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# Editorial

D Nel-Sanders

Chief Editor

The South African Constitution enshrines the right to a safe environment for all citizens. However, policing agencies cannot deal with the prevention of violent crime through law enforcement alone, and their efforts need to be supplemented. Crime statistics dated March 2022, yielded by the South African Police Service (SAPS), reveal that the Western Cape had the highest number of murders (3 848) in the country. Various crime strategies have been proposed, including the establishment of Community Policing Forums (CPFs). CPFs in the Western Cape have adopted community policing and social crime prevention approaches to contribute to the prevention of violent crime but to no avail. In their article, **'An Evidence-based Social Crime Prevention Approach for Community Participation in the Prevention of Violent Crime'**, L Siegelaar and H H Ballard note that three traditional approaches, namely Problem-Orientated Policing (POP), Community Problem-Orientated Policing (CPOP) and Social Crime Prevention (SCP), have been adopted in the Western Cape, but with limited success. In their article, the authors investigate the causes for this failure to reduce violent crime and proposes an alternative approach aimed at reducing the high levels of violent crime. Two CPFs, established in Nyanga and Mitchell's Plain were selected for evaluation because they currently administer and implement crime prevention approaches to prevent violent crime. Community policing performed by CPFs, and other community organisations could enhance the crime prevention strategies of the policing agencies. CPFs are constitutionally mandated to participate in community policing and thus need to be at the forefront of the prevention of violent crime. EBSCP could enhance their abilities in this regard. The article proposes a further intervention, namely the Evidence-Based Policing Social Crime Evidence-Based Policing (EBSCP) approach, to complement the above-mentioned methods to achieve the crime prevention strategy outcome effectively. According to the authors, SAPS's inability to effectively prevent violent crime could have a ripple effect in that the reporting of more violent crimes will result in more case dockets for investigation. If effectively performed, the approach will lead to an increase in court roles which can lead to pressure on the already overcrowded prison community. The authors recommend that an EBSCP approach is accepted as a community participation method for the prevention of violent crime.

In **'Necessitating the Need for Co-production of Public Services: A Tool for Promoting Political Trust in Local Government'**, A Jakoet-Salie and K S Ramolobe

explore the impact of co-production on political trust, and the potential benefits and challenges of adopting a co-production approach to public service delivery. The authors argue that the co-production of public services will enforce a mutualistic relationship between government and citizens, as it provides an avenue for citizens to share in the design and delivery of public services in local government; hence improving trust in government. When governments and citizens work together to improve public services, the concept of 'co-production' gains popularity in finding answers to problems and challenges in the public sector. This article contributes to the academic discourse in South Africa on co-production and the role of citizens in the decision-making process. Moreover, it provides a useful tool for local governments to measure and monitor the levels of political trust and co-production in their communities.

M P Khoabane and L M du Plessis, in their article, **'The Importance of Strategic Management Resources for Successful Technical and Vocational Education and Training Governance in Lesotho'**, discuss strategic management resources for implementing a successful Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) strategy in Lesotho. According to the authors, the country's Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) and TVET institutions use strategic management to achieve their strategic goals. However, strategic resources are scarce, hindering the expected development of human capital. The authors also state that, due to skills mismatches, TVET graduates leave institutions with irrelevant skills, causing unemployment, poverty and social inequality. TVET institutions also lack strategic resources to implement TVET strategies. This article found that Lesotho's government and MOET do not support TVET institutions' strategic resources and institutions adequately. The article recommends revising public sector policies, facilitating stakeholder collaboration, improving the robustness of TVET funding, enhancing leadership, and facilitating TVET corporate governance to support the successful implementation of the public sector TVET strategy.

In **'Effectiveness of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature Through the Lens of Gauteng Citizens'**, E Muzenda, C Alers and V A Clapper investigate measures to bridge the gap between how the Gauteng Provincial Legislature (GPL) and Gauteng citizens define and measure its performance and effectiveness. According to the authors, from an internal perspective, the GPL defines and measures performance using the performance model that focuses on inputs, activities, and outputs. However, the citizens assess the performance of the GPL using the expectation disconfirmation model, which emphasises outcomes. This means the GPL and the citizens define and assess GPL effectiveness using different lenses, causing a disjuncture in the results. According to the authors, on the one hand, the internal perspective lens underscores the ineffectiveness of the GPL. On the other hand, the external perspective lens revealed that the GPL has been performing sub-optimally. The article recommends that the GPL embrace, and correctly

balance the use of the performance and the expectation disconfirmation models. This would bridge the gap between results relating to the internal and external effectiveness of the GPL. The article makes it clear that the practitioners need to focus on citizens' expectations to improve perceived performance. This is a shift from a predominantly performance-based model to the expectation disconfirmation model.

In their article, '**Civil Society and Corruption Prevention: An Assessment of Antecedent Conditions**', H Lubita and W N Webb argue that corrupt practices in the upper echelons of state institutions have become more intricate. Notably, the authors state that conventional law enforcement institutions have lacked the capacity to effectively prosecute and convict the alleged perpetrators. The burden of proof and the length and cost of successful criminal prosecution and conviction places undue pressure on already overstretched law enforcement institutions. As a result, citizens have lost their trust in the state and the integrity of its institutions. The state's failed endeavours to combat and prevent corruption has increased the significance of the other pillars of the national integrity system, such as the media, private sector, civil society, and various watchdog institutions. In this article, the authors investigate the potential role of community security organisations (CSOs) in combating corruption. The authors report on their review of the most recent literature on the crucial role that civil society can play in preventing corruption. They based their findings on the following themes: The potential role of civil society in corruption prevention; the need for an enabling environment in which civil society can investigate and report on malfeasance; the need for adequate funding to prevent corruption; the need for effective collaboration between civil society and various role-players such as anti-corruption institutions; and linkages with anti-corruption legislation and policies, both internationally and domestically.

In '**A Good Governance Framework for State Institutions: The Case of the Government of Zimbabwe**', B Muronda and G van der Walddt, investigate the roots of public-sector inefficiency in Zimbabwe. According to the authors, the proliferation of good governance ideas in the late-20<sup>th</sup> century gave the developing world a template for managing public resources and creating value for citizens. An emphasis on accountability, responsiveness, value creation, citizen engagement and safeguarding citizens' human rights meant that good governance principles were promoted as a panacea for public-sector challenges facing post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. The authors note that this coincided with the Zimbabwean government's desire to satisfy the needs of its citizens within the constraints of strict funding conditions by donors and multilateral lending institutions. Policy-makers and bureaucrats adopted socio-economic reforms to align with the emerging public management ideologies. The article found that, despite these reforms, the Zimbabwean state struggled to provide public goods and services. Undeniably, this was exacerbated by economic meltdown, corruption

and global isolation. The article demonstrates the Zimbabwean government's challenges with regarding managing public-sector performance and effectiveness. Against this background, the article proposes a good governance framework to promote sound governance. The authors argue that the good governance framework can be applied in the Zimbabwean context to improve the operations of public institutions. For example, the rule of law will ensure that culprits involved in corruption are prosecuted, and that the government sequesters their illicitly acquired assets. In addition, good governance principles encourage the government to involve citizens' views and opinions in policy-making.

In their article, '**International Strategies and Practices to Promote a Safe Road Environment: Citizen Participation Practices to Promote Safer Road Usage**', H S Fourie, C J Auriacombe and D B Jarbandhan investigate the instrumental benefit of citizen participation to promote road user safety programmes and strategies. To ensure sustainable development, the United Nations (UN) and its member states have included the reduction of road deaths in accordance with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Road safety issues are situated in social and cultural values, norms and practices. Hence, citizen participation is vital to creating and sustaining a safe road environment. This article highlights international strategies and best practices of safer road usage with a focus on the role of the UN, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and selected countries concerning the participation of citizens as road users. The article focuses on the top-three performing countries in terms of road safety, namely Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands (also known as the SUN countries). It discusses strategies and best practices of citizen participation in road safety programmes in these SUN countries. The article then spreads the net wider by discussing legislation, policies and strategies relating to citizen participation in road safety in these countries.

### **Chief Editor**

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# An Evidence-based Social Crime Prevention Approach for Community Participation in the Prevention of Violent Crime

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## **ABSTRACT**

High levels of violent crime in South Africa have been threatening the country's social, economic and democratic gains since the first democratic election in 1994. Crime statistics dated March 2022, yielded by the South African Police Service (SAPS), reveal that the Western Cape had the highest number of murders (3 848) in the country. Various crime strategies have been proposed, including the establishment of Community Policing Forums (CPFs). CPFs in the Western Cape adopted community policing and social crime prevention approaches to contribute to the prevention of violent crime but to no avail. This study attempted to identify the causes for this failure with the intention of proposing an alternative approach aimed at reducing the high levels of violent crime. Two CPFs, established in Nyanga and Mitchell's Plain, were selected for evaluation.

A mixed-method approach was adopted, which included a close-ended questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews. The findings arising from the analysis of the results of the questionnaire survey with purposively selected CPF representatives were validated with the responses from four purposively selected practitioners, who were recognised as knowledgeable authorities within the community policing discipline, through semi-structured interviews. The questionnaire survey revealed several individual and institutional capacity challenges to fulfilling their mandate and these findings were validated by the four purposively selected knowledgeable

persons regarded as experts on policing. The study revealed that the two selected CPFs currently administer and implement crime prevention approaches to prevent violent crime. The article proposes an Evidence-Based Policing Social Crime Prevention (EBSCP) approach for CPF participation in the prevention of violent crime.

## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Since the dawn of democracy, high levels of violent crime in South Africa have been threatening the country's social, economic and democratic gains. Violence in various forms, such as violence against women and children, gang violence and farm attacks, posed diverse challenges concerning policing. According to the Department of Justice (2019:2), violence and the fear of violence eroded the expectations arising from the transformation of the police service post-1994. The *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996* (hereafter referred to as the Constitution) posed challenges to the police, amongst others, when considering a democratic approach to delivering police services. The representative-elected government introduced numerous policing policies and strategies, such as the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), which included the involvement of stakeholders in delivering policing services to society at large in South Africa.

Despite these statutory interventions, Bhorat (2017:1–2) allude that violent crime levels are still unacceptably high. South Africa's crime statistics are among the highest globally, especially for violent crime. The South African Police Service Act, 1995 (South Africa, 1995) states that SAPS is responsible for the safety and security of all people in the country. The following primary tasks of SAPS are identified in Section 205(3) of the Constitution: crime prevention, crime combating, criminal investigation, preserving public order, protecting and securing the people of the republic and their property, and upholding and enforcing the law.

The Western Cape Crime Overview 2020/21, dated March 2022, issued by the Western Cape Provincial Government, presents a comparative crime analysis for the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and the Western Cape. The City of Cape Town (CoCT) hosted seven of the top ten stations for the most reported violent crimes, namely Khayelitsha (first), Delft (third), Nyanga fourth), Kraaifontein (fifth), Harare (sixth), Mfuleni (seventh) and Gugulethu (ninth). In three crime categories, the provincial increase is higher than the national increase, namely murder, sexual offences and attempted murder. Lamb and Warton (2016:1) allude that the high rates of violent crime undermine the social, economic, and political advances accomplished by the country since the commencement of democracy. Boateng,

Pryce and Abbess (2022:1) have demonstrated that SAPS cannot effectively prevent crime and suggest that crime prevention models be investigated to resolve this problem. In addition, the White Paper on Safety and Security (South Africa, 2016:8–9) and Manana (2015:1) propose that more rigorous studies should be undertaken to address the underlying causes of crime and that a strategy to effectively address the current obstacles in crime prevention should be developed. To facilitate crime prevention, Mokhlomole and Olutola (2023:1) advise that communities should mobilise to encourage collaboration and that consultation between the police and communities should be enhanced.

Three traditional approaches, namely Problem-Orientated Policing (POP), Community Problem-Orientated Policing (CPOP) and Social Crime Prevention (SCP), have been adopted in the Western Cape with limited success, as confirmed by the above crime statistics. The causes for the failure to reduce the violent crime rate were investigated in terms of the CPF's capacities to fulfil their statutory mandates and a further intervention has been proposed, namely the Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) approach, to complement the above-mentioned approaches to achieve the crime prevention strategy outcome effectively.

The article will present the normative and regulatory framework for crime prevention, an explanation of three crime prevention approaches and the proposed EBP approach, which has achieved international success. The findings arising from the analysis of the quantitative questionnaire survey results of the two CPF forums located in Nyanga and Mitchells Plain and the results arising from the validation of the above survey results will also be presented. Discussion of the results and findings will provide a premise for the proposed intervention.

## **NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR CRIME PREVENTION**

Burger (2007:12) defines crime prevention as "...any action designed to reduce either the actual level of crime or the perceived fear of crime." Lab (2020:34) articulates crime prevention as any effort or mechanism to prevent further criminal activity or to prevent crime from happening. Brantingham and Faust (1976:288) propose three levels of crime prevention: primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Firstly, the focus of the primary crime prevention level was mainly on environmental factors such as town planning, urban renewal and improvement of safety features. Newburn (2007:566) notes that the secondary crime prevention level is an action that could change circumstances and make it impossible to commit a crime. Groups of people at risk of becoming offenders or victims of crime, focus on the secondary crime prevention level. The tertiary crime prevention level focuses on convicted criminals and those who earn a living from criminality. SAPS and CPFs adopted three approaches within the secondary level of crime

prevention: Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), Community Problem-Oriented Policing (CPOP) and the Social Crime Prevention approach. Each of these three approaches is explained hereunder.

## **Problem-Orientated Policing (POP) approach**

The Problem-Orientated Policing (POP) approach was first introduced by Goldstein (1979), who then argued that policing was too reactive and not analytical enough. Goldstein accused the police of suffering from the “means over ends” syndrome (Goldstein 1979:236) as they seem to be more concerned with improving organisational and operational matters than with the defined outcome of their work. Goldstein (1979:248–256) opined that police simply responding to a call registered is insufficient for crime prevention and that police should additionally identify the underlying causes of the problems and address these causes. The approach is centred on three key elements: identifying and defining the problem, gathering information about the issue and implementing alternatives to solve the problem. There is limited community participation in these elements. According to Carlos (2013:2), the foregoing approach is aimed at the police to perform these three functions to improve their defined outcome and consult the local community for assistance if required. Thereby, the local community was reduced to becoming a tool for policing, with no real influence on the defined outcome of the process.

## **Community Problem-Orientated Policing (CPOP)**

To accommodate community participation in POP, Community Problem-Orientated Policing or Community and Problem-Orientated Policing (CPOP) was designed and implemented. According to Atkins (2000:6), CPOP involves the community joining the police as co-producers of crime prevention methods by utilising a problem-solving approach. Skogan (206:23) and Weisburd and Eck (2004:12) refer to this approach as Community-Oriented Policing (COP), focusing on community partnership, organisational transformation and problem-solving. The focus is on creating a partnership and a problem-solving platform for issues of common concern.

## **Social Crime Prevention**

The Social Crime Prevention approach is premised on the proposition that law enforcement focuses on crime prevention policies that are inadequate or insufficient to achieve crime prevention. The approach should be supplemented with strategies that reduce social risk factors (root causes). Bruce and Gold (2016:18)

state that social crime prevention aims to support law enforcement by influencing the macro-structural social factors contributing to crime in communities. Social crime prevention addresses the socio-economic and environmental factors that cause people to commit a crime.

The White Paper on Safety and Security (WPSS) (South Africa 1998:16) dictates that the government cooperates with local police to identify local safety urgencies and possible areas to be addressed by the provincial government. The document also specifies the Four Pillar approach. Through this approach, meaningful community participation in crime prevention will be enabled through education and information programmes. The WPSS (South Africa 1998:18) also promotes social crime prevention as an alternative or parallel approach (supplementary) to the criminal justice approach (law enforcement) and defines social crime prevention as actions directed at socio-economic and environmental factors conducive to crime commitment. The focus is on social and environmental factors that could entice crime or lead to committing a crime.

According to Crawford and Adams (2017:11), the objective of social crime prevention is two-fold: firstly, to reduce an individual's motivation to commit a crime through their social influence and institutions of socialisation and, secondly, to alter social relationships and the social environment. Social crime prevention adopts a meaningful community participation approach in crime prevention, which is enabled through education and information programmes. Due to the limited success of the three approaches within the secondary level, as explained above, a further approach was included in the scope of the research project, namely Evidence-Based Policing (EBP), regarded as a secondary-level intervention. EBP is presented and explained hereunder.

## **Evidence-Based Policing**

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2019:3) defines EBP as generating and testing a hypothesis to produce social evidence to best deal with crime. EBP is centred on the medical field (Evidence-Based Medicine) approach where successful medical treatment of a particular problem is shared. Other doctors could learn from it and build on its success, leading to continuous improvement (ISS 2019:5). Sherman (1998:3) defines EBP as a methodology using the best available research results to inform and evaluate policing activities. Lum and Kope (201:6) add to this definition by stating that EBP is a decision-making perspective, not a remedy. According to Honess (2018:3), EBP is a policing approach that is not blindly decided but is supported by research evidence and analytics, which finds its way into discussions on addressing crime. The actions of the police are examined to provide evidence for those actions and determine if the desired results are achieved. Honess (2018:4) argues that best practices could

be formulated with the evidence or altered and changed based on the evidence obtained from the process.

EBP directs the action of SAPS in preventing violent crime by presenting and analysing factual evidence to achieve the defined outcome of reducing violent crime significantly. The motivation for the inclusion of EBP is that it is comparable to POP, is led by policing agencies and is supported by various other stakeholders and the specific communities that are not actively involved in generating evidence for implementation. No real evidence exists concerning the implementation of EBP in South Africa. According to Vuma (2022:2), EBP was piloted in the five police stations in the Eden District of the Southern Cape, primarily focusing on law enforcement. In contrast, Newham and Rappert (2018:1) indicate that the interest in promoting EBP increased internationally to allow for scientific research in policing and to enhance collaboration. According to Newman and Rappert (2018:11), this is evident in an organisation called the Society of Evidence-Based Policing, first started in the United Kingdom in 2010, followed by countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States of America. This could indicate that developed countries view the approach as a success and are thus more inclined to adopt EBP as part of their policing strategies.

With mounting interest in crime reduction across the globe, Higginson *et al.* (2015:67) undertook a review of police interventions in developing countries, identifying 2 765 records of some type of police intervention. The review advances that only 54 papers, in 13 countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America, focused on preventing violent crime. Based on studies that focused on the effectiveness and the implementation of interventions, only five studies were deemed to contain enough information regarding methodological rigour to determine the success or failure of the interventions. Centred on sufficient quality to permit the analysis of factors contributing to the success or failure of policing intervention, another 37 studies were included in the systematic review. The findings of this systematic review indicate a need for well-articulated police-community partnerships with sufficient resources and personnel to achieve predetermined goals. Furthermore, the findings include that COP interventions require authentic community participation and political commitment supported by a multi-agent approach. A valuable lesson from this systematic review is that developing countries need different approaches to preventing violent crime. EBP, in collaboration with COP, could be an ideal approach to achieving this goal.

Professor Lawrence Sherman, the founder of evidence-based policing, later adapted his definition to "...a method of making decisions about 'what works' in policing: which practices and strategies, which police missions are most cost-effective". Sherman (2013:1) emphasises that, unlike decisions based on theory, assumptions, tradition, or convention, an evidence-based approach continuously examines hypotheses using empirical study findings. The emphasis should be on

making judgments based on scientifically derived facts rather than just beliefs. To allow for EBP on the secondary level of crime prevention, the Social-Ecological Model (SEM) could contribute to addressing root causes. The focus of the SEM is explained next.

## **The Social-Ecological Model (SEM)**

The Social-Ecological Model (SEM) emphasises the dynamics of individuals, relationships, community, and societal influences that put people at risk of becoming violent crime victims or transgressors. According to the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the SEM simultaneously encourages intervention over multiple levels to effect meaningful prevention (CDC 2022). On the individual level, the focus is on a biological and personal history that could influence the risk of becoming either a victim or transgressor of violence. These factors include but are not limited to, age, education, income, substance abuse or a history of abuse. Focusing on attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour could be prevention strategies. Conflict resolution and life skills training could also enhance prevention strategies. The second level, namely relationships, identifies close relationships as a feature that may increase the risk of exposure to violence as a victim or a transgressor. Role players like peers, partners and family members could influence one's behaviour and contribute to exposure. Strategies for prevention at this level may include collective efforts like parenting and family-focused prevention programmes.

Problem-solving skills could be improved through mentoring and peer programmes. Community, as the third level, includes schools, workplaces, and neighbourhoods as areas of socialisation conducive to becoming a victim or a transgressor. Here the focus is on social and physical environments to implement prevention strategies. The improvement of economic and housing opportunities in communities, social inclusion, attention to processes and policies and the social environment in schools and workplaces could be introduced. The fourth level, the societal level, examines broad societal issues that assist in creating a conducive environment for committing a violent crime. Social and cultural norms that are favourable to violence as a resort for conflict resolution are among these factors. Health, economic, educational, and social policies that promote social inequality amongst communities are also contributing factors. The CDC (2020) claims that the model aims to prevent crime before it begins. Saferspaces (202:4) refers to the aforementioned elements as protective factors that could enhance an individual's capacity to abstain from violent crime and defines them as "factors that shield people from the risks of becoming violent". The regulatory framework for community policing through community participation and community policing forums is presented hereunder to provide a context for the various approaches and the research study.

## REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY POLICING

A community participation approach assists in advocating the socio-economic causes (root causes) of violent crime. Since the formation of SAPS, the narrative on collaboration, problem-solving and partnerships between the police and communities has been a golden thread through police policy documents. A generic definition of community policing would be the interchangeable approach by various stakeholders to deal with challenges in creating the desired environment in a community. Cachalia (2007:22) postulates that community policing enhances the legitimacy of police action after years of mistrust between policing agencies and community efforts. Community policing is thus based on the principle that policing agencies and the community are jointly responsible for reducing crime and should be equal partners in their operational strategies. For Hill and Hupe (2002:294), community policing is a philosophy that focuses on management styles.

Section 18(1) of the South African Police Service (SAPS) Act, 1995 regulates CPF. It dictates liaison between SAPS and CPFs to achieve its constitutional mandate in Section 215 of the Constitution. CPFs will function at three levels: the station, the area, and the province. The following objectives are identified for CPFs in terms of Section 18(1) of the SAPS Act, 1995:

- establishing and maintaining a partnership between the community and the service;
- promoting communication between the police service and community;
- promoting cooperation between the police service and community in fulfilling the community's needs regarding policing;
- improving the rendering of police services to the community at national, provincial and local levels;
- improving transparency in the police service and accountability of the service to the community; and
- promoting joint problem-solving by the police service and the community.

These objectives were set against the transformation of SAPS and the amalgamation of the previous eleven policing agencies. According to Pelser (1999:13), these objectives aim to transform SAPS into an effective organisation that is accountable at all levels and is responsive to the needs of the communities it serves.

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

As indicated previously, the study aimed to assess whether the two selected CPFs achieved their statutory mandates and ascertain further whether the EBP



approach should be included with the POP, CPOP and Social Prevention approaches in the attempt to have a more effective method of reducing violent crime in the Western Cape.

The foregoing assumes that the extent of a decrease in violent crime (dependent variable) depends on the extent of effective implementation of the community participation intervention, including EBSCP (independent variable). In other words, a relationship exists between the reduction in the incidence of violent crime and the intervention. To achieve this aim, a mixed quantitative and qualitative methodology was adopted, which included two methods, namely the closed questionnaire survey (quantitative) and semi-structured interviews (qualitative). The latter method, after analysing the results, validated the findings of the questionnaire survey.

The research population was the two police precincts located in Nyanga and Mitchells Plain, with the target research population demarcated as the members of the two respective community policing forums. The purposive sampling technique was utilised for selecting the participants from the two CPF members, who were then subjected to the closed-ended questionnaire survey. Twelve participants were selected from Mitchells Plain and fifteen from Nyanga. To validate the findings arising from the analysis of this questionnaire survey, four purposively selected individuals, who were regarded as experts on policing matters, were presented with the findings and interviewed according to the semi-structured interview format.

## **QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY RESULTS**

The questionnaire survey attempted to assess the capacity of the two selected CPFs to achieve their mandate and ultimate outcome. The individual and institutional capacity factors for this survey study are presented below.

Individual capacity factors:

- experience in community policing;
- acquired training and knowledge of their role in community policing which includes community safety forums and the implementation of crime prevention programmes and projects;
- familiarity with legislative provisions and directives; and
- familiarity with primary level and secondary level crime prevention approaches and evidence-based policing at the tertiary level.

Institutional capacity factors:

- availability of crime prevention programmes and projects;
- availability of marketing strategies for the prevention of violent crimes;

- availability of strategies to promote community participation;
- strategies that focus on the root causes of violent crime;
- availability of resources to implement violent crime programmes and projects;
- existence of partnerships with all three spheres of government and other public bodies and agencies; and
- involvement in all phases of policy-making, design, development, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

The research findings indicate that both the Nyanga and Mitchells Plain CPFs have, to a great extent, individual and institutional capacity to participate in the prevention of violent crime in their respective policing precincts. However, several institutional and individual capacity challenges, noted below, influence these CPFs' participation in the prevention of violent crime.

Individual capacity challenge:

- the low levels of training of members in the implementation of violent crime prevention strategies.

Institutional capacity challenges:

- the lack of resources to implement violent crime prevention strategies;
- the low level of partnerships with the three spheres of government;
- the existence of parallel structures in government duplicating the role and functions of CPFs;
- the low levels of collection of evidence to inform violent crime prevention strategies could result in the strategies being informed by the wrong information; and
- the low level of assistance by external stakeholders to collect information to inform the strategies.

The responses indicated that both CPFs are reasonably involved in problem identification, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This could be viewed as a strength of both CPFs. However, the low levels of training for implementing violent crime strategies and collecting evidence to inform their strategies and the assistance of external stakeholders in collecting evidence and the resources to implement their strategies could be viewed as negative. A perception exists that they are not efficiently trained, focusing on the wrong issues, and not sufficiently resourced to perform their functions. Should this state of affairs exist, then involvement in the policy process could be deemed futile. The expectation is that CPFs should have a high level of partnership with all three spheres of government as they enhance service delivery. A perception also exists that there is a lack of political will to support CPFs, which could negatively influence the participation of CPFs in the prevention of violent crime.

## VALIDATION OF RESULTS

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with four knowledgeable persons who could be regarded as figures of authority in the policing discipline. The purposively selected persons have a rich source of information, advice and insight into the roles of CPFs. The interviewer aimed to validate the reliability of the data obtained, ensuring triangulation. The same questions were posed to the respondents. However, in terms of Respondent 4, the questions were directed at the Anti-Gang strategy as the respondent was an advisor to the Minister of Police during the development and implementation of the strategy. The responses arising from the four interviews were captured separately.

The respondents generally support the responses collected from the questionnaires in the following categories:

Training in the implementation of violent crime strategies, with Respondent 3 stating: *No, they are not adequately trained, as a half-day workshop is sometimes done with the CPFs, and recently, no training has been provided.*

In terms of having the necessary resources to implement their strategies, the respondents also agreed in responses to the questionnaires that CPFs do not have enough resources to implement their strategies, with Respondent 1 replying as follows: *No, the CPFs are left on their own to raise funds without proper support from the government, especially the SAPS. Simple issues like office accommodation, telephones, petrol for travel, transport, and allowance for official engagement are a challenge.*

Concerning partnerships within the different spheres of government, the respondents alluded to the creation of parallel structures by the different spheres. Respondent 2 and Respondent 1, respectively, remarked: *The challenge is that there are too many parallel forums, like the Mayoral Urban Regeneration Programme (MURPS) of the City of Cape Town, and the Ward Forums also duplicate the work of CPFs. Neighbourhood Watches also play a role in crime prevention. It is not under the control of the CPF. In the Western Cape, the creation of Neighbourhood Watch structures, Area Based Teams, and Law Enforcement deployment to crime areas have separated from any direct control/ relationship of the CPF.*

According to Respondent 4, CPFs are not involved in the planning and implementing of the Anti-Gang strategy as the Anti-Gang Unit is a specialised unit with no accountability to local communities. The respondent concurred that the lack of clear policies and guidelines and support for CPFs partly contribute to the lack of participation of CPFs in the prevention of violent crime.

Respondent 4: *The lack of clear guidelines in assisting CPFs to participate in the prevention of violence, in general, is a critical inhibiting factor in the prevention of violent crime.*

Respondent 1: *The regulations for the CPFs are still in draft form and interim, almost 27 years after democracy. This important policy document needs the Minister of Police to finalise it immediately.*

Concerning the use of evidence to determine programmes and projects, Respondent 1 replied: *There is a lack of research and scientific data in communities regarding the root cause of violent crime in their specific areas. There must be tailor-made proactive and preventative programmes initiated locally with all the key role-players/stakeholders involved.*

Respondent 2 added: *CPFS must be at the forefront of gathering information and evidence to address violent crime and needs to be supported. It is supposed to be a bottom-up approach in communities through CPFs leading the process.*

These responses in the semi-structured interviews corroborate and validate the information gathered through the questionnaires. The findings demonstrate that a different intervention is needed to enhance community participation in preventing violent crime in the identified policing precincts. An EBSCP approach may contribute to the low levels of training of members in implementing violent prevention strategies and the low level of partnership with the three levels of government, as it would create an opportunity for collaboration. The low collection rate of evidence and assistance in collecting evidence for violent crime prevention strategies would also be addressed. The proposed intervention is presented and explained below.

## **A Proposed Evidence-Based Social Crime Prevention (EBSCP) approach**

EBSCP can be an effort of communities, through CPFs and other organisations, to generate and test social and environmental hypotheses to produce the best solutions to social and environmental issues.

### **Elements of the community participation approach for the prevention of violent crime**

The elements of a community participation approach are:

#### **Community policing**

Community policing allows for policing agencies and the community to be jointly responsible for reducing crime and, therefore, should be equal partners.

#### **Social crime prevention**

Social crime prevention includes integrated crime prevention by individuals, communities, businesses, non-government organisations and all levels of government,

aiming at social and environmental factors that could increase crime risk. The primary focus of social crime prevention is to enable participants (individuals, communities and government at all levels) to deal with social and environmental factors (root causes) conducive to crime commitment.

### **Social-Ecological Model (SEM)**

The SEM emphasises the interaction between individuals, relationships, community, and societal influences that put people at risk of becoming victims or transgressors of violent crime. The SEM encourages intervention over multiple levels simultaneously to effect meaningful prevention.

### **Evidence-based Policing (EBP)**

EBP generates and tests hypotheses to produce social evidence to best deal with crime. Instead of making judgments based on theory, assumptions, tradition, or convention, an evidence-based strategy continuously checks ideas with empirical research findings. This emphasises that decisions about policing must be based upon scientifically generated facts and not merely beliefs. This evidence could direct the theory of change.

### **Theory of Change**

According to Cloete *et al.* (2018:61), a theory of change is linked to explaining why a particular intervention in a community is needed and why it should be successful. The theory of change must be directed by prior basic research evidence coupled with knowledge of good practice. Cloete *et al.* (2018:62) stress that it is thus critical that basic, fundamental theoretical, and practical appreciation of the focus area is available. The elements of community policing, social crime prevention, the social-ecological model and the theory of change must be determined by evidence. As depicted in Figure 1, combining these elements should result in an effective EBSCP approach.

## **Phases of an EBSCP approach**

The social crime prevention activities constituting EBSCP will be those depicted in the Figures below. The various phases constituting the EBSCP approach will now be explained. These phases are designed by following the policy process.

### **Phase 1 – Focus areas through problem identification**


The SEM could inform the focus areas of the EBSCP approach used for violence prevention. The focus will be on the individual, relationship, community or societal level or a combined number of levels. The root cause of violent crime in the specific community could be established through these focus areas. This could

**Figure 1: Elements of Evidence-Based Social Crime Prevention approach**



Source: (Researcher's own construction)

**Figure 2: Phase 1–Focus areas**



Source: (Researcher's own construction)

inform the research of the low level of evidence collection to inform violent crime prevention strategies identified in the findings. This could also enhance social crime prevention by focusing on the social environment and influences.


### **Phase 2 – Diagnosing and analysis**

The diagnosing and analysis phase of the EBSCP approach will, firstly, allow the discussion of the problem. Problem identification remains the function of the community, police and other stakeholders. This could result in (in no specific order and not limited to) identifying the root causes, focusing on previous interventions, the existing knowledge of the problem, the desired change, and the extent of the problem. This phase must be supported by research, evidence and analytics. Secondly, the community or CPFs could obtain the best information amongst themselves, especially as the community are the one that experiences these problems. Thirdly, it will allow the community or CPFs to critically weigh the evidence against the identified problem in the focus area (Figure 2). This phase could create the opportunity for the training of members in the policy process and allow for assistance by external stakeholders with research, evidence collection and analytics as identified in the research findings.

