha *et al.* 2016:1). Such unwarranted levels of political interference hamper ZINARA's mandate of constructing and maintaining the country's roads despite collecting revenue from motorists for these purposes.

Road authorities

The National Road Traffic Act Chapter [13:18] of 2000 states that Zimbabwe's road authorities are responsible for the planning, designing, construction, maintenance, rehabilitation and management of roads that fall within their jurisdiction. Zimbabwe's road authorities are divided into the following four categories: The Department of Roads (DOR) is responsible for all state highways, while Urban Councils (UCs) (municipalities) are charged with maintaining roads that fall under their jurisdiction. In turn, the District Development Fund (DDF) is charged with establishing all-weather road access throughout the rural areas of Zimbabwe and managing activities in Rural District Councils (RDCs) (ZINARA 2012:7).

The success of a tolling system is premised on the adequacy of toll-collection system, as well as the implementation of funds. In line with this, ZINARA plays a crucial role in road authorities' functioning. It is responsible for the disbursement and allocation of funds to all four categories for the construction, refurbishment and maintenance of the national road network. The revenue allocated to respective road authorities determines the rate of fixing roads. The disbursement and allocation of funds can be based on any one of the following criteria:

- A fundamental percentage split of the total funds available among roads of different classes (which is informed by acquittals).
- A formulation which takes into account the class of the road, its length, width, surface type and the traffic levels on the road.

- Identified needs based on the condition of the road network and nature of maintenance work to be carried out (ZINARA 2012; Mbara, Nyarirangwe and Mukwashi 2010:24; Gumbie and Kudenga 2009:24).

After disbursements have been made, the road authorities are expected to perform routine and periodic maintenance on the road network in their respective jurisdictions. According to ZINARA's Company History (2016) routine maintenance includes instances where councils are given funds for cutting grass, patching potholes, cleaning drainage, clearance and grading. While substantial resources are required for periodic maintenance, it takes place in three- to five-year intervals. Thus, ZINARA has ample time to mobilise revenue for the rehabilitation of roads and similar activities.

The current fund-distribution framework to local authorities is on an acquittal basis. Local authorities are required to submit requisitions to the road fund that outline proposed road projects within their respective jurisdictional areas. These acquittals should specify and justify all the proposed expenditure items. After an in-depth analysis of the requisitions, ZINARA then disburses funds to respective local authorities (Chilunjika 2018:198). However, this technical exercise sees many proposals being rejected. In addition to ZINARA's stringent requirements, many local authorities fail to forward proposals to ZINARA. Subsequently, disbursements to road authorities remain low and local authorities' road infrastructure continue to deteriorate. This is especially the case with urban and rural councils, where late submissions of acquittals undermine further disbursements to the councils.

The 2017 National Budget (2016:73), argued that local authorities have failed to capitalise on ZINARA's road maintenance resources. A lack of capacity to prepare documents, as well as a failure to account for prior disbursements were highlighted as the reasons for the state of affairs (National Budget 2016:73). Local authorities' failure to draft convincing work documents are further compounded by allegations of corruption and abuse of funds. According to Matabvu (2018:2), local authorities have been diverting ZINARA's funds for other uses. This undoubtedly erodes the limited revenue that is available to rehabilitate the country's road network. As such, disbursed funds have made little impact over the years,

The rehabilitation and development of the country's road network continues to be hampered by inadequate financial resources and skilled personnel. Due to challenges relating to securing and using toll revenue, allocations to local authorities fall far below the required level to complete road construction and rehabilitation. The issue is exacerbated by a growth in road traffic volumes since the country's economy started to stabilise in 2009. Chilunjika (2018:295) argues that this further compromises road safety and provision of efficient transport services.

Toll collectors

When toll roads were first introduced in 2009, 22 toll points were established on all the regional trunk roads throughout the country. The most basic version of the MTC system was introduced, which consisted of lane markings, demarcated by 705mm plastic cones, a resting tent and a makeshift office and toll collectors who collected fees from motorists. During the early stage, no toll booths were constructed at the toll sites (Mbara *et al.* 2010:13). According to Juma (2015:10), toll fees were collected in the open at gazetted tolling points. This was hazardous to collectors, as they ran the risk of being run over by motorists who wanted to evade payment. The labour-based collection process also led to fatigue-related challenges.

According to Zhou and Chilunjika (2013:199–200), the country's fledgling tolling system faced the following challenges:

- Issuing change was a problem, especially during changes in shifts. As a result, vehicles parked next to the booths while waiting for change.
- Revenue was lost during heavy rainstorms. As rudimentary structures did not provide adequate shelter against the weather, toll officials abandoned the toll gates leaving vehicles to pass through without paying.
- As there were no proper monitoring systems, the vehicle type that passed through the toll booth could not be determined — this created irregularities between the collected fees and the vehicle types.

According to Juma (2015:10), before the computerisation of Zimbabwe's tolling system, the enforcement of collection fees was inefficient. Moreover, it was characterised by fraudulent activity (ZINARA 2014:10). There were many loopholes, which led to regular pilferage and severe revenue losses. For example, motorists could pass tolling points without paying, or toll collectors could use one receipt for two vehicles (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013; ZINARA 2014:10). This lack of control made it difficult to ascertain the actual vehicle population. Moreover, no reporting structures were in place, which was exacerbated by limited and difficult auditing and poor working conditions (Chilunjika 2018:110). Since it was challenging to compile and reconcile data, it was almost impossible to audit the manual system (Chilunjika 2018:110).

When ZINARA was mandated to collect fees independently, it designed new workflow procedures and documentation that streamlined the process (Chilunjika 2018:110; Juma 2015:12). Toll plazas were constructed and computerised, and some electronic features were implemented (Chilunjika 2018:110). High-tech additions like smart power solutions, automatic number-plate recognition (ANPR) technology, CCTV with live-streaming and radio-frequency identification (RFID) were adopted and operationalised (ZINARA 2014:12). The introduction of

automated tolling systems improved general cash collection, vehicle and transaction control, auditing and enforcement. Now toll collectors work in well-built, air-conditioned cubicles, while computer-generated tickets are issued to motorists who have paid their toll fees.

The introduction of automated toll collection has enhanced transparency and accountability. To curb fraudulent activity, ZINARA has fiscalised transactions at tolling points. As all transactions can now be tracked, pilferage and revenue leakages are minimised (Chilunjika 2018:269). For example, toll have to reconcile collected fees with the recorded number of vehicles before leaving their shifts (Chilunjika 2018:269).

The original arrangement was that toll collectors made their collections without close supervision. They were only accountable to ZIMRA accountants. However, these accountants doubled as toll managers and hardly visited the tolling points (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:191). Accordingly, they relied heavily on collectors' collection figures. Given such an arrangement, the toll collectors had more room to embezzle toll fees (Chilunjika 2018:270). In a bid to curb toll revenue leakages, armed Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) officers were called in to curb corruption and fraudulent activities among toll collectors (Chilunjika 2018:270). At the end of toll collectors' shifts, police officers do physical checks to ensure that everything is in order (Chilunjika 2018:270). The toll collectors are also required to declare any money that they bring to the toll station. Also, they are required to leave all their belongings (mobile phones, wallets and money) in their lockers (Chilunjika 218:270). Members of the ZRP also protect tollbooths from armed robbers and potential toll evaders (Chilunjika 218:270).

General public and motorists

Where toll fees are paid, motorists and the general public expect quality roads. Motorists can only be satisfied by visible and meaningful developments and improvements on highway infrastructure (Chilunjika 2018:305). As such, toll revenue should be used to construct, maintain and rehabilitate road networks. According to Ndlovu (2015), ZINARA has made visible efforts to rehabilitate the Harare-Plumtree Road, as well as other related projects. The state-of-the-art Plumtree-Harare-Mutare Highway is regarded as an example of road-tolling as a reliable revenue source for road infrastructure construction and maintenance (Chilunjika 2018:302). Given this initiative to construct the highway, it can be argued that the motorists are aware that tolling systems have a high potential to raise public revenue for investment in road networks. (Chilunjika 2018:302).

Mbara *et al.* (2010:629) state that it will be difficult to divert funds collected through toll charges. The authors argue that the toll revenue does not measure up to the growing need to improve the road network and mounting pressure to

meet the motoring public's expectations (Mbara *et al.* 2010:629). In similar vein, Chilunjika (2018:305) argues that the revenue collected from these tolling systems is so minute concerning the road network requirements that any divergence would jeopardise the road construction efforts.

THE AFTERMATH OF NOT FOLLOWING A WELL-PLANNED APPROACH

According to Ergas and Greig (2012:56), it is common practice that planners and researchers conduct feasibility studies on the viability of road-tolling systems. Muzaale and Uwizeyimana (2016:73) underscore the importance of consultations with key stakeholders (users and decision-makers) before implementation. Rotaris *et al.* (2009:17) state that a well-functioning toll-planning process is characterised by informed participants who are willing to play an active role in the process. To create a sense of ownership, public officials (policy-makers and ZINARA officials) should provide the public with the reasons for, and benefits of, introducing toll roads (Chilunjika 2018:6). If motorists acknowledge that tolling is for their benefit as it leads to better infrastructure, they become more positive towards the system (Chilunjika 2018:304).

The Zimbabwean system is unique, in the sense that it was implemented without consulting key stakeholders, such as motorists and other related organisations. Also, no feasibility studies were conducted before the operationalisation of the tolling project (Chilunjika 2018:6). Furthermore, no standard regular or rational approach was followed, such as providing alternative routes, standard distances between tolling points, rational determination of the toll fees and traffic volumes (Chilunjika 2018:6).

Failure to involve users in the planning process could lead to a lack of support. Deficient public backing (a product of a dearth in political acceptability) for e-tolling has been the most crucial impediment to the full implementation of tolling schemes (Kalauskas, Taylor and Iseki 2009; Bowerman 2007; Schade and Schlag 2000; Guilliano 1991). A lack of citizen backing stems from fears that tolling will have negative financial implications. As such, successful tolling projects should be grounded in sound political acceptability (Chilunjika 2018:238). According to Twitchen (2014:1), political accountability refers to the decision-makers' (formal and informal actors) attitudes to the toll projects. Also, it reflects popular perceptions and the distribution of political power (Van der Walddt & Du Toit 1999:256).

Zimbabwe has a history of public funds being extracted from the general population under pretext of government policies and programmes. Within this context, the article argues that the general population views toll road policy with great suspicion. Citizens question the implementation of toll revenue, as there is no

visible improvement in the quality of the country's road infrastructure (Chilunjika 2018:304). Chilunjika 2018:195 argues that, "Motorists and the general populace are highly disgruntled with the tolling system probably because there is no transparency on the usage of the revenues that have been collected. There is no visible investment in road infrastructure; the highway continues to be fractured, and potholes are in certain circumstances are being seen along the major road network".

Furthermore, motorists fears that toll fees could be just another government ploy to raise funds under false pretexts, as was the case with the AIDS Levy and the Drought Relief Fund (Chilunjika 2018:304). Bhat, Kilmarx, Dube, Manenji, Dube and Magure (2016:7) argue that, "History repeats itself since the same Government that led to the abuse of the AIDS levy cannot be trusted with the toll fees given the economic hardships that the country is currently facing. If they did it before they can, in the same way, divert the toll road funds from the intended purposes". Correspondingly, Mbara *et al.* (2010:627) contend that, for most people, the introduction of the road-tolling scheme is just a way of milking money from motorists under the guise of funding road maintenance.

In light of this, it can be noted that there are no tangible developments on the road network. As such, there is a departure from the intended purpose of the tolling systems, which is to mobilise revenue for the construction and rehabilitation of the road network. Although motorists are paying toll fees, there are no extensive upgrades and refurbishments of road networks. As such, motorists feel short-changed by Government. There needs to be a balance between the toll fees motorists pay and the resultant road infrastructure investments. That way, motorists will be satisfied that toll fees are being put to good use.

The Zimbabwean tolling system is built in such a way that it does not provide alternative routes for the motorists. Equity becomes an issue, as it limits the mobility if motorists who cannot afford to pay the toll fees. Accordingly, Twitchen (2014:2) states that providing untolled alternative routes helps give motorists the choice to travel on well-maintained, shorter tolled routes or travel on longer, untolled routes. According to the author, "Failure to provide alternative untolled routes raises equity issues, as the assumption created by this kind of an arrangement is that all motorists have equal access to financial resources" (Twitchen 2014:2). Also, motorists from different income groups are charged the same toll fees, which imposes a more substantial burden on low-income earners. Littman (2011:3) argues that providing alternative untolled routes lessens the financial burden on low-income earners, as they have the option of using untolled routes. Failure to provide the motorists with alternative untolled routes often leads to resistance, which ultimately forces tolling projects to fizzle out.

Provisions have been made for occasional visitors, out-of-towners and government vehicles. According to Chilunjika (2018:187), "Some vehicles are exempted from paying some toll fees and also given special discounts, which serve as

provisions to accommodate state-owned vehicles and those who stay very close to the tolling facility". Exemptions are also extended to people with disabilities upon providing full evidence at the Central Vehicle Registry (CVR) that the vehicle is registered in their name. Discounts are also awarded to out-of-towners who pay a flat rate every month. In substantiating the need for discounts, Kjerkreit and Odeck (2005:13) postulate that support for a road-tolling system could be gained by giving the most frequent travellers discounted fees regardless of their proximity to the tolling point. If this were the case in the Zimbabwean context, Chilunjika (2018:267) argues that only frequent users who do not stay within the 10km radius would benefit.

The Zimbabwean model make provision for frequent motorists who reside near toll facilities rather than the general bracket of frequent motorists (Chilunjika 2018:268). To support this point, Chilunjika (2018:268) argues that, "Discounts and exemptions are incentives that can stimulate the motorists to support a particular tolling system". Notably, these provisions consider equity issues, as different charges are afforded to different motorists depending on factors such as disabilities, frequency of road use and proximity to the facility. In line with this, Prud'homme and Bocarejo (2005:35) state that the major reason for exemptions and discounts, particularly in the case of London, was to gain acceptance. However, exemptions can only help gain acceptance if motorists do not resist the tolling system by trying to avoid paying fees and that they instead support the road tolling system. In addition, occasional visitors from other countries are not given special treatment. They pay the same toll fees as local motorists that fall within category or vehicle class (Chilunjika 2018:268).

CONCLUSION

The article examined the politics surrounding road tolling in Zimbabwe. To provide perspective, it commenced by tracing the historical development of road tolling in Zimbabwe. Hereafter, the conceptual issues surrounding the tolling processes were unpacked. The article examined the different definitions of politics from key and prominent scholars. Lasswell's (1936) definition of politics, namely "who gets what when and how", was used to determine the actors or role players that are associated with Zimbabwe's road tolling process, as well as the nature and type of services that are rendered. It was found that the statements, "when and how", associated with Lasswell's definition denote the given time when respective actors access services, as well as the processes, methods or strategies, used to access those services.

From Lasswell's (1936) perspective, this article found that tolling serve different functions to different groups in society. Governments may perceive tolling as an

instrument to increase social welfare and government revenue, while motorists might view road tolling as a means to improve road infrastructure. Tolling hits low-income groups the hardest and also has the potential to induce a form of inequity. Additionally, it might lead to regional inequality, since the charge is to be paid in tolled areas. Given that some routes have more tolling points than others, the tolling burden is more substantial in some areas than others.

ZINARA expects toll collectors to follow ethical procedures when collecting toll fees. In turn, toll collectors expect to receive payment at the end of the month. In similar vein, road authorities can access funds through ZINARA's acquittal processes to construct, maintain and rehabilitate road networks in their respective jurisdictions. In this regard, ZINARA has played an oversight role, as it monitors respective road authorities to ensure that funds are used for the intended purposes.

The interests of the groups mentioned above differ vastly. The allocation of goods and services among ZINARA, road authorities, toll collectors and the motoring public can be contradictory and conflicting. The Government's decisions and actions further the interests of some groups, while side-lining the interests of others. This is reflected in Lasswell's (1936) definition of politics. They are striking a balance between "who gets what when and how" is one of careful consideration and meted political will. Undeniably, the equitable allocation of public goods and services between and among key actors in the Zimbabwean tolling discourse is of importance. Equally so, key actors should strive to develop Zimbabwe's highway road infrastructure.

NOTE

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Developing Driving Licence Standard Operating Procedures

The Case of Madibeng Local Municipality

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ABSTRACT

Driving Licence Testing Centres located in local and metropolitan municipalities in South Africa generally lack standard operating procedures according to which driving licences are issued. This has serious implications for road safety in general and organisational efficiency in particular.

This article aims to design a framework for the development of standard operating procedures according to which driving licences should be issued. The Driving Licence Testing Centre of the Madibeng Local Municipality was used as case study for this purpose. Specific recommendations are presented to the Madibeng Local Municipality on how to effectively design and review standardised procedures.

The systems theory and the ADDIE (an acronym for *Analyse, Design, Develop, Implement* and *Evaluate*) instructional design model served as theoretical parameters to gain understanding of the nature and application of standard operating procedures in the public sector. A qualitative research design was followed and mixed methods were used to collect data. In addition to the robust literature review, the empirical findings validated the synergy between systems theory and the ADDIE instructional design model for the design of a standard operating procedures framework. The meticulous implementation of this framework could ensure that driving licences are issued as per statutory prescripts and road traffic specifications.

INTRODUCTION

A multitude of information exists about the development and revision of standard operating procedures, and the use of standard operating procedures to guide, direct and streamline processes and actions of public servants and municipal employees, are often emphasised (Clark 2015; Ijeoma and Nzewi 2016:61–62; Nzewi 2017:2–3). However, frameworks for developing standard operating procedures are often roughly designed to cater for a wide audience in the public sector. For this reason, specific frameworks for the development of specialised standardised procedures are largely absent, particularly in the driving licence environment. Despite the significance and benefits of using standardised methods and procedures, the Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) lacks contemporary and efficient standard operating procedures for the issuing of driving licences – impeding driver fitness. The need is evident to identify an appropriate framework for the development of driving licence standard operating procedures. The purpose of this article is two-fold: first to present a framework for the development of driving licence standard operating procedures and second, to make recommendations to the MLM on how to effectively develop and implement standardised methods and procedures.