### **Phase 3 – Option-generation and planning**

During the option-generation and planning phase, CPFs can formulate some theory of change, design an action plan, and lobby for resources and stakeholders.

**Figure 3: Phase 2 – Diagnosing and analysis**



Source: (Researcher's own construction)

**Figure 4: Phase 3 Option-generation and planning**



Source: (Researcher's own construction)


A theory of change is linked to explaining why a particular intervention in a community is needed and why it should be successful. The theory of change must be directed by prior basic research evidence coupled with knowledge of good practice. It is thus critical that basic, fundamental theoretical and practical appreciation of the focus area (Phase 1) is available. Therefore, the involvement of experts and researchers is pivotal to developing a theory of change. This phase also contributes to the level of assistance by external stakeholders, as identified in the research findings and could enhance the institutional capacity of CPFs by providing resources and skills (Figure 4).

### **Phase 4 – Implementation**

Next, CPFs can implement the action plan through programmes and projects. The identified stakeholders, like the CPFs and boards, relevant spheres of government, community organisations, the private sector, academic institutions, and organised labour could assist with the implementation (Figure 5). Training in the implementation of violent crime prevention strategies was identified as one of the challenges preventing CPFs from fulfilling their mandate. Training could create the opportunity to address this challenge. It would also speak to the low levels of assistance by external stakeholders. These stakeholders can contribute to the lack of resources for implementing violent crime prevention strategies, which was also identified in the findings.



**Figure 5: Phase 4 – Implementation**




Source: (Researcher’s own construction)

**Phase 5 – Evaluation**


Evaluation of the outcomes can determine the levels of success or failure. This will allow for the redefining of objectives and the identification of follow-up areas. The support and guidance of experts through all these phases are critical for the success of the approach. Preferably, this should be done by the same stakeholders involved in the implementation. Part of this phase will be redefined and areas for follow-up will be identified (Figure 6).

**Figure 6: Phase 5 – Evaluation**



Source: (Researcher’s own construction)

**Figure.7: A proposed Evidence-Based Social Crime Prevention approach**



Source: (Researcher’s own construction)

The recommended social crime prevention activities resulting from this EBSCP approach will be scientific and could improve the effectiveness of policing in the prevention of violent crime in the CoCT, Western Cape.

Sherman (1998:13) proposes that community policing in its current form is not conducive to EBP due to the lack of accountability of the police in the process. He acknowledges, though, that community participation in partnership and communication and respect for communities are essential for the success of evidence-based policing. He also supports the notion that the concept could be applied to community policing through EBSCP. CPFs and other interested groups could adopt an EBSCP approach to prevent violent crime in the CoCT, Western Cape. This approach allows these groupings to be assisted by experts and researchers in problem identification and informs Phase 2, the diagnosing and analysis phase.

## REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This study argues that the prevention of violent crime is ineffective because the focus is on the policing agencies to achieve primary crime prevention through law enforcement. It was argued that law enforcement needs to be supported by community policing, focusing on the secondary level of crime prevention with

the support of EBP to focus on the root causes of violent crime. The study acknowledges that CPFs are constitutionally mandated to perform community policing and thus investigated the participation of CPFs in the prevention of violent crime through a case study in Nyanga and Mitchells Plain policing precincts. The ultimate aim of the study was to present a community participation approach to the prevention of violent crime.

Based on the literature and the research findings, the following recommendations are proposed:

- **Training for participation in the implementation of the prevention of violent crime strategies**

It is recommended that the training of these CPF members should include the broader field of policy implementation with a specific focus on violent crime prevention.

- **Assistance with the collection of evidence**The research findings reflect a low level of collecting evidence by CPFs to determine their violent crime prevention strategies. It furthermore shows that there is also a low level of assistance for the CPFs in collecting this evidence. It is recommended that academic institutions assist CPFs with scientific evidence collection.

- **Partnership with the three spheres of government**

It is recommended that CPFs should be entrusted with the responsibilities for community policing or be included as significant stakeholders in these processes and not be excluded or undermined. The low levels of participation between the CPFs and all levels of government could be due to the parallel structures formed at these levels. It should be the responsibility of all levels of government to collaborate with CPFs regarding crime prevention issues in their respective areas.

- **Finalisation of the CPF regulations**

It is recommended that the interim regulations for CPFs must be updated and finalised. The CPFs are still guided by the SAPS Interim Regulations for Community Forums and Boards created in 2001. Not only are the regulations temporary arrangements, but they are also outdated. They do not make provision for a policy or guidelines for CPFs to participate in the prevention of violent crime. This could result in CPFs who acted in goodwill to participate in the prevention of violent crime doing so blindly and without any policy certainty.

- **Adoption of the EBSCP approach for CPF participation**

It is recommended that an EBSCP approach is accepted as a community participation approach for the prevention of violent crime. CPFs could apply it as the mandated organ to perform community policing. An EBSCP approach can be an effort of communities, through CPFs and other organisations, to generate and test social and environmental hypotheses to produce the best solutions for these social and environmental issues in their precincts. An EBSCP could also enhance the institutional capacity of CPFs, as identified in this study.

The South African Constitution enshrines the right to a safe environment for all citizens. However, policing agencies cannot deal with the prevention of violent crime through law enforcement alone, and their efforts need to be supplemented. The inability of the South African Police Services (SAPS) to effectively prevent violent crime could have a ripple effect in that the reporting of more violent crimes will result in more case dockets for investigation, which, if effectively performed, will lead to an increase in court roles which can lead to pressure on the already overcrowded prison community. Community policing performed by CPFs, and other community organisations could enhance the crime prevention strategies of the policing agencies. Therefore, these structures need to be encouraged and supported to participate in the prevention of violent crime. CPFs are constitutionally mandated to participate in community policing and thus need to be at the forefront of the prevention of violent crime. EBSCP could enhance their abilities in this regard.

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# Necessitating the Need for Co-production of Public Services

## A Tool for Promoting Political Trust in Local Government

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### **ABSTRACT**

This article acknowledges an underlying problem of a lack of trust and co-production between citizens and the government in South Africa. Evidence suggests that citizens show declining levels of political trust and identification with political parties over time. This article explores the impact of co-production on political trust, and the potential benefits and challenges of adopting a co-production approach to public service delivery. The research methodology employed in this article is a hermeneutic framework as it combined the exploration and explanation of literature and the pursuit for relevant literature. The literature was compiled using electronic bibliographic databases and databases from different fields and websites, including Journal Storage (JSTOR), Google Scholar, Africa Online Journals, Web of Science (WoS) and Scopus. The literature identifies various theoretical models to explain the mutual relationship between the co-production of public services, political trust and citizen engagement. The researchers posit that trust in government will improve with the successful application of these models. The central argument of this article is that the co-production of public services will enforce a mutualistic relationship between government and citizens as it provides an avenue for citizens to share in the design and delivery of public services in local government. When governments and citizens work together to improve public services, the concept of 'co-production' gains popularity in finding answers to problems and challenges in the public

sector. This article contributes to the academic discourse in South Africa on co-production and the role of citizens in the decision-making process. It also provides a useful tool for local governments to measure and monitor the levels of political trust and co-production in their communities.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Over time, it has become widely accepted that public services generally require inputs from both professionals and users to be fully effective (Bovaird, Van Ryzin, Loeffler & Parrado 2015). This is known as the concept of co-production, where both professionals and users work together to produce a service that best meets the needs of the user. Co-production has become a crucial part of the modern service delivery landscape and is essential for ensuring quality outcomes for users (Fledderus 2018; Fledderus, Brandsen & Honingh 2014). According to Sicilia *et al.* (2016) co-production is an effort to raise the quality of public services by incorporating user and network expertise. When governments and citizens work together to improve public services, the concept of 'co-production' gains popularity as a means of finding answers to problems and challenges in the public sector (Khine, Mi & Shahid 2021). Co-production has been linked to increased trust between citizens and public institutions, as well as increased trust in society as a whole. There is an underlying assumption in the relationship between co-production and trust that service delivery experiences influence trust attitudes (Fledderus 2018).

The purpose of this article is to explore the impact of co-production on political trust and how it can positively contribute to effective service delivery. The article begins by discussing the theoretical and contextual basis of co-production and trust within the New Public Governance (NPG) paradigm because co-production and trust are essential components of the NPG. This is followed by the methodology used to collect the information for analysis. A hermeneutic framework analysis is used, which covers the following topics: citizen engagement and trust in government; co-production and service delivery; and the impact of political trust on co-production.

## **BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY**

Trust in government is often referred to as political trust that is defined as the short-term outcomes, evaluations of particular leaders and institutions and



the public's expectations towards their governments and institutions (Bauer & Freitag 2017). The importance of political trust cannot be overstated because it determines whether people want to vote for a specific political party to lead a specific country or constituency (Mohamad & Othman 2020). One of the key challenges is the declining levels of political trust by citizens in government and public institutions (Fransman 2022). The source of the trust deficit is citizens' dissatisfaction with government policy, direction, performance and political leaders (Mohamad & Othman 2020). A co-production approach is required to address this trust deficit. Co-production is a collaboration between citizens and public service providers to jointly design, develop, and deliver services that are responsive to citizens' needs (Seravalli, Agger Eriksen & Hillgren 2017). It is based on the premise that citizens have a role to play in improving public services and that their participation can lead to better outcomes, increased trust, and improved governance. However, despite its potential benefits, the co-production of public services is not yet widely adopted, the genuine involvement of the citizens in the decision-making process is still limited, and there is still a lack of mechanisms and policies to ensure a higher level of active participation (Wiewiora, Keast & Brown 2016). This article sought to close the gap by exploring the impact of co-production on political trust, and the potential benefits and challenges of adopting a co-production approach to public service delivery. This was done to gain a better understanding of how co-production can increase political trust, and how it can be implemented to improve public services in local government in South Africa.

According to a study conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) 2019, South Africans lack trust in government institutions. For instance, confidence in local government institutions is low at only 49.8% of South Africans. The lack of confidence in local government is driven by low confidence (43.3%) in local government's ability to deliver services (Potgieter 2019). The lack of trust at the local level is reflected in low municipal polls. Mohamad and Othman (2020:126) state that political trust is extremely important as it is the deciding factor for people who want to vote for a particular political leader or party to lead a country or constituency – they maintain that trustworthiness is vote-worthiness. The literature consulted (Brix, Lust, Woolcock & Woolcock 2015; Mohamad & Othman 2020) agrees that it is difficult to ascertain the causal relationship between civic engagement and trust in government. However, this article agrees with Brix *et al.* (2015) who state that without citizens' participation, government's performance will be poor and trust in government will decline. Similarly, Mohamad and Othman (2020) assert that citizens will evaluate their government's performance, and this forms the basis of their political trust. The theoretical and contextual context of co-production and trust under the NPG paradigm is provided below.

## **THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF CO-PRODUCTION AND TRUST WITHIN THE NEW PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PARADIGM**

Originally the concept of co-production related to the clients' or citizens' involvement in production (i.e. direct user involvement either in the public or private sector) (Abeysekera 2015:23). Co-production is inclusively defined based on the public nature of the goods and services delivered for the public good and adding public value to people's lives. For the purposes of this study, Bovaird's (2007) definition of co-production is used, namely, "the provision of services through regular, long-term relationships between professionalised service providers (in any sector) and service users or other members of the community, where all parties make substantial contributions" (Bovaird 2007:847). These substantial contributions predominantly refer to matters related to decision-making affairs of government. Thus, it logically relates to a conceptualisation of governance as a facilitative and cooperative partnership, rather than a government as a controlling hierarchy (Schwella 2015). Nabatchi, Sancino and Sicilia (2017) state that co-production implies the presence of two types of participants, namely, (1) state actors who are government agents and who serve in a 'professional' capacity; and (2) according to Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere (2013), co-production can contribute to greater user satisfaction with services, which proponents of NPG have claimed. Citizens now play more active roles as co-producers of some or many of the services they expect, demand, or even rely on to meet a variety of their most essential needs under the NPG paradigm (Osborne 2010). The NPG supports the co-production theory as it encourages community members to participate actively in the governance of the services they rely on (Wiewiora, Keast & Brown 2016; Pestoff 2018). Bao, Wang, Larsen and Morgan (2013:446–447) state that NPG has three main characteristics, namely, that it is value-centred; it creates necessary platforms for government to collaborate on how best to deliver public value; and that the NPG theory views public service delivery as a process of co-production involving various stakeholders such as citizens, private sector organisations and non-governmental organisations. Similarly, Calabro (2010) views co-production theory as characterised by a mix of public service agents and citizens who contribute to the delivery of public services. Co-production is evident when communities actively participate in government decision-making matters; from this, they develop a sense of inclusion. According to Khine *et al.* (2021), co-production values include openness, salience, inclusion, credibility, trust and legitimation. When citizens contribute, they usually do so with the expectation of benefiting from the services that will be provided to them.

## Co-production and service delivery

Many actors have advocated for co-production as a way to raise the standard of citizens' public services (McMullin 2023). It is thought that user involvement in the provision of public services, such as citizens' co-production of safety (Meijer 2012), enhances their effectiveness and results (Fledderus, Brandsen & Honingh 2015). Increasing user involvement in service delivery is expected to have a direct impact on service quality, specifically on service outcome (Bovaird & Downe 2008). Service quality will be improved because users are often more knowledgeable about the content, costs and limitations of local services (Brudney & England 1983 in Fledderus 2015:554). Citizens have always been involved in the provision of public services. According to Fledderus (2015), citizens are increasingly participating in the production of public services. For instance, residents work with the police in neighbourhood watch programmes to combat crime and antisocial behaviour (Fleming 2005); volunteers in care services augment the expertise of professional staff, such as parents in childcare (Pestoff 2006). Co-production, which gives users more control over the services they use, is intended to increase satisfaction with and trust in public services and government (Pestoff 2009). When service providers and the government sufficiently facilitate and support users, co-production is more likely to foster trust (Hazenbergh, Seddon & Denny 2014). According to Ostrom (1996 in Fledderus 2015:551), successful co-production is thwarted when responsibilities between citizens, public agencies and governments are not clearly defined, and when top-down administrative command is used as the decision-making style. Thus, on the one hand, the activities of service users and service providers should be effectively coordinated; and on the other hand, both users and professionals should have a voice in decisions about the services provided (Cepiku & Giordano 2013 in Fledderus 2015:554). Consequently, professionalism in public service delivery can help to reduce the uncertainty that comes with co-production (Fledderus *et al.* 2015). Professionals are better able to recognise user problems and needs when they have specific, expert knowledge. The role of service users is then to trust the advice of experts and follow the professionals' instructions (Ewert & Evers 2014). However, the process of collective co-production suffers when there are questions about whether other users are motivated to co-produce and when there is a genuine risk that people will neglect their obligation to put forth effort in the provision of the service (Pestoff 2014). Meijer (2016:596) states that central to the structure of the public domain is the relations between government and citizens.

Co-production has become an important reality in the delivery of public services in South Africa. Through transparent and accountable cooperation and co-production between the various public officials and the communities, sustainable development as well as efficient and effective service delivery will be promoted (Pestoff *et al.* 2015). Several articles (Jakoet-Salie, Draai & Taylor 2020; Miszczak


& Patel 2018; Chigova & Hofisi 2021) have been published on co-production and its challenges and possibilities in South Africa. According to Miszczak and Patel (2018), knowledge co-production through strategic partnerships is becoming more and more acknowledged as a method to achieve sustainable and just urban development in South Africa. Chigova *et al.* (2021), concur that co-production is a well-intentioned innovation that meets the aspirations of South Africa's local governments. Additionally, co-production, according to Chigova *et al.* (2021), gives South African local governments the chance to collaborate with citizens to enhance public value. The adoption of co-production requires that citizens be informed about their responsibilities to participate in service delivery issues, be active, productive citizens, and be prepared to take advantage of the opportunities it brings (OECD 2018:16 in Chigova *et al.* 2021:968). Jakoet-Salie *et al.* (2020) agree that South African citizens need to be more involved in the future of their municipalities so that both the public sector and the general public can contribute to effective service delivery and, eventually, (re)gain public confidence in government. Chigova *et al.* (2021) assert that there are some significant obstacles that must be overcome for co-production to be successful in South Africa. The challenges include making sure that national policies and White Papers support co-production as a workable innovation in local government. Additionally, the institutionalisation of co-production needs to address the various local government issues (Chigova *et al.* 2021). Lastly, increased co-production may increase the public's trust and confidence in local government by ensuring that council members play a more significant role in ensuring accountability (Jakoet-Salie *et al.* 2020).

One of the benefits of co-production is that it can improve efficiency through enhancing trust and commitment between role-players as well as creating mechanisms to ensure citizen accountability (Ostrom 1996). Similarly, Verschuere, Brandsen and Pestoff (2012:1092) assert that the nature of service delivery improves because citizens are afforded the opportunity to contribute in the co-production of services and this also leads to an improvement in citizen satisfaction. This leads us to a key question in this article: Why do citizens want to engage in the co-production of services? To address this key question, Van Eijk and Steen (2016:30) developed a theoretical model (Figure 1) to explain citizens' engagement in the co-production of public services and identified three factors that would motivate citizens to engage, namely:

- Perceptions of the co-production task and competency to contribute to the public service delivery process;
- Individual characteristics; and
- Self-interested and community-focused motivations.

Van Eijk and Steen (2016:34) state that their theoretical model suggests that "socio-psychological factors (i.e., perceived salience, ease, internal efficacy, external

**Figure 1: Theoretical model: What motivates citizens to co-produce**




Source: (Van Eijk and Steen 2016:30)

efficacy, and trust), socioeconomic variables and social connectedness, and self-centred and community-centred motivations work together to influence one's decision to participate in co-production".

Van Eijk and Steen (2016:31) affirm that trust is an important element in the co-production of services as citizens' level of engagement will be affected by the extent to which they trust government. The issue of mistrust, or lack thereof, affects almost every aspect of society, and trust is essential to the efficient operation of all spheres of government. Biljohn and Lues (2019:231) state that "using protests as an avenue to air grievances and express discontent highlights a disconnect between citizens and local government regarding service delivery". According to Draai (2016), trust in the political system and the public sector is conditional, fluctuates based on experience and perception, and is behavioural in the sense that people evaluate the conduct of political leaders and the performance of public servants. A survey conducted in 2021 by the Afrobarometer team of researchers, asserts that trust in various institutions in South Africa is at its lowest level since the survey began in 2006. Trust is inversely related to perceptions of corruption and positively related to perceived performance of leaders and institutions (Afrobarometer 2016). These figures are shown in Figure 2.

It is interesting to note from Figure 2 that in 2015, trust in the ruling party fell by 18%. The African National Congress (ANC), which is in power in most municipalities in South Africa, and the opposition parties all continue to lose people's

**Figure 2: Trust in political parties in South Africa 2006–2021**



Source: (Afrobarometer 2021)

trust (by a combined 27 and 24%, respectively). The decline in the points for the ruling party and other opposition parties shown in the above Figure could be caused by a variety of factors. Wade (2017) acknowledges that several factors, including inadequate education, lack of service delivery, unemployment, corruption, and crime, may have an impact on South Africa's low voter turnout, which is demonstrated by the decline in voters from the total number of voters since 1994. Seanego and Mogoboya (2019) assert that the number of eligible voters has decreased worldwide, especially among young people and, to a lesser extent, the elderly. According to Statistics South Africa, in 2019, there were 26.1 million registered voters on the voters list. Nine million eligible South Africans did not register to vote, though. This decrease shows a diminished desire among eligible South African voters to exercise their right to vote (Seanego & Mogoboya 2019). Trust and co-production between the government and citizens is necessary to ensure that citizens are actively participating in the democratic process.

## METHODOLOGY

To critically review the pertinent literature, this article used a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach was used to gain a greater understanding of the complexities of this topic, and to provide an in-depth analysis of the impact of co-production on political trust and public service delivery. The data was gathered, organised, implemented and systematically recorded in accordance with the hermeneutic

framework which was used to integrate the analysis and interpretation of literature (Boell & Cecez-Kecmanovic 2014). The hermeneutic approach adopted in this article is used to describe the literature review process as a process of acquiring knowledge that is essential in nature and it assisted in a critical construction of literature review development. Boell and Cecez-Kecmanovic (2014) state that the hermeneutic approach emphasises continuous collaboration with and gradual development of a body of literature during which increased understanding and insights are developed. According to Paterson and Higgs (2005) hermeneutics is the theory and practise of interpretation. Hermeneutics philosophy (Gadamer 1975; Ricoeur 1976) provides a rich theoretical foundation for comprehending and characterising the literature review process. Hermeneutics, in particular, provides a framework for conducting literature reviews by providing principles for building comprehension of texts. The hermeneutic framework describes the literature review process as an iterative process of developing understanding (Boell & Cecez-Kecmanovic 2014). According to Gillo (2021:43), in hermeneutics, the research approach is to gain an understanding of a particular phenomenon through an intense literature review of related literature, so that with a “fore structure of understanding” the research problem is established. A search was conducted by combining the following terms: municipalities, service delivery, co-production, governance, trust, and public participation and in addition, relevant articles on public trust on service delivery were also consulted. The literature was compiled using electronic bibliographic databases and databases from different fields and websites, including Journal Storage (JSTOR), Google Scholar, Africa Online Journals, World of Science (WoS), and Scopus. These databases are the most relevant scientific information platforms that access scientific databases and the most significant publications of the various disciplines, more specifically, the impact of co-production on political trust, and the potential benefits and challenges of adopting a co-production approach to public service delivery.

## **RESULTS**

Based on the collected literature on the impact of co-production on public services in promoting political trust in South Africa, the article presents the following findings.

### **Co-production as a strategy for enhancing citizen participation in local government**

The co-production-based delivery of public services has changed the role of citizens around the world (OECD 2011). Citizens’ involvement is not separate from government or politicians, who may have an impact on the results of the

various co-production service delivery stages (Van Staden & Biljohn 2020). Citizen participation is mandated by four groups, namely, voters, citizens, end-users and organised partners. Through their participation, citizens have become more important in terms of their role in identifying solutions to social issues and issues with the delivery of public services (Biljohn & Lues 2019). In an effort to improve service delivery and strengthen participatory governance through co-production, the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) drafted *Electronic Government, The Digital Future: A Public Service IT Policy Framework* in 2001 (Van der Waldt *et al.* 2014). However, the evolution of co-production has not only resulted in a more distinct role for people, but it has also altered the conventional function of the government and politicians in service delivery and the co-production of service delivery stages (Van Staden & Biljohn 2020). Local government officials in South Africa have no choice but to include citizen participation in each phase of the co-production service delivery cycle considering the current volatile political climate, service delivery protests, and pressure on natural resources (Biljohn & Lues 2019).

The extent of citizen engagement appears to be determined by citizens' varied demands, capacities, and desire to contribute to finding solutions to their service delivery needs (Biljohn & Lues 2020). Citizens' participation in service delivery helps governments achieve better development outcomes by improving programme efficiency, identifying and decreasing corruption, increasing public knowledge of services, and lowering costs (Kumagai & Iorio 2020). Van der Waldt *et al.* (2014) contend that one distinctive aspect of the South African local government model is the chance for people to actively participate in governance. Equally significant is the municipality's openness to citizen participation at the many levels (voice, choice, contribution, and control), as well as the local governance structure, which is essential in promoting residents' ability to make meaningful contributions. As a result, the administration's and its local governance system's lack of openness to community participation might hinder genuine citizen participation (Biljohn & Lues 2020). To reinforce the democratic nature of governance and encourage accountability, government and citizens ought to promote public participation and engagement (Mzimakwe 2010). Citizens may be discouraged from making significant contributions during the service delivery stages if the government does not recognise the value of citizen participation during the relevant stages of the service delivery cycle. Since citizen participation in the co-production of services, could enable the government to obtain additional information to plan and enhance the delivery of services, enhancing citizen participation necessitates an internal organisational context that will harness citizen participation (Biljohn & Lues 2020). The goal of co-production should be to bridge the trust gap that exists between municipalities and their constituents and to



re-establish public faith in municipal government and service delivery (Van Staden & Biljohn 2020).

## **Promoting Political Trust through Co-Production of Public Services**

Politicians and public officials' views can impact the extent of co-production (Voorberg, Bekkers & Tummers 2015), and it can also impact organisational structure (Khine *et al.* 2021). In turn, co-production can be used as a convenient justification for technical solutions to political issues while also serving as the scapegoat for cost-cutting initiatives and contentious political issues, enabling governments to shirk their civic duties and projecting the appearance of consensus and shared responsibility among various social actors (Boyer 1990 in Van der Graaf, Cheatham, Redgate, Humble & Adamson 2021:3). Increased levels of co-production may improve public trust and confidence in local government by ensuring that councillors play a more meaningful role in ensuring accountability (Jakoet-Salie *et al.* 2021). Draai and Raga (2012), contend that the degree of trust that the public has in public services is determined by how willingly and quickly the government responds to issues that the public views as important. Crime, poverty, and inadequate client services are just a few of these problems. Accordingly, high levels of trust are attained by local government's overtly positive performances, in which citizens experience change, while low levels of trust, or even distrust, occur when citizens receive unsatisfactory service delivery (Draai *et al.* 2012). According to Jakoet-Salie *et al.* (2021) enhancing co-production of services is essential to restoring trust and confidence in communities, as consistently poor service delivery undermines trust in local government.

Trust in the politics and public service is conditional; it 'ebbs and flows' based on experience and perception, and it is behavioural, depending on how citizens evaluate the actions of political leaders and/or the performance of public officials (Draai 2016). Pillay (2017) contends that political trust is based on good governance, which is based on the existence of ethical standards and accountability mechanisms because citizens expect good and ethical governance. Moreover, political trust is typically partisan and relates to citizens' perceptions of political leaders' credibility and integrity, particularly in relation to the party in power (Draai 2016). Peters (2014:304) asserts that there are various reasons for the degrees of citizen participation and some of these may include a lack of trust in government and within communities, a lack of participatory capacity by communities to support government actions and programmes, as well as societies divided along cultural, linguistic and ethnic lines. This evaluation of a party's credibility is based on organisational factors, including the party's dedication to

its political platform, by exhibiting success in its political leadership and oversight responsibilities (Draai 2016).

## **The benefits of co-production for local government and the community**

Co-production has emerged as an influential discourse in public administration and management (PAM), defined as “regular, long-term relationships between professionalised service providers and service users where all parties make substantial resource contributions” (Bovaird 2007; Osborne, Nasi, & Powell 2021). The notion of co-production places a strong emphasis on the role of people or groups of citizens in the development of services, even though their involvement has evident repercussions for both the meso- and macro-levels of society (Pestoff, Osborne & Brandsen 2006). The relationships between citizens and professionals which make reciprocal use of each other’s strengths can be categorised as co-production (Bovaird & Loeffler 2010). This includes co-commissioning (e.g. public participation in policymaking, participatory budgeting), co-design (e.g. user consultative councils), co-assessment (e.g. online satisfaction ratings for family doctors), co-delivery (e.g. expert patients), which was the focus of many early analyses of co-production (Bovaird, Van Ryzin, Loeffler & Parrado 2015). Co-production is used at many levels of service delivery, including co-planning, co-design, co-delivery, and co-evaluation (OECD 2011:37).

The first stage, co-planning, comprises determining and giving priority to public service needs, outputs, and beneficiaries (Nabatchi, Sancino & Sicilia 2017), as well as selecting resources. According to Biljohn (2018), this stage promotes citizen participation in service design through voice, choice, and contribution. Citizens’ roles in service co-planning include expressing their service delivery goals and preferences, as well as suggesting solutions to service delivery difficulties (Biljohn 2018). During the co-planning stage in local government, the government is accountable for developing platforms for citizens to take part in service planning, while politicians’ roles can be identified as having frequent interactions with citizens to reach consensus on service delivery priorities and ways in which these priorities can be addressed (Biljohn 2018). All stakeholders collaborate to identify which services will be prioritised and how resources will be allocated to deliver these prioritised services.

The second stage, co-design, refers to the creation, planning, and arrangement of public services (Bovaird & Loeffler 2013). This stage involves more than simply traditional consultation; it is about incorporating service users’ and communities’ experiences into the design of public services (Bovaird & Loeffler 2013; Sorrentino, Sicilia & Howlett 2018). Thus, co-design comprises citizen participation in the planning and development of processes and activities to meet

the requirements and priorities defined during the co-planning stage (Campanale, Mauro & Sancino 2021). In the context of local government, the government must consult residents throughout the co-design step while designing the service specified during co-planning (Biljohn 2018). The administration should create a database listing people's competence and skills to encourage involvement during this stage (Biljohn 2018). Citizens' roles in service co-design include expressing their preferences for how a service should be offered to them, including time, location, frequency, and mode of delivery, as well as designing the layout of services (Biljohn 2018). Meanwhile, politicians should develop policies that establish platforms for citizen participation in service delivery processes and ensuring that these plans are carried out by the administration (Biljohn 2018). The co-design stage allows lawmakers, administration, and residents to deliberate how best to deliver services (Blomkamp 2018). Beneficiaries of the specific service should be the key participants throughout the redesigning of the service and are vital to this stage (Biljohn 2018).

The third level, co-delivery, comprises the administration, legislators, and citizens working together to deliver public services (Bovaird & Loeffler 2013; Sorrentino *et al.* 2019). Co-delivery refers to the provision of services in accordance with the implementation of the intended methods and procedures outlined during co-designing (Campanale *et al.* 2020). At this level, individuals and public sector organisations are taking action to achieve policy objectives through the management of people, projects, and assets, as well as project implementation. Citizens can participate in co-delivery of services by taking the initiative to submit plans and proposals to municipalities relating to service delivery (Biljohn 2018). Politicians, on the other hand, must guarantee that policies, plans, and municipal bylaws encourage citizen participation during co-delivery (Biljohn 2018). In this sense, local government officials should collaborate with residents on service delivery by identifying services that citizens can provide (Biljohn 2018).

The last level, co-evaluation, involves citizen involvement in the observation and assessment of public services provided (Nabatchi *et al.* 2017; Sorrentino *et al.* 2018; Campanale *et al.* 2020). This can be achieved through ideas, inquiries, feedback from role-players, opinion surveys, and proposals aimed at improving the quality of service delivery for the development of public value (Loeffler & Bovaird 2017; Biljohn 2018). During the co-evaluation of services, officials should ensure that services are assessed, and citizens are viewed as partners in this process by making it simple for citizens to engage in the evaluation of services through available platforms (Biljohn 2018). Citizens presenting comments and alternatives to improve service delivery are also included in service evaluation (Biljohn 2018:195). Meanwhile, legislators perform an oversight role during this stage, engaging with residents to gauge their happiness with the services they

received and providing feedback on how citizens' involvement and feedback influenced decision-making (Biljohn 2018:194).

It is clear that service evaluation is a critical element in the legislative process that requires both public engagement and political oversight. As a result, changes in service delivery cannot occur in the absence of citizen partnerships, because government can only remain responsive to complex social problems through these partnerships (Bourgon 2010; Voorberg *et al.* 2013). Citizens, as service users, play an important role in the design and delivery of public services at each level, while government officials lead implementation (Pestoff 2014; Stenvall *et al.* 2014 quoted in Biljohn & Lues 2020).

## DISCUSSION

The article sought to close the gap by exploring the impact of co-production on political trust, and the potential benefits and challenges of adopting a co-production approach to public service delivery. The study found that trust stems from a people-centred government that is responsive and capable of communicating public needs through pro-poor policies. According to Mle (2014:61), citizen involvement in municipal affairs fosters a sense of pride and belonging among citizens and can help to dispel an "us" (communities) versus "them" (municipality) mentality. When citizens begin to trust the government, they believe their voices have been heard and no longer feel compelled to engage in public protest. According to Taylor, Scott, Steynor and McClure (2017), there is a link between trust and protest activity and low public participation in South African municipalities that are failing. Taylor *et al.* (2017) assert that when South African citizens have lower levels of trust in their government, this eventually results in more service delivery protests. Jakoet-Salie *et al.* (2021) concur that the root of the protests lies in the lack of adequate public participation and co-production at the local government level.