Unique to this study is the link between standard operating procedures and the issuing of driving licences. Furthermore, the systems theory and the ADDIE instructional design model were used to develop a framework for the development of driving licence standard operating procedures. The study commenced with sketches of the nature and significance of standard operating procedures as well as conceptualising Driving Licence Testing Centres (DLTCs) to pinpoint aspects to consider when developing standardised procedures of issuing driving licences.

The qualitative research design was followed, although mixed methods were used to collect data to comprehend the problem why the DLTC of the MLM lacks relevant standard operating procedures to issue driving licences. The empirical findings that follow complemented the literature review and enabled a holistic view of standardised procedures and the effect thereof on the issuing of driving licences. In conclusion, recommendations of how to develop and implement the framework for standard operating procedures of issuing driving licences are presented.

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

In simple terms, the concept “method” refers to the way or manner in which a task is performed, while the concept “procedure” refers to the actions or steps

to be taken in succession to complete a task. In any public institution, methods and procedures have the potential to offer every official involved in a specific step of a task, a bird's-eye view of the total actions, goals and objectives to gain a better understanding of any detailed activities. In this way, public officials can understand how their activities relate to those of their colleagues. It therefore ensures consistency, effectiveness and efficiency in the accomplishment of tasks. Written methods and procedures ensure that public officials are suitably informed as documented directive documents often serve as training material (Alvarez and Hall 2008:830; Nzewi 2013:15–16). It follows that standard operating procedures use methods and procedures to define step-by-step sequences of activities to be followed in the same order over a wide number of situations and over an open period of time to eventually correctly perform a task (De Treville, Antonakis and Edelson 2005:232). Barbosa, Zuliani Mauro, Bavaresco Cristóvão and Mangione (2011:132) concur that standard operating procedures comprise detailed instructions to attain uniformity when officials carry out a specific function. In the public sector, standard operating procedures derived from legislation and policy decisions to regulate actions and behaviour, to ensure compliance with the relevant statutory framework (Thornhill 2012:105). Nevertheless, where did standard operating procedures originate?

The idea of standard operating procedures was initially developed in the manufacturing industry when Frederick Taylor studied the deliberate slow-paced work of workers who believed that high efficiency would result in jobs. Taylor's analysis involved the use of scientific methods and standardising tools, such as procedures, formal structures and rules to re-design tasks for maximum productivity. Through the eyes of the workers' foremen, Taylor studied the relationship between the managers and the workers and the workplace processes, to establish methods and procedures to improve effectiveness (Taylor 1911:31).

The concept of standard operating procedures can directly be linked to Taylor's note that the workers received – in most cases – complete written instructions, describing in detail the task which they were to accomplish, as well as the means to be used in doing the work. Taylor believed that a scientific analysis would lead to the discovery of the best way of doing things. This could minimise unnecessary activities and help to save cost and time. Taylor believed that if standards were established and job processes and procedures controlled by management, individual workers would strive to outperform the group average. In this way, efficiency in the workplace would be maximised through standard procedures. In addition, Taylor emphasised that procedures should focus on realising an organisation's objectives (Taylor 1911:52).

Today, the development and implementation of standard operating procedures have changed fundamentally. Modern development and refinement of standard operating procedures, in contrast to Taylor's principles of scientific management,

call for the active involvement of the procedure end-users. Input from a multiplicity of role players, including the external environment, is sought, while thorough consideration of available resources is seldom neglected (De Treville, Antonakis and Edelson 2005:232). However, despite the shortcoming of Taylor's contribution, his lasting influence is embodied in putting the spotlight on directive documents in the workplace (LeMay 2006:117). Morgan, Green, Shinn and Robinson (2013:179) go so far as arguing that Taylor's contribution to improving efficiency via standard operating procedures, contributed towards the rise of the systems analysis from which modern managerial techniques emerged.

The foundation of the development and implementation of methods and procedures in the modern-day South African public sector would be to meet the needs of society by the provision of public services at all spheres of government (Wessels 2017:29). Unfortunately, standard operating procedures are often associated with bureaucracy, red tape and the excessive use of rules and regulations. To combat red tape, public institutions are trying to re-draft policies and procedures by considering the public's point of view. Procedure-writing in government entities should therefore break out of the dominant mode of working in silos. To prevent standard operating procedures being trapped in a rhetorical limbo, the notion of procedure- and policy-making taking place at high levels away from the complex realities of day-to-day implementation, should be resisted (Kaufmann and Tummers 2017:1311–1314).

Basu (2004:46) states that rule-bound and hierarchic public administration has outlived its usefulness for the modern age that is characterised by rapid change in technology and societal demands. In line with this argument, Nzewi (2013:15) wrote that the main disadvantage of methods and procedures is that standard procedures do not allow opportunities for extensive deviation as it prevents the use of individual judgement. Unfortunately, standard operating procedures encourage conformist behaviour and limited innovative thoughts and practices. De Treville, Antonakis and Edelson (2005:232) warn that the use of standard operating procedures causes a decrease in autonomy, which may reduce the sense of responsibility and originality. Another barrier is that humans tend to stagnate and become set in well-known and established ways. This phenomenon often results in public officials not initiating change and being unwilling to adapt to changing environments. Complicating this issue is resistance to change in the form of over-simplification of procedures that may result in deviations from legislation and policy goals.

Consequently, the question arises "How can innovative standard operating procedures that not only embrace the contemporary needs of society, but also cater for intricate officials confined in ever-changing public institutions, be developed?" A framework for the development of standard operating procedures can be set by revisiting the systems theory and the ADDIE instructional design model, as described in the following section.

Developing standard operating procedures

When drafting standard operating procedures, cooperation between all relevant role players should be encouraged. Allowing the end-users to participate in the development of the procedures increases a feeling of ownership and a sense of being able to make a positive contribution towards the goals of the organisation (De Treville *et al.* 2005:236). Collaboration among the instructional designers, subject matter experts, officials at operational level and management indeed increases efficiency when developing the procedures (Barbosa *et al.* 2011:132–133).

Standard operating procedures should be clear and written in such a way that they can be interpreted by a wide audience. Overloaded and directionless standard operating procedures are difficult to interpret. For this reason, caution should be taken not to include an overwhelming amount of detail. However, a lack in critical information must also be avoided. It is also important that procedures are made readily available and do not contain information that will become outdated within a short period of time (Sinocruz, Hildebrand, Neuman and Branaghan 2011:803–806). Having a standard format also makes the developing and revision of standardised procedures easier (Ashbrook 2014:29).

It is evident that certain aspects need to be considered to produce standardised procedures. The systems theory embodies this process as it allows input, output, feedback and evaluation from various role players, and its potential role in developing standard operating procedures deserves further attention.

Systems theory

The origin of the systems theory can be traced to the thinking of the biologist, Von Bertalanffy in the 1920s. Von Bertalanffy (1972:417) defined a system as a collection of interdependent and interrelated parts and processes which receives inputs, acts upon them in an organised manner while considering input and feedback from its environments, and in doing so, produces certain outputs. The systems theory accentuates an interactive and interrelated set of elements. Interdependent parts imply that the subsystems of a system are dependent on each other, and a change in one element influences the other parts and ultimately affects the entire system. Furthermore, a system has identifiable boundaries that distinguish it from its surrounding environment in which it is embedded, and with which it interacts. A system thus comprises of subsystems that all work together to form the whole system. A subsystem does not act in isolation, but subsystems increase efficiency, productivity and innovation through cooperation with the other elements of the system. The systems theory is particularly relevant to the study of complex organisations that have elaborate structures and are embedded in larger social, political and economic environments.

Inputs into any public system comprise demands as well as support. Demands are the claims for action that individuals and groups make to satisfy their interests and needs, while support is rendered when groups and individuals accept the decisions upheld by the system (Holtzhausen 2014:257–258). Outputs of the system include laws, rules, standardised procedures and judicial decisions; in other words, public policy that purportedly obeys the public interest. Feedback implies that public policies, or any outputs (including standard operating procedures), may change the environment, the demands as well as the character of the system itself (Von Bertalanffy 1972:417). As in the case with the elements in a system, methods and procedures also comprise of interrelated and interdependent components connected to the internal and external environments through regular input, feedback and revision. Instead of reducing the function of standard operating procedures to hierarchical structures and rigid processes, its nature might be perceived as a kind of system. In this sense, a system is the pattern that arises from the regular interactions of interdependent elements, such as the relevant role players, public needs and legislation. These relations and interactions involve a flow and transfer of information when methods and procedures are drafted and implemented. Information from the environments helps the system to adjust the procedures and take corrective actions to rectify deviations from its prescribed pattern.

To accommodate the magnitude of inputs, intricate conversion processes and demanding environments and role players, a complementary but simplified procedure development process is needed. The five phases in the ADDIE instructional design model, namely analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation, represent a dynamic and flexible guideline for developing standard operating procedures.