The needs and demands of South African citizens are well expressed in the National Development Plan (National Planning Commission 2012). The document mentions three challenges that South Africa faces, namely poverty, unemployment, and inequality (National Planning Commission 2012). In response to these challenges, this article advocates the necessity for the co-production of public services in South Africa. The advantages of co-production include addressing societal issues, offering practical alternatives for designing and delivering public services, fostering democratic values and practices, providing more effective, affordable and sustainable services, increasing the quantity and quality of services, encouraging affective attachment between actors, and decreasing the prevalence of self-serving bias (Khine *et al.* 2021). Pillay (2017) asserts that politicians and

administrators should respond to these election manifestos rather than relying solely on elaborate or verbose party manifestos or pre-election promises to gain the public's trust. The emergence of mistrust occurs when citizens realise or believe that manifestos and promises are forgotten. Public trust is a crucial lubricant for every political system's operation (Chiweza, Chunga & Chunga 2021). When it comes to political trust, most people want to know whether the candidate and the party running for office earns or deserves their trust. It stands to reason that people will vote for a politician or party if they believe in them (Mohamad & Othman 2020). Consequently, a loss in trust reflects how poorly the government is performing (Catterberg & Moreno 2005). It is crucial to have political trust (Mohamad & Othman 2020). Lastly, Mchunu and Theron (2017), assert that it is critical to recognise how creative strategies like co-production highlight the need for adaptable governmental regulations and policies that serve as forums for discussions between local government and communities.

## CONCLUSIONS

The study highlights the importance of understanding the factors that promote co-production between citizens and government to build trust and strengthen the relationship between them. Communities have little or no trust in local government and transforming the citizen-local government relationship will increase trust in local government. As a result, all stakeholders in local government must make efforts to promote co-production of services in local government in South Africa.

By applying the theoretical models of Van Eijk and Steen (2016) (Figure 1), local government can place itself at the forefront of addressing the causes of the declining levels of political trust. These theoretical approaches could benefit municipalities in South Africa where political trust has been declining and where citizen engagement has been minimal, as they would assist municipalities in determining what motivates citizens to co-produce. By identifying the factors that promote co-production, governments could remedy the causes and not the symptoms of declining political trust and a mutualistic relationship would exist between citizens and government in the country. The insights from the theoretical models discussed in this article can be implemented not only within South Africa, but internationally as well because the issue of political trust manifests itself at both national and international levels. This article contributes to the academic discourse in South Africa on co-production and the role of citizens in the decision-making process. It also provides a useful tool for local governments to measure and monitor the levels of political trust and co-production in their communities. The co-production and trust between citizens and the government is a key element of this article and provides a fresh perspective on the issue of political trust

in South Africa. The article argues that citizens are more likely to trust their government when they are actively involved in the decision-making process. Future studies should focus on using qualitative research methods to investigate the impact of citizens' participation on political trust in different contexts. This could include exploring the role of citizen engagement and participation on political trust in different racial, ethnic, and socio-economic groups, as well as the impact of citizen participation on trust in different types of political systems.

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# The Importance of Strategic Management Resources for Successful Technical and Vocational Education and Training Governance in Lesotho

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## **ABSTRACT**

This article discusses strategic management resources for implementing a successful Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) strategy in Lesotho. The Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) and TVET institutions use strategic management to achieve their strategic goals, but strategic resources are scarce. This hinders the expected development of human capital. Due to skills mismatches, TVET graduates leave institutions with irrelevant skills, causing unemployment, poverty and social inequality. TVET institutions lack strategic resources to implement TVET strategies. Pragmatism and a mixed-methods approach guided data collection, data analysis, and interpretation of the results of this study. MOET staff were interviewed to determine strategic management resources. TVET staff completed a questionnaire to assess access to the strategic resources needed to implement the strategy successfully. This study found that Lesotho's government and MOET do not comprehend TVET's strategic resources and do not support TVET institutions adequately. The study recommends revising public sector policies, stakeholders' collaboration, improvement of the robustness of TVET funding, enhanced leadership, and TVET corporate governance to support the successful implementation of the public sector TVET strategy.

## BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

Since achieving independence in 1966, the Government of Lesotho has strategically pursued the promotion and expansion of critical skills and knowledge for its human capital development (Lesotho Government 2018:3). Several national and departmental strategic plans have been developed to achieve this objective.

The National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2005/2015 and the Education Sector Strategic Plan aimed to produce skilled human capital by 2015, reducing poverty and unemployment. However, these have failed to achieve their primary goals (Lesotho Government 2016:42). In 2016, the unemployment rate stood at 27% and the poverty rate at 57%, which were significant increases from previous years (Lesotho Review 2018:3). The Government of Lesotho allocates 15% of its GDP to human capital development and education planning programmes. The technical and vocational fields, essential for lowering unemployment and reducing poverty, are allocated less than 2% of the Ministry's USD 66 million budget, which is out of step with the country's human capital needs. However, there is no correlation between the production of critical skills and investment. The reality is that both strategies demonstrate a lack of support for strategic resources to improve the successful implementation of the Lesotho Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) strategy.

The TVET sector in Lesotho faces obstacles regarding the required resources to support a successful TVET strategy. Basotho have stigmatised the technical and vocational stream as lower than the academic stream. Their leaders prioritise academic planning and funding. Despite the government's massive expenditure on education and training, the World Bank (2020:39) reports that funding is skewed towards the academic stream rather than acquiring technical and vocational skills. In addition, as noted by UNESCO (2017), focusing on academic courses rather than practical ones has resulted in an overproduction of graduates in the academic stream, leading to high unemployment rates due to a mismatch between skills and industry needs. Consequently, Lesotho remains an undeveloped country with a cross-national per capita income of USD 1,296 and a poverty rate of 57% (World Bank 2020).

The mandate of the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) is to produce Basotho graduates with relevant applied knowledge and skills that meet the needs of the Lesotho labour market (UNESCO 2017; Kuiper 2017:26). However, it is expected to provide an education system that addresses economic needs. Recent studies have linked poor education services in Lesotho to inadequate resources to promote skill development (Dungey and Ansell 2020:615). Due to the expanding mining, water, and agriculture industries requiring applied skills, the lack of skilled Basotho has necessitated importing such skills from neighbouring countries.

The TVET Act of 1984 (Lesotho Government 1984) established the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Advisory Board to oversee TVET in Lesotho. However, the Board was dissolved in 2004. The Ministry's Technical and Vocational Division currently governs and implements TVET in Lesotho but the organisation's organisational structure does not support these essential duties. Consequently, this article investigates the following questions: What strategic management resources and obstacles exist to implement a TVET strategy in Lesotho successfully? And, does the Ministry provide sufficient amounts of these assets? This article begins with a conceptual and contextual overview of strategic resources and their obstacles. The methodology section describes the parallel convergent mixed method used to investigate the strategic resources of Lesotho's TVET strategy. The conclusion and recommendations follow a discussion of the key findings of the analysis.

## **STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT RESOURCES: CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL ORIENTATION**

Non-alignment and the lack of strategic management resources to support the implementation of public sector strategies have negatively impacted their success. In numerous political systems, strategic management in the public sector has improved service delivery (Shahriar and Khan 2016). Public sector systems that can align their resources with their strategic plans typically achieve favourable outcomes and improved service delivery. Public sector leaders need to identify the strategic resources that will support the formulation, implementation, and execution of the strategy to achieve the intended strategic goals (Amoli and Aghashani 2016:447). Multiple strategic resources influence the successful implementation of an organisation's strategic plans. Grant (1991:3) states that resources may be either tangible or intangible assets. According to Ismail, Rose, Uli, and Abdullah (2012:155), for an organisation to be competitive, it must combine these assets to produce strategic resources.

In contrast, capabilities result from the efficient selection and application of resources to achieve organisational objectives. Effective resource management enhances an organisation's service delivery and competitiveness. According to Ismail *et al.* (2012:153), resources enable organisations to develop the necessary capabilities to thrive in their respective market environments. These assets can also enhance an organisation's capacity for production and innovation. Lerro and Schiuma (2014:76) analysed the managerial literature on the nature, function, and applicability of the intellectual capital dimensions. They argue that capability resources and intellectual capital are essential to the success of a strategic plan. Szymaniec-Mlicka (2014:20) and Barney (1991:100) categorise resources

as physical capital (plants, machinery, raw materials, and locations), capital resources (organisational structure, control and coordinate systems and culture), and human capital resources (workforce skills, training, experience, relationships, and leadership knowledge). Othman, Arshadda, Abdul, and Arif (2015:4) identify organisational financial and physical assets as crucial for ensuring effective strategy implementation in the Malaysian state of Perak. Collins (2021:335) argues that labour, materials, tools, equipment, financing (insurance, salaries, legal fees, and administrative costs), and facilities are required to implement any strategy or project successfully. According to Okeke, Oboreh, Esione, and Chukwuemeka (2019:5437), a motivated workforce is essential for organisational change and transition because it stabilises the organisation against environmental volatility. A lack of strategic leadership and a non-pragmatic paradigm, according to Freeman *et al.* (2021:1757), makes it difficult for stakeholders and employees to accept the proposed strategy, thereby impeding the growth of an organisation.

Several studies have identified the following environmental factors that impede access to strategic resources:

- the political environment plays a crucial role in determining whether an organisation can launch a thriving national programme or vice versa (Bryson 2018:221);
- the development and implementation of the national plan depend on the growth of the nation's economy and finances (Aryal 2020:62);
- failure to harmonise the strategic plan content with employees' social activities and lack of effective strategic communication (Pereira *et al.* 2020:33);
- as the Covid-19 pandemic and lockdown hit the world from 2019 to 2021, organisations without technological capacity, infrastructure, internet connection, and technology were at a competitive disadvantage (Tegek 2018:15);
- the disregard for corporate governance in the formulation, implementation, and execution of strategy, along with insufficient staff participation in strategy implementation (OECD 2021);
- absence of a dynamic educational environment (Blackman 2021:44).

Integrating and coordinating strategic resources to facilitate a strategic plan's effective implementation is necessary for any successful public strategy. However, strategy implementation is not a discrete activity. Therefore, public organisations should value strategic resources supporting the entirety of strategic management, including formulation, implementation, and evaluation (David 2011:235).

The discussions above have highlighted the need for the following strategic resources: financial, organisational, physical, technological, strategic human, research and innovation, and organisational efficiency and capabilities. The literature further identifies the national political and socio-economic climate, the legal framework, technology, corporate governance, and the absence of a dynamic learning environment as barriers to accessing strategic resources.

## Strategic leadership resources

To ensure business continuity, leadership must think strategically to adapt efficiently and effectively and to manage unforeseen circumstances that may disrupt strategy implementation. Leaders must manage resources to enable remote access and achieve strategic objectives (Khosiev, Ostaev, Gogaev, Markovina, Latysheva, and Konina 2019:55). Turkey's Ministry of Interior's strategic planning (2007 to 2013) failed due to a lack of effective leadership. Aydın, Nyadera, and Önder (2020:732) conclude that the top-down rational model for strategic planning was unsuitable. Their study suggests that if there is no adequate strategy management framework in which to organise organisational resources and structures, top leadership must be adaptive to recognise the combination of resources required at a particular stage.

An organisation's leadership models determine change agents. The change model emphasises how leadership, structure, motivation, compensation, and other factors facilitate the implementation of a new comprehensive strategy (Momin 2018:32). Due to decision-making and delegation of power, top management's leadership style and approaches are essential for implementing a successful organisational strategy. A change agent advocates for the organisation's vision and directs the development and implementation of its strategy. Implementing a strategy effectively requires a sufficient workforce with shared objectives. Al Aina and Tarik (2020:4) investigated the relationship between talent management and sustainable organisational performance. A total of 306 United Arab Emirates real estate managers received structured questionnaires. The research recommends talent management and employee rotation based on individual strengths. These transfers advance organisational objectives. During implementation, this strategy also helps overcome employee incapacity.

## Financial resources

Organisations must secure sufficient financial resources to support their strategies. According to Volberda (2011:945), financial resources are necessary to implement any strategy. The firm's financial liquidity, operating funds, borrowing capacity, and ability to generate internal funds are crucial for organisational operations. These funds assist the company in achieving maximum profitability, and this financial stability may lead to a successful business plan. In addition, it is argued that business financing and current assets are essential components of financial resources. Existing assets are short-term liquid assets that can be converted to cash (Othman *et al.* 2015:6).

## Organisational resources

TVET institutions must have primary resources that facilitate their vision and mission accomplishment (UNESCO 2021:5). Organisational resources (reputation,



organisational values and management styles, and coordination systems) promote the effective and efficient achievement of predetermined objectives (Teece and Linden 2017:8). To ensure the success of the TVET strategy, the implementing agencies must have these essential resources to support the formulation, implementation, and execution of the strategy.

## **Physical resources**

According to Zarutskie (2010:162), physical resources such as machinery, supplies, and equipment provide a crucial service to the production process and are therefore essential for the success of a company's strategies. Moreover, according to Hesterly and Barney (2014:24), an organisation's physical resources are among its most valuable assets. To ensure the success of the TVET strategy, the system must be equipped with basic infrastructure, laboratories, and simulators for practising skills before entering the workforce. This is essential for ensuring the acquisition of the necessary skills and knowledge.

## **Research and development funding**

As highlighted by Lawson and Samson (2001:380) and Terziowski (2011:4), innovation capabilities are highly dynamic in the sense that they contribute to the radical reinterpretation, recombination, and transformation of the organisation's knowledge and resources to influence and adapt to changing environments. According to Porter (1990:33), innovation is a company's core value capability and a crucial competitive weapon. According to Durrheim and Terre Blanche (1999:44), the research paves the way for the generation of new knowledge by fostering an understanding of previously acquired information, which in turn paves the way for the generation of novel concepts, methodologies, and interpretations that lead to the creation of innovative and unique solutions. According to Johnsen (2021:78), creativity and innovation are the most critical capabilities and resources for organisational strategies. Numerous internal and external factors influence businesses' innovation strategies and performance. Innovation benefits small and large companies (Camison and López 2010:858; Darroch 2005:110).

## **Organisational effectiveness and capability assets**

Organisational efficiency and capability play a significant role because they highlight the accumulation of capabilities ingrained in a company and are directly related to its financial performance (Hsu and Wang 2012:172). Organisational capability comprises internal coordination and integration of external resources. Integration of market, customer, and emerging technology knowledge is a typical

external integration activity that helps organisations transform resources into innovative outputs (Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 2005:277). Innovations in technology and the marketplace may be boosted by integration. Technology innovation can benefit from both external and internal integration capabilities. An organisation entering a new technological niche can use free resources to integrate new specialised knowledge with existing technological knowledge repositories to increase innovative output and achieve strategic objectives (Kotha, Zheng, and George 2011:1011).

## **Technological assets**

Technology resources are highly strategic for leveraging synergies between the various components and tools businesses employ to attain a particular level of productive performance (Pan, Pan and Lim 2015:401). Organisations also require technological resources (patent rights, knowledge, and research and development) to preserve their reputation and stakeholders' trust, as well as their loyalty and social standing (Grant 1991:11).

According to Porter (1985:5), every technology-related product the company manufactures involves primary and secondary activities. This combination of assets facilitates the achievement of the intended strategic objectives (Gibson, Bittner, and Chang 2020:4). Modern technologies are contagious, combinatorial, and transverse instead of being used in isolation.

According to Gibson *et al.* (2020:7), technological resources as physical and intangible materials help organisations create, produce, market, use information, and manage all processes to achieve their goals. This ultimately makes organisations competitive and attracts external funding for a successful strategy. This article provides an evaluation of the strategic management resources that support the execution of the strategic plans of public organisations. In this instance, the primary objectives are to identify strategic resources, develop an integrated resources suite to successfully implement a TVET strategy in Lesotho, and comprehend the barriers to accessing these resources.

## **BARRIERS TO ACCESSING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT RESOURCES**

Understanding the types of obstacles will aid the TVET leadership in identifying the factors that must be resolved for the system to gain access to strategic resources. It has been established in the preceding literature review that financial resources are not the only significant resources. Therefore, it is necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the entire political system in order to comprehend the obstacles to gaining access to strategic resources.

## Political and socio-economic factors

Political systems create and allocate laws and public resources. According to Eresia-Eke and Soriakumar (2021:33), finances, taxes, alternative tariffs, patron safety, and government oversight of public institutions are political factors that impact strategic execution. In some countries, government stability, trade regulations, tax policies, and other laws influence organisations' strategic objectives, such as the companies and state-owned enterprises Acts. At this stage, it is crucial to comprehend the political climate and how society views the dissemination of TVET. Sociological and demographic factors influence the programme's impact (Pereira, Mascarenhas, Flores, and Pires 2020:12). Socio-economics, population growth, age range, education, mindset, culture, habits, and living standards are examples of community perceptions. The TVET sector must evaluate people's perspectives on how TVET can boost Lesotho's economy and how laws support human capital growth.

## Legal structure

Organisations are required by law to implement programmes efficiently. This transparency safeguards employee rights during the execution of organisational strategies (Lee and Yeri (2020:22). Oketch, Kilika, and Kinyua (2020:7) analysed the census survey of Kenya's 23 regulatory bodies with descriptive statistics to determine if the legal environment influences organisational performance, mandates, funding, and reporting frameworks. According to the study, legal environments impact the success of organisational strategic strategies. The study suggests a favourable legal environment for public organisations to receive government funding. The 1984 TVET Act should thus align with the 2018/23 Lesotho NSDP for human capital development and resource provision. The TVET Act should be aligned with national objectives and establish a legal framework for TVET programme administration and funding to ensure compliance by all TVET ecosystem stakeholders.

## Technology

Artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things result from the fourth industrial revolution. According to Dasan (2019:109), organisations that do not upgrade their technologies will require more time to accomplish their objectives. Awareness and adoption of technology within an organisation are interdependent. According to Varelas, Karvelas, and Georgopoulos (2020:8543), technological capacity is contingent upon internet connectivity, technological innovation, research, patent regulations, and digital legal guidelines. In 2020 and 2021, the

Covid-19 pandemic devastated the globe (World Economic Forum 2022). Zhang, Sun, Yang, and Wang (2020:264) argue that a technical environment conducive to strategy implementation is essential. Organisations achieve multiple objectives through competitiveness and through efficient and effective technological strategies to endure long-term disruptions that impede the successful implementation of organisational goals. This is due to the corporate governance structure that determines and allocates strategy execution resources.

## **Corporate governance**

Corporate governance involves overseeing organisational strategy development and implementation. The primary objective is to promote trustworthy, moral, and ethical strategy development and a conducive environment (OECD 2021). Public and private institutions have enhanced their corporate governance systems to improve oversight and fiduciary responsibilities to achieve their objectives. Legislation and corporate governance codes that are more stringent enable the government to improve service delivery, mitigate risks, and implement strategies with greater efficiency.

In addition, corporate governance also requires risk management. There are both financial and non-financial risks. Risk management is indispensable. TVET risks must be identified, analysed, assessed, and mitigated as part of risk management. Risk management alerts enable timely intervention (Dowbiggin 2021:3). The risk strategy addresses TVET compliance fraud and reputational concerns. Lesotho's TVET administration is contingent on compliance with local and international laws. The TVET strategy necessitates compliance, and the governing board must comprehend sector-specific regulations. Compliance management must thus support risk management (Fisher, Makey, Macpherson, Paul, Rennie, Talbot-Jones and Jorgensen 2022:5).

Effective governance and goal attainment also require ethical leadership. Ethics in TVET administration and strategy is the application of moral principles. According to the OECD (2020), ethics and good governance build stakeholder confidence. For the TVET strategy to be successful, economic growth, environmental protection, and social justice must be balanced. For TVET strategy and governance to be successful, fair and objective leadership is necessary. Corruption may therefore harm Lesotho's TVET system. The environmental issues of TVET may be resolved through ethical leadership and good governance.

## **Dynamic learning environment**

Education institutions must provide a suitable learning environment with effective strategy implementation platforms. Standardisation of collaboration methods,

communication, and processes that enforce teamwork throughout an organisation can facilitate the creative execution of joint strategic projects. In addition to a literature review, Leiren and Jacobsen (2018:492) conducted a qualitative study on silo barriers in Norwegian municipalities. They determined that standardising teamwork practices, language, and processes throughout an organisation makes it easier to creatively execute collaborative strategic projects.

Moreover, according to Pereira *et al.* (2020:45), successful strategies are thwarted when implemented practices are inconsistent with the overall strategy. Since strategies can be implemented through projects, the team in charge of project management must be able to articulate the desired outcomes to ensure that they are in line with the strategy. Without this alignment, resources, time, energy, and effort may be wasted on activities that do not contribute to enhancing social status, which is the objective of programmes such as TVET. A lack of strategic communication within an organisation impedes and prevents the accomplishment of organisational objectives. In addition, as articulated by Gaikwad, Giera, Guss, Forien, Matthews, and Rao (2020:2368), deficiencies in handling the specialisation of professionals result in the departmentalisation of people, which hinders collaboration and increases the likelihood of duplication of efforts, thereby making it impossible to achieve strategic objectives.

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This investigation is founded on the pragmatist paradigm. Pragmatic research focuses on explaining real-world problems and has been utilised by practically-minded researchers as a method of inquiry (Creswell, Klassen, Plano-Clark, and Smith 2011:534). According to Tsung (2016:32), philosophy reflects the beliefs and research strategy of the researchers because each stage of research is predicated on assumptions about the nature and sources of knowledge. Therefore, selecting a particular philosophy depends on the study's practical implications. This permits the researcher to adopt suitable strategies for achieving the study's objective and answering the research question (Kaushik and Walshe 2019:255). The research for this article utilised a convergent parallel mixed methodology. Qualitative research (involving interviews with the MOET) and quantitative analysis (in which the staff of TVET institutions responded to questionnaires) were used to determine the strategic resources and barriers to their accessibility. According to Creswell (2012:101), this methodology enables the researcher to collect verified data. In this case, the data was on the integrated strategic management resources for Lesotho's effective TVET strategy and governance.

This study's population consisted of MOET and TVET institution personnel in urban and semi-urban regions of Lesotho. Purposive random sampling was used

to select appropriate participants to answer the research questions for the qualitative part of the research. This type of sampling facilitates the selection of a readily available sample that can provide information pertinent to the research question (Creswell 2013:111; Bergin 2018:156). Of the MOET officials 30 were targeted for interviews in order to collect in-depth information on the resources for effective TVET strategy and governance. Officials employed between 2005 and 2018 were included in the sample. They were involved in developing and implementing the Education Sector Strategic Plan (2005–2015) (Lesotho MOET 2018) or Education Sector Plan (2016–2026) (Lesotho MOET 2016) on which TVET depended. Consequently, they were qualified to answer the study’s research questions. Table 1 outlines the sample of the study.

**Table 1: Summary of Interviewees**

Job/title	Sampled	Actual Number
Principal Secretary	1	1
Deputy principal secretary	1	1
Curriculum and Assessment	1	1
Secondary	1	1
Tertiary	1	1
Technical and Vocational Division	3	2
Planning	1	1
National Curriculum Development Centre	3	2
Examinations Council of Lesotho	3	3
District Education	10	9
Lesotho Distance Teaching Centre	2	2
Inspectorate	3	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>27 (90%)</b>

Source: (Author’s construction 2023)

For the quantitative part of the study, the sample comprised administrators and instructors from Lesotho’s TVET institutions. Based on the TVET population, 200 respondents were chosen. However, 10 additional respondents were included to account for the non-return of any survey questionnaires.

TVET officials were selected using stratified random sampling based on their positions as senior management, deans or heads of departments, and instructors. Stratified random sampling facilitates the validation of results by ensuring the sample's representativeness (Palinkas 2015:553). The TVET sample was stratified into 20 top management members, 30 department heads, and 150 instructors and lecturers. Of the 210 distributed questionnaires 205 were returned and processed. The researcher used 200 of the 205 questionnaires intended for analysis because an additional 10 questionnaires were sent out to account for questionnaires that were not returned. The response rate for the quantitative study was therefore 100%. The self-administered survey was designed to elicit responses to the research questions. This study employed a four-point Likert scale: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, and (4) strongly disagree (Ivanov *et al.* 2019). The University of the Free State approved this study, and the researcher obtained ethical approval clearance before conducting the research. In addition, the Ministry and the TVET institutions that participated in this study granted permission to conduct this study.


The researcher designed a semi-structured interview instrument comprising three types of questions: fixed-format (qualifications, etc.), semi-structured format (questions about TVET resources), and scale questions (questions based on the degree of occurrence or levels). Although Ivanov and Webster (2020:1065) argue that these questions are challenging to construct, the researcher ensured that the questions adhered to the necessary criteria in order to meet the generally accepted standards for this study. The questionnaire contained hypothetical statements to which respondents were required to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement.

## **DATA ANALYSIS**

For the qualitative data, the researcher took interview notes, compared them with voice-recording clips to fill in data gaps, and edited and cleaned the resulting data. This increased the validity and dependability of the obtained data. The interview data was analysed using the NVivo software. Thematic codes were used to enhance data analysis.

**Initially, quantitative data was recorded in Excel. This was imported into the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for additional analysis. SPSS South Africa certified the researcher for an intermediate SPSS course, so he felt comfortable utilising this software. The analysis and interpretation of both studies were carried out simultaneously. Figure 1 depicts the data analysis procedure for this study.**

**Figure 1: Convergent parallel mixed method**



Source: (Creswell, Klassen, Plano-Clark and Smith 2011)

## RESULTS AND FINDINGS

The researcher interviewed 27 participants of the initial 30 targeted respondents from the policymakers (MOET officials). The primary reason for this was that three declined the invitation due to official engagements.

The policymakers identified numerous strategic resources and capabilities as well as barriers to strategic resources, which were grouped into seven themes. Table 2 gives a summary of these resources.

**Table 2: Strategic resources**

Themes	Subthemes
Strategic leadership resources	Board leadership, intellect, talent, leadership, learning, strategic unity, qualifications.
Financial resources	Internal funding, external capital, financial management, budgeting.
Organisational resources	Strategic vision and governance, organisational structure, administration of resources, learning resources, strategic vision resources, and legal resources.
Physical resources	Facilities, machinery, scholarships, buildings.
Technological resources	Information management systems, internet, communication, computer labs, equipment, digitalisation, simulators.
Research and innovation resources	Curriculum design, research and development, collaboration, implementation, value creation (relevance).
Organisational efficiency and capabilities resources	Funding, programme relevance, talent, speed, shared mind and brand identity, accountability, efficiency, customer connectivity, green environment, monitoring and evaluation.

Source: (Author's compilation 2022)



## **Strategic leadership resources**

The interviews revealed that strategic leadership is essential to successfully implementing Lesotho's TVET strategy. This supports Johnsen's (2021:382) assertion that leadership drives an organisation's output and strategic achievements. Participants agreed that strategic leadership aligns organisational and departmental business plans with resource allocation coordination. Nonetheless, some participants feared that obstacles such as recruitment primarily based on political affiliation rather than merit would lead to the failure of the strategy because some leaders, including board members, cannot carry out their responsibilities effectively. This results in an unbalanced allocation of resources to already-saturated regions at the expense of implementing the TVET strategy.

The interviews emphasised the significance of corporate governance in managing the implementation of the TVET strategy. Most respondents noted that boards become "watchdogs" and play a significant oversight role. Specifically, boards must ensure that the vision, mission, and objectives are developed. Therefore, they are better positioned to allocate the necessary financial resources, monitor and evaluate their use, and track the implementation of the strategy.

## **Financial strategic resources**

The interview participants stated that financial resources were significant for the successful development and implementation of the strategy. The financial resources were classified under the following themes: internal funding, external capital, financial management, and budgeting. TVET institutions must be able to generate their finances, manage finances effectively through budgeting, adopt spending controls, and, most importantly, generate capital from external sources. Most participants mentioned that finances give an organisation a competitive advantage, so acquiring other organisational resources becomes more accessible. TVET institutions must generate funds and raise money from outside sources (Aryal 2020:72). This, therefore, implies the need for adequate financial management to guard against funds misappropriation, which becomes an excuse for the Ministry to provide inadequate organisational resources to the TVET institutions. Most participants agreed that the resources provided by the Ministry were insufficient to support successful TVET strategy implementation.

## **Organisational strategic resources**

TVET institutions must have primary resources to achieve their vision and mission (UNESCO 2019). The interviewees highlighted various organisational resources as the cornerstone of effective TVET systems. Among them were organisational

structure, administration, information management system, learning resources, strategic vision, and governance structure. Most respondents stated that TVET strategy implementation was not backed by the resources required, so achieving the planned goals was difficult. The government is aware, but the focus is less on TVET than on the academic stream. As a result, the provision of basic physical infrastructure is not achieved.

### **Physical strategic resources**

This study reveals that physical infrastructure was essential in supporting the implementation of the TVET strategy in Lesotho. The physical resources comprise facilities, machinery, scholarships, and buildings. One participant mentioned that physical infrastructure attracts students, generating more revenue for the institutions. Parents and students use the physical infrastructure of the TVET institution to judge its competitiveness. According to Yeap, Suhaimi and Nasir (2021:1827), adequate TVET infrastructure gives students the confidence and sway to enrol in such a facility. However, 12 participants mentioned that due to poor technology, most TVET institutions lacked proper infrastructure and failed to execute and achieve the intended goals of producing graduates with the right skills.

### **Technological strategic resources**

Technological resources were regarded as critical for fostering the successful implementation of strategies. These resources entail the following: information management systems, internet, communication, computer labs, equipment, digitalisation, and simulators. These resources enable constant, consistent, and remote implementation of the strategy. The Covid-19 pandemic and lockdown prevented business continuity, and organisations without these resources were forced out of operations and business. Syuzeva, Zheltenkov, Antipina, and Kuznetsova (2021:937) note that many firms were driven out of operation because of a lockdown imposed to stop the spread of the disease. It requires sound research and development for the TVET sector to positively impact the economy. Without it, is challenging to advance strategic goals.

### **Strategic resources relating to research and innovation**

Research and innovation resources were classified into the following themes: curriculum design, research and development, collaboration, implementation, and value creation (relevance). Johnsen (2021:384) identified creativity and innovation as significant capabilities and resources for organisational strategies.

Participants were unanimous that research and innovation were critical in determining the viable direction and decision-making for any public sector strategy to achieve the intended goals. As the four participants emphasised, enhanced service delivery is based on adopting and adapting new ways that are proven to support the successful implementation of a strategy. Therefore, organisational efficiency could be improved through practical research and development.

### Strategic resources relating to organisational efficiency and capabilities

The interview participants expressed the need for organisational efficiency and capabilities to implement a successful strategy. These resources include funding, programme relevance, talent, speed, shared mind and brand identity, accountability, efficiency, customer connectivity, green environment, and monitoring and evaluation. This is in line with Bourn (2008), who states that successful strategies lead to high turnovers and enhanced services due to quality products that address customer needs and satisfaction.

The quantitative part of the study achieved a response rate of 100%. Table 3 gives a summary of the response rate from the quantitative component.

**Table 3: Response rate**

Targeted sample	Questionnaires distributed	Questionnaires returned	Questionnaires used for analysis
Top management	23	20	20
Heads of department (academic heads)	33	32	30
Lecturers	154	153	150
	<b>210</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>200</b>
<b>Total used: 200 (100%)</b>			

Source: (Authors' own construction 2022)

The availability of strategic leadership resources within the TVET institutions for implementing a successful strategy was established through the following indicators: allocation of strategic resources, the Ministry's oversight structure, effective boards and governance, qualified leadership, monitoring and evaluation, and coordinating the efforts of staff towards a common goal. A summary of these findings is presented in Table 4.

**Table 4: Strategic leadership**

Strategic leadership resources	Proportion of respondents (%)				Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
There are adequate and relevant strategic resources to support successful strategy implementation.	11	10	79	0	100%
The Ministry provides the necessary strategic leadership and governance.	7	12	80	1	100%
The national and TVET sector strategic plans are aligned and therefore attract adequate government funding.	2	38	155	5	100%
The governance structures are adequate to facilitate successful strategy implementation.	2	16	67	15	100%
There is adequate expertise to facilitate successful strategy implementation.	3	22.5	71	3.5	100%

Source: (Author's own construction)

Table 4 indicates the results of the quantitative study on the extent to which the strategic resources for implementing the TVET strategy were available in the sector. Of the respondents, 79% disagreed that they had adequate and relevant resources to support a successful TVET strategy in Lesotho. In the same way, 80% of the respondents affirmed that the Ministry did not provide adequate oversight. Most respondents (67%) pointed out the inadequate governance structures for successful strategy implementation. The analysis further showed a lack of strategic expertise to implement an effective strategy. A total of 71% of the respondents said that there was insufficient TVET development expertise to advance the TVET strategy.

This situation has resulted in irrelevant programmes and barriers to attracting strategic leadership. Most (80%) of the respondents pointed out the outdated curriculum and failure to align with 21st century skills as the primary barriers stifling TVET strategy implementation.

This study established the strategic financial resources by focusing on the capital, finances, budget, and external funding to assess access to the strategic resources in support of the TVET strategy implementation. Table 5 shows the results of this part of the quantitative component.

**Table 5: Financial strategic resources**

Financial strategic resources	Proportion of respondents (%)				Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
There is sufficient capital to finance TVET's strategy.	19	24	54	3	100%
Obtaining financial support is challenging.	22.5	41	35.5	1	100%
MOET budget allocation to the TVET strategy is adequate.	4	22	62	12	100%
There is adequate external financing for strategy implementation.	2.5	81	12	4.5	100%

Source: (Author's own construction)

Obtaining financial resources to support implementing a successful TVET strategy and governance is challenging in Lesotho. Data from Table 5 indicates that the respondents' views were not significantly different from those who agreed and disagreed with the statement that the TVET strategy had enough capital to support successful implementation. Although 35.5% of the respondents disagreed, 63.5% of the respondents agreed that the TVET system does not have access to the required financial resources. The MOET budget allocation to TVET institutions is insufficient to support the implementation of the TVET strategy. A total of 74% of the respondents disagreed that the budget allocation supports relevant strategies and programmes. Nevertheless, the TVET strategy benefits from external funding, as 83.5% of the respondents agreed, while 16.5% disagreed that the TVET strategy received ample external financing.

The significant barrier to TVET strategy implementation in Lesotho is the legal framework. No regulation enhances the coordination of the strategy implementation. A total of 82% of the respondents suggested reviewing the legal framework to include the development of guidelines for funding for physical resources.

Physical strategic resources were established through appropriate facilities, machinery, and scholarships. Table 6 highlights the findings.

Table 6 shows that the TVET institutions lack the physical resources to implement the strategy successfully. Of the respondents, 42% agreed and 44% strongly agreed that TVET facilities were inadequate. The strategy's success also depends on the teaching and learning infrastructure. Respondents disagreed on whether institutions have access to these. While 51% disagreed that TVET has these

**Table 6: TVET organisational resources**


Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative percent
Strongly disagree	5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Disagree	23	11.5	11.5	14
Agree	84	42	42	56
Strongly agree	88	44	44	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	

Source: (Author's own construction 2022)

resources, 49% strongly agreed that the current teaching and learning infrastructure was adequate. The researcher used the one-sample binomial hypothesis test to determine the statement's p-value and retained it as the value was 0.42. The difference between supporters and opponents of this statement was negligible. Thus, sufficient physical resources supported TVET strategy implementation.


A further issue was access to relevant technology and whether the technological environment supports or challenges TVET institutions. Figure 2 shows TVET staff responses.

**Figure 2: Relevant technologies**



Source: (Author's own construction 2022)

**Figure 3: TVET organisational resources**



Source: (Author's own construction 2022)

Figure 2 indicates that TVET institutions face enormous challenges in providing an effective and efficient technological environment. A total of 90% of the respondents disagreed that there were relevant technologies in Lesotho to facilitate a successful TVET strategy in Lesotho. Only 2% strongly agreed, and 5% agreed that the technologies in Lesotho were appropriate.

Inan and Bititci (2015:310) established that organisations that do not organise resources and capabilities affect the achievement of organisational goals. The extent to which organisational resources for TVET were readily available in Lesotho is presented in Figure 3.

The pie chart shows that organising strategic resources is difficult. Organisational resources are essential to implementing a successful TVET strategy and programmes that address skills gaps in Lesotho. TVET institutions need internal liquidity to achieve strategic goals and generate strategic resources. Most (89%) agreed that developing TVET resources in Lesotho is complex. Only 11% disagreed that organising and coordinating the TVET resources was challenging.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A successful strategy requires strategic resource integration and alignment with national and departmental strategies to justify budget allocation and

achieve successful TVET strategy implementation. This study found that the Lesotho government and TVET institutions have yet to create an environment in which to generate the minimum required resources to support TVET strategy implementation.

At the government level, the importance of strategic resources for Lesotho's TVET strategy cannot be over-emphasised. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the government failed to fund the TVET infrastructure in order to foster the programme. Training and development that ought to have been provided suffered due to the lockdown, further preventing Basotho from acquiring the necessary skills. The lack of technological facilities and capabilities led to significant setbacks. Therefore, an integrated strategic resources framework would help the Ministry and TVET institutions achieve their strategic goals of producing relevant human capital and reducing unemployment, poverty, and social inequality. These findings support the following recommendations.

The limitation of the TVET leadership is that it does not comprehend the strategic resources necessary for implementing a successful TVET strategy. As a result, the TVET leadership must be recruited based on merit to facilitate the strategy formulation and execution properly. The TVET strategy must improve research and innovation and teacher infrastructure. Therefore, industry collaboration must be enhanced to address the current skills mismatch by aligning critical graduate skills with the world of work. Another recommendation is that there is a need to balance TVET and academic stream resources. The government should institutionalise legal structures to allow for transparent funding from the national budget based on the national strategic plan.

Furthermore, corporate governance should be embedded into TVET strategy management, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. This way, the sector can be competitive and attract external funding for strategy implementation.

At the TVET institutions' level, this research recommends a combination of the following strategic resources for implementing a successful TVET in Lesotho.

- **Strategic leadership resources:** TVET institutions require leadership that appreciates corporate governance in ensuring the development of relevant TVET strategies. Furthermore, strategic leadership plays an oversight role in the successful TVET implementation.
- **Financial resources:** adequate funding, both internal and external, is critical to supporting TVET programmes and strategy. The funding should cover strategy, human resources and curriculum developments.
- **Organisational resources:** relevant and adequate infrastructure is highly recommended for implementing a successful TVET programme. The technology, ICTs, digital platforms, and simulation provide flexible learning modes and



delivery. As a result, avoiding lesson disruptions that occur during pandemics and lockdowns.

- **Research and innovation resources:** the development of a relevant TVET curriculum depends on adequate research and development. Conventional innovations require collaborative research with the industry to ensure the relevance of TVET programmes to the skills and products required by the public and economic activities.
- **Quality assurance resources:** for the TVET programmes to get accreditation, constant monitoring and evaluation of TVET programmes are necessary to give the public and the industry confidence in the skills produced by the TVET institutions. An audit of what the economic sector wants in terms of the skills and outputs compared to the TVET curriculum is important in developing a relevant TVET system in Lesotho.
- **Public partnership as a resource:** the role of government is necessary in supporting the TVET system. Public partnership is key for the success of the TVET institutions. This partnership must be managed through numerous public policy frameworks which facilitate the smooth participation of all the stakeholders in the development and successful implementation of the TVET programmes. Typical policies include: relevant and updated TVET Act, TVET levy, and TVET bursaries policies.

A combination of these strategic resources is critical in ensuring a successful TVET implementation in Lesotho. In turn, political systems would benefit from the production of relevant skills, and this would lead to enhanced economic activities, and reduced unemployment and poverty.

## NOTE

- \* This article is based on Mokhitli Khoabane's PhD thesis completed in 2022 at the University of the Free State, titled "Strategic Management Resources Framework for the Technical and Vocational Education in Lesotho", under the supervision of Dr Lyndon du Plessis.

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# Effectiveness of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature Through the Lens of Gauteng Citizens

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## ABSTRACT

This article investigates how and why the Gauteng Provincial Legislature (GPL) and the people of Gauteng differ in defining and measuring GPL performance, also referred to as effectiveness. The article recommends measures to bridge the gap between how the GPL and Gauteng citizens define and measure GPL performance.

The findings of the qualitative research revealed that from an internal perspective, the GPL defines and measures performance using the performance model which focuses on inputs, activities, and outputs. However, the citizens assess the performance of the GPL using the expectation disconfirmation model, which emphasises outcomes. This means the GPL and the citizens define and assess GPL effectiveness using different lenses causing a disjuncture in the results. On the one hand, the internal perspective lens showed that the GPL has been relatively effective. On the other hand, the external perspective lens revealed that the GPL has been performing sub-optimally. Consequently, the article recommends that the GPL should embrace, and correctly balance the use of the performance, and the expectation disconfirmation models. This would bridge the gap between results of the internal and external effectiveness of the GPL.

The article makes a seminal contribution in two ways. First, by making it clear that the practitioners need to focus on the expectations of

citizens to improve perceived performance. This is a shift from a predominantly performance model to the expectation disconfirmation model. Second, by contributing to meeting the academic knowledge needs in the field of Public Administration through closing a knowledge gap about how and why the GPL's performance, from an internal and external perspective, differ.

## INTRODUCTION

South Africa adopted the outcomes or results-based approach in 2009 and effectiveness also referred to as performance in this article is thus measured at outcomes level (Republic of South Africa 2009:12). Effectiveness refers to the achievement of the legislature's mandate, namely law-making, oversight and scrutiny, and public participation, as stipulated in Chapter four of the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996*. The mandate is about serving the citizens which is associated with achieving outcomes such as improved accountability, transparency, and participation; and not outputs such as reports (Parliamentary Centre and World Bank Institute (WBI) n.d.:9).

This article seeks to document part of the findings of the research that critically analysed the appropriateness of the GPL performance measurement framework to establish the effectiveness of the GPL. One component of the main research involved investigating how and why the GPL and the people of Gauteng differ in defining and measuring effectiveness, which is the focus of this article. The article recommends measures to bridge the gap between how the GPL and Gauteng citizens define and measure performance.

## BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Available literature shows that public institutions have not been very effective. For example, using corruption as a proxy indicator for government performance, Gordon, Roberts, Struwig and Dumisa (2012:12) conducted a study that revealed that 74% of South Africans believed the incidence of corruption had increased in the past three years. Notably, 10% of South Africans were of the view that corruption had declined; while 12% indicated that it had remained the same over the period. 63% of South Africans mentioned that the government and parliament were not doing enough to fight corruption (Gordon *et al.* 2012:12&14). In the eyes of the citizens, this points to poor performance by the government and the



parliament of South Africa because their efforts have not been resulting in less corruption and good governance (Matebese-Notshulwana & Lebakeng 2020:200; Pelizzo & Stapenhurst 2013:1).

To further demonstrate the non-optimal performance of the South African public institutions, research findings of a relatively recent study that was conducted by Wike, Simmons, Stokes and Fetterolf (2017:2) revealed that 22% of the public had a lot of trust and another 22% had some level of trust in their South African government and this translated to 44% of South Africans that gave an affirmative response. Among the surveyed African countries, South Africa scored the lowest in terms of trust at 44% as compared to Tanzania (89%), Ghana (70%), Kenya (68%), Senegal (60%), and Nigeria (54%) (Wike *et al.* 2017:2). Taking a look at the results at a global level, the same study revealed that people in the sub-Saharan Africa (save for South Africa and Nigeria) and Asia-Pacific regions trusted their national governments more compared to those from Latin America, the Middle East, and southern Europe (Wike *et al.* 2017:2).

In the same study, 56% of South Africans registered their dissatisfaction with the way democracy was working in the country as compared to a median of 38% and 52% for the surveyed African countries and globally respectively (Wike *et al.* 2017:2). The fact that 44% and 56% of South Africans that were surveyed trusted the government and were dissatisfied with the way democracy worked, respectively in 2017, suggests that the country still had some work to do to boost the trust levels in the government and how democracy works as perceived by the public.

Moving away from the public sector in general to looking at performance of parliaments in particular, a study that was conducted by Beetham (2006 in Rolef 2006:9) revealed that using trust as a proxy for effectiveness; parliaments from both developed and developing nations have been less effective. The study revealed that 42% of the people in East Asia trusted their parliament, followed by Africa at 41%, and then the European Union at 35%, Latin America at 16% and finally Europe at 14% (Beetham 2006 in Rolef 2006:9).

The Conference Board of Canada (2019:Online) further confirms low citizens' trust levels in developed countries' parliaments by indicating that they (trust levels) have been on a downward trend for an extended period of time. The developed countries' average confidence/trust levels in their parliaments fell from 47% in the 1980s, to 42% in the 1990s, and further to 39% in the 2000s (Conference Board of Canada 2019:Online). As with the developed nations, public trust in the parliament of South Africa also fell from 66% in 1990 to 45% in 2013 (Holmberg, Lindberg & Svensson 2015:5) and further down to 25% in 2017 (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 2018:6,7). Based on these trust facts, it can be concluded that parliaments from both developing and developed countries have not been sub-optimally performing.

## **PROBLEM STATEMENT**

Although from an internal perspective, as documented in the annual reports, the GPL seems to have been relatively effective; from an external perspective as expressed in the background information section and by the people of Gauteng, the GPL has been underperforming. This suggests that the GPL and citizens have been measuring effectiveness differently. This is a problem because if the status quo remains, there will continue to be a disjuncture between what the GPL offers and does, and the needs of the citizens. This is an undesirable situation considering that the GPL is not supposed to be self-serving but constitutionally mandated to serve the people of Gauteng. Should legislatures not reach their constitutional mandate, the lives of ordinary citizens would remain unimproved and the public would also lose confidence and trust in legislatures, and possibly resort to violent public protests and voter apathy (Schulz-Herzenberg 2014:1). Once confidence and trust in legislatures are lost by the public, it means there will be no need for their (legislatures) existence, which in turn means taking away the voice of the ordinary citizens; excluding them from deciding their destinies. It is vital to understand how and why the citizens and the GPL differ in defining and measuring effectiveness and find a way of bridging the gap. The following section outlines some models that could be used as lenses to understand and find a solution to this undesirable situation.

## **CITIZENS' SATISFACTION WITH SERVICES**

According to DeHoog, Lowery and Lyons (1990:807) and Mangai (2016:93) there are four models that can be used to explain why citizens may be pleased or displeased with government service. The four models are performance, expectation disconfirmation, individual and jurisdictional (Mangai 2016:93) which are discussed in that order.

### **The performance model**

According to Roos and Lidström (2014:137), the performance model argues that citizens' satisfaction is derived from the availability of inputs such as policies and outputs such as welfare services, and roads delivered by public institutions. This model views satisfaction verdicts as influenced just by the availability and performance of a service or product (Van Ryzin 2004:434). This suggests that the model focuses mainly on operational matters (inputs, activities, and outputs).

## The expectation disconfirmation model

This model begins with the idea that persons who pass judgements about a service or product already have some expectations about the service or product's benefits or characteristics (Chatterjee & Suy 2019:244; Mangai 2016:93; James 2011:1419; Oliver 1980:460). The model got its name from the difference between what people expected to receive or experience and what they actually experienced after using a service or product. Thus, expectancy disconfirmation is the difference between expectations and the actual performance and this can either be positive or negative (Van Ryzin 2004:434). Positive disconfirmation is when performance of a service as experienced by a consumer exceeds expectation and negative disconfirmation is when performance falls short of expectations (Van Ryzin 2004:434; Oliver 1980:460). This model predicts that while high performance or low expectations lead to more positive disconfirmation which in turn results in better satisfaction levels, high expectations or low performance produce further negative disconfirmation which in turn result in lower satisfaction levels (Horáková 2020:62; James 2011:1419; Van Ryzin 2004:436; Yi 1989:20). Thus, for this model, satisfaction is theorised as citizens' summary judgements about the difference between what they experienced pertaining to a service and their expectations (Mangai 2016:94; James 2011:1425; Van Ryzin 2004:436).

A simplistic way of showing the difference between the performance and expectation disconfirmation models is as follows:

For the performance model, an increase in **outputs** results in increased satisfaction levels (Roos and Lidström 2014:137), but for the expectation disconfirmation model, enhanced **outcomes** (positive disconfirmation) (Yi 1989:2) leads to improved satisfaction levels. In the language of MANCP Network (2015:5), the performance model is about the operational objectives which are short-term and within the direct control of an organisation. The expectation disconfirmation model is about strategic or medium-term objectives, which are outside the direct control of an organisation (MANCP Network 2015:5).

## The individual and jurisdictional models

For the individual model the variables for citizen satisfaction are gender, race, income, age, home ownership, local political efficacy, general political efficacy and community attachment (DeHoog *et al.* 1990:810). In other words, citizen satisfaction is determined by demographic factors, political efficacy and how attached an individual is to a community they live in. For the jurisdictional model, which is not very different from the individual model, the satisfaction variables are the prominent racial composition of an area, jurisdiction average income level, socio-economic matrix of a neighbourhood, whether the area functions under a

fragmented or consolidated government system, and the quality and quantity of services provided in a jurisdiction (DeHoog *et al.* 1990:812).

The jurisdictional model argues that people tend to cluster together in certain communities based on their socio-economic status (DeHoog *et al.* 1990:810). This clustering is influenced by related expectations of the people that form a community (Mangai 2016:94; DeHoog *et al.* 1990:811; Sharp 1986:70–71). For example, the upper-class areas are usually interested in amenities such as restaurants, parks and health clubs, while the working-class value housekeeping services such as refuse collection and the lower-class areas push for social services such as food programmes, and primary healthcare (Mangai 2016:94, 2017:40–41; DeHoog *et al.* 1990:811; Sharp 1986:70–71).

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study employed the interpretivist scientific approach or qualitative methodology which assumes multiple realities in understanding and explaining a phenomenon. Since not much is known about how and why citizens and the GPL differ in defining and measuring effectiveness, an exploratory case study design was employed to investigate the phenomenon. Data was gathered through analysing 31 GPL documents and interviewing seven purposefully selected individuals in the GPL with planning and performance reporting as one of their major Key Performance Areas (KPA). The semi-structured individual interviews were done to supplement and triangulate data obtained from the following 31 documents:

- One 2015/16–2019/20 strategic plan.
- Five 2015/16–2019/20 APPs.
- Five 2015/16–2019/20 annual reports.
- One 2020/21–2024/25 strategic plan.
- Three APPs (2020/21; 2021/22; 2022/23).
- Two annual reports (2020/21; 2021/22).
- Three GPL regulatory documents (Framework for Integrated Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (PBMER); Standing rules and Processes and procedures manual).
- 11 GPL evaluations.

This study focused on documents from the fifth (2015–2019) and sixth (2020–2024) legislature strategic terms mainly because records management in the GPL is poor making it very difficult to access documents from the earlier legislature strategic terms.

To comply with ethical requirements for studies that involve human participants and unpublished documents, the study was guided by the Belmont ethics

code which is founded on three basic principles of respect for persons, beneficence and justice (Al Tajir 2018:2; Belmont Report 1979:4). To proceed with the study, an ethical clearance letter was obtained from UNISA after obtaining permission from the Secretary to use the GPL as a case study. Consent to conduct interviews and record them was sought and obtained from each of the seven interviewees, whose confidentiality was upheld.

## **RESEARCH FINDINGS**

This section is divided into two sub-sections. Findings on how effectiveness is defined and measured from an internal perspective or by the GPL and by the people of Gauteng are presented in the first and second section respectively.

### **GPL effectiveness from an internal perspective**

The analysis of 31 documents revealed that while the word effectiveness is present in almost all of the documents, the term was defined in five documents only, namely the 2015–2019 strategic plan, 2019/20 APP, 2020–2025 strategic plan, GPL public perception survey of 2015 and the Evaluation of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature Oversight Mechanisms/Tools study of 2018.

In the 2015–2019 strategic plan the definition of effectiveness is about the degree to which an objective was/will be likely to be achieved. Considering that objectives can be operational, or strategic, the foregoing definition can mean either achieving operational and/or strategic objectives; meaning the definition is not explicit.

In the 2019/20 APP and the 2020/21–2024/25 strategic plan, effectiveness is defined as doing the right things and about the working or not working of a strategy, respectively. Both definitions are not very clear, but the words ‘doing’ and ‘working’ are associated with execution, and not result or effect. This suggests that the two definitions are at operational level and not strategic.

The remaining two definitions in the 2015 perception survey report and the 2018 oversight report are about outcomes/impacts. The varying definitions of effectiveness for one institution prompted the need to engage the seven participants to gain a better understanding of how effectiveness is defined in the GPL.

Responses from all the participants showed that effectiveness in the GPL is associated with achieving some results of some sort or accomplishment of a task. However, the participants differed in their views of the level of results to be achieved. For example, participant one mentioned that in their view, effectiveness has to do with achievement of strategic outcomes linked to the impact on the lives of the people but went further to qualify that in the GPL, effectiveness is

interpreted at operational level. Participants four, five and seven were also very clear that in the GPL effectiveness is interpreted at an operational level associated with activities and outputs not outcomes or impacts.

Participant two associated effectiveness with execution of plans or recommendations contained in reports, which is about processes as mentioned by participants four, five and seven. Thus, participant two insinuated that the GPL is not effective because it has not been implementing some of its processes.

Participants three and six mentioned that in the GPL, effectiveness is about making sure that things are working according to plan or specifications regardless of level (operational or strategic). This again shows that effectiveness in the GPL is understood at implementation or operational level. However, both participants agreed that there is something wrong with the current approach. While participant three did not clarify the exact nature of the challenge, participant six was very clear that there is a need for the GPL to consider the expectation of citizens/impact in its definition and understanding of effectiveness as indicated by participant one.

Based on an understanding of effectiveness in the GPL, which is mainly at operational level, the following paragraphs outline performance of the GPL during the fifth and sixth legislature strategic terms. GPL performance information presented in Tables 1 and 2, was extracted from the GPL annual reports which are compiled by GPL staff and audited by the Auditor General of South Africa. This is the performance of the GPL from an internal perspective.

During the fifth Legislature strategic term, the GPL achieved 72% of its targets in the 2015/16 financial year. The GPL saw an improvement for the following two financial years at 81% and 87% achievement of set targets in the 2016/17 and the 2017/18 financial years respectively. Unfortunately, performance dropped by 3% to 84% in the 2018/19 financial year and further dropped to 75% in the 2019/20 financial year. On average, the GPL achieved 75% of its targets set for the fifth Legislature strategic term as presented in Table 1.

Performance dropped to 67% for the first year (2020/21) of the sixth Legislature strategic term as depicted in Table 2. The main contributor to this drop was the Covid-19 pandemic which caused some of the activities of the GPL such as oversight visits to be temporarily suspended, especially during levels five and four lockdown periods. Lockdown levels five and four, called for minimal physical human interaction. Nonetheless, performance improved to 83% of the targets achieved during the second year (2021/22) of the sixth Legislature strategy. Performance improved because the lockdown levels had been reduced which allowed reasonable physical activities. Moreover, the GPL had put measures in place to allow virtual or remote working where necessary. For example, some public participation activities, House committee meetings and House sittings were done online where

**Table 1: Performance of the GPL during the fifth Legislature strategic term**

Objective / Outcome	2015/16 Annual Report targets (GPL 2016c:41–113)			2016/17 Annual Report targets (GPL 2017c:32–53)			2017/18 Annual Report targets (GPL 2018b:27–41)			2018/19 Annual Report targets (GPL 2019)(GPL 2019a:28–45)			2019/20 Annual Report targets (GPL 2020b: 25–50)			2015/16 to 2019/20 % of targets Achieved
	Achieved	Not Achieved	% Achieved	Achieved	Not Achieved	% Achieved	Achieved	Not Achieved	% Achieved	Achieved	Not Achieved	% Achieved	Achieved	Not Achieved	% Achieved	
Improved Accountability by the Executive to the Legislature in respect of service delivery.	26	11	70%	6	1	86%	4	1	80%	7	1	88%	9	2	82%	76%
Improved meaningful involvement by the public in Legislature business.	26	10	72%	6	2	75%	2	1	67%	2	1	67	1	2	33%	70%
Increased responsiveness of Laws to meet the needs of the people of Gauteng.	17	9	65%	3	1	75%	1	0	100%	1	0	100%	1	0	100%	66%
Fostered coherent and coordinated legislative sector.	13	3	81%	6	0	100%	2	0	100%	1	0	100%	1	0	100%	88%
Enhanced public confidence in the governance and leadership of the Legislature.	76	20	79%	16	4	80%	3	0	100%	5	0	100%	5	2	71%	80%
Modernised business practices towards supporting the functions of the Legislature.	15	15	50%	5	2	71%	1	0	100%	0	1	0%	1	0	100%	55%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>72%</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>81%</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>87%</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>84%</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>75%</b>

Source: (Muzenda 2023)

**Table 2: Performance of the GPL during part of the sixth Legislature strategic term**

Outcomes	2020/21 Annual Report targets (GPL 2021a:22–41)			2021/22 Annual Report targets (GPL 2022a:24–46)			2020/21 to 2021/22 % of targets Achieved
	Achieved	Not Achieved	% Achieved	Achieved	Not Achieved	% Achieved	
Outcome 1: Enhanced oversight and accountability towards service delivery.	4	2	67%	4	2	67%	67%
Outcome 2: Increased responsiveness of laws to meet the needs of people of Gauteng.	3	1	75%	4	0	100%	88%
Outcome 3: Enhanced meaningful public participation.	2	0	100%	1	1	50%	75%
Outcome 4: Improved alignment and collaboration between organs of state.	1	0	100%	1	0	100%	100%
Outcome 5: Enhanced compliance with relevant fiduciary requirements and principles of good governance.	4	4	50%	10	1	91%	74%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>76%</b>

Source: (Muzenda 2023)

necessary. As shown in Table 2, the average performance for the two financial years of the sixth Legislature strategic term stood at 76% of targets achieved.

During the 2015/16 to 2019/20 term, best performance was witnessed in cooperative governance at 88% (see Table 1). This success was attributed partially to well-functioning and established structures such as the forums for the Speakers, Petitions and Public Accounts as well as technical teams like the Secretaries’ Association of the Legislatures of South Africa (SALSA) that support cooperative governance activities (GPL 2015:22). Cooperative governance is followed by targets for improved public confidence in the GPL which were achieved at 80%. Oversight, public participation, and law-making targets achieved were all above two thirds at 76%, 70%, and 66% respectively. In terms of the six objectives the GPL had for the term, *Modernised business practices towards supporting the*



*functions of the Legislature* performed the worst at 55% met targets. Seemingly, a general insufficient awareness of the benefits of ICT in the GPL, aggravated by the lack of clear records management processes and a knowledge management strategy as well as relevant capacity and skills to effect the transformation process in the institution, are some of the reasons provided for this unsatisfactory performance of 55% (GPL 2015:17 & GPL 2020a:29).

As with the fifth Legislature strategic term, for the first two years of the sixth Legislature strategic term, cooperative governance performed the best at 100% of all targets being achieved (see Table 2). Law-making followed at 88%, followed by public participation and compliance with relevant fiduciary requirements and good governance principles targets at 75% and 74% targets achievement respectively. Oversight performed the worst at 67% of targets achieved both from the mandates and objectives perspectives for the sixth Legislature strategic term. The oversight mandate requires substantial interaction with the citizens and service delivery sites. As mentioned, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, some of the oversight activities were suspended temporarily, hence a drop in performance compared to all other objectives and activities of the GPL.


Participants were engaged to get further clarity on reasons behind the performance of the GPL. Participant one mentioned family emergencies and emerging priorities or unforeseen circumstances which led to cancellation of planned activities, as some of the reasons behind sub-optimal performance by the GPL. Participant five attributed inadequate performance by the GPL to poor planning. In their view, the so-called emerging priorities were a symptom of poor planning. In addition to poor planning mentioned by participant one, lack of professionalism and boldness as well as willingness to do the right thing were stated by participant two as some of the reasons behind sub-optimal performance by the GPL. Participant six cited capacity limitations and negligence. Participants three, four and seven avoided the question.

## **GPL effectiveness from an external perspective**

As stated in the background section, citizen trust as a proxy for effectiveness in both developed and developing countries' public institutions has been dropping in recent years. GPL documents which form part of the study were reviewed to investigate if the same trend also applies to the GPL. Figure 1 presents results on Gauteng public's trust in the GPL from various studies that were conducted by the GPL.

Figure 1 shows that the Gauteng public's trust in the GPL dropped from 63% in 2015 to 42% in 2019 but went up a bit to 56% in 2020 and dropped again drastically to 27% in 2023. This trend supports what literature says about the dwindling trust levels in public institutions, including the GPL. To confirm the

**Figure 1: Gauteng public's trust in the GPL**



Source: (Citofield 2023:7; Ipsos Public Affairs 2020:24; Ipsos Global Reputation Centre 2019:89; HSRC 2015:51)

foregoing statement, it is imperative to explore the performance of the GPL from a mandate perspective. Accordingly, in the following three sections the performance of the GPL in achieving, from an external perspective, the constitutional mandates, namely public participation, oversight, and law-making is presented and discussed.

### **Public participation mandate performance of the GPL**

Through the public participation mandate, citizens' views are heard with the possibility of influencing policy for the benefit of the citizens. Consequently, it is vital to examine the effectiveness of the GPL's public participation mandate to corroborate information about declining trust levels in the GPL.

For the GPL, a review of the institutional documents which form part of the study revealed that the GPL has and uses an array of public participation mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms include the petitions system, public education, sector parliaments and public hearings (HSRC 2015:31). Thus, the GPL is aligned to best practices for the provision of an array of mechanisms and programmes.

However, regarding deliberative democracy associated with the inclusiveness and equality of participants, a review of the GPL's past evaluations revealed sub-optimal performance by the GPL as depicted in Table 3.

As shown in Table 3, there was a decline from 52% to 24% and 53% to 24% of the people of Gauteng who mentioned that the GPL conducts business in an open and transparent manner and is accessible to all people living in Gauteng, respectively. There was also a drop from 55% to 16% of the residents of Gauteng who indicated that communication from the GPL was clear and effective to

**Table 3: Deliberative democracy in the GPL in 2020 and 2023**

Perception	2023 (Citofield 2023: 94 &117)	2020 (Ipsos Public Affairs 2020: 46, 47, 49)
<b>GPL conducts business in an open and transparent manner</b>		
Strongly agree/agree	24%	52%
Strongly disagree/disagree	48%	29%
<b>GPL is accessible to all people living in Gauteng</b>		
Strongly agree/agree	24%	53%
Strongly disagree/disagree	50%	21%
<b>GPL communicates effectively</b>		
Strongly agree/agree	16	55
Strongly disagree/disagree	57	16

Source: (Muzenda 2023)

enable deliberative democracy. Results of an earlier GPL perception survey study that was conducted in 2015 showed that the GPL had been struggling in the area of deliberative democracy for some time. For instance, only 38% of the 2015 household survey participants believed that the GPL provided an effective forum for debate (HSRC 2015:66). Inadequate time allocated to public participation activities (Ipsos Public Affairs 2020: 39–41); ineffective communication associated with poor information provision and use of communication channels not favoured by the public (Ipsos Global Reputation Centre 2019:32) were cited as some of the reasons for the poor rating for GPL public participation. The people of Gauteng cited television, social media and radio as the most preferred communication channels as opposed to the traditional methods such as physical public meetings and awareness campaigns that the GPL has always been using (Citofield 2023:79; Ipsos Public Affairs 2020:52).

As with deliberative democracy, the GPL was also found wanting in the extent to which public involvement influences the policymaking process in the GPL as shown in Table 4.

Table 4 shows a decline from 37% to 23% and 50% to 27% of the people of Gauteng who perceived that their inputs were considered by the GPL in decision-making resulting in an improved quality of life of citizens, respectively.

In 2015 the number of people of Gauteng who believed that their vote was effective in influencing decision-making within government was 55% (HSRC 2015:49). This figure echoes findings of a study that was conducted in 2016 wherein a total of

**Table 4: The degree to which public involvement influences the policymaking process in the GPL**

Perception	2023 (Citofield 2023:117)	2020 (Ipsos Public Affairs 2020: 24 &39)
<b>The GPL improves the quality of life of Gauteng Citizens</b>		
Strongly agree/agree	27	50
Strongly disagree/disagree	41	21
<b>The GPL meaningfully engages the people of Gauteng / my inputs are heard and considered</b>		
Strongly agree/agree	23%	37%
Strongly disagree/disagree	47%	31%

Source: (Muzenda 2023)

123 GPL committee oversight reports for departmental budgets and annual reports for the 2014/15 financial year were analysed. These reports exposed that “across the board, civil society attendance in Committee oversight meetings was high at 76%, and 61% of oversight reports confirmed that submissions were made. However, only 22% of reports confirmed that Committees applied submissions made in their recommendations and evidence of feedback being provided to communities was evident in only 2% of reports that were analysed” (Brügge 2016:18).


Overall, in the eyes of the people of Gauteng, the GPL has been performing poorly in executing the public participation mandate. In 2019, 34% of the people of Gauteng gave an affirmative response regarding the execution of the public participation mandate by the GPL and this figure went down to 18% in 2023 (Citofield 2023:108).

### **Law-making mandate performance of the GPL**

As far as law-making is concerned, the main objective of the GPL is to make laws that are responsive to the needs of the people of Gauteng. Thus, it is imperative to investigate the extent to which the GPL’s law-making mandate has been effective or responsive to the needs of the citizens, which is the focus of the ensuing paragraphs.