ADDIE instructional design model

Although a simplified model, the ADDIE instructional design offers an effective means to analyse any public institution's needs, design and develop content, implement and finally evaluate the efficacy of newly developed standard operating procedures. Continual feedback from all external and internal role players is considered and attended to. For that reason, the ADDIE model addresses concerns, while still simple, to find solutions.

Analysis

During the initial procedure analysis phase, the legal framework in which the procedures will be developed is determined and defined by identifying and analysing the relevant policies, Acts and Regulations as well as the goals and vision of the organisation or institution. Job descriptions, legal contracts, the organisational culture, and the structure and hierarchy of the organisation also need to be consulted. In addition, information in existing directive documents is taken into

account (Ashbrook 2014:28). During this phase, internal and external role players are identified and then informed that their input and feedback on specific matters will be required (Evans 2011:71–80).

Design

It follows from the above-identified analysis phase, that the designers of standardised procedures must have a holistic overview of the workflow and structure of the relevant institution. They need to measure the requirements and the steps necessary to complete a task against the existing practices and structures to avoid the excessive introduction of unfamiliar processes. The first draft of the procedures should be written and documented during the procedure design phase. Each task and step that forms part of the procedure should be specified. Elements such as quality control requirements, specific service or product specifications, time frames, alternative steps, safety and security considerations, relevant legislation, personnel requirements and internal control mechanisms must be incorporated into the procedure design (Roughton and Crutchfield 2008:372).

Development


Developing and implementing new procedures, requires a mindset that embraces all the functions and processes of the institution's internal and external environment. Since standard operating procedures affect the behaviour and actions of employees at operational level, procedure writers need to involve key role players and stakeholders to acquire relevant and current advice. The writing of standard operating procedures is, therefore, a complex and contested process, and is not developed in a vacuum. Generally, feedback from external role players is requested after feedback from the internal role players has been received and considered. The draft procedures may only then be published for public participation (Cloete and De Coning 2011:126).

The effective implementation of procedures is closely linked to available equipment, resources and other related systems. All relevant input must thus be incorporated into the procedures before the development process continues to the implementation stage (Nzewi 2013:15–16).

Implementation

Procedure implementation is ideally preceded by the adoption thereof. The new or updated standardised procedures should be submitted for acceptance by management. The approved procedures should then be published and made known to all staff for acknowledgement. Training on the new or updated standardised procedures should then take place to dismiss doubt of how to apply the procedures (Ashbrook 2014:29).

Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the synergy between systems theory and ADDIE instructional design model



Source: (Adapted from Von Bertalanffy 1972:410-417)

Evaluation

Standard procedures must be revised continuously. The evaluation phase comprises of the evaluation of each phase of the procedures drafting process. Feedback on the accepted procedures should also be welcomed (Ashbrook 2014:30).

Theoretical parameters for standard operating procedure framework development

The above-described literature review and the empirical findings of the study were used to validate the synergy between the systems theory and ADDIE instructional design model, as illustrated in Figure 1.

CONCEPTUALISING AND CONTEXTUALISING DRIVING LICENCE TESTING CENTRES

The case under study is the MLM DLTC that is registered and graded in terms of Section 8 of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the NRTA of 1996) to examine and test applicants for learner's and driver's licences. The MLM DLTC is responsible for issuing driving licences and professional driving permits. Other responsibilities include managing facilities and test material for driver's and learner's licence tests (NRTA 1996:Section 8).

General problems experienced by the MLM DLTC are that the guidelines provided by the national Department of Transport, do not provide adequate detailed instructions on how to issue and renew driving licences. This is problematic because the processes, methods and procedures at DLTCs differ from one Centre to another. The issuing and renewal of driving licences is thus undertaken differently at individual DLTCs. The consequence is that each DLTC develops and implements its own practices and procedures on how to issue driving licences regardless of the general guidelines issued by the national Department of Transport. The latter Department's task of issuing instructions to DLTCs is complicated by the Centre's organisational structure which varies from one province to another. In certain instances, policies and procedures are deliberately personalised to suit the Centre. To a certain extent, the lack of standardised procedures implies that DLTC staff cannot be held accountable for not upholding directive documents and guidelines. These practices result in unique challenges experienced by individual Centres. For example, applicants at the MLM DLTC experience unjustifiable delays in the issuing of driving licences and lengthy queues are also a familiar sight. Furthermore, incorrect details on driving licence cards are often reported by the public. Moreover, internal control mechanisms, such as organisational structure, segregation of duties, written policies and procedures, physical and mechanical control, authorisation

and approval, accounting controls, training of staff, supervision, management, and information and communications technology, are not optimised to ensure effective and efficient issuing of driving licences. In addition, procedures are neither aligned nor updated according to the licensing and road traffic policy amendments. These outdated procedures might result in unlawful actions. The development and implementation of standard operating procedures offer a probable solution at operational level. A need for a framework to develop standard operating procedures to issue driving licences thus emanated as a result of challenges experienced by DLTCs across the nine provinces, especially the MLM DLTC.

The research design and methodology followed to determine how to develop standardised procedures are elaborated on in the following section.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The qualitative research design was followed to determine the ideas and opinions of the employees about the development of standard operating procedures, although mixed methods, questionnaires and personal interviews, were used to collect the data for the case under study.

Case of the Madibeng Local Municipality

As stated above, this study focuses on the MLM which is a Category B municipality, and one of five local municipalities within the Bojanala Platinum District Municipality in the North West Province (Local Government Handbook 2017:Online). The DLTC (unit of analysis) falls under the Directorate of Public Safety, Fleet and Facilities Management as one of eight directorates of the MLM. The MLM DLTC is registered and graded as a grade A Centre by the North West Provincial Government in terms of Section 24 of the NRTA of 1996 (Madibeng Local Municipality 2017:Online).

Sampling procedures

Only officials directly involved with issuing driving licences were requested to complete the questionnaire and/or were interviewed. The research population comprised of employees from different levels within the organisational structure, which included management representatives, DLTC supervisors, front-line employees, electronic National Traffic Information System (eNaTIS) cashiers and driving licence examiners. The target population included the middle managers, employees who are responsible for receiving and capturing applications for driving licences on eNaTIS as well as driving licence examiners who test applicants

and issue driving licences. The participants were invited because of their extensive experience of the topic.

The participants were neither subjected to any form of intervention nor exposed to any harm or exploitation. It was accentuated that participation is voluntary, and the participants were under no obligation to consent to participate. Those who decided to participate received an information leaflet to keep and were requested to sign an informed consent form.

Applying two parallel sampling techniques was considered most appropriate for this study. The participants (in groups) in this study, as well as the site population, sample size and sampling technique, are summarised in Table 1:

Table 1: Selected target population, sample size and sampling techniques

MLM DLTC at the local sphere of government			
Data collection instrument	Population	Sample size	Sampling technique
Structured questionnaire	56 employees of the DLTC	56 respondents	Probability sampling (entire site, excluding security guards)
Personal interviews	1 management representative 3 supervisors	4 participants	Non-probability sampling

Concerning the research population and sampling techniques, the quantitative method places the key emphasis on generalisation by ensuring that the knowledge gained is representative of the population from which the sample was drawn, while the qualitative method places primary emphasis on saturation.

Data collection instruments

Due to the relatively small number of respondents, the questionnaires were administered by the researcher. However, the self-administered questionnaire had an inherent limitation. The primary limitation was that it tended to de-contextualise human behaviour by removing the event from its real world setting (Prinsloo and Hanyane 2016:189–190). To mitigate the shortcoming, semi-structured personal interviews were utilised to gather additional detailed information apart from what was provided for in the questionnaires. The main reason for selecting personal interviews as follow-up data gathering instrument was that it is flexible and permits immediate clarification of unclear issues and to observe the interviewees’ feelings and/or reactions towards the questions (Pollitt 2016:81–82).

The response rate to the questionnaire is tabulated in Table 2.

Table 2: Response rate to questionnaire

Occupational category	No. of questionnaires distributed	No. of questionnaires returned	Response rate
Management representatives	1	1	100%
DLTC supervisors	5	5	100%
DLTC front-line employees	15	13	87%
eNaTIS cashiers	15	11	73%
Examiners for driving licences	20	17	85%
Total	56	47	84%


As opposed to the questionnaire that was distributed to all the staff at the Centre, the interviews were directed at one manager and three supervisors.

The next section describes the data analysis processes. The research findings are also presented.

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The SPSS system was used to analyse the quantifiable data, including the demographic data of the respondents who completed the questionnaire. The gender distribution of the respondents comprises of 56% females and 43% males of the total sample ($n=47$). Furthermore, the majority of the respondents ($n=21$) have

Figure 2: Process of validating qualitative data



Source: (Adapted from Yin 2010: 177-179)

been employed at the MLM DLTC between 11 and 15 years. This confirms that the respondents had adequate experience to issue driving licences to provide valuable data for analysis and recommendations.