Effectiveness in making laws should not only be about the number of Bills passed by a legislature, but also about making sure that adopted Bills meet the needs of the citizens. Put differently, effectiveness in executing the law-making mandate should be assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively. For the GPL, quantitative performance or results of the number of laws that were passed by the GPL from 1994 (when democracy was attained) to date are presented in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Number of laws passed by the GPL (1994–2023)**




Source: (Twenty Years of Institution Building and Democratic Consolidation Assessment Report 2015:43; and GPL electronic Monitoring and Evaluation data bases)

Information presented in Figure 2 was obtained from two sources. Information for the period 1994/95 to 2013/14 was obtained from the *Twenty Years of Institution Building and Democratic Consolidation Assessment Report* that was compiled in 2015 (GPL 2015b:43). Due to the poor records management in the GPL as stated in the methodology section, records of the total number of laws that were passed between 2014/15 and 2016/17 could not be found at all. For the period 2017/18 to 2022/23, information was mined from the GPL’s electronic Monitoring and Evaluation data bases.

As can be seen from Figure 2, during the first Legislature (1994/95–1998/99), the GPL passed 53 laws. During the second Legislature (1999/2000–2003/04), 52 laws were passed. Most of the laws were passed (initiated and/or amended) during the first and second Legislatures to address the ills of apartheid. The number of laws passed went down to 24 and 22 during the third (2004/05–2008/09) and fourth (2009/10–2013/14) Legislatures respectively. This is because most of the laws associated with apartheid had already been dealt with during the first and second Legislatures (HSRC 2015:29). During the fifth Legislature (2014/15–2018/19), where information for three financial years could not be found; four and nine laws were passed in 2017/18 and 2018/19 respectively. For the sixth Legislature (2019/20–2023/24), which is left with approximately one financial year to end, 16 laws had been passed at the time of data gathering.

This narrative is in support of what is available in literature that quantitative performance of legislatures as far as law-making is concerned is very impressive.

**Figure 3: People of Gauteng satisfied with the GPL's execution of the law-making mandate**



Source: (Citofield 2023:101; Ipsos Public Affairs 2020:36; Ipsos Global Reputation Centre 2019:63; HSRC 2015:54)

However, it is likewise imperative to assess the law-making mandate qualitatively, which is the focus of the next paragraphs.


Between 2015 and 2023 the GPL experienced a significant decline of 75% of people satisfied with how the GPL executes the law-making mandate as depicted in Figure 3. Some of the people of Gauteng mentioned that they were dissatisfied as most of the laws did not speak to their needs because of poor public consultations (Ipsos Public Affairs 2020:36). Poor implementation of passed laws was also mentioned by the people of Gauteng as one of the reasons for their dissatisfaction with the law-making mandate (Ipsos Public Affairs 2020:37).

In summary, the GPL has been passing a reasonable number of laws over the years performing relatively well quantitatively. However, qualitatively, the performance of the GPL has been on a downward trajectory as depicted in Figure 3. This has implications on the operations of the GPL for the execution of its law-making mandate. For example, citizens have been bemoaning laws that are not fully responsive to their needs. Thus, future law-making strategies must be geared towards correcting these undesirable results.

### **Oversight and scrutiny mandate performance of the GPL**

The main aim of oversight and scrutiny in the GPL is to influence service delivery by the Executive for the benefit of the people of Gauteng. Consequently, it is vital to investigate how the oversight mandate of the GPL has been effective, and this is done in Figure 4 and the following paragraphs.

**Figure 4: People of Gauteng satisfied with the GPL's execution of the oversight and scrutiny mandate**



**Source:** (Citofield 2023:105; Ipsos Global Reputation Centre 2019:65; HSRC 2015:57)

Figure 4 shows that the perceptions of the people of Gauteng regarding how the GPL has been executing the oversight and scrutiny mandate has been on a downward trajectory. In 2015, the majority (87%) of the people of Gauteng mentioned that they were satisfied with how the GPL was executing the oversight and scrutiny mandate. The figure went down to 31% in 2019 and further down to 14% in 2023. This finding about the GPL supports what is available in literature that the performance of both developing and developed nations' parliaments has been on a downward trajectory.

Several reasons have been advanced for this sub-optimal performance by the GPL. One of them is capacity. For the GPL, in a study that was conducted in 2018, it was found that the GPL had capacity in terms of head count but lacked capacity in terms of skills to execute the oversight functions effectively (Brügge 2018:107). For example, most of the GPL oversight recommendations that were examined in 2018 were found to be information-seeking because of inadequate skills to develop explanation- and remediation-seeking (press for action) recommendations which result in improved oversight and service delivery (Brügge 2018:107). The same challenge of not passing explanation-seeking and remediation oversight recommendations was exposed in the 2023 perception survey study (Citofield 2023:30). In the perception survey of 2023, 93% of the study respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that the GPL had highly skilled MPLs and staff (Citofield 2023:117) to develop and pass meaningful resolutions that result in service delivery, among other activities.

It is vital to note that the citizens usually regard the government as one entity and do not consider the three arms of the state, namely the Executive, Judiciary, and the Legislature as being different (Citofield 2023:17). Thus, poor performance by the Executive, for example, in service delivery would affect how the citizens perceive the effectiveness of the GPL. To support the foregoing point, the 2023 Gauteng perception survey found that the increasing cost of living, interest rates, and load-shedding challenges which were experienced countrywide influenced how the people of Gauteng rated the performance of the GPL (Citofield 2023:17).

Lack of political will is stated in literature as another reason for sub-optimal performance by legislatures in fulfilling their constitutional mandate. Lack of political will to conduct oversight effectively is partly because of the South African political system that promotes allegiance to the political party as opposed to the Constitution and the citizens (Brügge 2018:89). In South Africa, at the time of writing this article, it has not been individuals that were voted into office but political parties. In most cases the senior members of political parties take up positions in the Executive branch of the state, and the junior members sit in legislatures and find it odd to hold their seniors accountable. This situation which does not promote political will to serve the citizens fully, impedes the full execution of the oversight mandate by legislatures and stifles service delivery which affects how the citizens perceive the GPL. Service delivery was also found to be suffocated in Gauteng by corruption (Ipsos Public Affairs 2020:18; Ipsos Global Reputation Centre 2019:35; Brügge 2018:87; HSRC 2015:59).

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

It was concluded that from an internal perspective the GPL measures its performance or effectiveness using the performance model. However, from an external perspective the citizens measure using the expectation disconfirmation model. Considering that the GPL is a public institution that is constitutionally mandated to serve the citizens, it is recommended that the GPL shift from a predominantly performance model and strongly embrace the expectation disconfirmation model. However, this does not mean that the GPL should ignore the operational space which is comprised of inputs, activities, and outputs. In short it is recommended that the GPL should embrace, and correctly balance the use of the performance, and the expectation disconfirmation models. This would bridge the gap between how the GPL and Gauteng citizens define and measure performance.



## CONCLUSIONS

It was found that effectiveness in the GPL is mainly understood at operational level. It can be concluded that the GPL subscribes to the performance model which defines effectiveness in terms of having the required inputs and outputs.

Regarding the actual performance, from an internal perspective, it was found that the GPL has been performing relatively well, achieving not less than half of the targets in any given financial year for the period of the study. However, sub-optimal performance has been recorded from an external perspective. It can be concluded that two effectiveness theories are currently in use in the GPL. On the one hand, from an internal perspective, the GPL assesses its effectiveness using the performance model. On the other hand, the people of Gauteng use the expectation disconfirmation model (outcomes) in assessing the performance of the GPL. There is a disjuncture between performance reported from an internal and external perspective.

According to Wessels (2008 in Cameron 2013:578) the study of Public Administration should assist in solving practical public sector problems and contribute to meeting academic knowledge development needs. This study contributed to both. In terms of solving practical public sector problems, which include poor performance of the GPL as perceived by the citizens, the study managed to shed some light in terms of what practitioners need to focus on to improve perceived performance. The study revealed that practitioners need to seriously consider the expectations of the people as opposed to just focusing on operational matters. The study likewise contributed to meeting the academic knowledge needs in the field of Public Administration. This was achieved by closing a knowledge gap of how and why performance from an internal and external perspective differs. The study revealed that from an internal perspective, the GPL uses the performance model while the citizens view effectiveness using the expectation disconfirmation model. Moreover, the study demonstrated the applicability of these theories to the GPL. According to Nieuwenhuis (2010:112) the process of bringing analysed data into context with current theory or revealing how it verifies existing knowledge or brings new understandings, constitutes the researcher's exceptional contribution to the development of science or knowledge. Thus, this study made a seminal contribution to knowledge in the field of Public Administration.

In conclusion, DeHoog, Lowery and Lyons (1990:807) and Mangai (2016:93) argue that there are four models that can be used to explain why citizens may be pleased or displeased with government service. This article focused on two of the models, namely the performance, and the expectation disconfirmation. The role played by the individual and jurisdictional models in determining satisfaction of citizens was not explored in this article.

## NOTE

- \* The article is partly based on a thesis for a Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration (PhD) degree under the supervision of Dr C Alers and co-supervision by Prof V A Clapper, titled: Muzenda, E. 2023. *Critical analysis of the performance measurement framework of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature*. Unpublished PhD-thesis. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

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# Civil Society and Corruption Prevention

## An Assessment of Antecedent Conditions

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### **ABSTRACT**

As corrupt practices in the upper echelons of state institutions have become more intricate, conventional law enforcement institutions have lacked the capacity to effectively prosecute and convict the alleged perpetrators. The burden of proof and the length and cost of successful criminal prosecution and conviction places undue pressure on already overstretched law enforcement institutions. The benefit of illicit gains clearly outweighs its potential costs. This state of affairs has resulted in the loss of trust by citizens in the state and the integrity of its institutions. The weakness of the state in the combatting and prevention of corruption has increased the significance of the other pillars of the national integrity system such as the media, private sector, civil society, and various watchdog institutions. In this article, the authors report on their review of the most recent literature on the role of civil society in preventing corruption. By using a qualitative semi-systematic review of several journal articles and book chapters, five themes emerged from the literature review. In this article, these five themes are described, and provisional findings are reported on. These findings include the potential role of civil society in corruption prevention, the need for an enabling environment in which civil society could investigate and report on malfeasance, adequate funding, the need for effective collaboration between various anti-corruption institutions, and linkages with anti-corruption policies.

## INTRODUCTION

Where many states have emphasised the use of anti-corruption agencies supported by strong legislation, there is an apparent realisation that these conventional law enforcement agencies have become ineffective. Corrupt practices have become more sophisticated, while these agencies find themselves lacking the necessary capacity to effectively detect and prosecute corrupt offenders (*Transparency International Sourcebook 2000:41–42*). In South Africa, this situation is aggravated when the governing party applies cadre deployment ostensibly as a contrivance of transformation to address socio-economic inequalities. Cadre deployment advocates for the appointment of ruling party loyalists in prominent positions of the public service with the objective of enabling the ruling party to control every lever of power of the state (Twala 2014:159–160; Chamisa 2018:2).

While it is reasonable to expect a governing party to appoint skilled, experienced and sagacious individuals in senior positions in the public service, the practice has been the deployment of those loyal to the ruling party who abominate transparency, accountability, ethical leadership and good governance. This state of affairs has created windows of opportunities for private sector actors to unduly influence senior public officials for private benefit. Despite the existence of strong anti-corruption legislation and several anti-corruption agencies, grand corruption in South Africa has shown great resilience and appears to be a well organised and an entrenched enemy of the public (Rothstein & Torsello 2013:36).

The objective of this article is to provide a review of the literature on the role that civil society organisations (CSOs) play in combating grand corruption. The structure of this article is comprised of the following sections: the conceptualisation of corruption and the five themes of literature about the role of civil society in combating corruption. These five themes include the efforts by CSOs in combating corruption, the conditions necessary for promoting anti-corruption advocacy by civil society, the collaborative approaches in fighting corruption, the limitations of civil society in promoting scrupulous conduct, and the linking of civil society to anti-corruption policies. In the final section of this article, the conclusions derived from the literature review are reported on.

## CONCEPTUALISING CORRUPTION

It is common knowledge in South Africa that corruption has become a prominent challenge. The discourse on corruption keeps reoccurring in every academic and informal discussion and there is no sign that it will go away anytime soon. The widely known definition of corruption in the public sector is that given by the World Bank (WB), which regards corruption as the abuse of public office

for private gain (World Bank 1997:9–10). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), broadens the definition of corruption as “the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement” (UNDP 1999:7). Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, which in effect projects corruption as present in both the public and private sector”. Argandoña (2003:253–267), Søreide (2006:381–417) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2017:36) assert that corruption is also prevalent in the private sector.

The South African government endeavoured to give a comprehensive and expanded legal definition of corruption in both the public and private sectors when it enacted Section 3 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (PRECCA), which defines corruption as the abuse of authority or breach of trust by any person who gives to or receives from, any person any form of gratification, which results in the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules. Gratification is considered in Section 1 of PRECCA to include money, donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, property, office, status, honour, employment, holiday accommodation, service, favour, advantage, right, privilege, vote, consent, influence, consideration, benefit, discount, commission, rebate or bonus. Therefore, the definition of corruption by PRECCA is neither based on the level of authority the individuals have in the public or private sector nor on the value of gratification. Instead, PRECCA criminalises all forms of corruption.

Scholars such as Vargas-Hernández (2009:2); Abjorensen (2014:19); Roman and Miller (2013:775–795); and Yeboah-Assiamah, Asamoah and Osei-Kojo (2014:186–204) submit that much as there is no universally accepted definition of corruption, there is no universally valid typology of corruption. Hence, researchers on corruption have elaborated multiple classifications. The public sector consists of government and all publicly controlled or publicly funded agencies, enterprises, and other entities that deliver public programmes, goods, or services at national, regional and local levels (Institute of Internal Auditors 2011:3). In South Africa, it can be presumed that all organs of national, provincial, district municipalities, local municipalities, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and government established and funded agencies constitute the public sector.

## **GRAND AND PETTY CORRUPTION**

The WB (2000:xv-xix) distinguishes between ‘state capture’ and ‘administrative corruption’. State capture refers to the influence of the formulation of laws, regulations, and decrees with the objective of favouring a specific group of individuals. Administrative corruption refers to the distortion of the implementation of laws

and regulations to favour a state or non-state actor. Doig and Theobald (2000:1–12) distinguish between grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption involves high level officials who extract large bribes for personal gain, while petty corruption involves low level officials who extract small amounts for personal gain.

Pedersen and Johannsen (2005:6–7) define grand corruption as the abuse or misuse of power by heads of state, ministers and senior officials of government for private gain. Rose-Ackerman (2018:100) considers it as the direct monetary payoffs to the highest government officials by private firms to unlawfully secure government contracts, purchase SOEs, and obtain concessions for resource extraction. Bester and Dobov ek (2021:73) embrace the notion that the terms grand corruption and state capture are two convoluted concepts of corruption. They define state capture as the payment of bribes by private sector actors to officials at high levels of government to extract significant amounts of money from the state.

Ouzounov (2004:1191) endeavoured to make a distinction between grand corruption and state capture by stating that grand corruption involves subverting existing rules governing the awarding of contracts and implementation of laws, while state capture refers to the clandestine influence by individuals or entities of the law-making process to obtain undue financial gains. However, Hellman and Kaufmann (2001:32) argued that some forms of grand corruption, such as buying votes of members of parliament, bribing government officials or bribing judges to influence their decisions, have the overall effect of conferring undue advantages to firms within a country's legal and regulatory framework and constitute state capture. In this article, the two concepts of grand corruption and state capture are used interchangeably and refer to the exerting of influence on or payment of bribes by private sector actors to high-level public service officials to obtain undue fiduciary benefits from the state.

## **GRAND CORRUPTION AND ITS EVOLUTION**

In South Africa, grand corruption or state capture gained traction in the political discourse in 2016 (Dassah 2018:1). Grand corruption in the form of state capture emerged and gained traction after the Public Protector released the 'State of Capture Report' (2016). The report was a result of an investigation following complaints raised by the Dominican Order of Catholic Priests, a former leader of the Democratic Alliance and leader of the Opposition in Parliament and an anonymous person. The complaints related to allegations of bribery and the influence exerted on the former president by members of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of the ministers. The Public Protector found that there were numerous financial favours extended by the Gupta family members to the president, some ministers and senior officials of SOEs. These exchanges appear to



be in violation of a myriad of statutes such as the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, the Executive Ethics Act 82 of 1998 and section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (State Capture Report 2016:343–349; Dassah 2018:6–7).

The efforts by members of the Gupta family to capture the head of state and his cabinet to influence how the affairs of government were conducted, also came to the attention of the South African Council of Churches (SACC). The SACC set up a five-member panel to investigate the extent of political and fiduciary influence by the Gupta family on the state. In 2017, the SACC released a report entitled: 'The Unburdening Panel Process Report'. The report confirmed the existence of a well organised network of political elites centred around the former president which exercised control over the function of the state to the benefit of the Gupta business entities (Dassah 2018:7).

In the same year, an interuniversity research partnership consisting of academics from four universities and their research teams also known as the 'State Capacity Research Project' explored the allegations of state capture and released a report entitled: 'Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa is Being Captured'. In that report, Bhorat, Buthelezi, Duma, Mondli, Peter, Qobo and Swilling (2017:2–3) observed, among several other things, the continuous manipulation of procurement budgets of the SOEs to favour companies and individuals that have close relations with the ruling elite; cabinet reconfigurations designed to appoint personnel ready to implement corrupt decisions made by well-placed politicians; and the muffled reaction of law enforcement agencies against the suspected perpetrators who have created an environment for corruption to flourish.

Pursuant to the remedial action taken by the then Public Protector, in the 'State of Capture Report', the president appointed a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of improper conduct on the part of the then president of the Republic of South Africa and certain members of the Gupta family. The Zondo Commission was set up in 2018 (Zondo Commission Report 2021 Part 1, Vol.1: i). Among other things, the Zondo Commission revealed that different configurations of board directors and senior managers across the SOEs were affected and particular individuals were strategically positioned to repurpose the SOEs towards serving their interests and those of the Gupta family. These implicated individuals oversaw the corrupt award of high-value contracts that allegedly enriched entities connected to them at great loss to the SOEs. Key positions were filled by individuals who had the veneer of professionalism and possessed the appropriate experience. These individuals were positioned in key positions at the National Treasury, at the SOEs as chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs), and also maintained control over the procurement of goods and services. From these vantage points, processes and systems were manipulated to advance their ends and to enable the agenda of looting. Parallel processes were created which

did not come under scrutiny, governance systems were weakened, and the focus was on high-value tenders (Zondo Commission Report 2021 Part 1, Vol.1: 757).

The findings of the Public Protector (2016), the SACC (2017), Bhorat *et al.* (2017) and the Zondo Commission (2022) substantiate the pervasiveness of grand corruption in both the South African public and private sectors. However, despite the availability of evidence, public hearings, criminal investigations and prosecutions, no perpetrator of the alleged malfeasance has been successfully convicted of grand corruption. Given the state of affairs, there is an urgent need to explore the proposition that civil society – as a non-government actor – can play a significant role in combating public sector corruption.

## **THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMBATING GRAND CORRUPTION**

In exploring the relationship between civil society and corruption Anheier (2004:20), Habib and Kotze (2003:3), and Habib (2005:673) defined civil society as the organisations and informal networks located between the family, the state and the market in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests. Themudo (2013:670) explains that civil society is constituted by not-for-profit, non-governmental groups such as churches, sports, philanthropic, and advocacy organisations. In this study civil society is defined as any non-governmental and not-for-profit organisation established to address the social, cultural, political, religious, recreational, gender-based, and economic issues affecting members of society.

A qualitative review of literature was used to identify and understand all potentially relevant narratives in journal articles and book chapters that canvass the role of civil society in the fight against corruption (Wong, Greenhalgh, Westhorp, Buckingham & Pawson 2013:987–1004). Through content analysis a commonly used technique broadly defined as a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns in the form of themes within a text (Braun & Clarke 2006:77–101) five themes of literature on the role of civil society in combating corruption emerged. The themes which emerged include: the role of CSOs in combating grand corruption, the conditions necessary for promoting anti-corruption by civil society, the limitations of civil society in the anti-corruption drive, the necessity of collaborative work by civil society in the fight against corruption, and the linkages between anti-corruption policies and civil society. The different themes are discussed in the sections below.

### **Civil Society Organisations and Grand Corruption**

It has been suggested by Head, Brown and Connors (2008:29) that failure of genuine efforts to combat corruption is greatly attributed to the lack of effective

involvement of civil society. In an effort to explore new anti-corruption strategies, the South African government embarked on engendering civil society in the fight against corruption in 2001 with the formation of the National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF) which comprised of civil society, business and the public sector (Ramsingh & Dobie 2006:4–5; Camerer, 2009:113). The need for civil society in combating corruption is highlighted by the National Planning Commission (NPC) Diagnostic Report (2016:70). Furthermore, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) (2020:10) stresses that the successful implementation of the strategy requires parliament, all elected representatives, all organs of state, state institutions supporting constitutional democracy, civil society and the private sector to work in a collaborative and coordinated manner with relevant oversight and accountability.

In 2011, CSOs were involved in coordinating major anti-corruption protests in India, Spain, Russia, China, Taiwan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Oman, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, and Indonesia. CSOs organised protests in the United States and the United Kingdom against grand corruption perpetrated by multi-national companies in the forest industry in Borneo. The widespread cross-border protests gave rise to the belief that strengthening civil society is a hallmark of anti-corruption policy (Themudo 2013:64). Themudo (2013:67) further posits that public officials are corrupt because citizens are unable to fully observe their behaviour. By monitoring public officials, civil society is able to report undesired behaviour of public officials, and in turn, limit official discretion and increase the likelihood of sanctions against corrupt behaviour. This independent watchdog function contributes to a system of checks and balances, which increases public sector transparency and holds government officials accountable for the proper use of public office. Sung (2002:146) also contends that open political debates and civic participation in community affairs identify problem areas and make corrupt practices difficult to hide. Despite the existence of various anti-corruption institutions which effectively execute their mandates, CSOs should continue to take on an auxiliary function.

One of the best examples of civil society playing a significant role in combating corruption is exemplified by the study conducted in Sweden by Makarova (2018:80) entitled: 'The Anti-Corruption Civil Society as part of Sustainable Policy Networks'. It was found that more than 85% of the Swedish population aged 16–84 belong to one association or another and as a result there are many associations and trade unions that promote anti-corruption practices and rules in state institutions and commercial enterprises. Civil society anti-corruption activities in Sweden include advocacy works in some corruption cases; raising public awareness about corruption issues; proposing action plans in fighting corruption; monitoring government actions and decisions; and providing leadership to remove corrupt leaders at national and local levels. Makarova (2018) also states

that CSOs in Sweden have created networks with the state and businesses with the main aim of promoting accountability and preventing corruption.

Wijkström (2004:20) submits that the effectiveness of civil society in fighting corruption in Sweden is attributed to its long-established culture of integrity and institutionalised CSOs that originates from mass organisations that emerged in the late 19th century and which became the dominant civil society paradigm in the country. Although Sweden is said to have a very active and effective anti-corruption civil society, Makarova (2018) contends that assessing its effectiveness against corruption is difficult to ascertain because all institutions and actors of the National Integrity System (NIS) are considered very strong. Accordingly, the vibrant nature of anti-corruption civil society activities in Sweden seem to shatter opportunities for grand corruption.

In South Africa, the role of CSOs in fighting against corruption has been anchored on four main strategies. First, through advocacy, CSOs have been able to galvanise the public to join the fight against grand corruption. Having observed that there was a failure of state institutions to fully investigate allegations of corruption and state capture, members of civil society held a People's Tribunal on Economic Crime in South Africa in 2018. The People's Tribunal did not have the status of a court of law which implied that its deliberations and decisions were not binding. However, it was an advocacy effort to strengthen calls for the powerful and influential institutions and individuals implicated in economic crimes to be held accountable (Open Secrets, 2018). The People's Tribunal publicised the report on the outcome of the hearings and provided the evidence gathered to Parliament, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including state organs also known as the 'Zondo Commission' to enable them to investigate the matters further (Open Secrets 2018).

Another form of advocacy by CSOs was conducted through the People's Hearing on State Capture, held on 12 October 2019 at Constitution Hill. This hearing was organised by the Civil Society Working Group on State Capture. The Civil Society Working Group on State Capture is a coalition of over 23 CSOs. The People's Hearing on State Capture was created to openly engage with the public and hear evidence of how state capture impacted their lives. The findings made by the panel presiding over the People's Hearing were shared with the Zondo Commission. Among other things, the People's Hearing supported efforts to hold the beneficiaries of state capture in both business and the state accountable through legal mechanisms such as the Zondo Commission on State Capture (Open Secrets 2019).

The second strategy by CSOs has been the use of civil litigation to fight against grand corruption and in some instances has been successful in the courts of law.

For instance, in 2016, the non-profit organisations (NPOs) of Corruption Watch and the Right2Know filed an application in the North Gauteng High Court (Case No. 81368/2016) requesting it to set aside the findings of the Seriti Commission on the grounds that it was not credible. The Seriti Commission had found that there were no irregularities and evidence of corruption in the arms deal in which a former president was involved. The commission was established in 2012, was chaired by a judge, and heard evidence for approximately four years. The North Gauteng High Court set aside the findings of the Seriti Commission for two reasons: the commission failed to test the evidence of important witnesses, and the commission failed to take into account documentary evidence which contained serious allegations that were important to the inquiry (Corruption Watch 2019).

In 2020, responding to the judgment by the North Gauteng High Court (Case No. 81368/2016), two CSOs namely Open Secrets and Shadow World Investigations, wrote to the chairperson of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to investigate the two judges for their apparent misconduct during the Arms Deal Commission, and to sanction them for any misconduct found. They also asked the JSC to consider referring any evidence of criminal conduct by the judges to the NPA. The head of the JSC agreed to the request of both CSOs. Rather than cooperating with the process launched by the JSC to investigate their alleged misconduct, both judges launched an application to the South Gauteng High Court (Case No. 32193/2021) arguing that retired judges should not be included in the definition of a judge under the Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994 and therefore could not be subject to JSC disciplinary processes. The court dismissed this argument and vindicated the efforts of the two CSOs. Both judges were investigated and held accountable for their efforts to cover up wrongdoing in the Arms Deal.

After receiving allegations of corruption, Corruption Watch filed another application to the Northern Gauteng High Court in 2015 (Case No. 21904/2015) to challenge the decision of the CEO to pay R316 million by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) to Cash Paymaster Services (CPS) through a variation agreement. The High Court declared the decision taken by the CEO as invalid and ordered CPS to pay back the R316 million to SASSA with interest. CPS, however, appealed the High Court decision. The case was argued in the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) and in 2019, judgment was handed down in favour of Corruption Watch. The SCA held that the services stipulated in the variation agreement were already incorporated in the original contract between SASSA and CPS. Therefore, the SCA found that the additional payment of R316 million made to CPS by SASSA was unlawful and invalid and upheld the judgment of the High Court. Although CPS appealed to the Constitutional Court, the case was dismissed in 2020 on the grounds that it had no reasonable prospect of success (Corruption Watch Annual Report 2020:46).

The third strategy envisaged by CSOs is through investigative journalism on the scale of grand corruption. The Daily Maverick's Scorpio investigative unit and amaBhungane, a CSO engaged in investigative journalism in South Africa, uncovered what is termed as #Guptaleaks. The #GuptaLeaks contained a large number of email correspondence and other documents which provided evidence of how members of the Gupta family had captured the political decision-making in South Africa, benefited from state contracts and allegedly laundered billions of rands offshore. The Gupta family were friends of the former president and his son. The scandal has reverberated internationally, implicating multinationals who facilitated or turned a blind eye to the Gupta's allegedly criminal ventures (amaBhungane & Scorpio 2017).

Pillay, Chitunhu and Chivandire (2023:169) point out that the media in South Africa has played a critical role and served as a watchdog of the corrupt system that is pervasive in the government and its institutions. Through investigative journalism the media exposed and reported on the state capture and provided a platform for public discourse and debate on the issue. They revealed that three media houses namely *News 24*, *Daily Maverick* and *AmaBhungane* were venerated with the Taco Kuiper Honour for Investigative Journalism, and this was in recognition of their work in exposing state capture. Pillay *et al.* (2023) commended the media for heightening the public awareness of state capture and for generating pressure from several corners of the society and which compelled the government to take corrective measures.

The fourth strategy has been the launch of public anti-corruption campaigns. It is advanced by Grimes (2013:399) and Villanueva (2020:553) that civil society has the ability to carry out awareness campaigns on corruption and report malfeasance in government. Writing in *The South African.com*, Chothia (2020), reported that six CSOs that include the SACC, Ahmed Kathrada Foundation, the Desmond & Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation, the Nelson Mandela Foundation, the Foundation for Human Rights and the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC) made an appeal to South African citizens to act against all forms of corruption, urged the public servants to report corruption and called on the public to demonstrate outrage at the failure of government to act against corrupt officials. According to Mafata (2021) CSOs urged the public to participate in the 'United in Action Against Corruption week', late in 2021. The occasion was organised by the Defend our Democracy campaign CSO, as a build-up to the International Anti-Corruption Day. The campaign was supported by four CSOs that included the Right2Know, Corruption Watch, Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse (OUTA) and the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation. The organisations demanded accountability, transparency, clean and ethical government, and the meaningful support and protection of whistle-blowers. While CSOs have achieved some measure of success in fighting against corruption in South Africa,

the main drawback of their anti-corruption strategies is their spontaneity, rather than having a sustained approach. As a result, CSOs have neither generated the desired societal response to corruption, nor proved to be an effective and strong preventative tool.

## **Conditions Necessary for Promoting the Anti-Corruption Agenda**

In a study conducted by Villanueva (2020:557–558) entitled: *Why Civil Society Cannot Battle it All Alone: The Role of Civil Society Environment, Transparent Laws and Quality of Public Administration in Political Corruption Mitigation*, it was established that to reduce corruption, there should be the presence of legal and political institutions; rigorous public administration with impartial public officials; free media; a state or government that has predetermined options for civil society not only in participatory governance or policymaking but also for the anti-corruption agenda; and copious engagement between government and civil society. Wiktorowicz (2000:43–61) points out that environments within which CSOs operate greatly influence their effectiveness. When those in power monitor and regulate the collective activities of CSOs, they become more of an instrument of the state in social and political control, rather than a mechanism for empowerment of citizens in the fight against corruption.

In another study by Grimes (2013:399–400) entitled: *The contingencies of social accountability: Examining the link between civil society and good government*, it is concluded that the existence of dense associational networks may enhance accountability provided that necessary conditions, namely political competition, press freedom, and government transparency are present and that if in place, a richer civil society means lower corruption, and if absent, the density of civil society has no bearing on the prevalence of corruption in a country. Grimes (2013) also avers that the existence of political competition creates an auspicious climate in which civil society activists find allies in political opposition parties as bringing corrupt incumbents to justice is an aim that resonates well with the interests of members of opposition parties. Government transparency fostered by access to information laws can enable societal actors to substantiate grievances regarding abuses and in so doing present a more plausible call for investigative and punitive actions on the part of formal institutions of accountability (Grimes 2013:400). Civil society cannot, cautions Grimes (2013), act as a substitute for the formal mechanisms of accountability and this raises doubt regarding the contention that civil society constitutes an independent force that can strengthen accountability and mitigate corruption.

In South Africa, the CSO legal environment is considered enhanced in accordance with the Civil Society Organisation Sustainability Index (CSOSI) for 2020.

The CSOSI indicates that a score of 1.0 to 3.0 means enhanced (strong) sustainability, 3.0 to 5.0 means evolving (weak) sustainability, and a score of 5.0 to 7.0 reflects an impeded (poor) sustainability (CSOSI 2020:1). In terms of this Index, the South African legal environment is depicted as enhanced or strong. The Non-Profit Organisations Act 71 of 1997 provides a conducive legal framework for the creation of CSOs. Most CSOs can easily register as voluntary associations under Act 71 of 1997 or as non-profit companies under the Companies Act 71 of 2008. CSOs have the option to register either online or at the Department of Social Development offices at no cost and the registration usually takes no more than two months. Act 71 of 1997 requires registered organisations to annually submit audited financial reports to the NPO Directorate (CSOSI 2021:2).

Section 32(1)(a) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right of access to information held by the state. To give effect to the constitutional provisions of section 32 and to promote transparency and accountability of the state to its citizens parliament promulgated the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. Section 11 of Act 2 of 2000 gives every South African, including CSOs, the right to access records of public bodies. Additionally, parliament also promulgated the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 to make provision for procedures to be followed by employees in the private and public sector to disclose information about the unlawful or irregular conduct of their employers or other employees. Botha (2021) attests that employees have taken the risk to report allegations of corrupt practices by senior management in government institutions in terms of Act 26 of 2000. In many instances, the consequence has been disastrous to a number of whistle-blowers. Some have lost their employment, while a recent whistle-blower – who disclosed public procurement corruption during the Covid-19 pandemic – lost her life (News24 2021). The legal environment in South Africa has enabled CSOs to vigorously pursue anti-corruption activities aimed at combating grand corruption on the basis of the information disclosed by whistle-blowers.

## **Collaboration in Corruption Prevention**

This theme focuses on possible avenues for collaboration between government and CSOs in corruption prevention. While civil society possesses the ability to significantly contribute to combating corruption, Villanueva (2020:554–558) contends that it cannot constitute a single and independent force in the anti-corruption drive. Hence, it not only requires the support of institutions of government but also actors outside government like the private sector and independent media. Having derived lessons from the former communist states, Villanueva (2020) affirms Sandor's (2003:3) argument that the best results can be obtained when the state is fully involved and working harmoniously with civil society.



When many countries began searching for solutions and the proverbial low hanging fruit to corruption challenges in the mid-1990s, Transparency International (2012:3), a global anti-corruption CSO, developed the NIS as a comprehensive method of combating corruption. The NIS is defined as the sum of institutions and processes used to protect and enhance public integrity and control corruption across society (Brown 2005:1; Brown & Heinrich 2017:286–287; Brown, Ankamah, Coghill, Graycar, Kelly, McMillan, Ransley & Prinzler 2020:iii).

According to Doig and McIvor (2003:3270) and Brown *et al.* (2020:iii), the NIS should be used as a comprehensive and holistic approach to combating corruption. The NIS consists of the main institutions and actors that contribute to integrity, transparency and accountability in a society. The institutions constitute the pillars over which the NIS rests and comprises the executive, legislature, judiciary, the public sector, electoral management body, the supreme audit institution, ombudsman, law enforcement agencies, anti-corruption agencies, political parties, the media, civil society and business as the primary social forces which are active in the governance arena (Transparency International 2012). These pillars are inter-dependent. The ultimate goal of establishing a national integrity system is to make corruption a high risk and low return undertaking (Langseth, Stapenhurst & Pope 1997:507). Langseth *et al.* (1997:522) state that the initiation and management of the NIS determines the success or failure of the reform efforts. It is vital for each state to define the most strategic elements for the NIS to maximise existing opportunities for positive change while providing critical support to weak areas that, if left unattended, could undermine the anti-corruption agenda.

The development of the NIS coincided with the development of the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996*. Act 108 of 1996 emanated from a collection of ideas from ordinary citizens, civil society and political parties which was negotiated and agreed upon by the Constitutional Assembly – the first legislative assembly following the first democratic elections in 1994. The 34 constitutional principles agreed upon by members of the Constitutional Assembly (South African History Online 2019), ostensibly include many of the pillars of the NIS as proposed by Transparency International (2012). In Table 1, the pillars of the NIS were established in terms of specific sections of Act 108 of 1996.

Despite the existence of the relevant pillars of the NIS aimed at promoting national integrity to eradicate all forms of corruption in the state, collaboration among the pillars of the NIS has not been effective (Balia 2005).

The UNDP (2004:9) suggests that to close the loopholes for corruption, a holistic anti-corruption strategy should be utilised which, among other things, should increase public awareness, encourage the reduction of rents (bribes) by means of economic liberalisation, deregulations, tax simplifications, de-monopolisation, and macro-economic stability. It should also reduce discretion through administrative and civil service reform, including meritocratic recruitment and

**Table 1: Constitutional Provisions of the South African NIS**

Section	NIS Pillar
S. 16 (1)	The Media
S. 42	The Parliament
S. 22	The Private Sector
S. 18 & 23	Civil Society Organisations
S. 85	Executive
S. 165	Judiciary (section 179 establishes the Prosecuting Authority)
S. 181	Public Protector (Ombudsman) and The Office of the Auditor General of South Africa (AGSA)
S. 195	Public Administration
S. 231	International Cooperation

Source: (Transparency International 2012)

decentralisation, and increase accountability by building up institutions such as auditing and accounting units, through legal reforms such as judicial strengthening, and by encouraging public oversight through parliament, an independent media, and a more vibrant civil society. The UNPD strategy, much like the NIS, realises the supportive role that civil society can provide to the state in the fight against corruption.

Yeboah-Assiamah (2017:545) postulates that efforts to effectively prevent, control or combat corruption require a holistic approach of systems that are comprised of three pillars, namely strong personalities – public officials with integrity and personal ethics; strong institutions – with mechanisms to promote ethical conduct and integrity of public officials; and a strong third force or active civil society that monitors and enforces ethical conduct as well as the integrity of public officials. These three pillars constitute the Corruption Control Tripod.

The tripod is a holistic strategy and indicates that efforts of civil society in the endeavour against corruption have to be complemented by not only the promotion of integrity and ethical behaviour among public officials but also the building of institutions capable of ensuring probity in the public sector. Civil society is an integral part of the collaborative approaches posited by Doig and Mclvor (2003), UNDP (2004), Yeboah-Assiamah (2017). However, these authors omit reference to a structural framework within which civil society can effectively play its role in the anti-corruption crusade.

In an effort to explore new anti-corruption strategies, the South African government has endeavoured to collaborate in the fight against corruption. In 2001, the

government facilitated the formation of the NACF which comprised of civil society, business and the public sector (Ramsingh & Dobie 2006:4–5; Camerer 2009:113). The role of the NACF is to contribute towards the establishment of a national consensus through the coordination of sectorial strategies against corruption, advise government on national initiatives on the implementation of strategies to combat corruption, and advise sectors on the improvement of sectorial anti-corruption strategies. In spite of the political will portrayed by government to collaborate with CSOs in combating corruption, the NACF was rendered ineffective because of the problems experienced in agreeing on dates for meetings, and the absence of the full quota of business and civil society representatives (Ramsingh & Dobie 2006:7–8).

The need for civil society in combating corruption was once again echoed by the NPC Diagnostic Report (2016:70). The NACS (2020:10) stresses that the successful implementation of the strategy requires parliament, all elected representatives, all organs of state, state institutions supporting constitutional democracy, civil society and the private sector to work in a collaborative and coordinated manner with relevant oversight and accountability.

In response to both the provisions of the NPS Report (2016) and NACS (2020), the government established the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC) (McInnes 2022). The NACAC brings together representatives from civil society and business. It was created to advise government on the critical preventative measures, institutional capabilities and resources that are required to proactively curb a recurrence of state capture as well as to prevent fraud and corruption. The NACAC is required to give advice on the effective implementation of the NACS by government, and to give input on the government's response to the Zondo Commission's recommendations. While the establishment of the NACAC is a demonstration by government of its resolve to eliminate corruption, success is dependent on the level of political will to implement the recommendations.

## **Limitations of Anti-Corruption Efforts**

The fourth theme emanating from the review of the literature, emphasises the limitations encountered by CSOs in their efforts to prevent corruption. In assessing the capacity of CSOs in Romania, South Africa, Ukraine and Croatia, Sandor (2003:2) asked the question: are CSOs able to deal with corruption, given that Central and East-European CSOs are considered to be poorly funded, over-dependent on foreign donors, concentrated almost entirely in the large centres of population, relatively unskilled, tend to oppose government rather than cooperate with it, and not yet well enough organised to lobby effectively? Grimes (2008:11) attempted to answer the question by stating that much as it is attractive and innovative, the participatory approach to fighting corruption, which in essence is a citizen-centred approach, has four main limitations. The first limitation is the lack

of government support. It has been articulated that without government support, citizen participation is at best limited, and at worst irrelevant or even counter-productive (Huber, Rueschemeyer & Stephens 1997:323–342; Schonleitner 2006:35–63). The success of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in Brazil is mainly attributed to government providing support to civil society's involvement in the affairs of local authorities (Wampler 2008:61–81; Wampler & Avritzer 2004:291–312; Baiocchi 2001:41–61).

Spector (2005:275) asserted that in countries where high levels of corruption are perceived to exist, government institutions are often weak and not amenable to provide the necessary funding to CSOs to prevent the scourge. This appears to be the situation in South Africa where CSOs lack the necessary funding to carry out their activities. The CSOs (2021:4) indicates that the financial viability of CSOs in South Africa is impeded (very poor) with a score of 4.9. This implies that the CSOs do not have multiple sources of both domestic and foreign funding, lack the capacity to raise funds, while the revenue generated from the sale of their products and services is insufficient to fund their activities.

The second limitation is caused by the level of education of the citizens expected to participate in the anti-corruption initiatives. Mansuri and Rao (2013:27) and Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes (2010:264–271) assert that educated citizens are often more suitable to articulate community needs, while low literacy and education levels have consistently been acknowledged to reduce citizens' ability and confidence to participate in providing evaluation and oversight on the actions of both public officials and the state. The restriction of educational opportunities has thus become a tool used by the public officials, intentionally or otherwise, for limiting and retaining control of citizen engagement (Verdenicci & Hough 2015:31). While this may seem true especially in developing countries, it cannot be ruled out that citizens may be compelled to mobilise and take mass action because of the unbearable harm inflicted on them by corruption.

The anti-corruption activities of CSOs are driven by international institutions. These external agents often attempt to recreate what they consider successful mechanisms in host countries and contexts, while simultaneously promoting 'country ownership' (Walker 2009:1035–1051). In their endeavour to induce citizen participation, these external agents set up anti-corruption projects which very often offer substantial project funding and employment opportunities, shifting the incentives of citizens involved towards personal financial gain and away from reducing corruption. Verdenicci and Hough (2015:31) posit that levels of corruption have, in some instances, been reported to have markedly increased during such anti-corruption initiatives as citizens attempt to secure the continuation of the project and the related personal benefits.

The fourth limitation arises in societies that are highly divided based on either race, religion or ethnicity. In such societies citizen engagement and participation

is quite difficult to achieve (Walker 2009:1035–1051). For instance, the continued prevalence of violence and insecurity in Afghanistan has somewhat deepened divisions in the society along different ethnic, sectarian and political lines fuelled by the support of various groups of external actors, for example, the United States of America and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This has provided the space for the development of clientelistic networks across the country and institutions based on the so-called social contracts of favours and loyalty in exchange for rewards (Mohmand 2015:20–25). Such a disposition in society impedes the development of efforts between citizens and civil society to act together to look after the common interests of society (Schönleitner 2006:36). Consequently, corruption is more likely to pervade CSOs in societies with higher levels of overall corruption, rendering civil society a poor instrument to tackle corruption (Sandor 2003:3).

While many factors which limit the efforts of civil society in fighting corruption appear externally-based, others are intrinsic in nature. Ebrahim (2003:813–829) contends that CSOs are often not very transparent to the public and as a result they lose credibility in society as it is difficult to hold them accountable. In countries considered less democratic, state elites have increasingly used CSOs as vehicles to disable dissent from members of society opposed to the political establishment, which damages their image (Gilbert & Mosheni 2018:454–480).

Sandor (2003:3) further warns of countries in political, social and economic turmoil. In such countries, international funds are often channelled through local NGOs that could embezzle part of it. State officials or politicians could even consider establishing bogus NGOs to channel funds to their own pockets (Sandor 2003:1). Therefore, much as civil society has the ability to combat venality, once plagued by corruption, its anti-corruption drive diminishes.

## **Linkages to Anti-Corruption Policies**

The final theme espouses the notion that corruption prevention has become an imperative for governments becoming signatories to international anti-corruption conventions. In the case of South Africa, these conventions include the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (2001), and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003) (NACS 2020:8). All signatories to these conventions are obligated to create environments that enable civil society and the media to hold governments to the highest levels of transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs (AU Convention 2003; SADC Protocol 2001; UN Convention 2003).

These international conventions have not culminated in an equally explicit domestic statutory framework. Despite a strong lobby in favour of a statutory body to

prevent corruption, the preference was to establish a non-statutory and advisory body. In 1999, government invited organised business, organised religion, NGOs, the media, organised labour unions, academic and professional bodies and the public service to the first national Anti-Corruption Summit. Shortly after, in 2001, the NACF comprising three sectors, was established: civil society, business, and government. While civil society expressed the need for a statutory body, which would be provided with a legal mandate, other representatives preferred a non-statutory and advisory body in the management of corruption (Ramsingh & Dobie 2006:6). The NACF has since become ineffective because of *inter alia* a lack of proper coordination, cooperation and collaboration between the large number of organisations it represents (Pereira, Lehmann, Roth & Attisso 2012:56–57). To build a resilient anti-corruption system, the National Development Plan (NDP) (2011:446–447) advocates for sound institutions, a solid legal foundation and an active civil society that not only holds public officials accountable but also protects whistle-blowers and closely monitors procurement. In a review and situational analysis of corruption and anti-corruption measures in South Africa undertaken by the NPC, citizen empowerment and whistle-blower protection were identified as the major issues of concern (Diagnostic Report 2016:70). This policy position by government is also proclaimed in the NACS in which the participation of the whole-of-society in combating of corruption is tendered. It is envisaged that this approach requires everyone in the society to become an active participant in the fight against corruption, and build a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability among public sector officials (NACS 2020:10–30).

## CONCLUSIONS

In this article, the authors investigated the role which CSOs can play in combating corruption. Five themes emanated from the review of the literature: the potential role of civil society in combating corruption; the need for an enabling environment in which civil society can prevent corruption; limited funding as a constraint to prevent corruption; the nature of collaboration between civil society and various role-players; and the linkages with legislation both internationally and domestically.

CSOs have the potential to play a significant role in monitoring the conduct of public officials, raising complaints against corruption, pressing for investigations, staging public protests, arranging successful public hearings and lobbying for institutional reforms, using information and communication technology to provide website-based solutions to corruption, formatting anti-corruption alliances, and advocating for strong legislation. An enabling environment is a prerequisite for civil society efforts in corruption prevention. The environment could include

adequate political support, establishment of political and legal institutions to tackle corruption, rigorous public administration and public officials of integrity and ethical conduct, political competition, press freedom, access to information laws and copious engagement between the state and CSOs.

Civil society also requires access to adequate funding. The effectiveness of civil society involvement in corruption prevention depends on adequate funding, government support, and strong government institutions. Weaker states with divided societies are often the breeding ground of corrupt opportunities; even using CSOs as vehicles for illicit behaviour. In addition, civil society must collaborate with other institutions in both the public and private sector. They require the collaboration with other state institutions and actors that usually constitute the national integrity system as well as public officials geared towards achieving public probity and providing ethical leadership. Civil society require linkages with various anti-corruption policies. The UN, AU and SADC conventions against corruption require similar domestic policy design efforts. This statutory framework has not been forthcoming. A non-statutory and advisory body to prevent corruption has been the preferred policy instrument. Recent policy pronouncements on government collaboration with civil society are expressed in the NDP, NPC reports and in the NACS.

## NOTE

- \* This article is partly based on an uncompleted draft doctoral thesis of Mr H Lubita, with the title: “Towards an anti-corruption agency for South Africa” under the supervision of Prof W N Webb at the University of South Africa.

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# A Good Governance Framework for State Institutions

## The Case of the Government of Zimbabwe

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### ABSTRACT

The proliferation of good governance ideas in the late 20th century gave the developing world a template for managing public resources and creating value for citizens. An emphasis on accountability, responsiveness, value creation, citizen engagement and safeguarding citizens' human rights meant that good governance principles were promoted as a panacea for public-sector challenges facing postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa. This coincided with the Zimbabwean government's desire to satisfy the needs of its citizens within the constraints of strict funding conditions by donors and multilateral lending institutions. Policymakers and bureaucrats adopted socio-economic reforms to align with the emerging public management ideologies. Regardless, the state struggled to provide public goods and services, exacerbated by economic meltdown, corruption and global isolation. Public governance researchers are challenged to develop interventions to increase public-sector performance and strengthen oversight over the state's functions. It is against this background that a good governance framework is proposed.

A qualitative research approach rooted in interpretivism shaped the data collection, processing and analysis. Interviews with bureaucrats, public officials, academics and practitioners representing non-governmental organisations produced rich qualitative data about the operations and challenges of selected institutions drawn from the Zimbabwean public sector. The findings reveal the roots of public-sector inefficiency.

## INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the third millennium, the Zimbabwean government has struggled to manage performance and effectiveness in the public sector. This is evidenced by poor performance in state-owned enterprises and the dwindling quality of public services (Chigudu 2020; Chimbari 2017). This article proposes a good governance framework to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. Good governance principles were introduced to public-sector management to increase efficiency, transparency, accountability, the rule of law and responsiveness in administering the state's authority and managing public resources (Haifa, Zineb and Ziad 2023; Keping 2018). These principles fit in the normative governance thesis because they allow broad citizen participation and engagement with the state's social partners to deliver value to the citizens (Dixon and Feldman 2023; Michaud and Audebrand 2022; Pishchikova and Jessop 2021).

A government is an intricate web of public systems, institutions and authorities deployed to implement public policies and safeguard the state's integrity (Fasenfest 2010). Six public institutions were selected for the purposes of our investigation. These were split into public companies and institutions overseeing the state's authority and management of public resources. The literature the authors reviewed from contemporary research outlined the challenges facing public institutions in Zimbabwe. This is supported by data recorded by continental and global institutions, indicating that poor governance is slowing socio-economic development in the country (Muchadenyika 2017; Nyakurukwa and Seetharam 2022).

This article presents the findings from an empirical inquiry into the functions, processes and challenges facing public-sector institutions in Zimbabwe. A qualitative research design allowed the authors to collect in-depth insights about public-sector performance and the legal architecture of corporate governance. A good governance framework is proposed to promote sound governance in Zimbabwe.

## FROM NORMATIVE GOVERNANCE TO GOOD GOVERNANCE

The view of governance adopted in this article is rooted in the governance theory proposed by researchers such as Kjaer (2011), Maesschalck (2017), Michaud and Audebrand (2022), and Stoker (2018), who posit that the contemporary governance construct encapsulates an ecosystem of multiple networks and autonomous role players committed to common goals. Ansell and Torfing (2022) reject this idea by suggesting that since governance encapsulates several views of discrete systems and procedures, there is not a singular theory of governance because a theory would need to encompass all aspects of governance, such as stakeholder

engagement, citizen participation, power relations and legitimacy in a single theory. This is a complex theoretical proposition since most theories on several aspects of governance are abstract and rely on deductive reasoning instead of empirically tested assumptions and hypotheses (Ansell and Torfing 2022). Nevertheless, it is evident that governance in any theory underpins a collaborative system followed by institutions and role players pursuing mutual and interrelated socio-economic or political objectives. It is participatory and consensus-oriented since it requires participants to accomplish goals through shared vision, mutual commitment and trust (Dixon and Feldman 2023; Michaud and Audebrand 2022).

Conceptions of governance broaden comprehension of relations between the state as a legal governing entity and other social institutions, such as markets and society comprising citizens, social groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This view posits that non-state players leverage social capital to influence how the state administers authority and manages public resources (Maeschalck 2017; Pishchikova and Jessop 2021). According to this view, governance involves authoritative legal and political institutions enjoying support from social partners representing a cross-section of citizens' needs (Dixon and Feldman 2023:89). In other words, the state's social partners involved in governing can be configured to calibrate the state's authority (Kjaer 2011:101). This view applies when non-state institutions are leveraged to manage the state's authority and oversee the implementation of public policies. In cases where public institutions are deemed weak, the government's social partners, such as NGOs, citizens' groups and civil society organisations, are elevated to ensure that public resources are efficiently managed, and the state's authority is not abused for private benefit (Kjaer 2011; Stoker 2018).

The case of Zimbabwe demonstrates this. NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) entered the public governance sphere in the early 2000s to safeguard citizens' human rights, eradicate corruption and promote transparency in the face of the government's collapse. In fulfilling their mandates, these organisations engage with various state functions to complement the government's activities or oversee its implementation of public policies (Muchadenyika 2017; Kjaer 2011). This can ignite sociopolitical reforms, particularly in authoritative states with poor citizens' representation, and influence in public policymaking (Ruan 2017; Stoker 2018). However, in most cases, sociopolitical reforms are not successful due to the power imbalance between the state and social governance partners. Nevertheless, social governance is crucial in influencing the exercise of state authority and the management of public resources. This thesis of governance reveals two things: First, governance, despite being regarded as a theoretical construct by academics, is a measurable phenomenon showcasing complex interactions, processes and relations between various stakeholders; Second, since it can be measured, it can either be sound, effective and good or poor, lethargic and ineffective. The latter view of governance shaped the study's research problem and objectives.

## Notions of good governance

The drawback of considering normative governance as a panacea for ineffective government administration and public policy implementation is that, on its own, it is prone to deficiencies and shortcomings. In other words, merely convening state actors, social partners, and economic players does not guarantee an effective public administration. In light of this challenge, global organisations and scholars, particularly in the Western hemisphere, developed a template for sound and effective governance, commonly known as good governance (Keping 2018:4). In this article, good governance is analysed from four schools of thought.

In the first school of thought, good governance refers to public policymaking and implementation processes which are accountable, transparent, inclusive, effective, efficient, consensus-oriented, responsive to citizens' needs, and which follow the rule of law and ensure citizens' participation (Haifa, Zineb and Ziad 2023). This view focuses on how the state uses legal instruments, public institutions and human capital to ensure that public processes meet the criteria listed here. This approach is assessed by evaluating how bureaucrats and public institutions discharge their duties, manage citizens' needs and exercise the state's authority.

In the second school of thought, good governance is a standard for assessing the effectiveness of a governance system. In other words, it assesses the effectiveness of administrative, social and political systems established to deliver public goods and services. Most public governance researchers are interested in this because it measures the efficacy of a governance system, enabling them to determine if it is good or bad (Rotberg 2014:512). Hence, while good governance denotes favourably exercising the state's authority to satisfy citizens' needs, it comprises inherent standards and benchmarks for measuring the performance of bureaucrats and public institutions. This is an empirical approach to governance because it regards it as a phenomenon that can be measured, evaluated, benchmarked and compared with others (Mursyidah and Abadi 2018).

The third school of thought is from the perspective of a developing country, with an idea of good governance stemming from the Washington Consensus' expansion of neo-liberalism to the Global South to improve public-sector management, enhance marketisation and deregulation, and discourage governments from directly participating in the economy under the guise of New Public Management (NPM) reforms and economic structural adjustment programmes (Spence 2021). This political and economic ideology holds that governments in the developing world have weak, bloated institutions that hinder sustainable economic growth (Gumede and Dipholo 2014).

The fourth school of thought assimilates sound governance values in a corporate environment, also known as corporate governance. Corporate governance



encapsulates values, norms and standards of directing and managing organisations espoused through ethical leadership, accountability and transparency (Park 2021; Zuva and Zuva 2018). Sound corporate governance is aligned with good governance because it ensures that state-owned enterprises produce goods and services essential for citizens' livelihood and national economic development. The authors adopted these views of sound governance in evaluating the operations, systems and challenges of state-owned enterprises.

## **CASE STUDY: THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE**

The government comprises a complex web of institutions, authorities, individuals, departments and functions that govern through rules, procedures, protocols and standards (Fasenfest 2010). Hence, this expansive case study could not be easily delimited. Six public institutions were sampled, namely three state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which provide public goods and services, and three public institutions overseeing the management of public resources and deployment of state authority in implementing public policies. The SOEs are the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO). The oversight and independent institutions are the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG), the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC).

Indices and existing data points indicate that poor governance slows Zimbabwe's growth and national development (Muchadenyika 2017; Nyakurukwa and Seetharam 2022). From a public managerial perspective, scholars are typically interested in how public-sector performance can be leveraged to promote sound governance and increase socio-economic development. For example, while SOEs were originally established to provide citizens with basic goods and services, such as road, air and rail transport, food security and telecommunication, most of them cannot on account of "poor" corporate governance, mismanagement and "bad" leadership (Chigudu 2020:1; Chimbari 2017:213). The SOEs selected in the study are no exception as sustained bad governance, poor accountability and misuse of resources have led to dismal performance and poor growth prospects in this sector (Chilunjika and Mutizwa 2019:42; Muzapu *et al.* 2016:89).

Independent commissions and the OAG face similar challenges. Empirical data indicate that the ZACC's institutional weaknesses adversely impact the execution of its mandate (Chilunjika 2021:312; Mugadza 2017:330; Zinyama 2021:149). This undermines the state's commitment to eradicating corruption and ensuring an effective state architecture for implementing public policies and meeting citizens' needs. Even though there are fiscal management protocols designed to mobilise public resources, support policy implementation and inform the state's fiscal

plans, empirical data suggest that the continuous disregard of the auditor-general's findings and recommendations has allowed corruption, poor public financial management and weak transparency and accountability to fester in the public sector (Zinyama 2013:268–270). Despite being established to protect citizens' human rights and ensure the exercising of state authority does not impinge citizens' well-being (Brown 2016; Chitimira 2017), the ZHRC has been criticised for putting less emphasis on socio-economic rights and failing to bring state organs to account for rights violations (Kondo 2017).

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

Contemporary social science research is designed to generate solutions and interventions for practical challenges embedded in human interactions, organisations and society. Public administration research follows this trajectory by investigating challenges facing public-sector organisations or human interactions in the public service to proffer practical solutions (Raadschelders 2020; Van der Waldt 2013). This is achieved by following scientific and appropriate research methods.

A qualitative research methodology was used to identify, gather and analyse respondents' views, insights, knowledge and experiences on several aspects of sound governance. Contemporary research methods by scholars (Leavy 2017; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2016) provided the theoretical reasoning, description and philosophical justification for adopting a qualitative research design and an interpretivist worldview in the study. This approach was appropriate because it enabled the authors to investigate state institutions' systems, functions, procedures and challenges to determine their impact on sound governance and public-sector performance. An exploratory and inductive research design allowed the authors to explore issues about public governance and infer conclusions based on empirical data collected from individuals (see Table 1).

The Government of Zimbabwe was regarded as a single case; hence, a case study research design was adopted to examine specific public institutions under state administration. Nevertheless, state governance is complex; hence, the study was not intended to be conclusive. Further research can be conducted to build on its knowledge, insights and conclusions. Determining the total population was impossible since the study involved several public and non-state institutions. This is often the case in qualitative research; nevertheless, judgmental sampling was used to purposively select individuals with insights about sound governance and public-sector management (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2016). Since the authors were not aware of the entire composition of the population, a two-tier sampling approach involving purposive and snowball sampling was used. This enabled the authors to rely on referrals to identify more individuals with relevant

insights (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2016). Data was collected using online or face-to-face, semi-structured interviews and open-ended questionnaires, after which thematic data analysis was used to code and generate themes from data. These are traditional data collection and analysis techniques for qualitative research (Leavy 2017:133).

**Table 1: Sampling**

<b>Participants and respondents' groups</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
State-owned enterprises	8
Independent commissions and oversight institutions	7
Non-state entities	4
Academics and researchers	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>

Primary data was collected from a cross-section of public officials, academics and practitioners drawn from several state-owned enterprises, NGOs and civil society organisations. Relying only on public officials' views to examine the performance of state institutions was bound to produce skewed and somewhat inaccurate findings. Hence, non-state players were included in the pool of research participants to provide a wholesome picture of the state of governance and public-sector performance. The authors faced the dilemma of rationalising and collating divergent, and at times contradictory, views from individuals in public and non-governmental institutions and academics. An interpretivist worldview of conducting qualitative research encouraged the authors to acknowledge that social reality is complex, socially construed and multifaceted since it is based on individuals' subjective understanding of reality (Leavy 2017:13). This means individuals can hold contrasting subjective views about a social phenomenon and these are mirrored in the data collected in social research. Whilst this poses some challenges, from a knowledge-generation perspective, this is important because it enables researchers to reflect on multiple social perspectives (Leavy 2017:13; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2016:301).

The shortcomings in objectivity and veracity associated with qualitative research are countered by providing a detailed account of the study's research methodology and techniques, enabling fellow researchers to peer review and assess the research. In addition, the findings and conclusions can be compared to the existing knowledge and data from regional and global institutions collating data on various aspects of governance in Zimbabwe. The thesis is freely available on the North-West University institutional repository portal, opening it up to scrutiny and assessment.

## FINDINGS AND RESULTS

The study investigated two types of public institutions: (1) SOEs or public corporations providing public goods and services, and (2) public oversight and independent institutions ensuring that the state's authority and management of public resources is legitimate, transparent, accountable and creates value for its citizens.

### Findings from public oversight and independent institutions

The first batch of results was generated from public oversight and independent institutions. Within these institutions, the authors engaged with academics, researchers, bureaucrats, public managers, chairpersons and officials drawn from selected state institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Three themes: the purpose and mandate, oversight functions and the institutions' challenges were explored to establish their role in ensuring sound governance in the public sector.

#### ***Theme 1: The purpose and mandate of selected state institutions***

This theme explored the purpose and mandate of the ZHRC, ZACC and the OAG. The authors applied the *trias politica* philosophy, which separates, devolves and apportions the state's authority among the judiciary, executive authority and legislature to ensure that no single arm of the government has disproportionate control of the state's authority, management, planning and decision making. This demonstrates how particular public institutions can be designed to oversee the management of public resources and authority (Mathebula and Munzhedzi 2017). Therefore, in line with the *trias politica* philosophy, the theme explores the institutional influence of the ZHRC, ZACC and the OAG in imposing checks and balances over the management of public resources and exercise of the state's authority by bureaucrats, politicians, public institutions and the executive. Before this exercise, the authors collected data from academic journals, legislation, the constitution and online government sources. These sources shaped some of the authors' questions. The results indicated that the OAG is the primary auditor of public accounts and a gatekeeper of transparency and accountability in the public sector. It conducts financial audits of government departments, ministries, government agencies, public corporations, local municipalities, provincial governments and other publicly funded entities. It is a significant player in public financial management because it ensures that public spending is consistent with existing public policy objectives and that public funds are managed according to the standards, rules and norms of public financial accounting and management through scrutiny and analysis of financial records. The results further indicate that the OAG promotes fiscal accountability and transparency by strengthening public-sector

financial management and controls through the auditor-general's reports tabled in parliament. Although the OAG does not directly hold recipients of public funding to account, the reports and findings generated by this institution are an important tool used by parliament through the Public Accounts Committee to scrutinise accounts and summon managers and heads of government departments to account for their actions and decisions. Hence, the institution is an instrument for addressing fiscal mismanagement and misappropriation, contributing towards sound public spending and informing citizens about public-sector financial management.

The ZACC is an independent commission established to promote transparent, accountable governance and combat and eliminate corruption in the public and private sectors through investigations and facilitating judicial interventions. It educates, informs and raises awareness among citizens about the effects of corruption on national development and socio-economic development. The literature underlines the effects of corruption and embezzlement, particularly of public resources, on development since it deprives the public sector of resources required to implement public policies and satisfy citizens' needs. The Zimbabwean public sector is plagued by corruption and abuse of public resources (Mashavave 2017:211). This was acknowledged by respondents who stated that the ZACC adopts a multi-stakeholder approach to involve various social partners in combatting corruption. Furthermore, it cooperates with the judiciary to prosecute corrupt individuals and recommends how to fight corruption to responsible authorities, such as policymakers. This enables the state to create value for the citizens through transparent, accountable governance, which provides public goods and services to meet their needs.

The ZHRC is an independent commission established through a provision in the constitution to raise awareness of and promote citizens' rights around abuse and violation. Its operations enforce human rights and fundamental freedoms for all citizens, and ensure that the state does not compromise them as it exercises authority and implements public policies. Therefore, the ZHRC protects citizens from government officials' abuse of state authority and maladministration by receiving and investigating their complaints about human rights abuses.

### ***Theme 2: Exercising oversight over the functions of the state***

This theme established the OAG, ZACC and the ZHRC oversight functions. These institutions were investigated because their mandate involves oversight over the public administration and management of resources and the deployment of authority by the state's organs. Hence, the OAG, ZACC and the ZHRC are crucial in ensuring sound governance. In light of this background, this theme investigates how they achieve this since the research problem underscored that the state's mandate is weakened by ineffective public institutions, mismanagement, corruption and abuse of authority. Hence, the theme identifies the functions of selected institutions.

### *The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission*

The ZHRC recognises that human rights are a social issue; hence, galvanising support from key social partners and public institutions creates a robust culture of protecting citizens' rights. It forges partnerships and collaborations with public sector and social stakeholders such as government institutions, the legislature, the judiciary, NGOs, CSOs, diplomatic missions and international organisations to inculcate values and norms of respecting human rights in the Zimbabwean society. This enables it to harness various stakeholders' resources, support, goodwill, competencies and social capital and enhance its performance. In addition, it conducts outreach awareness campaigns and hosts radio programmes to share the institution's vision with citizens. This increases citizens' awareness of human rights issues and contributes towards combatting their violation. Furthermore, it trains public service employees, especially prison wardens, soldiers and the police, to teach them about preserving citizens' rights. This is significant since uniformed forces are an instrument of the state's authority accused of impunity and violating citizens' human rights (Nkomo and Mangiza 2021; Nyathi and Ncube 2020).