Concerning the interviewees, it is significant that the majority of the participants were male and most of the participants were between the ages of 40 to 49. The participants had the knowledge and skills to clarify the issues that were unclear from the responses provided to the questionnaire. A simplified overview of the process of validating the qualitative data is illustrated in Figure 2:

Interpretations and findings of quantifiable data

The questionnaire dealt with the respondents' opinion of the significance of writing standard operating procedures for the MLM DLTC. The questionnaire presented five statements in response to which the respondents had to select a number between 1 and 5: 1 = *Not important at all*, 2 = *Of little importance*, 3 = *Somewhat important*, 4 = *Very important* and 5 = *Extremely important*.

Table 3: Writing standard operating procedures: Total responses and percentages

SPSS custom table: Total responses and percentages							
No.	Statement	Not important at all	Of little importance	Somewhat important	Very important	Extremely important	Totals
1	Finding new and innovative methods and procedures of performing tasks.	9 (19%)	14 (30%)	11 (23%)	8 (17%)	5 (11%)	47 (100%)
2	Having knowledge of the existing workflow and organisational structure.	2 (4%)	7 (15%)	11 (23%)	14 (30%)	13 (28%)	47 (100%)
3	Identifying necessary equipment and resources to complete a task.	2 (4%)	5 (11%)	9 (19%)	14 (30%)	17 (36%)	47 (100%)
4	Seeking teamwork during the development of standard operating procedures.	1 (2%)	7 (15%)	9 (19%)	16 (34%)	14 (30%)	47 (100%)
5	Following approval processes when developing standard operating procedures.	4 (9%)	8 (17%)	11 (23%)	14 (30%)	10 (21%)	47 (100%)

Source: (Authors' interpretation)

Based on the following empirical findings of the statements included in Table 3, a framework for developing standard operating procedures for DLTCs could be determined.

Statement 1: Finding new and innovative procedures

As previously hinted at, caution should be taken against rigid steps and instructions. Statement 1 thus endeavoured to establish whether the MLM DLTC procedures are sufficiently advanced and progressive to take into account aspects such as managing risks and streamlining supervision and management within the communication channels. Only 19% of the respondents were convinced that it is not important at all to find new and innovative methods when drafting standard operating procedures, while 30% reflected that it is of limited importance. This matter was addressed further during the follow-up interviews (see the below interpretations of the qualitative data).

Statement 2: Having knowledge of the existing workflow

Statement 2 sought to establish the significance of having knowledge of the workflow and organisational structure of DLTCs when developing standard procedures for the issuing of driving licences. Fortunately only 4% of the respondents revealed that knowledge of the workflow and organisational structure at the MLM DLTC is not adequately considered when drafting procedures to issue driving licences. A total of 30% of the respondents were convinced that prior knowledge of the workflow and organisational structure is very important, while 28% held that it is extremely important to know the workflow and organisational structure of an institution when developing standard operating procedures. Hence, the majority of the responses revealed that although the existing procedures are not innovative, the workflow and structure of the DLTC is successfully incorporated.

Statement 3: Identifying necessary equipment and resources

Employees who implement policy at the front-line need to be well aware of the capacity of the equipment and resources necessary to reach policy outcomes and to deliver services and goods in a consistent and effective way. Consequently, statement 3 endeavoured to establish to what extent equipment and resources are identified and included in the standard operating procedures of the MLM DLTC.

Concerning the data, the majority of the respondents, 36%, held that it is extremely important to identify the necessary equipment and resources to perform specific steps when writing standard operating procedures. It is deduced that required equipment and resources is indeed identified in the standard operating procedures.

The reason for the majority responses could be the critical role that the eNaTIS system and hardware plays in the DLTC environment. Concerning policymaking

in the DLTC and licensing milieu, the availability of physical facilities and equipment, such as office space, eye test facilities, learner's licence theory tests, image capturing systems, driving licence testing yards and the eNaTIS terminals and printers, need to be considered when formulating policy on operational level. If a DLTC does not have the minimum required equipment and resources, additional structures will have to be acquired which could have extra financial implications. It follows that the need for specialist facilities and equipment must be considered carefully in the procedure-writing process.

Statement 4: Seeking teamwork

Statement 4 sought to establish whether the relevant employees and role players are involved when developing procedures at the MLM DLTC. In brief, the researcher wanted to establish if a team approach is followed when writing procedures at the Centre. Of the respondents 34% were convinced that working together as a team at the MLM DLTC would promote the development of standard operating procedures. Another 30% of the respondents selected extremely important. Based on the majority of the responses, it is concluded that the employees at the Centre work collaboratively or as a team during the development of standard operating procedures. Key role players are thus consulted to acquire relevant and current advice (Lelaka 2017).

Statement 5: Following approval processes

Should procedures be reviewed or new ones developed it would require a thorough approval process which must be followed when submitting the final draft for acceptance and implementation. Statement 5 therefore, sought to determine if the prescribed processes at the MLM are followed to acquire approval for the implementation of newly developed standardised procedures to issue driving licences.

Of the number of responses received, 30% selected very important. The majority of the respondents held that it is very important to follow approval processes when developing standard operating procedures. After procedures are reviewed for quality and correctness to establish the degree to which they still meet planned objectives, proper approval processes are followed for the official acceptance thereof.

The qualitative data acquired through the follow-up interviews is now presented to complete the data analysis and findings.

Interpretations and findings of qualitative data

The staff at the MLM DLTC is, almost daily, refining improved ways of service delivery to their customers. However, a particular set of skills and competencies, for example, diligent compliance with the *Batho Pele* principles, mindsets willing to

improve and renew any outdated internal controls as well as constantly growing knowledge of the NRTA of 1996 and the eNaTIS system, is required to drive innovative service delivery (Lelaka 2017). It is thus alarming that the majority of the respondents to Statement 1 (*Finding new and innovative methods and procedures of performing tasks*) of the questionnaire held that new and innovative methods and procedures of performing tasks is of limited significance. The matter was consequently further addressed during the personal interviews with the Centre's management and supervisors.

In response to the interview question *'How would you manage the writing and implementation of new and innovative ways of performing routine tasks at the Centre?'* Manager A implied that the implementation of innovative procedures at the DLTC is problematic as some officials are afraid to implement new and unknown procedures. To seek further clarity, the DLTC supervisors were asked *'Would it be possible to introduce and implement new and innovative ways of performing routine tasks at the Centre?'* Supervisor A reacted in the negative, and only focused on the eNaTIS system. Two of the three supervisors revealed that they would welcome new and innovative procedures to motivate the staff and to improve service delivery at the Centre. However, another supervisor indicated that new approaches to perform their routine tasks is pointless; suggesting that eNaTIS has built-in prescripts to be conformed to. Based on the above responses, it was revealed that there is indeed a need for modernised procedures at the MLM DLTC, but it requires consideration of the requirements of licensing and road traffic legislation that serves as the basis for the functioning of the eNaTIS system.

In summary, the findings revealed:

- The majority of the operational staff at the MLM DLTC were convinced that it is not important to find new and innovative methods when updating or developing standard operating procedures. However, management acknowledged that the gap between existing procedures and the expected procedures as per legislation need to be explored to identify any imbalances and needs for new updated procedures.
- The DLTC staff admitted that knowledge of the workflow and the organisational structure is important when developing standardised procedures.
- Required equipment and resources are listed in the available procedures.
- The employees at the MLM DLTC are willing to work collaboratively when developing standard operating procedures to issue driving licences.
- It is important for the DLTC staff to follow prescribed approved processes.

The recommendations presented in the following section build on the synergy between the systems theory and the ADDIE instructional design model as well as the empirical findings of the study.


RECOMMENDATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

The supervisors revealed that they would welcome new and innovative procedures to motivate the staff and to improve service delivery at the Centre. There is a need to update the procedures at the MLM DLTC, but with consideration of the requirements of licensing and road traffic legislation that serves as the basis for the functioning of the eNaTIS system. It is recommended that the Centre's employees work collaboratively and as a team to review, update and develop the standard operating procedures. Furthermore, key role players must be consulted to acquire relevant advice when needed. It is further recommended that the required equipment and resources be specified in the standard operating procedures due to the critical role of the eNaTIS system in the DLTC environment. The availability of physical facilities and equipment needs to be considered when formulating policy on operational level. Furthermore, after the procedures are reviewed for quality and accuracy, proper approval processes must be adhered to for the actual official acceptance thereof.

It is also recommended that established ways of completing tasks be reviewed, new and creative ideas be strengthened and appropriate behaviour among officials is encouraged within the legislated framework. It is recommended that the following fundamental elements be incorporated in the development processes:

- Licensing and road traffic legislation, demands and suggestions by the relevant role players as well as existing procedures are fed into the 'developing system' as **inputs**. Existing approaches to procedure development should be critically analysed and then compared to the framework to identify any needs or gaps.
- After the relevant information is collected and analysed, an orderly way of identifying, developing and evaluating strategies to develop the standardised procedures, should be set. All the information and strategies are then converted into possible solutions through the actual development and procedure formulation phase. This is also referred to as the **conversion** stage of procedure-making. The first draft of the procedures would then be developed. Further conversion would take place by transforming feedback on the first draft of the procedures into the final version thereof. This implies that various administrative processes have to be executed, for example, the individual steps needed to complete the task have to be specified.
- The **outputs** or the final set of procedures has to be approved and adopted by management before the implementation thereof. In addition, the end-users of the standardised procedure should be trained on how to utilise and implement the procedures. The approved procedures are fed back to the environment from where the need arose to ensure continuous **feedback and revision**. The

Figure 3: Schematic illustration of the framework for the development of standard operating procedures



Source: (Authors' own construction)

output of the development process, namely the standard operating procedures, has to be revised and refined for smooth implementation.

The ultimate responsibility lies with the top management (municipal council) to approve or reject the new set of procedures. The council has to take certain factors, such as operational, technical and financial feasibilities, as well as any organisational, personnel and legal implications into consideration when deliberating the procedures. Should the procedures be approved (known as procedure adoption), permission would be granted to utilise and implement the procedures.

- Generally, the **monitoring and evaluation** of the implementation of the procedures is the responsibility of the DLTC management. Internal control mechanisms may be used to monitor the implementation of the procedures. The procedures should also be **reviewed** regularly by the operational staff to ensure procedures are still relevant to manage the problems they were designed for.

Figure 3 presents the proposed framework and illustrates the critical phases and the fundamental elements of developing standard operating procedures.

It is envisaged that, should the framework be applied effectively, a decline in typical driving licence related problems would be experienced. The lack of relevant standard operating procedures to issue driving licences at the MLM DLTC will then be resolved. However, various complexities affect policy and procedure development and implementation. Challenges towards effective implementation of the framework for the development of standard operating procedures at the MLM DLTC, include officials being afraid of the element of uncertainty and may result in officials sticking to tried and trusted, but outdated, standard procedures.

A major limitation in this study was the use of only one case study. Since a range of cases is of critical importance to model fitting, confirmation or otherwise of the findings could be determined by undertaking similar research among larger DLTCs across all provinces.

CONCLUSION

Given the significant findings reported above, it is important that the MLM DLTC implement the framework to ensure that driving licences are issued as per road traffic specifications. In this article, existing knowledge about methods and procedures of performing a task was extended to a blueprint for the development and review of standard operating procedures. The aim of developing a framework was to identify the critical phases and fundamental elements in the procedure development process so that managers at the MLM DLTC may apply the framework in their procedure formulation process. When setting the framework, it was revealed

that the systems theory and the ADDIE instructional design model could be applied to write new and innovative procedures to issue driving licences.

The qualitative research design was followed, although mixed methods were used to collect data to comprehend the problem of why the MLM DLTC lacks relevant standard operating procedures to issue driving licences. The practical relevance of the study may empower novice researchers with a better understanding of the way in which the development of standard operating procedures influence policy and procedure formulation and implementation at operational level.

NOTE

- * The article is partly based on a doctoral thesis under the supervision of Prof G M Ferreira and co-supervision of Prof D J Brynard, titled: Alers, C. 2018. *The Development and Implementation of Methods and Procedures of Issuing Drivers Licences in the Madibeng Municipality*. Unpublished PhD thesis. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

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Globalisation and the Political Economy of Institutional Choices

Assessing their Impact on the Democratisation Process in Africa

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ABSTRACT

In the contemporary globalising world, most nations that were granted 'nominal political independence' by their former colonisers are still grappling with the challenge of institutionalising democracy and actualising good governance. The post-colonial political elites, though a minority, are still manipulating the institutions in these 'absent' and 'fragile' nations to the extent that the choices may be antithetical to a dynamic process of democratic socialisation. Premised on the assumption that institutional choices are going to be major determinants of democratic maturation, the thrust of this article is two-fold. First, it is going to present a succinct examination of the patterns of institutional choices adopted by political elites in Africa because of the impacts of globalisation; second, it is going to explicate which institutional choices are most suitable for democratic consolidation in these fragile African nations.

INTRODUCTION

Starting from the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the drive towards the democratisation and globalisation processes has been promoted as the "cure all medicine" for emerging governments throughout the "Third, Fourth and Fifth World" (Ezeanyika 2017). However, most studies on the democratisation and globalisation processes often ignore, or at best give very little attention to Africa.

Since the early 1990s, democracy and economic liberalisation construed as globalisation have been viewed as the panacea for the nascent African nations.

These emerging economies, mainly dominated by nominally independent nations as well, are “playing” catch up in many instances with the dominant well-established Western industrialised nations (Fukuyama 2014, 2015). Coupled with the realities of absolute and disproportionate poverty, ethnic particularism and politicking laced with religious bigotry, many of these nations represent a theatre for the experimentation of state-centric versus anti-state-centric institutional policies (Ezeanyika 2016). State-centric institutional policies advance the idea that governmental interventions (or regulatory measures) in the political and economic realms are going to help lessen the chances for turmoil. Whereas, anti-state-centric policies advocate minimal governmental intervention, the “invisible hand” of the market notion should suffice for any major political and economic deprivation (Ezeanyika 2016).

Contrary to the “end of history” thesis presented by Fukuyama (1992), Western models of democracy are not necessarily appropriate for these politically fragile and economically weak nations for a variety of reasons to be enunciated later. A politically fragile nation is one in a situation in which its authority has not been effectively established or consolidated (Marshall and Jagers 2002; Bowman, Lehoucq and Mahoney 2005). Moreover, the state institutions are weak, and the state has very little direct control over either the citizens or resources within its territorial integrity. Our understanding of economically weak nations is that they are, in the majority of cases, dependent on a narrow range of export products, especially of raw and semi-processed commodities and perhaps one or two groups of manufacturers (Nwebo and Ezeanyika 2016). These nations are usually more vulnerable and have already experienced (and are still experiencing) their domestic industry being undermined by cheaper imports, and the dumping syndrome (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). This article investigates the general patterns and implications of institutional choices on democracy in Africa, in the face of the growing demands of economic globalisation.

The structure of this article is as follows: after the introduction, there will be a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the literature on democracy in general as it applies to Africa in particular. Second, the establishment of a correlation, if there is one, between economic development and the democratisation process. Third, the political economy of the feasible institutional choices necessary for the institutionalisation of democracy will be addressed. Fourth, some available baseline data will be examined and findings discussed on the nexus between globalisation and the democratisation process. Last, the presentation of concluding remarks and suggestions for a roadmap for future research in the area of institutional choice, globalisation and democracy in Africa.

CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

The end of the Cold War between the United States (US) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the peripheral nations in Africa, ushered in calls for globalisation and democratisation (Grugel 2002a, Grugel 2002b; Fukuyama and McFaul 2007). However, in the last 50 years of Africa's nominal political independence, not a single nation on the continent has achieved full-fledged democracy according to Western liberal standards (Nwebo and Ezeanyika 2016; Ezeanyika 2017). This fact notwithstanding, different African nations such as South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Benin and Senegal have made considerable efforts towards building democratic institutions. However, most African nations have only attained the level of procedural democracy (Ezeanyika 2017). This implies that elections for legislative and executive positions are conducted regularly in the majority of African nations, but despite these rituals, the democratisation literature has struggled to adequately explain political change such as liberalisation.

Vast literature that dates back to Aristotle has attempted to explain the determinants of democratisation. From the modernisation perspective, democracy is more likely to emerge and consolidate in educated and affluent societies (Lipset 1959). In contrast, Weber (1930) and Huntington (1991, 1993) have emphasised the dynamic role of the social environment. They postulate that religion, culture and fractionalisation rather than income are the key determinants of democratisation. Following the above presumption, many scholars of democracy have expressed skepticism on the possible success of the recent steps towards democracy in many parts of the world. Yet, others argue that democratisation in regions such as Africa could be achieved through the improvement of income or social norms rather than the possession of mineral and natural resources. Modernisation economists like Friedman (1962), believed that economic liberalism is the key underlying factor leading to actualisation and subsequent institutionalisation of democratisation.

Heavily relying on the above influential conjectures and the early contributions of Lipset (1959) on the economic and social preconditions of democratisation, many empirical studies have tried to detect the significant correlates of democracy (Barro 1996, 1999; Bollen and Jackman 1985, 1995; Boix and Stokes 2003; Muller 1995 and Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O' Halloran 2006). Recent empirical literature has tried to de-emphasise correlations and accentuate causal relationships (Acemoglu, Simon, Robinson and Yared 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2004; Glaeser, Giacomo and Shleifer 2007). The efforts to promote causality have however, sidelined important issues of adequately measuring and identifying the process of democratisation.

Much of the literature on democratisation focuses on substantive policy content, which limits our ability to analyse and compare across nations (Diamond *et al.* 2006; Powell Jr and Powell 2005). Powell Jr and Powell (2005) suggest that

students of democratisation should focus on the processes of democratic linkages, like structuring choices (first linkage), institutional aggregation (second linkage), and policymaking (final linkage). Regrettably, Western paradigms of democracy suggest that any discussions outside of particular endogenous variables are presumed to stymie political liberalisation efforts. Additionally, liberalisation efforts do not always open up the political process or help it democratise. At times, liberalisation efforts have helped sustain authoritarian governments in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by furnishing a tactical maneuver that kept the competitors at bay without acquiescing to the government's authority. Moreover, Western liberal democracies that tout "winner-take-all" or zero-sum games in majoritarian systems are not appropriate in highly stratified societies like those in Africa (Joseph 2011). Grand coalitions which typically appease majority and minority groups are perhaps more advantageous for Africa. In addition, majoritarian systems create situations where the majority party governs with fewer constraints, not only regarding political choices but also regarding fiscal policy choices (Persson and Tabellini 2003).