The ZHRC ensures that the state follows international standards of managing prisons and jails by monitoring detention centres. The results further indicate that the ZHRC exercises oversight of the state by investigating allegations of human rights abuse and preparing them for prosecution. In this regard, it collaborates with law enforcement agents and the judiciary to ensure that violators of citizens' human rights are apprehended and prosecuted. To increase its capacity and prowess, the ZHRC conducts workshops and engagements with human rights commissions from other countries to share knowledge, experiences and insights into promoting citizens' human rights.

Based on the findings, the primary weaknesses of the ZHRC include a lacklustre emphasis on socio-economic rights and paying less attention to citizens' human rights violations by the state. The former view is highlighted by Kondo (2017:177), who states that the ZHRC plays lip service to citizens' socio-economic rights. Case law in jurisdictions like the United States (US) does not regard protecting socio-economic rights as the state's (federal government's) mandate, absolving it of protecting such rights (see *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez* in Nanda 2022:246–247). It should be noted that, despite this, socio-economic rights are broadly supported by state (regional) and local governments in the US (Nanda 2022:266; MacNaughton and McGill 2012:371, 386). It is unclear if the Zimbabwean government takes this approach since several respondents insisted that the ZHRC's mandate covers socio-economic rights. Hence, in the ZACC, it appears to be a shortcoming rather than a legal issue.

### *The Office of the Auditor-General*

The results indicate that the OAG is the bedrock of financial accountability and transparency in the public sector. It conducts annual financial audits of government departments, municipalities, public agencies, SOEs and other state-owned institutions to produce the auditor-general's reports used by parliament to assess accountability financial management in government and quasi-public institutions. Therefore, the OAG exercises oversight over how the state's resources are used by providing the legislature with the tools for promoting fiscal accountability and sound public financial management by scrutinising how public finances are expended.

The respondents stated that annual audit reports are tabled in parliament each year after the 30 June deadline. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC), a specialised committee comprising public representatives, examines and scrutinises the auditor-general's reports on behalf of the legislature. It shares its findings with parliament and recommends actions against individuals and institutions mismanaging public funds. The PAC works closely with the auditor-general since their recommendations and proposed sanctions are shaped by findings and recommendations in annual audit reports. The audit reports provide a detailed account of how government institutions are (mis)managing public funds. The OAG also promotes the economic, effective and efficient use of public financial resources through value-for-money (VFM) audits. These types of audits are conducted when there is a demonstrable need for scrutiny into the management of public funds. As a result, they are not conducted annually. In addition, they are more comprehensive since the OAG invites several players (CSOs, researchers, professionals, academics and citizens' representatives) to determine what constitutes value creation in a given circumstance. Therefore, even though the OAG does not directly sanction, reprimand or prosecute individuals and institutions that misuse public funds, its annual reports enable the PAC to identify financial mismanagement and implement corrective interventions.

### *The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission*

The constitution envisages a competent anti-corruption commission to be a cornerstone of combating corruption in Zimbabwe. This is a mammoth expectation in light of the magnitude of corruption in the country (Chilunjika 2021; Mugadza 2017; Zinyama 2021). The results indicate that the ZACC exercises oversight over how the state's resources are managed by public officials, technocrats, bureaucrats and private-sector players through handling corruption complaints and conducting investigations. This is achieved through cooperating with other state institutions, including the police and courts, to prosecute corrupt individuals and organisations. The ZACC educates citizens about the effects of corruption on social and national development and engages other stakeholders to bolster efforts to

combat corruption. It ensures compliance with financial management practices through research and investigations. Furthermore, it institutes preventative interventions such as reviewing accountability and transparency mechanisms in public-sector institutions and recovering assets acquired illicitly. Respondents drawn from the academia, CSOs and NGOs expressed dissatisfaction with the ZACC's performance by pointing out that since its establishment, it has made negligible progress in addressing corruption, particularly among influential individuals, politicians and office-bearers, resulting in citizens losing faith in its commitment to combat corruption. The ZACC is invariably reprimanded for failing to pursue corruption cases involving political figures or people affiliated with influential individuals or institutions. As a result, despite its lofty mandate, the ZACC has poorly executed it, resulting in weak independent institutions contributing little to eradicating corruption (Chilunjika 2021; Mugadza 2017).

### ***Theme 3: Challenges facing the OAG, ZACC and the ZHRC***

This theme explored the challenges facing the OAG, ZACC and the ZHRC. Establishing their challenges is essential because it identifies whether their weaknesses stem from institutional or macro-environmental challenges. This information is vital in developing interventions aimed at enhancing the capacity of state institutions and improving their performance and contribution to sound governance in the public sector. An analysis of the respondents' views indicates that the institutions' challenges can be grouped into three categories: legal, human capital and resource constraints.

#### ***Legal challenges***

The results indicate that while the ZACC has a legal obligation to combat corruption, it lacks the legal authority to manage, prosecute and bring corrupt individuals and institutions to book. According to the respondents, this is a challenge because the commission invariably relies on other state functions, such as the courts and judicial officers, to ensure that corrupt individuals face justice. Given the massive backlog of cases in the Zimbabwean courts, this is a long process, which slows the prosecution of corrupt individuals and entities. Some respondents suggested that amending the ZACC Act to extend prosecutorial authority to the commission will enable it to combat corruption since it will manage the entire process of investigating and prosecuting corrupt individuals without relying on other public institutions.

Regardless of the legal constraints highlighted by the ZACC officials, respondents drawn from the CSOs and NGOs indicated that the commission's shortcomings are institutional. They stated that it does not have an appetite to aggressively combat corruption, particularly that of a political nature, because some glaring corruption cases are routinely ignored. Since the commission is administratively



under the Office of the President and Cabinet, it enjoys broad financial and material support for its operations. Hence, its weaknesses cannot be attributed to the lack of support or legal constraints, especially since the Ministry of Justice established specialised anti-corruption courts in the country's administrative provinces. Given this reality, it is believed that bequeathing prosecutorial powers to the ZACC will not improve its performance.

Officials from the OAG opined that the legal limitations of its mandate deprive it of the authority to compel public-sector institutions to submit all their financial statements and records detailing expenses, improve public accounting procedures, strengthen financial management systems and implement the auditor-general's recommendations. Under the current legal architecture, the OAG relies on parliament to enforce its recommendations. Therefore, respondents suggested that extending the scope of the OAG's mandate will give it additional authority to increase its performance. Another legal challenge noted by the respondents is that unclear and inconsistent laws shroud the ZHRC's mandate due to the lack of alignment between some laws with the new constitution. This results in the commission operating under obsolete laws that cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.

### *Human resource challenges*

Most public institutions investigated in the study grappled with insufficient human capital due to budgetary constraints or high labour turnover. Although the OAG's challenge of high labour turnover has dissipated recently, it remains unsustainable because some of its human resources leave the organisation due to low wages and working conditions. The OAG remuneration is lower than the local private sector and international accounting labour market, leading to employees leaving for greener pastures or better working conditions. As a result, the OAG has become an incubator of accounting professionals, who tend to leave the organisation once they gain experience or get better employment opportunities. This significantly impedes the organisation's ability to execute its mandate. The respondents drawn from the ZACC and the ZHRC voiced the same sentiments. The ZHRC further stated that due to caps from the Treasury, they could not recruit more employees regardless of the crippling labour shortage. The findings indicate that human capital shortages affect the performance of these institutions.

### *Resource constraints*

The results indicate that OAG's operations require considerable resources that are not always available. For example, VFM audits are detailed and prolonged, requiring the organisation to commit a considerable portion of its workforce and other scarce resources. Obtaining more resources would increase the OAG's performance. The institution also lacks accounting software and other digital

auditing tools that can be used to increase the organisation's efficacy. Similarly, the results underline that the ZACC requires considerable financial resources to conduct research, investigations, awareness campaigns, and manage citizens' tips and reports. Given the financial challenges facing the Treasury, the commission does not receive sufficient funding to sustain its operations, resulting in lower-than-expected performance. The same challenge affects the ZHRC since the funds received from the Treasury barely cover the commission's needs. As a result, it is compelled to do with little. This affects its ability to procure vehicles, office equipment, and fieldwork in far-flung and remote areas where marginalised people reside. The high inflationary environment in Zimbabwe is responsible for most of the institutions' woes because the value of the local currency is continuously eroded, leaving a significant gap between the budgeted funds and its purchasing power. These financial challenges significantly impact the functions and performance of public institutions, resulting in below-par performance and the inability to procure essential operational resources.

The OAG faces additional challenges due to the lack of stakeholder cooperation and poor implementation of the auditor-general's recommendations. A document analysis of recent audit reports indicated recurring recommendations, suggesting a sustained disregard of the proposed recommendations. The ZHRC faces a similar challenge because their recommendations to public officers and government institutions are not heeded. This underscores an inherent culture of poor accountability and continuous improvement in the public sector; this limits the impact of public oversight institutions.

## **Findings from SOEs**

The investigation of SOEs was based on two premises: the role of agents (boards) and executive members such as directors and managers responsible for strategic management and organisational performance, and the internal functions, resource management systems, financial management protocols and the challenges affecting the operations of state enterprises. The former aligns with the principal-agent theory, which encapsulates the delegation relationship between the shareholders and agents tasked with overseeing the entity's governance and strategic management (Park 2021; Zuva and Zuva 2018). The primary shareholders of SOEs are line ministers appointed by the President. The strategic plans of SOEs are overseen by a board of directors, and the daily operations are managed by executive members such as the chief executive officer, HODs, directors and managers.

The key themes explored are SOEs' purpose and mandate, the board's role in ensuring corporate governance, public-sector challenges and financial management techniques.

### ***Theme 1: The purpose and mandate of SOEs***

This theme identified the role and functions of SOEs in the public sector by probing their purpose and mandate. The literature indicated that they are conduits for producing and distributing citizens' goods and services (Chimbari 2017). The neo-liberal doctrine promulgated by Western countries towards the end of the Cold War encouraged the state to cede public companies to private businesses, allow market forces to regulate forces of supply and demand and relax market regulations to stimulate economic growth (Spence 2021). Regardless, the Zimbabwean government operates many public corporations in various economic sectors. To this end, the purpose and mandate of SOEs were evaluated in line with the acts establishing public corporations and propositions of the public goods and public value theories, which emphasise the importance of providing citizens with value-creating public goods and services.

The results of this study indicate that the GMB ensures food security by stocking, marketing and distributing staple grains such as beans, maize, sorghum and wheat; these are among the primary sources of foods consumed in Zimbabwe. During droughts, the GMB imports grains to supplement local yields. It provides farmers and brokers a platform to market their products. Meanwhile, ZUPCO aims to provide citizens with safe and dependable transport services through a fleet of busses and minibuses operating local, regional and cross-border routes. It ensures that citizens have access to affordable and safe public transport. Similarly, the NRZ seeks to provide reliable and safe rail services for passengers and freight.

### ***Theme 2: Public-sector corporate governance***

This theme explored the role of SOEs' boards in promoting sound corporate governance and ensuring compliance with existing public-sector management legislation. Corporate governance is central to managing performance in public-sector companies because it is a framework of norms, values, rules, procedures and systems that can be leveraged to govern entities (Park 2021).

The results indicate that public-sector boards are the primary governing bodies entrenching sound corporate practices. They execute functions and duties stipulated by various public-sector corporate governance regulations and norms and ensure that public corporations adhere to corporate governance codes such as the National Code of Corporate Governance and the Corporate Governance Framework. Board committees assess reports and financial statements and oversee the performance of the executive management members by summoning them to account and giving them strategic policy directives regarding corporate affairs. For example, the Risk, Audit and Compliance Committees manage risks and ensure that financial management procedures, such as disclosures, audits, accounting and reporting, are consistent with public-sector regulations. They promote corporate governance by developing strategic plans, instilling ethical leadership

values and ensuring that public companies' financial resources are managed according to sound financial management norms.

Two sub-themes were probed focusing on how boards ensure compliance with corporate governance legislation and promote transparency and accountability. Results indicate that they use existing mechanisms to ensure that public corporations comply with prescriptions in the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act and the Public Finance Management Act. For example, they ensure that SOEs comply with the corporate governance checklist developed by the Corporate Governance Unit. The checklist comprises reporting procedures, corporate governance standards, and norms, such as financial management, disclosures and compensation. The board also ensures that an SOE operates legally like any other business by regularising its operations and displaying a certificate of incorporation, as stipulated by the Companies Act. Board committees oversee the executive management team to ensure compliance with corporate governance legislation and public-sector financial controls. The literature underscores the effects of weak accountability and transparency checks (Chigudu 2020). The results indicate that board committees, such as the Finance and Audit Committee, use internal audits, acquittals, financial and performance reports, and the auditor-general's reports to ensure transparency and accountability.

### **Theme 3: Public-sector financial management**

This theme explored the financial management techniques used in the public sector. The results indicate that disclosures, public audits, 3Es, and internal checks and controls are techniques for managing financial resources.

#### **Public audits**

The results indicate that public audits are an instrument for enhancing public financial management in public-sector corporations. The two types of audits conducted in SOEs are internal and external audits. The finance department and the board's finance committee oversee internal audits carried out by the entity's accountants and finance management team. External audits are carried out annually by the auditor-general or a designated private auditing firm.

#### **3Es**

3Es denote the efficient, effective and economic use of public resources. They ensure that public resources create value and satisfy consumers' needs (Fourie 2015; Muzapu *et al.* 2016). This is crucial since finite public resources should be sparingly managed to meet citizens' infinite needs (Barnett 2018). The results indicate that 3Es are achieved through cashflow management, accounting and records management, public-sector financial-management protocols, strategic planning, budgeting and budget approvals, competitive bidding, collaborative

decision-making and total adherence to public procurement protocols. The tender board (Procurement Authority of Zimbabwe) is involved in tendering for SOEs to professionalise the process and ensure that competent bidders get tenders. These measures provide a veneer of transparency, accountability and professionalism in managing SOEs' resources, expenses and financial commitments. Overall, they ensure that the public sector creates value for the stakeholders and consumers of public goods and services.

### *Internal checks and controls*

The results indicate that several checks and controls are implemented in the public sector to ensure the financial integrity of their operations. For example, senior members of public corporations should fulfil the conditions set out in performance-based contracts (PBC). PBCs are an instrument developed to enhance performance and sound financial management in the public sector. Failing to meet the contractual terms and conditions is tantamount to violating the contract. Hence, the PBCs put senior members at the forefront of sound financial management because their performance is measured by the organisation's performance and fiscal management.

The results further indicate that public entities use operating manuals to guide resource management. In addition, protocols for tenders, procurements and internal financial controls ensure that financial management follows guidelines and standards established for the public sector. SOEs also use accounting manuals to manage and oversee their expenditures. For instance, all purchases and expenses should be recorded and accounted for. Oversight entities, such as the Procurement Management Authority and the Procurement Oversight Committee, oversee procurement and tendering activities at various levels to ensure they are above board.

### *Disclosures*

Results indicate that financial disclosures are critical cornerstones of sound corporate governance because they reveal accurate information and trends about an entity's financial management and decisions to shareholders, enabling them to make informed decisions and investment choices. Principals can also use disclosures to determine if a public company complies with financial management regulations. This is an effective financial management intervention since it gives stakeholders, particularly consumers, insights into public corporations' operations and financial management. Therefore, financial disclosures promote transparency and accountability by enabling shareholders to interrogate an entity's financial performance.

The Zimbabwean government owns most SOEs in the public sector; hence, it is the ultimate shareholder. The Accountability, Transparency and Disclosures Manual for Public Entities acknowledges the challenge of poor reporting and

corporate disclosures among SOEs. Respondents indicated that SOEs disclose their financial information in the local press. Few entities have up-to-date disclosures on their websites; this deprives citizens of a convenient platform for accessing performance information. Results also indicate that annual general meetings with principals and other stakeholders are platforms for disclosing pertinent information regarding financial management.

#### **Theme 4: Challenges facing SOEs**

Several challenges impact the operations of public corporations. The literature review underscored that mismanagement of resources, corruption, poor corporate governance practices and the lack of sound leadership plague the growth and viability of most public-sector corporations (Chigudu 2020; Chimbari 2017).

The results indicate that the public sector struggles to retain specialised and critical-skilled employees, such as technical staff, due to poor working conditions and attractive wages in regional and global labour markets. Experienced employees leave the public sector, depriving it of critical skills, knowledge and experience. High labour turnover inevitably impacts public-sector corporations' productivity and service excellence. In addition, erratic energy supply, obsolete infrastructure, inadequate financial resources, crumbling immovable infrastructure, uncompetitive wages, poorly constituted boards, failure to pay business partners and service providers in time, failure to recapitalise operations and projects, poor operating capacity, vandalism, obsolete information communication technology systems, legacy loans, the high inflationary business environment, weak and depreciating local currency are some of the challenges facing the public sector. These challenges are emblematic of an ineffective public sector struggling to fulfil its mandate. For example, poor electricity supply continues to derail the operations of many public-sector institutions and reduce their capacity to provide good-quality services to citizens.

Overall, the results indicate the underlying challenges facing the public sector. From a public governance perspective, these challenges are noteworthy because they weaken the state's ability to create value for its citizens through public goods and services, such as reliable public transport, energy supply, food security, and safe and usable public infrastructure. An unproductive public sector drains the fiscus since they require perpetual bailouts and other forms of support to keep them functional. Failing to address public-sector challenges will result in sustained institutional lethargy and underperformance in the public sector and lend credence to the Washington Consensus of ceding public corporations to private-sector players to increase their performance and viability since most governments lack the means and capacity to sustain them.

In light of the challenges reflected in the results, the authors sought to incorporate recommendations into a conceptual governance framework to address

the public-sector inefficiencies and improve the sector's capacity to create value for citizens.

## **DEVELOPING A GOOD GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK**

The study's overarching objective was to develop a good governance framework for public-sector institutions. This culminated in identifying the research problem, reflecting on theoretical suppositions and synthesising empirical data. Traditionally, developing a framework involves discrete steps and processes aimed at synthesising empirical data and using it to solve a specific problem (Havenga, Poggenpoel and Myburgh 2014). This aligns with Public Administration research objectives of developing frameworks to solve practical public governance challenges using theoretical ideas and empirical findings (Maritz 2019; Raadschelders 2020; Van der Waldt 2013).


### **An exposition of the framework**

The good governance framework was developed as a blueprint for bureaucrats, public leaders and decision-makers who manage public affairs and implement policies to guide them in addressing the public sector's existing governance challenges. The exposition of the framework is based on the two tiers, illustrated in Figure 1.

Tier 1 encapsulates the fundamental governance principles, ideologies, philosophies and management paradigms underpinning a modern state. These elements of a modern state were outlined in the literature reviewed and theories analysed in the study. This dataset revealed the weaknesses and inefficiencies in the Zimbabwean public sector. Tier 1 envisages a modern government as an open system comprising inputs, processes and outputs. Inputs encapsulate the ideologies, natural resources, public policies, governance templates, legislation, regulations and public institutions leveraged by the government to meet citizens' needs. Processes include public management activities executed to extract value from managing the inputs. Outputs are generally regarded as the public goods and services consumed by the citizens, such as roads, safe neighbourhoods, public transport, stable markets and business environments and other necessities required to sustain a modern livelihood; in other words, a sound governance dispensation and an efficient public sector. Overall, Tier 1 outlines the essential elements of a modern state. As a prescription for good governance, it is incomplete because it does not reflect public institutions' status quo and challenges. Tier 2 addresses this deficiency.

Tier 2 was developed using empirical data collected during an extensive field study. It outlines the public-sector management functions such as human resource

**Figure 1: A good governance framework for the Government of Zimbabwe**



Source: (Authors' own construction)



management, public finance management and ensuring accountable governance. These are prerequisites for public governance which creates value for citizens. Tier 2 highlights that organisational learning and innovative thinking can be leveraged to increase public-sector performance. This tier focuses on how the objectives of public institutions can be transformed through new ideas, innovative thinking and strict application of existing legislation and regulations.

## **Applying the good governance framework in public-sector institutions**

In light of the exposition of the good governance framework, the following recommendations are proffered for applying it in the public sector.

### ***Involving social partners in public affairs***

The governance theory underpinning this article emphasises the importance of involving various social partners in public policy and state governance matters because they have competencies, social capital, insights and networks that can be leveraged to improve public policy implementation and create value for citizens. Successful democracies globally acknowledge the importance of converging social partners in public affairs and creating platforms for engaging and incorporating their views in public policy issues.

### ***Promoting citizens' socio-economic rights***

The South African Human Rights Commission and case law articulated in South African courts provide the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission with a template for managing citizens' socio-economic rights. There are cases in Zimbabwe where implementing public policies disenfranchised citizens' socio-economic rights. This trajectory will be sustained if the ZHRC does not take a leading role in protecting citizens' rights from abuse by the state. Therefore, the ZHRC should actively safeguard citizens' rights from violation, particularly by public officials and state institutions.

### ***Prioritise value-for-money audits***

The government faces the enduring challenge of satisfying infinite needs with finite resources. Hence, it is essential to instil economy, efficiency and effectiveness values in public-sector audits as this will encourage government departments and quasi-state institutions to consider the value created by their operations and corporate investments. Assessing value creation by every government expenditure will enable parliament to develop policies promoting strict public financial management.

### **Privatising under-performing public corporations**

Privatisation frees the state from managing and funding inefficient and under-performing public companies. This enables competent private businesses to turn them around and improve their performance. The state benefits from successful privatisation through a growing tax base, employment creation and markets for raw materials and other local products.


### **Guaranteed funding for public institutions**

The lack of adequate funding is a common challenge facing public institutions investigated in the study. Poor funding affects performance in the public sector since public institutions cannot hire and retain competent labour, procure equipment and invest in new technologies. Guaranteeing funding for public institutions will address these challenges and spur increased performance.

### **Role-players in implementing the framework**

Individuals who execute duties and tasks aligned with the recommendations are considered key role players in applying or implementing the objectives of the proposed good governance framework. The activities of individuals illustrated in Figure 2 add value to the propositions of the framework.

**Figure 2: Role-players in implementing the framework**



Source: (Authors’ own construction)

## SUMMARY

Based on existing data, the article demonstrates the Zimbabwean government's challenges with managing public-sector performance and effectiveness. Six public institutions were selected for analysis, split into public companies and institutions overseeing how the state's authority is exercised and manages public resources. A theoretical overview of governance outlines the importance of involving various social partners in managing public affairs and overseeing how the state's authority is managed. This discussion gives way to the principles of good governance. The authors argue that these principles can be applied in the Zimbabwean context to improve the operations of public institutions. For example, the rule of law will ensure that culprits involved in corruption are prosecuted, and the government sequesters their illicitly acquired assets. In addition, good governance principles encourage the government to involve citizens' views and opinions in policymaking.

A qualitative research approach guided the data collection and analysis. The results underline the processes and protocols of managing public institutions and the challenges bureaucrats and public officials face. The proposed good governance framework aims to promote sound governance.

## NOTE

- \* This article is based on Bright Muronda's doctoral thesis conducted at North-West University, completed in 2023, titled "A good governance framework for state institutions: The case of the Government of Zimbabwe", under the supervision of Professor Gerrit van der Waldt.

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# International Strategies and Practices to Promote a Safe Road Environment

## Citizen Participation Practices to Promote Safer Road Usage

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### ABSTRACT

This article highlights international strategies and best practices of safer road usage, with a focus on the role of the United Nations (UN), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and selected countries concerning the participation of citizens as road users. To ensure sustainable development, the UN and its member states have included the reduction of road deaths in accordance with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Citizen participation is vital to creating and sustaining a safe road environment. The article is based on a desktop review of qualitative secondary data, including legislation, policies, strategies as well as the findings of citizen participation practices in the top three performing countries in terms of road safety, namely Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands (also known as the SUN countries). The article outlines the role of the UN and the WHO and investigates international best practices in terms of road safety, with specific focus on the SUN countries. The article then spreads the net wider by discussing legislation, policies and strategies relating to citizen participation in road safety in these countries.

## INTRODUCTION

The WHO (2010) highlights that individuals' health and wellbeing can only be ensured if the international community succeeds in implementing road safety action plans. In line with this, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development acknowledges that road safety plays a key role in ensuring health and safety, promoting well-being and making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. In 2010, the UN General Assembly declared 2011 to 2020 the "Decade of Action for Road Safety". The aim was to save millions of lives by providing guidance to the international community on road safety management, improving infrastructure, vehicle safety, road user behaviour and a post-accident response. Governments responded to this call by following different approaches, strategies, policies and programmes.

The World Bank's "Guide for Road Safety Opportunities and Challenges: Low- and Middle-Income Countries" (2019:58) states that efforts to implement road safety interventions are fragmented, are characterised by a lack of coordination and are often not data driven. Internationally, more than 1,35 million people have lost their lives and 50 million people have been injured due to traffic-related incidents (World Bank 2019:59). The report adds that countries need to develop national strategies to address the issues leading to the carnage on roads (World Bank 2019:58). In 2016, road accident-related injuries became the number-one cause of fatalities among children and young adults between the ages of five and 29 (World Bank 2019:60). This is cause for concern, as 90% of the global population under the age of 30 lives in lower- and middle-income countries (World Bank 2019:61). These statistics highlight the need for global action, as road accidents pose a major threat to sustainable development.

Internationally, the critical behavioural risk factors for road accident-related injuries include speeding, drunk driving, non-use of crash helmets, seat belts, child restraints and other personal protective equipment, fatigue, distraction, and non-compliance with other road regulations such as ignoring stop signs, give-way or yield signs and running of the red light (World Bank 2019:58). Governments, in communication about road safety, use combat- and medical crisis-related phrases such as "the fight" against vehicle crashes and "epidemic" to draw the attention to the loss of life due to road accidents. Road safety challenges have also been highlighted as a social equity issue due to the disproportionately high toll on vulnerable road users, such as children, as well as economically vulnerable and disadvantaged communities (Guttman 2014:25).

Citizen participation in policy-orientated discourse is based on democratic ideals whereby citizens have the right and the capacity to engage in the democratic process. The statement is based on three arguments, namely the substantive, normative and instrumental benefit derived from citizen's input. The substantive



argument is that citizens living in communities are viewed as non-experts, while they often have an expert view on road safety issues specific to their community. Thus, the solutions offered by citizens on specific issues within a community is often on expert level due to their first-hand experiences of events. Secondly, the normative argument is drawn from the democratic ideals that citizens should participate in policy decisions that affect them.

The instrumental benefit of citizen participation is that it helps legitimise policy decisions to the wider public. Guttman (2014:271) is of the opinion that changes in social norms and practices calls for a broader and more in-depth discourse that involves a diversity of members of the public. Road safety issues are situated in social and cultural values, norms and practices. Thus, public participation input should be in tune with broader issues such as workplace and working hours, technology and the manufacturing of mobile phones (not being able to talk while driving), school uniforms and reflective clothing (especially in areas with a high number of vulnerable road users) and community participation in reducing instances concerning drunk walking and driving (Guttman 2014:271).

This article highlights the role of the UN and WHO to promote road safety, and key international best practices in the SUN countries in terms of citizen participation in road user safety programmes. Key points of discussion include legislation, policies and strategies relating to citizen participation to promote road safety in these countries.

## **ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION TO ADDRESS ROAD SAFETY**

As South Africa forms part of the global village, international organisations, such as the UN and WHO, play a role in road safety-related policies and programmes. The WHO plays a unique role in coordinating and guiding global efforts to advocate for road safety on the highest political platforms. The below sections outline the unique role these two organisations play to promote road safety.

### **The United Nations**

The UN has 193 members focusing on five main areas, namely, “the maintenance of international peace and security; to protect human rights; providing humanitarian aid; to support sustainable development and climate action; and to uphold international law” (UN 2022:Internet source).The UN is uniquely positioned to address 23 identified global issues, including promoting and protecting good health worldwide.

The prominence of road safety as a global health risk was confirmed by Resolution A/RES/64/255 of the UN General Assembly. Notably, the Assembly established the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011–2020 with the goal to “stabilise and reduce” road deaths by 2020. The history leading up to adopting a strategy to address global road safety started in 1998 when a report by the Federation of the Red Cross International Disasters raised the alarm on the extent of road traffic injuries, described as a “worsening global disaster destroying lives and livelihoods” (Commission for Global Road Safety 2011:10–13). A conference hosted by the *Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile* (FIA) in 2004 announced that road safety will be the focus of World Health Day 3 for 2004 (Commission for Global Road Safety 2011:10–13).

The first resolution of the UN General Assembly on the global road safety crisis was introduced by the Sultanate of Oman and is marked as the first debate by the UN General Assembly on road safety. The resolution established a UN Road Safety Collaboration and recognised the WHO as the coordinating agency on road safety within the UN system. In 2005, the World Bank established Global Road Safety Facility (GRSF), with FIA as leading donor (Commission for Global Road Safety 2011:12–13). The first Ministerial Conference on Road Safety, held in Moscow in November 2009, was opened by former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev (Commission for Global Road Safety 2011:10–13). The conference endorsed the “Decade of Action” strategy of 2001. In 2010, the UN General Assembly approved the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011–2020, which aimed to stabilise and reduce road deaths by 2020 (Commission for Global Road Safety 2011:12–13). In September 2019, the UN Secretary General called on all sectors of society to mobilise for a decade of action at three levels:

- “Global action to secure greater leadership, more resources, and smarter solutions for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);
- Local action embedding the needed transitions in the policies, budgets, institutions and regulatory frameworks of governments, cities, and local authorities; and
- People action, including youth, civil society, the media, the private sector, unions, academia, and other stakeholders, to generate an unstoppable movement pushing for the required transformations” (<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/decade-of-action>).

The Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations A/74/L.86, approved on 18 August 2020, confirmed further commitment to improving road safety (<https://www.un.org/pga/74/wp-content/uploads/sites/99/2020/08/Draft-Resolution-Road-Safety.pdf>). The Resolution reaffirmed its Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015, entitled “Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, in which it adopted a comprehensive, far-reaching

and people-centred set of universal and transformative sustainable development goals (SDGs) and targets (<https://www.un.org/pga/74/wp-content/uploads/sites/99/2020/08/Draft-Resolution-Road-Safety.pdf>). It confirmed its commitment to “work tirelessly towards the full implementation of the Agenda by 2030 to ensure that no one is left behind; its recognition that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, as the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development; its commitment to achieve sustainable development in its three dimensions – economic, social, and environmental – in a balanced and integrated manner, and to build on the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and seek to address their unfinished business” (<https://www.un.org/pga/74/wp-content/uploads/sites/99/2020/08/Draft-Resolution-Road-Safety.pdf>). According to Fourie (2023:166), while the Resolution confirmed, encouraged, commended, noted, acknowledged and proclaimed several road safety actions, the following are of special relevance in terms of citizen participation for safer road use:

- Expressing concern that the SDG 3, ‘Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages, with the emphasis on leave no one behind’, target 3.6, “by 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents” will not be met by 2020 and redefining targets for SDG 3 with a newly set achievement date;
- Considering that road traffic deaths and injuries are a social equity issue. Vulnerable road users are often poor and use walking and cycling as a transport mode.
- Encouraging member states to adopt, implement, and enforce policies to protect and promote pedestrian safety and cycling mobility;
- Encouraging member states to promote multi-stakeholder partnerships to address the safety of vulnerable road users (VRUs), the delivery of first aid to victims of road crashes, the provision of training and education, especially in developing and least developed countries;
- Recognising lessons learnt from Vision Zero (Sweden) and the safe system approach strengthening national multi-sectoral collaboration, including engagement with non-governmental organisations, civil society, academia and private sector, and the transport industry;
- Recognising research efforts to develop policies and sharing of knowledge;
- Proclaiming the period 2021–2030 as the second Decade of Action for Road Safety, with the goal of reducing road traffic deaths and injuries to at least 50% from 2021 to 2030. A second strategic plan for decade two needs to be prepared by the members; and
- Encouraging member states to take measures to promote road safety knowledge and awareness among the population through education, training, and publicity campaigns focusing on the youth and the propagation of good road

safety practices in the community – especially to promote World Day of Remembrance every third Sunday of November (Fourie 2023:166).

## **Role of the World Health Organisation to promote road safety**

The WHO is leading the UN's effort to promote and protect global health, whose constitution came into force on 7 April 1948. The WHO is a specialised agency of the UN, connecting nations, partners, and people to promote global health (WHO 2022:Internet source). The WHO is stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, and operates within the Economic and Social Council. The WHO identified road traffic accidents, injuries, and violence as global health topics. Road traffic injuries incorporate all road safety-related activities and fall under the Violence and Injury Prevention Programme (Fourie 2023:167).

The WHO works across sectors with member states; national and international partners; and stakeholders to support road safety planning, implementation, monitoring, and research. The WHO compiles and distributes information on good practices in prevention, data collection, trauma care, and raising awareness of road safety (Fourie 2023:167). Since 2004, the WHO's work includes collaborating with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and focuses on skills development in areas of advocacy for legislation change, communications and awareness campaigns, and facilitation of global events such as the annual World Day of Remembrance for road traffic victims on the third Sunday of November ([https://www.who.int/health-topics/road-safety#tab=tab\\_3](https://www.who.int/health-topics/road-safety#tab=tab_3)). The global plan for road safety, in terms of the Decade of Action 2011–2020, outlines the activities that should take place on local, regional, national and international scale according to the five pillars outlined in Table 1.

As noted above, the UN General Assembly Resolution 64/255 of March 2010 proclaimed 2011–2020 the Decade of Action for road safety. The goal was to stabilise and reduce the estimated global road fatalities by increasing activities conducted on national, regional and global levels (WHO 2010:3). South Africa prescribed to and undersigned the Decade of Action 2020, with the call to reduce road traffic-related deaths by half (WHO 2010:3). The Decade of Action is a framework for governments to address road safety in their respective countries and is based on five pillars namely (WHO 2010:11):

- Pillar 1: Road safety management;
- Pillar 2: Safer roads and mobility;
- Pillar 3: Safer vehicles;
- Pillar 4: Safer road users; and
- Pillar 5: Post crash response.

International road safety coordination and activities are needed to allow for national development and sharing among members in terms of information, best

practices, as well as assistance and advice on road safety-related matters. In terms of coordinating international road safety practices, the WHO (2010:12–19) is responsible for the following activities:

- Activity 1: Encourage, where appropriate, an increase in funding for road safety;
- Activity 2: Advocate for road safety at the highest levels and facilitate collaboration among multiple stakeholders;
- Activity 3: Increase awareness of risk factors and the need for enhanced prevention of road traffic crashes;
- Activity 4: Provide guidance to countries on strengthening road safety management systems and implementing road safety good practices and trauma care; and
- Activity 5: Improve the quality of road safety data collected.

The Decade for Action document also gives guidance on the monitoring and evaluation of countries’ implementation of key areas. As it is a high-level guideline document, citizen participation is not addressed directly (Fourie 2023:167). However, several activities imply the participation of citizens, not only in terms of implementation but also in terms of compliance to national legislation and regulations. Table 1 provides activities that may involve citizen participation.

**Table 1: Decade of Action activities and citizen participation**

<b>Pillar 1: Road safety management</b>	Activity 3 is concerned with the development of a national strategy. Citizen participation in the development of a strategy for road safety is anticipated to include stakeholder engagement with non-governmental and non-profit organisations. It will be important for national government to engage with provincial and/or local government, as these implementation agents could provide valuable input in terms of drafting and accepting the strategy.
<b>Pillar 2: Safer roads and mobility</b>	Activities 2, 3 and 4 entail safe infrastructure catering for all road user needs. Citizens are often best informed about local community circumstances. Citizen participation will include information sharing, consulting on different scenarios regarding technical solutions, deciding together, acting together and self-management.
<b>Pillar 3: Safer vehicles</b>	Activity 7 lends itself to information sharing with citizens on safety technologies in privately owned vehicles.
<b>Pillar 4: Safer road users</b>	Activities 1 to 8 lend themselves to citizen participation. Often, programmes are developed without collecting data or information on the needs to be a safer road user.
<b>Pillar 5: Post-crash response</b>	This pillar requires stakeholder management, coordination and governance due to the nature of the technical, medical and professional services and activities. Citizen participation could focus on information sharing between authorities and citizens, especially in Activities 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7.

Source: (Fourie 2023:169)

The first Decade of Action concluded at the end of 2020. Its objective was to “stabilise and then reduce” road traffic deaths (Fourie 2023:168). While road death rates have stabilised and lives have undoubtedly been saved when compared to projected death rate increases, the number of actual deaths on international roads have remained around 1.35 million per year (WHO in Van den Berghe, Fleiter & Cliff 2020:7). The more ambitious SDG target, reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly, sets a goal of halving road traffic deaths and injuries by 2030.

The third Global Ministerial Conference on Road Safety held in February 2020, hosted by the Government of Sweden under the auspices of the WHO, convened more than 1 700 delegates including ministers, deputy-ministers, heads of international agencies, civil society organisations (CSOs), foundations and private companies (Fourie 2023:167). With the theme of “Achieving Global Goals 2030”, the conference set out to highlight the connection between road safety and the SDG targets. Governments committed to halving road deaths by 2030, which reaffirms support for the SDG target (Van den Berghe *et al.* 2020:7).

The new resolution builds on previous declarations and the practical implementation of the safe system approach, with a strong focus on the interlinkages between sustainable mobility, including climate action and road safety (Van den Berghe *et al.* 2020:7).

According to Van den Berghe *et al.* (2020:7), the 12 voluntary global road safety targets for 2030 are listed as:

- **Action plans:** Comprehensive action plans by all countries with time-bound targets;
- **Core road safety instruments:** Global alignment by members countries complying to one or more of the core road safety-related UN legal instruments;
- **Standards for new roads:** All new roads must achieve technical standards for all road users;
- **Standards for existing roads:** A total of 75% of all existing roads must meet the technical standards for all road users;
- **Vehicular standards:** The implementation of technical performance standards by 2030 for all vehicles in all countries;
- **Speeding:** Halving the incidents due to drivers ignoring the posted speed limit;
- **Safety helmets:** Increasing the correct usage of safety helmets;
- **Protection:** Increasing the wearing of safety belts and child restraint systems;
- **Impaired driving:** Reducing the number of incidents caused by alcohol misuse by 50%;
- **Distraction:** Introducing national laws in all countries to make cellphone usage while driving illegally;
- **Professional drivers:** Implementing regulations on driving and resting intervals for professional drivers; and

- **Emergency care:** Establishing timely emergency care and reducing the time between accidents and access emergency medical care (Van den Berghet *et al.* 2020:7).

The revised Decade of Action strategy of the WHO that was published on 29 October in 2021 is divided into the following sections: “What to do?”; “How to do it?”; and “Who to do it?” (Fourie 2023:171). The strategy is built on the premise that all countries will implement an integrated safe systems approach. Under “Who to do it?”, the revised strategy mentions government, civil society (academia, NGOs and the youth), private sector funders and UN agencies as role-players. The strategy adds that, as safe mobility is a human right, road safety should be prioritised (WHO 2021:7).

The revised Decade of Action strategy document that was published by the WHO in 2021 (WHO 2021:7) states that the approach to road safety infrastructure provision should be to share responsibility with road users to create a safer road environment. Infrastructure should be planned, designed and implemented with the road user in mind. To ensure safe infrastructure provision, the WHO recommended that countries’ legislation relating to road standards and functions should be reviewed and updated to consider the needs of all road users (WHO 2021).

## **INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES TO ROAD SAFETY – SUN COUNTRIES**

International road safety practises represent an array of examples of citizen participation. The following paragraphs discuss the different participative areas. The international best-performing countries in terms of road safety are the SUN countries. Notably, South Africa is listed as the country with the highest deaths per 100 000 inhabitants (Fourie 2023:174).

### **The Netherlands**

The Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment works closely with the provinces, urban regions, water boards and municipalities to promote road safety. These authorities are responsible for traffic safety on the roads under their jurisdiction (<https://www.government.nl/topics/mobility-public-transport-and-road-safety/road-safety>). The Ministry also works in close cooperation with the following partners:

- **Veilig Verkeer Nederland (VVN):** Operates at local, regional, and national level on road safety neighbourhoods and streets and to prevent speeding,

driving under the influence of alcohol, and road aggression (<https://www.government.nl/topics/mobility-public-transport-and-road-safety/road-safety>).

- **Regionaal Orgaan Verkeersveiligheid (ROV):** Each province has a ROV which provides information and education, and advice on design and layout of infrastructure for safer traffic flows (<https://www.government.nl/topics/mobility-public-transport-and-road-safety/road-safety>).
- **Scientific Research on Road Safety (SWOV):** Carries out research focused improving road safety. SWOV is an independent organisation and makes knowledge available to professionals involved with road traffic and road safety (<https://www.government.nl/topics/mobility-public-transport-and-road-safety/road-safety>).
- **Landelijk Parket Team Verkeer (LPTV) and the police:** These entities help ensure that drivers adhere to the road traffic rules, offenders are fined and serious offences are prosecuted in a court of law (<https://www.government.nl/topics/mobility-public-transport-and-road-safety/road-safety>).
- **Team Alert:** This road safety organisation is by young people for young people to make them aware of and to encourage responsible road use (<https://www.government.nl/topics/mobility-public-transport-and-road-safety/road-safety>).

In its 2008 report, *“Beleving van Verkeersonveiligheid”*, SWOV addressed the question of safety in terms of citizen participation in traffic, acceptance and compliance with traffic rules and regulations and the priority of policy measures (<https://www.government.nl/topics/mobility-public-transport-and-road-safety/road-safety>). The report highlighted the fragmented understanding and application in road safety measures (Vlakveld, Glodenbeld & Twisk 2008:91).

In the Netherlands, road safety is introduced at an early age through a primary school programme that has been in place since 1932 (Vlakveld *et al.* 2008:91). This programme, which became obligatory in 1959, includes theoretical examinations that focus on traffic rules, such as cycling safety on public roads. A practical examination is also offered in schools (Vlakveld *et al.* 2008:91). According to the SWOV, not much is known about the link between traffic education and the prevalence of road accidents (<https://www.swov.nl/en/facts-figures/factsheet/traffic-education>). While motorist-related training and examinations are intensive, Schepers, Twisk, Fishman, Fyhri and Jensen (2017:268) state that there is no clear evidence that this influences behaviour after a driver’s licence is awarded.

### **Legislation, policies and strategies in the Netherlands**

The government implemented the Sustainable Road Safety Programme in the mid-1990s, followed by an updated version of the guiding principles, called Advancing Sustainable Safety (Beunen, Jaarsma & De Vries 2010:1). The evaluation of the



programme shows that the implementation has helped to reduce the number of road accident fatalities. In the road safety context, the relationship between policies and outcomes are complex. The outcomes are a result of an ongoing participation-focused interaction and negotiation process between various independent role-players (Beunen *et al.* 2010:3).

The Advancing Sustainable Safety initiative is based on three safety principles, namely the functionality of the roads, the homogeneity of traffic and design-for-behaviour (Beunen *et al.* 2010:3). The proactive policy focuses on designing a forgiving environment for road users by anticipating behaviour in the design. Secondly, the policy also focuses on road users' level of awareness and their driving ability (Beunen *et al.* 2010:7). The policy was developed as a sector-orientated concept and its main motivation is to reduce the occurrence of vehicle accidents (Vlakveld *et al.* 2008:91). The concept does not pay much attention to other possible impacts. For example, it disregards the potential trade-off between traffic volume and speed, the fragmentation of wildlife and environmental impacts (Beunen *et al.* 2010:7).

### **Citizen participation and road safety in the Netherlands**

The implementation of road safety strategies, policies and programmes in the Netherlands falls mostly within the ambit of local authorities, who depend on other role-players such as national and provincial government, neighbouring municipalities, water boards, local citizens who live in the area of control, entrepreneurs and other road users. A study of Beunen *et al.* (2010:3) found that different role-players' perspectives have a significant effect on the planning process and influences the implementation of policies and programmes. Their study investigated the roles of the various role-players in the planning and decision-making processes by identifying four stages, namely problem identification, overall plans, specific measures and lastly evaluation, monitoring and results.

Community safety is no longer the sole responsibility of the police and the judicial authorities, as seen in communities in and around Amsterdam. Terpstra (2008:221) identifies six types of citizen involvement in relation to local security networks, which serves as a good example for citizen participation in road safety issues:

- Type one is based on the exchange of information between different partners in a local security network (Terpstra 2008:221). This has a dual benefit, as government officials collect information on local issues and inform the community of their work "knowing and being known" (Terpstra 2008:221).
- With type two, citizen participation goes one step further and gives citizens a voice as advisors in policy making. However, Terpstra (2008:221) notes that this influence on policy is quite small.

- With type three, participation involves citizen control over safety activities (Terpstra 2008:221).
- Type four's approach to participation promotes collective efficacy and informal social control.
- Type five promotes self-reliant behaviour, forming networks to actively work on identified issues and creating social control with others representing a mix of government, business and citizen groups.
- Type six is concerned with autonomous and exclusive initiatives between citizens and business owners (Terpstra 2008:221).

With these types of citizen interventions, concepts such as 'multi-agency approach', 'citizen well-being', 'liveability', 'healthy local economies', 'the physical quality of urban environments' and 'empowered communities' come into play (Beunen *et al.* 2010:10–14). Van Steden, Van Caem and Boutellier (2011:435) note that reform programmes are increasingly geared towards "active citizenship", where citizens are given the opportunity to identify, define and address issues through community participation programmes. Furthermore, there is a focus on "strengthening communities, by assisting them to form and sustain their own organisations in dealing with common concerns...Public partnerships involve citizens and communities in the planning and delivery of public services and co-produce [while] recognising the limitations of government, fostering efficient participatory institutional structures among citizens and engaging public services" (Van Steden *et al.* 2011:435).

In 1985, the Netherlands published a White Paper on Society and Crime (in Van Steden *et al.* 2011:439), which advocated for defensive and pro-active policies, including a multi-stakeholder approach. The government stated that public safety rested on a multi-stakeholder approach including the police service and ordinary citizens (Van Steden *et al.* 2011:435). This policy direction was translated into the "People Make Amsterdam" initiative, a city council programme that ran from 2006 to 2010. Informal social controls and collective efficacy are seen as important complementary contributors to formal policing (Van Steden *et al.* 2011:439).

## Sweden

Sweden's Vision Zero road safety policy calls on road users to voice their demand for safety improvements to civil servants and elected officials (McAndrews 2013:749). The policy states that no one should die or be seriously injured while using Swedish roads. Furthermore, the policy states that all road transport designers and manufacturers, namely the motor vehicle industry, road traffic planners, road safety engineers, police, health professionals, educators and road users, have

a shared responsibility to ensure that the system protects all users (McAndrews 2013:749). The Swedish policy adopted a new approach by recognising that traffic injuries are preventable, that road safety is a social equity issue and that it is a shared responsibility (McAndrews 2013:749).

### **Legislation, policies and strategies relating to road safety**

Sweden has three democratic levels, namely national, regional and local. The Constitution of Sweden, 1974, which contains the basic rules for political decision-making, states that all public power in Sweden “proceeds from the people and is a representation of the people” (Constitution of Sweden 1974:4). Chapter 1: “Basic principles of the Form of Government”, Article 2 rules that, “Public power shall be exercised with respect for equal worth of all and the liberty and dignity of the individual. The personal, economic and cultural welfare of the individual shall be fundamental aims of public activity” (Constitution of Sweden 1974:4). Article 2 further states: “The public institutions shall promote the opportunity for all to attain participation and equality in society”. To this end, citizens have representation in decision-making through their elected representatives in the *Riksdag* (Parliament) and in local government assemblies (municipal and county councils) (Constitution of Sweden 1974:4).

Citizen dialogue is seen as an important area in the governance process within local authorities. As local government is seen as “closest to the people, a guideline for citizen participation was published (Länsstyrelsen, Skåne & Malmö in Dehlin 2017:6). Citizen participation is often seen as a mechanism to get support for decisions already taken (Dehlin 2017:6). Thus, planning by government is essential if a process of citizen participation with genuine potential to influence decisions is considered. Depending on the case, roles of politicians and officials need to be spelled out (Dehlin 2017:6). The role of the different role-players within government also requires attention. In this regard, the Government of Sweden views citizen dialogue and service dialogue as two very different approaches and suggests that the one cannot replace the other (Dehlin 2017:6).

The question on what information is needed present three key perspectives, namely:

- **The organisational perspective:** Focuses on budget, working environment with rules and regulations is needed by the officials to fulfil employers’ responsibilities (McAndrews 2013:749).
- **The user perspective:** How users view services they receive. They give important input to understanding the authority’s ability to offer quality public services.
- **The citizen perspective:** The authorities and the work they deliver are seen from a tax-payer perspective (McAndrews 2013:749). Delhin (2017:8) notes that officials are least-informed about this area, and systematic analysis is

lacking. A systematic analysis limits the notion that “those who shout the loudest are most influential” scenario (Dehlin 2017:9).

The Swedish guideline also offers a classification of levels of participation (McAndrews 2013:750). The first participative step is to provide clear information and transparency about decisions that have already been made to ensure that citizens are well informed. The second level is consultation, where citizens have an opportunity to review and provide their opinions or specific questions (McAndrews 2013:750). Here, experts or officers must present a set of multiple-choice questions to citizens so that they can choose an option that best suits their views (McAndrews 2013:750). Level three of participation gives citizens the opportunity to engage in dialogue on a topical issue (McAndrews 2013:750). The participants have equal time to view their opinions and arguments (McAndrews 2013:749). The next level is concerned with long-term involvement and participation (Dehlin 2017:10). The process can span from the drafting process to the final proposal to be submitted for a political decision (Dehlin 2017:10). The last suggested level is co-decision-making, where delegated representatives who do not form part of the elected assembly make a decision (Dehlin 2017:10).

### ***Citizen participation and road safety***

As one of the SUN countries, road safety implementation in Sweden is regarded as one of the best in the world. The question remains to which extent direct citizen participation plays a role in Swedish road safety. While citizen participation is an important focus area of Sweden’s local government, interaction with citizens has not been used systematically in decision making (Dehlin 2017:11). System development for citizen participation requires external methods, such as citizen panels and e-petitions, and the involvement of different target group (Dehlin 2017:11). Citizen panels originated in the United States (US) in the late-1980s and, during the 1990s, Sweden started to use these panels (Dehlin 2017:11). With this approach, citizens are invited to meetings with politicians and technical experts. Another citizen participation technique is e-petitions, where citizens’ call for action is forwarded to the local authority for action (Dehlin 2017:11). This virtual engagement allows all citizens to participate and offer their input and opinion (Dehlin 2017:21–22). Traffic planning is directly linked to road safety and several stakeholders are involved, from the transportation planner to the different users of such infrastructure (Fourie 2023:180). These stakeholders all represent different needs and demands, and Swedish guidelines encourage citizen participation as part of the planning process (Wahl 2013:105). However, the detailed instructions on how to collect and interpret citizens’ opinions are vague in Swedish citizen participation guidelines (Wahl 2013:105).

Citizen consultations are mandatory in Sweden. To ensure this, traffic planning, along with guidelines such as workshops, surveys, focus group interviews, seminars, open-house sessions and walk-through evaluations are presented as possible modes of citizen consultation (Wahl 2013:105). While the guidelines suggest that participants should be representative, there are no specifications on the nature of representation. It was found that older men and younger women with children tend to participate. However, younger individuals do not participate, while it is difficult to reach women in marginalised neighbourhoods (Wahl 2013:105).

Wahl, in her study on public participation, interviewed 14 traffic planners representing 24 municipalities in Sweden (Wahl 2013:105). The participants were interviewed on why, how and when citizen participation should take place. The planners' attitudes towards citizen participation were also considered. The research presented mixed results. Wahl (2013:111) concluded that, "Though encouraged in guidelines and positively acknowledged by informants in this study, systematic involvement of public participants in the traffic planning process seem to be a rare phenomenon in Swedish municipal traffic planning". Reasons for the absence of participatory practice are mostly related to lack of resources in terms of money and time. Research results suggested that the attitude of the planner and/or the tradition in the municipality are determining factors in the implementation of public participation (Wahl 2013).

The Swedish road safety website, *Trafikverket*, was launched after the Vision Zero Academy was established in 2019. The purpose of the website is to serve as a global knowledge hub about Vision Zero, as well as to support and collaborate with different international stakeholders to ensure safe road transport systems (<https://www.trafikverket.se/en/startpage/operations/Operations-road/vision-zero-academy/>).

Furthermore, the Speed Camera Lottery initiative was launched to reduce speeding and to motivate drivers to participate. Speeding resulted in a "fine", which was paid to a collective piggy bank. Drivers who obeyed the speed limit were rewarded by standing a chance to win the overall lottery. The project as deemed successful, as instances of speeding was reduced by 22% (<http://yup-thatexists.com/speed-camera-lottery/>).

## United Kingdom

After Sweden, the UK has the second-safest roads in the world. Notably, the number of road deaths dropped with 45% between 2005 and 2014 (UK 2008:2). In the UK, it is acknowledged that road safety is best addressed at local government level. The devolution of road safety to local government levels is seen as better democracy and accountability. While all transport modes are embraced, cycling and walking are encouraged due to their health benefits (UK 2008:2). The UK

also recognises that technology offers opportunities to manage risky behaviour without restricting the freedom of road users (UK 2008:2). As a result, there is a focus on creating “modern, sophisticated and non-legislative” approaches that focus on road-user groups and distinct risk profiles. The UK recognises the role of the private insurance companies who monitor driver behaviour, and it is seen as potential to new targeted reduction initiatives (UK 2008:2).

In Lancashire, the Healthy Streets project focused on a 30-kilometre per hour speed limit for urban areas to promote safer walking and cycling opportunities for communities in England (Society for the Prevention of Accidents (SPA) 2014 in Fourie 2023:144). The project was community focused, and each community created an individualised action plan with specific goals and resource requirements (SPA 2014 in Fourie 2023:144). Information sharing, training and giving communities the opportunity to choose safe routes created an awareness of safe spaces (SPA 2014 in Fourie 2023:144). The communities were given the following tools to take the action plan forward (SPA 2014 in Fourie 2023:144):

- Volunteer training of volunteers to encourage community to cycle;
- Drawing maps of desirable cycling or walking routes;
- Walks with children using different crossings to increase road safety;
- Providing speed indicator devices and training how to use the devices; and
- Creating signage in local places and involving the children in the design.

The UK’s national targets are in line with the UN Global Road Safety plan and the five road safety pillars, as outlined before in this article (UK 2008:2, 8, 9, 10, 13, 27). The road safety statement identified several areas where increased national efforts could create and sustain a safe road transport system (UK 2008:8). The two main areas with planned interventions are first, improving road user safety (direct interaction and support to road users) and second improving road user safety (direct interaction and support to road users) (UK 2008:27)

### **Legislation, policies and strategies**

The UK’s White Paper of Communities in Control, 2008 (in UK 2008:10) states that, “Real people, real power and the Local Economic Development and Construction Bill requires local authorities in the UK to promote democracy and involve citizens in its functions”. The White Paper outlines the role and importance of citizen participation with several steps taken to encourage participation (UK 2008:10). These aspects include an empowerment fund to promote democracy, including citizenship themes in the national school curriculum to set a path towards active citizenship, appointing community development workers to help shape their local communities, creating channels that provide address to information, creating channels for participatory budgeting in local matters, setting up of neighbourhood councils, implementing youth training in shadowing government,

recognising the third sector and the role it plays in local politics, addressing and setting up partnerships between central and local authorities, government agencies and third-party role-players within a set of national indicators for the monitoring and evaluation of these partnerships (UK 2008:13).

Chapter 39(2) of the Road Traffic Act, 1988, which was revised in 1991 and amended by the New Roads and Street Works Act, 1991, sets out the duty of highway authorities to promote road safety. The Act states that each highway authority is required to prepare and carry out programmes to promote road safety, which includes contributing to initiatives by other authorities or bodies (New Roads and Street Works Act, 1991). Section 39(3) states that road authorities should undertake the following activities:

- “Crash studies;
- Dissemination of information and advice;
- Practical training to road users;
- Construction, improvement, maintenance or repair of roads;
- Other measures for controlling, protecting or assisting the movement of traffic on roads”( New Roads and Street Works Act, 1991).

The UK Department for Transport’s 2011 Strategic Framework presents guidelines for local authorities to develop local road safety policies and strategies as well as national measures for implementation by the Department (UK Department of Transport 2011: 6–8). The national government recognises its continuing leadership role on road safety, which includes delivering better driving standards and testing, enforcement, education, managing the strategic road infrastructure and supporting local delivery through research and the collation and provision of public information (UK Department of Transport 2011:6–8). The framework provides guidance within a safe systems approach, promotes a vision for the continued improvement in road safety and reduced numbers of road traffic collisions, and is especially focused on vulnerable groups (UK Department of Transport 2011: 39). Furthermore, the framework highlights the role of improved technology, behaviour change, training and education (UK Department of Transport 2011:46).

### ***Citizen participation and road safety***

Kimberlee (2008:323) states that engaging young people in decision-making processes is an important link in delivering programmes to communities at a local government level. Participation includes an array of representative bodies, such as school councils, local authorities, community-based youth forums/councils and youth parliaments (Kimberlee 2008:323). The UK National Government has produced several policies and pieces of legislation that encourages participation, for example, the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 and the Children Act, 2004. The

2008, Streets Ahead on Safety (SAOS) (in Kimberlee 2008:323) project initiated in Birmingham was used to lower child pedestrian accidents. A third of the residents were aged under 16 and, between 2001 and 2005, there were, on average, 56 child pedestrian accidents per year (Kimberlee 2008:323). The SAOS project serves as an example of “youth local knowledge utilised as an approach to address road safety crashes and risk” (Kimberlee 2008:323).

## SUMMARY

The international road safety community regards traffic-related injuries and deaths as a global health crisis. The international strategy for road safety focuses on five pillars, namely road safety management, safer roads and mobility, safer vehicles, safer road users and post-crash response. However, international responses to the strategy vary. For example, Sweden’s Vision Zero strategy has proven to be a great success, while other have failed to implement any concrete strategies to address national road safety challenges. The case studies of the respective countries showcase positive results emanating from engaging communities on road safety agenda.

A minimum requirement for the selection of case studies was the implementation of projects, along with an element of citizen participation to ensure collective safety within a defined area. Despite their limitations, participatory approaches contribute to devising appropriate and effective solutions to address road safety challenges. The following observations were made: Targeted interventions, including educational programmes, have a positive on increasing acceptable road safety behaviour; multiple actors should be involved to ensure that appropriate road safety behaviour is demonstrated; most of the studies were conducted in controlled environments and the real-life effect was not always certain; and there are important risk factors that influence road safety behaviour, such as reckless driving due to alcohol.

The nature of the projects and campaigns, and the elements of citizen participation, could serve as a positive point of departure to create a viable road safety strategy for South Africa.

## NOTE

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# Editorial policy

1. *Administratio Publica* is a quarterly journal. The aim of the journal is to promote academic scholarship in Public Administration and Management and related fields.
2. *Administratio Publica* publishes original theoretical and empirical manuscripts in Public Administration, Public Management and Public governance related fields (teaching, research and learning). This includes articles, debates, research notes, review articles and book reviews in English.
3. All articles, research notes and review articles are submitted to the Chief Editor. The Chief Editor decides whether a proposed article falls within the ambit of scholarly material and research that supports the objectives of ASSADPAM. The article is then submitted to subject specialist referees for evaluation. Normally, these referees are members of ASSADPAM. In the case of any one of two reviewers rejecting the article completely, the editorial committee considers the reports, and may appoint another independent reviewer.
4. Anonymity is maintained by omitting the name of the author and all identifying footnotes or other references in the text. Referee reports may be made available to authors but the names of the referees will be withheld. The particulars of referees will only be made known to the Department of Higher Education, for purposes of auditing the requirements as set out by the Policy for the Measurement of Research Output of Public Higher Education Institutions (Higher Education Act 101 of 1997).
5. Copyright of published material vests with ASSADPAM (Association of Southern African Schools and Departments of Public Administration and Management). Authors, however, bear full responsibility for the contents of their own contributions. Opinions expressed in the journal are those of the authors, and are not necessarily subscribed to by the Chief Editor, the editorial committee, the Editorial Board, or the Executive Committee of ASSADPAM.
6. Accepted papers will, as far as possible, be published in the sequence in which they were received. A page fee will be charged for all articles approved for publication. This fee is subject to annual adjustment.

## Presentation of manuscripts before publication

### Formatting requirements

- Typewritten on one side of the paper and language edited. A4 format; one and a half spacing with generous margins; statistics are to be presented in table format, and graphic images in boxed diagrams.
- Contributions should preferably be between 6 000–8 000 words. Contributions less than 4 500 words will be considered as viewpoints and not as full articles for subsidy purposes. Each article must be preceded by an abstract (maximum length 200 words). Abstracts should represent the contents of the article concisely.
- Title of Paper (Centre, Bold, 12pt Times New Roman/Arial, Caps), Name and Surname, Affiliation (name of university/institution), (Align left, Bold 12pt Times New Roman).
- Biographical details: Please provide full details of title, surname and initials, and first name, address, fax, cell, work number etc at the end of the references/bibliography and not under the title on the first page.
- **ABSTRACT:** (12pt Times New Roman, Title in Caps), 200 words. Do not format, shade or place in textbox or table.
- **HEADINGS:** Do not number headings in text
  - **HEADING 1** (Bold, 12pt Times New Roman, Caps)

- **Sub-heading 1.1** (Bold, 12pt Times New Roman)
- *Sub-heading 1.1.1* (Bold, Italic, 12pt Times New Roman)
- Sub-heading 1.1.1.1 (Underline, 12pt Times New Roman)
- When listing, please use bullet form.
- Please do not format or use any special style in your article.
- All tables and figures should be numbered and given a heading e.g. Table 1: Population Growth before the table is inserted. The source must be provided at the bottom of the table.
- Remember to give credit to the original authors from which the table or figure was adapted.
- References in the text: Thornhill (2012:128), (Nhlabathi and Mubangizi 2012:55), (Cloete et al. 2008:4). First time three or more authors are used, type out all the authors, thereafter et al.
- **REFERENCES:** Bibliographical particulars arranged alphabetically, no numbering and according to the simple Harvard method e.g.:
  - **Book:** Gildenhuis, J.S.H. and Knipe, A. 2000. *The Organisation of Government: An Introduction*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
  - **Article:** Auriacombe, C.J. 2007. Deconstructing the public interest for application in South Africa. *Administratio Publica*. November 2007. 15(1):28–52.
  - **Official publication:** Public Service Commission. 2008c. Report on the Audit of Reporting Requirements and Departmental Monitoring and Evaluation Systems within National and Provincial Government. Public Service Commission. Pretoria: Government Printers.
  - **Internet reference:** Patton, M.Q. 1999. Utilization-Focused Evaluation in Africa, training lectures presented at the African Evaluation Association, 13–17 Sept. 1999. Nairobi. Kenya. Available at: [www.afrea.org/documents/document.cfm?docID=64](http://www.afrea.org/documents/document.cfm?docID=64) (Accessed on 25 March 2009).
  - **Title of acts in italics** e.g. *Public Service Act, 1994* (Act 103 of 1994) or *Public Service Act 103 of 1994*. Be consistent with the referencing.
  - **Full reference:** South Africa (Republic). 2000. *Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000* (Act 32 of 2000). Pretoria: Government Printers.
- **AUTHOR'S CONTACT DETAILS:** The title, the name(s), e-mail addresses, telephone and fax numbers and postal address(es) of the author(s), to whom correspondence should be addressed.
- A separate application first page(s) should contain the proof of language editing by a qualified language practitioner, title, the name(s) e-mail addresses, telephone and fax numbers and postal address(es) of the author(s) names and to whom correspondence and the invoice for page fees should be addressed. The article is to commence on a new page in a separate file. Language editing fees will be added to the page fees if the language editing is not satisfactory.
- Two kinds of references are distinguished; notes and bibliographical particulars. Notes should be numbered consecutively and be inserted at the end of the text and not in footnotes.
- A statement should accompany all manuscripts (at the end of the document when submitting the paper) in which the author(s) state(s) that the contribution has not been published, is not being published, or is not being considered for publication elsewhere, and will not be submitted for publication elsewhere unless rejected by the Editorial Committee. The author(s) need to declare that they are willing to pay the page fee, if the article is approved for publication that the article has not been submitted to any conference proceedings, is not plagiarised and is checked on Turnitin before submission.
- Confirmation of provisional acceptance of articles will be forwarded to authors on receipt by the Chief Editor. Authors will be given notice of the outcome of peer reviews within twelve weeks of submission. It is important to know that an article submitted in the second half of the year may only be published in planned editions of the following year.

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