This reality has tremendous implications in the face of globalisation's "push and pull" factors. They include notions of 'free trade' and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in order to compete in the global marketplace. Moreover, the works of Dillman (2000, 2002, 2004, and 2007) have sufficiently demonstrated that in the case of North African countries, significant globalisation measures in the form of economic trade and liberalisation policies have had very little impact on political liberalisation. This trend is attributable to political elites' institutional choices which stipulate 'pseudo-economic reforms' that only sustain distributional coalitions, and which limit far-reaching political reforms to the masses. Put differently, the autonomous preferences and interests of political elites override the public good of increased political liberties, civil rights for the community, and the rule of law.

In most of the democratisation literature focused on Africa, elements such as primordial political culture, religious bigotry and fanaticism, ethnic particularism and class cleavages, low levels of economic development, low levels of education, and fragile or nonexistent civil society activities are considered quintessentially destructive forces to any democratic model (Ezeanyika 2017). There is a symbiotic relationship between highly fractionalised nations and the tendency to be associated with lower levels of constraints on their chief political executive (Nwebo and Ezeanyika 2016; Ezeanyika 2017). Thus, lower levels of executive constraints open the door to corruption and autocratic rule, which clearly are antithetical to the democratising process. Furthermore, ethnically fragmented societies' political systems are less democratic. In such ethnically diverse societies, executives choose political systems and make institutional choices, which shield or insulate certain groups and prevent others (out-groups) from having input (Chazan 1982; Horowitz 1993).

There is evidence illustrating that religious fanaticism and ethnic particularism have compromised democratic consolidation throughout the African continent (Horowitz 1993). The above notwithstanding, the “third wave” of democracy appears to be spreading across the continent like a ‘harmattan fire’ (Huntington 1991). African nations such as Botswana (the longest standing democracy in post-colonial Africa), Mauritius, South Africa, Ghana, Senegal, Zambia, Nigeria, and others have made the arduous trek to democracy and have consolidated democracy at various levels.

Currently, 35 per cent of Africa can be characterised as undergoing the democratising process. Of the 54 nations 19 have introduced some forms of democratic rule. This is no small achievement; given the reality that most of Africa, especially SSA has only attained nominal political independence in the past 50 years (Nwebo and Ezeanyika 2016). Never mind the reality that democracy waxes and wanes and “one size does not fit all”. The recommendation of Rustow (1970:346) that “there may be many roads to democracy” makes sense even in the post-Cold War era. Put differently, “... the same formal rules and/or constitutions imposed on different societies produce different outcomes” (North 1990:4).

IS THERE ANY CORRELATION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATISATION?

In Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000), the scholars have postulated that their research could not establish a connection between levels of economic development and transitions to a democratisation process. They remarked that transitions could occur for many reasons, not all of which are systematic. They claim that ‘the apparent connection results from the political stability of rich democracies. Although poor democracies sometimes collapse and return to dictatorship, rich democracies never do, which over time leads to a high proportion of rich countries among democracies.’ Using a different measure of democracy and a dataset covering a much longer period of time, Croissant (2005) and Armev and McNab (2015) were also not able to establish a linkage between development and transitions to a democratisation process after controlling for characteristics of countries’ neighbours. In his own study, Pevehouse (2002) could also not find a nexus between development and democratisation after controlling for the average level of democracy among the members of regional international organisations that countries belong to. These findings are, however, open to different interpretations. It is a generally acceptable truism that economic development tends to vary by region. Consequently, levels of development are likely to be collinear with average democratisation in neighbouring countries or regional international organisations. It might be that

economic development in a region causes democratisation in a region, thus accounting for the correlation between neighbours' regime type and the likelihood of democratisation, even if neighbours have no direct influence. Alternatively, it might be that neighbours' influence is the reason for the correlation between development and democracy (Boswell and Geddes 2011).

Other scholars, however, have rejected the arguments advanced by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000). In a very careful re-appraisal that extends the time period back to 1850, Boix and Stokes (2003) show that development does contribute to democratic transitions, though the average effect for the whole period is small relative to the effect of development on maintaining democracy. In fact, they note that a careful reading of *Democracy and Development* shows that even Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000) find a small statistically significant effect of development on the likelihood of transitions to democracy.

Boix and Stokes (2003), show that when the dataset is divided by periods, economic development is an extremely important predictor of transition prior to 1950, but it has only a small (though statistically significant) effect in the post-1950 period. Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O'Halloran (2006) also challenge the Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000) findings. They show that results are changed by using a trichotomous measure of democracy rather than a dichotomous one, as Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000) did. They find that development has strong predictive power for transitions into and out of the category; they call it partial democracy, but with less effect on transitions from full autocracy to full democracy. The findings of Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O'Halloran (2006) should probably be interpreted as meaning that development is a good predictor of the softening or routinisation of authoritarian regimes, though not necessarily of regime change.

Economic development is correlated with many other trends, and one or more of those may be the causal mechanism that accounts for the apparent relationship between development and democracy. Lipset (1959) and other modernisation theorists suggested that increasing education, equality, urbanisation, experience of working in factories, and the weakening of traditional loyalties to tribe and village – all correlates of economic development – would result in citizens with more tolerant and participatory attitudes who would demand a say in government (Lipset 1959; Inkeles and Smith 1974). These arguments stressed the experiences and values of ordinary citizens as the basis for democracy without specifying the process through which transitions might occur or giving much attention to the possible reluctance of elites to give up power (Auty 2007). Zak and Feng (2003) have modelled a process through which this relationship might unfold, but have not tested it.

Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Zak and Feng (2003) argue that democratisation is more likely when the income distribution – which

tends to even out as countries reach high levels of development – is more equal. Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that elites fear redistribution less when income distribution is relatively equal because the median voter's preference concerning taxes will then be less confiscatory. Elites, according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), are willing to cede some power rather than risk the costs of revolution when they expect democracy not to lead to extremely redistributive taxation.

Boix (2003) expects a linear relationship between equality and the likelihood of democratisation. Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) model suggests a non-monotonic relationship: at low levels of inequality, an increase can promote democracy by increasing the threat of revolution, but at higher levels of inequality, elites will repress rather than offer concessions because of their fear of the redistributive consequences of democratisation. An empirical challenge to these arguments is that evidence of more equal income distributions in democracies is at best mixed (Bollen and Jackman 1985). There is little evidence that the current set of recalcitrant dictatorships is made up of countries with especially unequal income distributions. In the post-Second World War period, longer-lived dictatorships (excluding monarchies) have more equal income distributions than brief ones.

Boix (2003) and Rogowski (1998) argue that capital mobility, which also tends to rise with development, also contributes to democratisation. When capital is mobile, it can flee in response to high taxes. Democratic governments are therefore expected to refrain from taxing heavily; so elites need not fear democracy. In the Boix (2003) model, elites' interests can be protected either by a relatively equal income distribution or by capital mobility. Where capital mobility is low, as in countries with predominantly agricultural economies, and income unequal, however, elites should be unwilling to negotiate democratisation.

FEASIBLE INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES

Institutions (including political ones) are public entities “with formally designated structures and functions, intended to regulate certain defined activities which apply to the whole population” (Bealey 1999:166). In addition, “institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals” (North 1990:4). Institutions help constrain those innate human impulses. It is pertinent to state that institutions were of special importance in the immediate post-colonial period, because of the trepidation of the residuals of colonisation, the ‘struggle’ for power by the elites and the mobilisation of competing interests. Political elite behaviour (and all political behaviour for that matter), including corrupt behaviour (manipulating public power for one's private gain) is largely influenced by the way political power is organised. A functional strategy to constraining corruption is to provide

some level of checks and balances on the avarice and greed of the ruling elites and their acolytes (Ezeanyika 2016).

Institutionalism focuses on regulating the political behaviour of political leaders. Thus, institutionalism is the theory, which posits that formal political organisations like the legislature and the judiciary are necessary to ameliorate political behaviour and restrict attempts to engage in corrupt practices. Organisations may facilitate the introduction of democratic rule, but are not self-sufficient in creating democratic consolidation. Organisations are endogenous tools that compete with exogenous “push and pull” factors such as globalisation (Nwebo and Ezeanyika 2016).

Political elites in Africa, in their attempts to free themselves from the shackles of colonialism, autocratic, dictatorial and military rule should consider the types of institutional choices that are most appropriate for their particular nation (Nwebo and Ezeanyika 2016). Political elite choices include, constraining executive power in the form of legislative checks and balances; expanding executive recruitment efforts that go beyond nepotism; expanding who can participate in the political process (for example, not just males over the age of 18 or royal bloodlines). It also includes increasing the competitiveness of participation, all of which can be mandated and monitored through a people-inspired and people-oriented written constitution (Ezeanyika 2016).

Institutions are functional and practical tools fashioned to create a sustainable environment for the emergence, growth and deepening of democratic ideals and democracy. Moreover, institutions structure behaviour into stable, predictable, and recurrent patterns, thus institutional systems are less volatile and more enduring, and so are institutionalised democracies (Diamond *et al.* 1995:33; Diamond and Plattner 2006; Diamond 2008). This notion of institutions is a type of theory of organisational institutionalism. It suggests that there are necessary organisations such as legislatures, executives and judiciaries that can facilitate democratic transitions and ultimately the institutionalisation of democracy, that is, democratic consolidation and deepening. However, the lesson of Rustow’s (1970) “pre-third wave” finding is not lost. He illustrated that transitions to democracy are dynamic and thus varied. He cautions, “no two existing democracies have gone through a struggle between the very same forces over the same issues and with the same institutional outcome. Hence, it seems unlikely that any future democracy will follow in the precise footsteps of any of its predecessors” (Rustow 1970:354).

Colonial policies in terms of economic growth and democratic consolidation did not differ much in Africa and maintenance of hand-picked political elites as pawns of the Western colonisers helped perpetuate policy-implementing institutions (an executive branch), as opposed to policymaking institutions (legislatures) (Ezeanyika 2016).

Put differently, African colonial and post-colonial leaders were literally compelled to be administrators of Western propagated policies as stooges of Western

imperialism, as opposed to creating viable participatory and representative legislatures. Legislatures would be more beholden to their constituents, which would allow for some democratic maturation. As La Palombara (1974) and Ezeanyika (2016) illustrated, the lack of effective and efficient legislatures, cumbersome, very incompetent and corrupt bureaucracies, and entrenched military rule; is still commonplace throughout much of Africa.

Likewise, the 19th century European colonisers carved up Africa, establishing non-democratic and traditionally alien governments in the nascent nations. Thus, general patterns of institutional choice by post-colonial leaders tended to reflect their colonial legacies of either liberal or statist political and economic policies. In the new millennium, Taylor and Nel (2002) caution the “New Africa” Initiative (comprising the political leaders from Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Mali, and Tanzania) to be vigilant in the neoliberal discourse of globalisation because it may perpetuate the benefits to only a small number of elites like themselves.

It is therefore arguable that the types of general patterns of institutional choices that the political elites of Africa are subscribing to include the following. Capitulating or surrendering to the whims and caprices of Western powers for short-term economic gain; willingness to use coercive force and repressive techniques as a tool to control and manipulate; political elites’ maintenance of coalitions that may not have an interest in democratisation but they nevertheless support economic liberalisation because of self-interest; political elites’ maintenance of dependent distributional coalitions that can partake in economic windfalls as long as they are politically loyal; and partial reform policies to appease international financial donors such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, despite these ‘worthy’ economic liberalisation reforms to accommodate the ever-growing demands of globalisation, North African nations have experienced very little political liberalisation, sustaining benevolently repressive and dictatorial governments (Ezeanyika 2018a).

POLITICAL ELITE INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES AND THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION

It is only in the last two decades that the concept of globalisation became commonplace. Scholars who used it in the 1970s accurately recognised the novelty of doing so (Modelski 1972). Since the advent of industrial capitalism, however, intellectual discourse has been replete with allusions to phenomena similar to those that have attracted the attention of globalisation theorists.

Since the mid-1980s, social theorists have improved our understanding of globalisation through their rigorous analysis of the concept. In spite of this critical

approach to the elucidation, major disagreements remain about the precise nature of the causal forces behind globalisation. While Harvey (1989, 1996) develops his argument directly on Marx's pioneering explanation of globalisation, others such as Giddens (1990), Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999) are critical of the exclusive focus on economic factors characteristic of the Marxist approach. This notwithstanding, one can observe a consensus about the basic rudiments of the concept of globalisation. Some of these are mentioned below:

- Contemporary analysts associate the concept of globalisation with that of 'deterritorialisation'. It emphasises a growing variety of social activities taking place irrespective of the geographical location of participants. It has been observed that global events can – through the use of telecommunication gadgets, digital computers, audio-visual media, rocketry and the like – occur almost simultaneously anywhere and everywhere in the world (Scholte 1996:45). Globalisation is associated with increased possibilities for action between and among people in situations where latitudinal and longitudinal location seems immaterial to the social activity at hand (Ruggie 1993; Scholte 2000).
- Recent theorists postulate that the concept of globalisation is connected to the growth of 'social interconnectedness' across existing geographical and political boundaries. From this perspective, deterritorialisation is a crucial facet of globalisation.
- According to Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999:15). Globalisation refers to "the processes of change which underpin a transformation in the organization of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents". Within this context, globalisation is perceived as a matter of degree since any given social activity might influence events more or less far away.
- Finally, we might consider the degree to which interconnectedness across frontiers is no longer merely haphazard but instead predictable and regularised (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999).

From the above explanation, we can infer that globalisation is a buzzword, which has now graduated to a *passee-partout*. It can also be referred to as 'free trade' activities with minimal barriers to access markets, liberal trade policies, international movement of transnational capital, goods, and labour, the hegemony of neoliberal economic policies, and minimal state involvement in the exchange of those goods and services, that is, *laissez-faire* capitalism (Ezeanyika 2003c, 2005a,b). Castells (2009, 2010) emphasises in his works that globalisation undermines state power, particularly in underdeveloped and developing nations, and any attempts at reconstructing national identities are also sabotaged by the forces of globalisation. Put bluntly, globalisation is the new form of imperialism.

Globalisation in many ways reduces the economic and political sovereignty of nations. It achieves this by being hostile to protective markets, tariff measures, protective legislation, executive mandates, and so on. Globalisation means that you must “play” by the rules regardless of your economic position *vis-à-vis* other nations’ competitive edge. The barriers to free trade are viewed with disdain and are a bane to economic development. Globalisation means that political elites’ institutional choices are grossly restricted and must be tailored in such a way that the political systems tend to become heavily bureaucratised in order to meet the economic requirements to “play” in the global marketplace of goods and services (Ezeanyika 2018a).

In addition, political elites’ institutional choices are focused on the management and execution of national policies which must coincide with International Financial Institutions’ (IFI) demands, like the World Bank and the IMF. Globalisation tends to focus more on political stability rather than democratisation, which can mean authoritarianism at worst, or pseudo-democracy, non-liberal democracy at best (Ezeanyika 2003a, b, c; Alianak 2004).

Globalisation, coupled with the seemingly never-ending political and military instability in many parts of Africa means that political elites’ institutional choices will have to attempt to abate such realities. Political violence may also temporarily inhibit democracy, like other potential characteristics such as elite noncompliance and elite reception of radicals (Lupo 2004; Cave *et. al.* 2006; Meyer and Lupo 2007).

CONCLUSION

This article provides a baseline research in the area of political elites and institutional choices in Africa. It also provides at least a starting point for assessing variables that impact on the democratisation process and the concept of globalisation.

The article has illustrated that political elites in Africa can, if adequately focused, contribute substantially in fostering democratic ideals and institutionalising the democratisation process by facilitating electoral rules that will substantially increase participation. Increasing levels of participation regardless of ethnicity, class, religion, and socio-economic status, should be paramount in any discussion on democratic consolidation and deepening. Consequently, mitigating the negative impacts of ethnic particularism, class stratification, religious bigotry and fanaticism, and socio-economic cleavages with institutional choices involving proportionality, as opposed to majoritarian rules might help appease majority as well as minority groups.

Institutional choices by political elites in Africa made in the midst of “push and pull” factors of globalisation such as free trade and SAPs, might require, in order to

compete, more coalition building, instead of the more contentious Western majoritarian “winner-take-all” system. A zero-sum political system, whereby political elites and other parties with vested interests either win or lose, leaves no room for a constructive and dynamic dialogue between already historically contentious groups, especially in nascent regimes engaged in the democratisation process.

NOTE

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- Typewritten on one side of the paper and language edited. A4 format; one and a half spacing with generous margins; statistics are to be presented in table format, and graphic images in boxed diagrams.
- Contributions should preferably be between 6 000–8 000 words. Contributions less than 4 500 words will be considered as viewpoints and not as full articles for subsidy purposes. Each article must be preceded by an abstract (length 200–250 words). Abstracts should represent the contents of the article concisely.
- Title of Paper (Centre, Bold, 12pt Times New Roman/Arial, Caps), Name and Surname, Affiliation (name of university/institution), (Align left, Bold 12pt Times New Roman).
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 - **Article:** Auriacombe, C.J. 2007. Deconstructing the public interest for application in South Africa. *Administratio Publica*. 15(1):28–52.
 - **Official publication:** Public Service Commission. 2008c. *Report on the Audit of Reporting Requirements and Departmental Monitoring and Evaluation Systems within National and Provincial Government*. Public Service Commission. Pretoria: Government Printers.
 - **Internet reference:** Patton, M.Q. 1999. Utilization-Focused Evaluation in Africa, training lectures presented at the African Evaluation Association, 13–17 Sept. 1999. Nairobi. Kenya. Available at: www.afrea.org/documents/document.cfm?docID=64. (Accessed on 25 March 2009).
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